



THE UNIVERSITY *of* EDINBURGH

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**Priorities, Visions, Identities, and Normative
Approaches:
—A Corpus-Driven Discourse Analysis of
the Official Discourse between China and
the EU (1994-2019)**

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Abstract

This thesis takes a language-oriented constructivist perspective contending that language has a shaping or constructing role in creating patterns and norms in a relationship as language and social realities are mutually constitutive. It seeks to examine the challenges in contemporary China-EU relations through engaging the official discourse (1994 to 2019) between China and the EU. Apart from understanding and examining the factors and their interrelationship behind the challenges in contemporary China-EU relations with a comprehensive analytical framework bridging constructivist and realist approaches, it endeavours to test the potential of the multidisciplinary methodology which combines corpus-driven discourse analysis and international relations (IR) studies.

China-EU relations have witnessed an overall positive development with promising prospects over the last twenty-five years since the EU issued its first Asia policy paper in 1994 with a primary focus on China (Commission of the European Communities, 1994). Nonetheless, the relationship is not without challenges. Issues range from disputes in specific areas such as trade disputes and human rights disputes to unresolved, persisting issues such as the recognition of China's market economy status (MES), the EU's arms embargo on China, as well as questions and misunderstandings from the EU about China's global visions and initiatives. In terms of longitudinal development patterns, there have also been re-occurring down-turns in the relationship, signalling its volatility in the last two decades. This thesis departs from the existing space between the high expectations of the bilateral relationship and the status-quo, thus attempt to understand the dimensions of the factors and their interrelations behind challenges in contemporary China-EU relations based on a corpus-driven discourse analysis of their official discourse across twenty-five years.

The volatility and uncertainty in the relationship suggest that the challenges in China-EU relations have multidimensional driving forces. So far, realist approaches in China-EU relations focus on the impacts of materialist factors between China and the EU, such as economic and military power, in terms of the relationship. Liberal approaches focus on economic and trade issues, often considering the roles of global institutions. The differences between the languages, identities, visions, and norms of China and the EU have not been thoroughly addressed in these two approaches. Existing constructivist research on China-EU relations mostly focuses on China and the EU's conceptual differences and their influence on the relationship. Although traditional constructivist factors such as identities, cultures and ideologies have been discussed, the relationship between these factors, how they interact with discourse and materialist perspectives and how these interactions have impacted China-EU relations over the years have not been discussed from a comprehensive, longitudinal perspective. This gap exists not only because challenges in China-EU relations

take place at multiple levels and are caused by multiple factors against the background of a constantly changing global environment but also due to the lack of an integrated data platform which covers the topics in China-EU relations longitudinally.

This research fills this gap by analysing the official discourse between China and the EU. It establishes and engages the machine-readable corpora of the official discourse between China and the EU covering twenty-five years. Informed by grounded theory, the thesis carries out a corpus-driven discourse analysis and generates findings related to mismatches in the priorities, visions, identities as well as the normative and strategic approaches of China and the EU despite their substantial common ground and shared interests.

This research contributes to current China-EU studies empirically, theoretically, and methodologically:

Empirically, it enhances the understanding of factors and their dynamics behind the challenges in China-EU relations through emergent themes and data from the corpora. It enhances the arguments in the existing literature on the mismatches between China and the EU in terms of priorities, identities and visions despite the shared interests and common ground between the two. It extends the arguments in the field by pointing out that mismatches and gaps not only exist in their understandings of the international order, expectations of the other but also in areas where they have shared discourse and interests. These include their common topics of economy and trade, their self-perception and perception of the other, and their normative power approaches which are impacted by their shifting economic power in the world. These findings specify the mismatches and point out the longitudinal changes of the mismatches over the study period, which offers China-EU studies empirical evidence for targeted, specified mismatches from multiple aspects for further policy analysis and decision-making based on China-EU studies especially in terms of expectation management and other strategic choices.

Theoretically, it bridges the constructivist approach and realist approach with the introduction of the paradigm of discourse and economic power as the boundary objects linking constructivist and realist approaches as well as the discipline of corpus-linguistics and international relations (IR) studies. It also complements the existing constructivist approach on the mismatches between China-EU relations by establishing the framework of Multidimensional Dynamic Mismatches for analysing the challenges in China-EU relations and potentially the challenges in other bilateral relations and beyond with a comprehensive and longitudinal perspective.

Methodologically, it explores and extends the potential of a synthesised approach with corpus-driven discourse analysis applied in bilateral relations studies. It establishes the linkage between the methods of word frequency, connotations and concordance searches and priorities analysis, between content analysis of emergent themes from the corpora on

identity and vision analysis, and between assertive, directive and commissive discourse, both in the form of phrases and in terms of sentence structure, and the analysis of normative power. The thesis offers a possible methodological structure for further rule and norm-oriented constructivist analysis of bilateral relations.

Lay Summary

This thesis examines the challenges in contemporary China-EU relations through engaging machine-readable corpora consisting of official discourse in China-EU relations from 1994 to 2019.

Previous studies taking a constructivist approach on China-EU relations have mostly focused on specific aspects of the relationship such as human rights issues, trades disputes or China's and the EU's conceptual differences on certain concepts such as sovereignty, human rights and international orders. However, the challenges in China-EU relations are wide ranging, and the relationship has shown volatility despite the positive trend and the common ground between the two. The traditional approaches did not offer a framework in which the longitudinal conceptual and materialist factors as well as the connections between them are discussed and reviewed. Plus, they do not coordinate the relations of different levels of mismatches, which gives the impression that these factors may be parallel (which may not be the case).

A corpus-driven discourse analysis offers a chance to put these aspects onto the same platform and provides an opportunity to understand the relations between these aspects thus providing a fuller picture of them and of where China and the EU converge and diverge. It also makes it possible to review the changes in policies from a longitudinal perspective which is otherwise impossible without the involvement of longitudinal, systematic corpora.

The aim and contribution of this research are threefold. First, it explores the possibilities of integrating corpus-driven discourse analysis with constructivist analysis in China-EU studies. Second, through this integrated methodology, the research highlights the long-standing factors which have influenced the relationship as well as the way they interact with each other and impact China-EU relations. This helps to understand the challenges in China-EU relations. Third, the thesis proposes an analytical framework which links these aspects and points out their interrelations from a longitudinal perspective which can potentially be applied in and beyond bilateral relations analysis in International Relations studies. A few cases studies, including the trade issues between China and the EU, persisting issues such as the recognition of China's Market Economy Status and the EU's arms embargo on China, as well as questions raised by the EU member states on China's international initiatives and projects have been included and allow this framework to be applied to understand the challenges in China-EU relations.

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China-EU relations but also linguists and language scholars and students who have a passion for alternative methodologies in international relations.

The motivation for me doing this piece of research was to explore the role of language in international relations, in this case, official discourse in China-EU relations, with the hope that a better understanding and management of these differences revealed from the language will contribute to the long-term, healthy development of China-EU relations especially in an age when uncertainties prevail on the international stage. Although the thesis studies conflicts, disputes, and challenges, it comes from a place aiming to contribute to the resolution, easing or at least improved mutual understanding of these differences and disputes.

Looking back, I realise that this goal is not easy to achieve with my limited personal efforts. However, I have learnt to reconcile myself with my limitations and focus on what I can do to improve and contribute. The path is long, and I am still on my way.

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List of Abbreviations

Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM)
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
BOAO Forum for Asia (BFA)
Central Compilation and Translation Bureau (CCTB)
Constructivist International Political Economy (CIPE)
Corpus-Driven Discourse Analysis (CDCA)
Coxian Critical Theory (CCT)
Central and Eastern European (CEE)
China International Publishing Group (CIPG)
Content Analysis (CA)
Comprehensive Regional Economic Partnership (RCEP)
Computer-Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis (CAQDAS)
Corpus-Driven Discourse Analysis (CDCA)
Corpus Linguistics (CL)
Corpus Linguistic Analysis (CLA)
Communist Party of China (CPC)
The Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC)
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)
Discourse Analysis (DA)
European Community (EC)
European Economic Community (EEC)
European External Action Service (EEAS)
European Union (EU)
European Union Institute of Security Studies (EUISS)
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)
Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP)
Grounded Theory (GT)
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP)
Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA)
International Political Economy (IPE)
International Relations (IR)
Market Economy Status (MES)
National People's Congress (NPC)
Natural Language Processing (NLP)

Non-Market Economy (NME)
Noun Phrase (NP)
Normative Power Europe (NPE)
Norm-oriented Constructivism (NOC)
One Belt One Road (OBOR)
Part of Speech (POS)
Policy Papers and Speeches (PPSP)
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)
Rule-oriented Constructivism (ROC)
Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD)
Trade Defence Instruments (TDI)
Treaty of Lisbon (ToL)
Verb Phrase (VP)
World Trade Organisation (WTO)

Chapter 1 Introduction

This introductory chapter presents the background of contemporary China-EU relations with two challenges emphasised in China-EU relations and the development of the official discourse between China and the EU from 1994 to 2019. Based on these, it reviews the existing approaches in China-EU studies on understanding the challenges between China and the EU over the researched period while highlighting the development of the discourse-oriented approach in understanding China-EU relations. These justify the rationale behind examining the challenges in China-EU relations through a combination of a constructivist perspective and a Corpus-Driven Discourse Analysis.

This chapter contains six sections:

Section 1.1 reviews the phases in the development of China-EU relations between 1994 and 2019 and categorises the challenges in China-EU relations. This provides the context for the research questions of this thesis. It also categorises the challenges in contemporary China-EU relations into three groups, namely the longitudinal ups and downs, or the volatility of China-EU relations, the issues in specific policy areas, and structural challenges. This paves the way for responding to the research questions through the analytical framework developed in this thesis.

Section 1.2 reviews the development of China-EU official discourse since the establishment of their diplomatic relations with a focus on China-EU interactions after 1994 when the EU issued its first Asia strategy policy paper “Towards A New Asia Strategy” of which its China strategy makes up a large proportion (Commission of the European Communities, 1994). This introduces the existing mechanism of discourse interactions in China-EU relations, highlighting the role it has been playing in China-EU relations.

Section 1.3 reviews the existing literature both on the general trends and scopes in China-EU scholarship but also specifically about the existing approaches in examining and understanding the challenges in China-EU relations. It also presents the theoretical approaches in understanding challenges between China and the EU with an emphasis on constructivist discourse analysis. The section also observes a few differences in the Chinese language literature and English language literature on China-EU relations.

Section 1.4 presents the research aims and questions, namely its endeavours in examining and understanding the challenges in contemporary China-EU relations, both empirically, theoretically and methodologically.

Section 1.5 presents the structure of the thesis.

1.1 The Challenges in Contemporary China-EU Relations

The existing literature on contemporary China-EU relations studies has argued that several positive factors set the foundation for a successful bilateral relationship between China and the EU. These positive factors can be categorised into four main aspects. First, there are no direct military or territorial disputes between the two. The relationship enjoys the “absence of serious impediments and frictions” (Shambaugh, 2004). Second, the economy and market of China and the EU are mutually beneficial and complementary to each other. China and the EU are large export and import markets for each other and they have transferrable technologies for each other. When China was applying to join the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the EU supported quick access for China to join it (Eglin, 1997). Third, both China and the EU do not appreciate hegemony and prefer a more balanced power structure in the international arena. Finally, China and the EU promote peace and development of both themselves and the international environment (Zhou, 2003).

Despite major efforts and high expectations, this thesis takes the stance that challenges in a few aspects have appeared over the last thirty years in China-EU relations and should be examined so that future development of the relations can be geared towards and supported with an understanding of the challenges in mind.

In order to examine the challenges with a systemic approach, it is necessary to review and categorise the challenges since the thesis does not plan to focus on each individual case, but the common elements behind cases of a similar nature from the constructivist framework developed. The coming sections review and summarise the challenges in China-EU relations in the last twenty-five years from three perspectives. Section 1.1.1 categorises the challenges from a chronological perspective, reviewing the longitudinal ups and downs in China-EU relations in the last two decades. Section 1.1.2 reviews the challenges in China-EU relations in specific policy areas. Section 1.1.3 reviews the structural challenges in China-EU relations, namely the disputable imbalances between political and economic interactions and the tension and imbalances along with the power transitions going on between China and the EU in the international arena.

1.1.1 Ups and Downs in China-EU Relations

The first category of challenges between China and the EU from a longitudinal perspective is the volatility in the relationship despite its overall positive developmental trend. There have been recurrences of disputes and cooling-down periods despite the generally positive trend of the relations. This cycle, although not completely regular, is a source of instability and uncertainty in the bilateral relations.

The first downward plunge in China-EU relations came when the European Commission paused its diplomatic relations with China after the 1989 political incident in China and

initiated sanctions against China including an arms embargo. In 1990 the European Council and the European Parliament gradually restored their interactions with China. The European Commission resumed its diplomatic relations with China two years later, but the arms embargo has remained in place since then (Europe China Culture and Economy Commission, 2015).

Since 1994, China-EU relations, in the opinion of the writer of this thesis, have undergone four stages of development: a honeymoon period (Shambaugh, 2007: 263; Caira, 2010; Li *et al.*, 2017), a cooled-down phase, a phase of adjustment, and currently, progression with a promising trend despite the uncertainty on the international arena including Brexit and the trade war between China and the US.

The period between 1994 and 2005 in China-EU relations is commonly referred to by China-EU researchers as the “honeymoon” period although opinions differ about when exactly the honeymoon started and whether or when it ended (Shambaugh, 2007: 263; Caira, 2010; Li *et al.*, 2017). In 1996, the first Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) was held in Bangkok, Thailand and both China and the EU participated. In 2001, China entered the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and became its 143rd member (Europe China Culture and Economy Commission, 2015) with the EU being supportive of China’s application (Eglin, 1997). Since then, the economic benefits have tied the two together more tightly than ever, with the interactions between China and the EU extending from trade to a wider range of political, cultural and social aspects. Both parties became major trading partners with each other, with the EU becoming China’s second-largest export market in 2003 and the EU expansion in 2004, making it China’s largest trading partner. China became the EU’s second-largest trading partner after the US in 2003 (Commission of the European Communities, 2005). In 2008, bilateral trade between China and the EU reached 420 billion US dollars, ten times that of 1994 (Chen, 2009).

The “honeymoon”, however, cooled down after a few years. In September 2007, German Chancellor Merkel met the Dalai Lama in a private talk. This was followed by a steep drop in the trade between China and Germany. In December 2007, former German Minister of Finance Peer Steinbrück’s visit to Beijing was cancelled. This tension between Germany and China has also caused internal disputes between Merkel and the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) where Former Minister Peer Steinbrück was a member. The SPD regarded Merkel as moving away from the previous SPD’s more prudent diplomacy with China (Xinhua News, 2014). In 2008, Merkel started to adopt a value-based diplomatic approach with more critical views on China (Xiong, 2008).

At the end of 2007, the then French President Sarkozy visited China and made deals worth many millions. In 2008, he drastically changed his approach to China and met the Dalai Lama in Poland under the title of both the French President and the rotating Chair of the

European Union. In the same year, there had been clashes in Paris during the torch relay for the Beijing Olympic Games. Several French protesters interfered with the relay by attempting to seize the torch from one of the torch holders who was in a wheelchair (Xinhua News, 2014).

In 2012, the then Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, David Cameron, met the Dalai Lama despite the objection of China. This was followed by an ice-age for business trade between China and the UK. Cameron finally travelled to China at the end of 2013, after showing a willingness to visit Beijing several times (Xinhua News, 2014). Political and social disputes increased the tension and distrust between China and the EU member states, which also affected trade.

In 2013, the EU enacted anti-dumping and anti-subsidies policies towards Chinese photovoltaic (PV) products. This enforced an 11.8% duty on the imports of Chinese PV products and it was intended to raise it to 47.6% until the solution of a “floor price”, a minimum price for Chinese PV products in European markets, was proposed and passed (Schroeder, 2013; Morris, 2013).

In 2016, China and the EU went through a period where the two had tensions in terms of recognising China’s Market Economy Status (MES). China assumed that MES could be automatically granted according to the agreements of the WTO (World Trade Organisation, 1994), but the EU had different interpretations of the rules and its own decision procedures. The case has been pending and unresolved until today.

1.1.2 Issues in Specific Policy Areas

Challenges also exist in specific areas of cooperation, including the economy and trade, political interactions, and communications. Although the economy is the primary focus of China-EU relations, this does not mean that economic cooperation and trade between China and the EU are necessarily free of problems. There are several trade issues which have had major negative impacts on the relationship. The most prominent issues are the EU’s trade deficit with China (Godement & Fox, 2009: 11), the EU’s accusation of China with regard to photovoltaic dumping and the refusal of the EU to grant China MES (Crookes, 2013: 646), as well as the tension about the access to the Chinese market as well as other trade disputes and frictions in the context of trade protectionism.

Regarding political aspects, there are quite a few areas where China and the EU have tension, including human rights and territorial issues, among others. However, there are a few issues which bear a persistent, or sticky nature, including the EU’s arms embargo to China (Caira, 2010: 268) and the EU’s recognition of China’s MES. Although this thesis does not have the scope to discuss all of them, it will address issues related to MES and the arms embargo because the longitudinal and systematic features of corpora-driven discourse

analysis with the analytical framework developed in the persistence of these issues can be explored.

Regarding communication between the governments, China tends to turn to the EU member states rather than to the EU for negotiations (Godement & Fox, 2009: 36). Regarding the attitudes towards communication, the contrast between the interdependent economic development and the lack of trust between China and the EU is sharp. There is an “increasing absence of trust” and “growing acrimony” in the major policy domains in China-EU relations (Crookes, 2013: 641).

1.1.3 Structural Challenges

Structural challenges or challenges involving multiple international and domestic factors are also features of other problem areas in China-EU relations. As defined by the official discourse of China and the EU, China and the EU are aiming for ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ (World Trade Organisation, 1994). Structural challenges manifest in two senses in the contemporary China-EU relations.

First, existing literature has discussed the possible imbalances between economic cooperation and political interactions between China and the EU (Jan van der Harst & Tjalling Halbertsma, 2017).

Second, as the rise of China has taken place both economically and politically, the economic power balance between China and the EU are shifting as the EU is a traditionally strong economic entity whereas China is a strong emerging economy. This power shift and the related changes represent another dynamic going on in China-EU relations.

Recent years have witnessed more uncertainties prevailing in China-EU relations as well as the wider context of the international arena. Within the EU, structural changes have been taking place for years. Brexit marks the first case where a Member State (MS) has signalled its intention to withdraw from the Union, leading to a series of unresolved issues. For China, external and internal pressure accompanies the fact that China is gradually playing a more critical role in the international order. Internationally, China faces pressure, especially from the West, related to its political and social conditions as well as the EU’s protectionism precautions and policies in business and trade. Internally, China has to deal with the social and environmental problems related to its traditional labour-intensive industry and the imbalanced economic structure. In terms of the international environment, China-US relations and US politics have been going through tensions both economically and politically, which have also impacted China-EU relations.

Increasing globalisation has led to a new level of interdependency among countries and has made uncertainties a ‘new normal’ in international affairs. These challenges are calling for more comprehensive, dynamic, and creative problem-solving.

1.2 Official Discourse in Contemporary China-EU Relations

This thesis examines contemporary China-EU relations, especially in terms of the challenges and trying periods, through a comparative analysis of the official discourse between China and the EU. This section, while introducing the background of China-EU relations in the timeframe set by this research (1994-2019) and that of the official discourse development between China and the EU, addresses the importance and necessity of taking official discourse on board when exploring China-EU relations.

China and the European Economic Community (EEC) established formal diplomatic relations in 1975. The year 2019 marks the forty-fourth anniversary of China-EU relations. Over the years, the development of China-EU relations has been accompanied by the signing of agreements and issuing of official policy papers. China-EU relations started by focusing on trade and economic cooperation partly because back then, the EEC was very different from the EU today which encompasses comprehensive functions and roles extending to all areas of the European economy, politics, culture and many more aspects. This is reflected in the scopes of the early official discourse between China and the EU.

In 1978, the signing of the “China-EC Trade Agreement” between China and the European Community (EC) set the legal basis for bilateral economic and trade relations (Kong, 2012: 8; Europe China Culture and Economy Commission, 2015) between the two. In 1985, the “Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation between the European Economic Community and the People’s Republic of China” (The Council of the European Communities, 1985) expanded the partnership to a wider scope (Europe China Culture and Economy Commission, 2015; Kong, 2012).

Although the China-EU relationship started off as economy- and trade-oriented, the last two decades have seen expanding communication between China and the EU as reflected in their extensive official discourse including policy papers, dialogues and communications between the two. The significant volume of official discourse between China and the EU is what makes a corpus-driven discourse analysis possible. The European Union External Action Service (EEAS) lists the framework of the political dialogue between China and the EU up until December 2016. The existing levels of China-EU political dialogue under this framework are shown in Table Apx 1 (see Appendix, Section A.1) and Table Apx 2 (Appendix, Section A.1).

The summits, top-level dialogues, ministerial dialogues as well as sectoral dialogues on all sectors between China and the EU have been expanded greatly over the last two decades and have provided China-EU relations with the mechanism for long-term communication. The development of dialogue between China and the EU facilitate the political relationship between the two. Since 2003, China and the EU established the ‘Comprehensive Strategic

Partnership' and have subsequently established three high-level dialogue tracks, including high-level strategic dialogue, high-level economic and trade dialogue and high-level people-to-people and cultural exchange dialogue (Zhao, 2014). Since 2010, China and the EU started the China-Europe high-level forum of political parties. China's National People's Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) have also established regular exchange mechanisms with the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Council. There are also regular meetings between Chinese foreign ministers, and the EU's high representative on common foreign and security affairs (Zhao, 2014). Up to 2015, the number of discussions and dialogue mechanisms between China and Europe have reached over seventy (Liu, 2015). The expanding political dialogues show that China and the EU are determined to develop in-depth relations for the long-term and expand the bilateral relations to more areas.

The most prominent official discourse block, which plays the role of guiding papers for China and the EU in their policies towards the other, is one consisting of the EU's official policy papers on China and vice versa. Table Apx 6 (see Appendix) shows the list of the EU's policy papers on China and China's policy papers on the EU from 1994 to 2019.

In 1994, the European Commission issued its first policy paper on Asia "Towards a New Asia Strategy" (Commission of the European Communities, 1994) which marks one of the EU's earliest strategy documents in the East Asia region in which China strategy plays a large role. In the following year, the EU framed its vision of China-EU relations as a "long term relationship" in its first China-specific policy paper where the EU proposed to develop political, economic and trade relations with China and to make China-EU relations a founding stone for the EU's interactions and policies with Asia (Commission of the European Communities, 1995). In 1998, this upgraded to the "Comprehensive Partnership" through the EU's second China policy paper "Building a Comprehensive Partnership with China" (Commission of the European Communities, 1998). Since then, the EU has issued a constant stream of new policy papers with regard to China which demonstrates the importance the EU has placed in its relations with China.

China has so far issued three policy papers on the EU in October 2003, April 2014 and December 2018 respectively (People.cn, 2003; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2014; Xinhua, 2018). Until 2019, thirteen China-specific policy papers from the EU have been issued. This means that, on average, the EU updates its China policies and strategies and publishes them in the form of official policy papers every one or two years. On the Chinese side, although the number of policy papers is lower compared to the EU's China policy papers, its EU policy papers play an important role in China-EU relations as they set the goals and the guidelines for policymaking and implementation of China-EU relations for the coming years. The 2003 policy paper was the very first policy paper China issued dealing with a foreign entity (Shi, 2003) in which China advocated that

the EU should lift its arms embargo on China. The issuing of the policy paper to the EU demonstrated China's awareness of the importance of its relations with the EU, the necessity to respond to the EU's official discourse on China and the potential functions of issuing policy papers aligning domestic policies with those policies towards China at different levels of administration.

Nevertheless, the official documents are important not only because of the volume and the fact that they are becoming a regular phenomenon in China-EU relations but more importantly because they convey key information signposting the visions of both sides of the relationship. For example, the key phrases and terms framing China-EU relations have been developing along with the enhancement of China-EU relations. In 2003, China and the EU launched the "Comprehensive Strategic Partnership" (Commission of the European Communities, 2003; People.cn, 2003) and the term was confirmed in the EU's 2006 policy paper to China (Commission of the European Communities, 2006a). Despite the critiques in the existing literature that the extent and scope of this partnership have not been sufficient in practice (Holslag, 2011; Richard, 2012), the changes in relationship defining terms from "A Long-term Relationship" as stated in the 1995 (Commission of the European Communities, 1995) EU policy paper to China, to a "Comprehensive Partnership" as defined in the 1998 EU policy paper on China (Commission of the European Communities, 1998), and finally to a "Comprehensive Strategic Partnership" in China's second EU policy paper (Mission of the People's Republic of China to the European Union, 2014) demonstrate the aspirations of both the EU and China to bring the relationship to the next level.

The framing of words is just one example of the information offered by the official discourse on China-EU relations. There are many more changes at a lexical level which indicate changes in policies and attitudes from both the side of China and the EU. This goes far beyond the lexical level, of course. The sentence patterns, figures of speeches, alignment of paragraphs and coherent devices can all indicate changes in the relationship of the discourse makers. However, without systematic organisation and the assistance of corpus linguistics, the information in the official documents is fragmented, selective and could be biased. With the participation of corpus linguistic methods, these official documents can act as a living resource for discourse analysis on all levels and in terms of all aspects of the discourse, i.e. the lexical usage, paragraph, figure of speech, coherence, emotions, etc.

Moreover, official discourse not only signposts changes in China-EU relations, but also interacts with major events and activities in China-EU relations. Many political dialogues and the annual EU-China summits have produced regularly issued keynote speeches and press releases which summarise the main points in China-EU interactions. The issuing of keynote speeches, dialogues, agreements after meetings and press releases forms an important part of the political engagement between China and the EU. Studying the discourse offers a

chance to look at the relations between discourse and actual interactions between China and the EU.

The documents released with the official dialogues exemplify the role discourse plays in relation to the events in China-EU relations. These discourses between China and the EU also consist of a large source of official discourse apart from the regular issue of policy papers. The political dialogues between China and the EU started in 1994 in the form of structured dialogues discussing issues of common concern, such as trade and investment as well as issues related to sovereignty. In 1998, this evolved into the EU-China Summit, which has been held almost annually¹ (Delegation of the European Union to China, 2016b), where leaders of China and the EU exchange opinions on a range of issues (Delegation of the European Union to China, 2016b). In 2002, China and the EU agreed to establish a formal exchange of letters which set the legal basis for China-EU political dialogue (Delegation of the European Union to China, 2016b). In 2010, the High-level Dialogue on Strategic and Foreign Policy was launched between the EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy and her Chinese counterpart in order to create channels between officers on both sides to exchange ideas in a more direct way (Delegation of the European Union to China, 2016b). More recently, the “EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation”, issued in 2013 (European Commission, 2013), marks that the relationship between China and the European Union has developed from an economic partnership to a partnership covering a wide range of topics including peace and security, education, science and technology, environmental sustainability and many more areas. These official discourses have been milestones of China-EU relations witnessing the important moments and changes.

In sum, official discourse shapes and signposts the direction of development in China-EU relations. It also provides the bilateral communication with a framework or mechanism to operate in a structured, regular way. Most important of all, while events in bilateral relations can happen in a sporadic manner, the regularly released official documents and dialogues, especially in the increasingly matured dialogue mechanism between China and the EU in recent years, provides a resource to study the interactions between China and the EU in a more systematic, organised way with computer-assisted corpus-driven discourse analysis. This offers a way to look at China-EU relations with reduced bias and a longitudinal perspective.

1.2.1 China as an International Actor and Discourse Maker

With the rapid development of China’s comprehensive national power, China’s status and responsibility in the world have also increased. Under the Xi-Li administration, China has

¹ It has been held annually apart from in 2008 when it was cancelled as the then UK Prime Minister David Cameron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel and the then French President Nicolas Sarkozy arranged meetings with the Dalai Lama (Delegation of the European Union to China, 2016b).

been working on improving China's discourse power on the international stage. The advocacy of "telling Chinese story well" (Ouyang, 2019) has been put forward.

According to the political structure of China, the top leaders of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and country play a key role in official discourse making in China, setting the direction and tone of the official discourse at all levels of administration. In this sense, as compared with the EU's official discourse, the Chinese official discourse is more unified and mostly offers undivided messages while the EU's official discourse, especially when taking into account the officers' speeches, contains a higher level of diverse opinions. Therefore in this thesis, both Chinese policy papers and the leaders' (at presidential, prime ministerial, ministerial and ambassador's level) speeches are counted as core discourse.

In terms of China's official discourse to the EU, China issues policy papers to the EU not on an annual basis but every couple of years. So far, China has issued three official policy papers to the EU in the year 2003, 2014 and 2018. Although the numbers of key policy papers are small, each of the policy papers plays an important role in defining and setting out the vision for China-EU relations for the coming years.

In terms of the official language, Mandarin is the official language Chinese official discourses are issued in. When it comes to translated versions, only some of the documents, mostly the official's speeches in international summits and forums, are issued with English translations. These translations are usually made through China's Central Compilation and Translation Bureau (CCTB), or the China International Publishing Group (CIPG) and are available on major state media such as Xinhua, People.cn, or China Daily.

1.2.2 The EU as an International Actor and Discourse Maker

This section pays special attention to justifying taking the EU as an integrated discourse maker as multiple institutions at different levels are involved in the discourse making. This involves addressing the nature of the EU as an actor, the roles of its different institutions in its foreign policy discourse making and the changes that have taken places over the timeframe of analysis in the EU's discourse making on China with an emphasis on the changes after the Lisbon Treaty, which brought up institutional changes in the EU.

This thesis takes the EU as an entity or counterpart of China in the context of official discourse making in the bilateral relationship. This is for the sake of making a comparison between China's discourse on the EU and the EU's discourse on China possible. This also makes it possible to examine the changes in the EU's priorities and strategies in this thesis. However, the integrity of the EU's official discourse about China is a controversial issue. Since the EU contains twenty-eight member states (up to the completion of this thesis) and multiple institutions on a different level, and given that it has been going through constant changes, sometimes major ones, over the time frame covered by this research, the EU as an

international actor and discourse maker involves complications in terms of policymaking and its integration of voices towards China.

The EU's discourse on China takes multiple forms including official journals, speeches of EU officials at different levels, country summaries and fact sheets, trade records, meeting minutes as well as live meetings. Taking all these discourses into account in this thesis would be unrealistic. In order to make the research possible, especially in terms of comparing the EU's official discourse on China and China's official discourse on the EU, the thesis only selects the key documents and speech which are overarching and comprehensive, including key policy papers and speeches.

Official documents of the EU, in general, are issued by fourteen main institutions and bodies: the Official Journal of the European Union, European Parliament, European Council, Council of the European Union, European Commission, Court of Justice of the European Union, European Central Bank, European Court of Auditors, European External Action Service (EEAS), European Economic and Social Committee, Committee of the Regions, European Investment Bank, European Ombudsman, European Data Protection Supervisor, European Union agencies and other bodies (Europa.eu, 2016a). Some of these institutes mainly produce discourse relating to a specific area in the context of China-EU relations. For example, the European Central Bank (ECB) is the main EU financial institution which takes charge of issues related to the euro and EU economic & monetary policy.²

Regarding the languages, the EU has twenty-four official languages. According to the current EU language policy, all the legislation and key political documents, such as the China policy papers issued by the European Commission, are published in all twenty-four official languages. Other official documents which are not legally binding are usually available in at least English, French and German (Europa.eu, 2016b).

1.2.2.1 The EU's Discourse Making on China

The institutes which issue more China-related documents directing China-EU relations are the European Parliament, European Council, European Commission, EEAS and the EU's delegation in China. Among these, the European Commission (EC) stays at the forefront in terms of issuing the EU's policy papers on China. The European Commission oversees implementing decisions, proposing legislation, and other day-to-day business of the EU. It

² The ECB publishes working papers and research articles and reports on topics such as finance and business in China. However, most of the time, these reports do not reflect the ECB's official stances. Instead, they only reflect the personal views of the researchers and are therefore not categorised as official discourse in this thesis. Plus, the thesis only focuses on the official discourse which offers over-arching guidance or reviews of China-EU policies instead of their relations in specific areas; therefore, institutional discourse such as the ECB's official discourse are not included in the primary data applied in the thesis. The same standards apply to the Court of Justice of the European Union, European Court of Auditors, European Economic and Social Committee, Committee of the Regions, European Investment Bank, European Ombudsman, European Data Protection Supervisor, to name a few.

works as a cabinet government, currently with 28 commissioners, one from each member state. Most of the EU's policy papers on China are published by the European Commission.³

The EU's delegation in Beijing carries out local demarches to the Chinese authorities apart from consular issues. It is a long-term institution representing the EU in China (Delegation of the European Union to China, 2016c). The delegation was established in 1988 and is the main institution in charge of official relations between China and the EU, which works as a bridge or connecting point between China and the EU. The delegation keeps close relations with delegations of other EU member states as well as the EU rotating chair country.

1.2.2.2 The Impacts of the Lisbon Treaty on the EU's Discourse-making on China

The Treaty of Lisbon (ToL), or Lisbon Treaty, was signed on 13 December 2007 and came into force on 1 December 2009. The goal of the treaty is to create more coherence and efficiency within the EU as well as increasing the EU's global impact (Marques, 2016: 2). The Lisbon Treaty amended the Maastricht Treaty (1993) and the Treaty of Rome (1957) and has brought a series of institutional changes to the EU. Three main institutional changes include: first, establishing the role of the President of the European Council and the role of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP); second, expanded applicable areas of the majority effective voting system and an introduction of the system of 'double majority voting system'; third, reforming the European Committee, European Parliament and European judicial institutions with the aim of improving the EU's decision power and efficiency (Zhang, 2009).

Although whether the Lisbon Treaty has achieved its due purpose has been under debate, overall, the post-Lisbon era has seen the EU with more coherence in regard to its external policies. These changes have centralised the internal structures of the EU and enhanced the EU's policymaking efficiencies both with the EU and in terms of its external policies.

The political dialogue between China and the EU after the Lisbon Treaty have been more conducted by EU representatives including the president of the European Council and the High Representative of Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (EU HR/VP). Previously, the country of the rotating EU Presidency was in charge of holding meetings with China together with the European Commission and the upcoming presidency (Delegation of the European Union to China, 2016c). This means more consistency and centralisation in the representatives of the EU who talk to Beijing, which provides promising improvements in terms of the EU's discourse on China.

This institutional change in the EU after the Lisbon Treaty also resulted in easier tracking of the EU's discourse to China. After 2010, the President of the European Council, the

³ Before the Lisbon Treaty came into effect in 2009, the policy papers on China were published by the European Commission under the Commission's previous name as the Commission of European Communities.

President of the European Commission as well as the High Representative's Speeches and Remarks have been available on the websites of EU institutions such as EEAS.com and Eur-lex, which contributes to the document collection and corpora establishment for this thesis. In the Corpus EU PPSP established in this thesis, which consists of the EU's key official documents and keynote speeches on China, the numbers of speeches made by the President of the European Council, for example, President Barroso's Remarks at the Opening Ceremony of the First EU-China High-Level Cultural Forum in 2010 (José Manuel Durão Barroso, 2010), the President of the European Commission, for example, Remarks by Herman Van Rompuy President of the European Council's Speech to the EU-China Business Summit in 2012 (Mission of the People's Republic of China to the European Union, 2014b) and HR/VP's speeches have increased since 2010. Timewise, this is consistent with the time when the Lisbon Treaty came into effect.

In sum, despite the EU's complications due to the nature of the organisation and the on-going uncertainties, its integrity and coherence has reached a status that in many aspects, such as its international representation in the global arena, is comparable to a nation. After the Lisbon Treaty, the EU has seen more coordinated and better representations of its external relations with China. This makes it possible to take the EU and China as comparative actors in China-EU relations in the context of foreign policy discourse making. Plus, the fact that the European Commission remains main institution issuing EU policy papers on China before and after Lisbon also supports the choices made in this thesis to take the EU as a discourse producer, or a counterpart of China when it comes to official discourse interactions between the two.

The political dialogue between China and the EU has expanded in scope over the last ten years, especially in the high-level official dialogue between China and the EU as well as the person-to-person dialogue in the relationship. On the EU's side, discourse on China started in 1995 and expanded on a regular and consistent level in a steady and consistent manner over the last two decades. The EU has shown high-level consistency and regularity in issuing its official discourse on China. The EU's official on China has a clear hierarchy consisting of goals, strategies, policies, action plans and reviews. On the Chinese side, it is only in recent years that these official documents generated from the meetings have become available via open-source access resources. The discourse material of China comes from the websites of Chinese state media, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs China as well as the Commission of the EU Delegation of China. There has been a lack of application of these official discourses in terms of analysing China-EU relations which forms one gap which this thesis strives to fill.

1.3 Explaining the Challenges in China-EU Relations

As this research is interdisciplinary, the literature review focuses on discussing the existing approaches and explanations for the challenges in China-EU relations and identifying the gaps in research. Section 3.1 in Chapter 3 will review the literature on methodology, especially in terms of constructivist discourse analysis and foreign policy analysis in International Relations as well as China-EU studies.

The volatility in China-EU relations has challenged the high expectations of China-EU relations and stimulated discussion of the driving force behind the problems and challenges in China-EU relations. Explanations of these problems follow three main perspectives: the triangle dynamics among China, the EU and the US, the structural imbalances between economic development and political interactions, and the conceptual and ideological differences between China and the EU.

1.3.1 The Constructivist vs Realist and Liberal Approaches

As there are no face-to-face, direct clashes, for example, territorial disputes, between China and the EU member states, realist studies from a bilateral perspective are not the mainstream approach in China-EU studies. A lot of the realists' research has incorporated elements of other theoretical approaches in their work as a realist framework alone ends up insufficiently explaining the challenges in China-EU relations.

1.3.1.1 Realist Approaches

One of the most prominent primarily realist approaches in China-EU studies positions China-EU relations in the context of the balance of power among the US, EU and China (Wang, Yuping, 2000; Xiao, 2000; Shambaugh, 2004, 2005; Narramore, 2008; Ross, Tunsjø & Tuosheng, 2010; Chen, 2010). Most of this research attempts to address the on-going discussions. This approach takes the position that the US is an essential and trend-changing factor. One opinion is that US-EU ties are more durable than EU-China ties, and therefore the former poses a threat to the latter. Due to similar culture and value as well their historical linkage, the EU tends to partner more with the US rather than China in terms of strategic arrangements, and this is more evident when the EU or China-EU relations face a crisis (Cui, 2018).

Another argument is that US-EU ties are not all negative for China-EU relations and part of the reason why China and the EU has a high potential for strategic partnership is that they are both against US hegemony (Shambaugh, 2004, 2005). Plus, the US and the EU envisage different international orders after the Cold War. The US prefers a “vertical” world order in which it stands at the top of the hierarchical system (Chen, 2003: 1). The EU, on the other hand, considers that the EU must be one “regional pole” (Graham & Buchan, 2003) in the new international order (Chen, 2003: 1). From this perspective, the EU and China share a similar view of international order: a multipolar international order.

A third view is that the EU-US tie is a double-edged sword for EU-China relations. A recent report issued by Fudan University, “A Report of the EU and EU Member State’s Policies on China”, in 2017, the first and so far the only systematic report⁴ on the EU and Member States’ policies on China issued by a Chinese institution, has pointed out that on the one hand, the EU has “dropped” the discourse of building a “strategic partnership” with China and turned to the US for consolidation of the existing system of international rules. On the other hand, due to the changes in US policies on climate, especially the fact that it left the Paris Treaty, among other issues such as the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the EU has realised that it is a mistake to turning to the US and risk estranging China. The EU is, therefore, taking a double-sided policy towards its dilemma on China (Long *et al.*, 2017).

Others have looked at the dynamic propensities of China-EU-US triangle relations. China needs the US in terms of capital and technology. Plus, the US has been prioritised in China’s foreign policy (Wang, 2000). The EU needs the US for political influence. Meanwhile, the US needs the EU to keep expanding its influence. Although the EU also has disputes with the US, these disputes are not confrontational in nature due to the broad common interests between the EU and the US in terms of politics, the economy and security areas and their cultural and ideological ties. In certain circumstances, for example, after the 1989 political incident in China, the EU and the US joined forces, trying to coerce China by putting sanctions on China (Wang, 2000). As Huntington has argued, the US is a lonely superpower in a system which is a mixture of a unipolar and multipolar world structure which he termed a “uni-multipolar system”. A healthy US-European relationship will reduce the loneliness of the situation where the US is a lonely superpower (Huntington, 1999: 36). A few studies which have taken this perspective have been methodology-driven and have been based on the classic model of the Strategic Triangle as defined by Lowell (Dittmer, 1981) and its advanced versions.

These approaches, however, do not give full credit for the autonomy in China-EU bilateral relations. It sees the EU as switching between having a good relationship with the US and coercing China or having a less satisfying relationship with the US and turning to more coalition with China. Also, this approach does not consider the impacts of the conceptual and ideological differences between China and the EU in shaping the bilateral relationship. It tends to simplify these into the overgeneralised argument that the EU shares more ideologies and values with the US and is, therefore, more likely to be friendly towards the US.

⁴ It is a report on the EU and EU member states policies on China in 2017. It is sponsored by the International Relations Research Centre of Fudan University and Shanghai Institute for European Studies, written mostly by Chinese (with one non-Chinese author) China-EU relations specialists.

Methodologically, the framework of game theory or the strategic triangle theory does offer useful tools for the analysis of China-EU-US relations. However, these approaches bear the risk of being over-mechanical when it comes to analysing the possibilities in China-EU relations regardless of the uncertainties. In an age when uncertainties are becoming an indispensable feature of international politics, an approach with a more comprehensive perspective which has more resilience in its analytical framework is useful.

1.3.1.2 Neo-liberal Approaches

Neo-liberal approaches are also adopted widely in China-EU scholarship, especially in the form of case analysis of economy and trades. Robert O. Keohane's and Joseph S. Nye's theory of complex interdependence which entails concepts such as sensitivity and vulnerability of states was applied by some scholars in analysing the structural, economic, political and diplomatic aspects in China-EU relations (Nie, 2009: 38; Mikusevic, 2012). These scholars observed that China-EU relations fit the precondition of relations in complex interdependency: military competition is not the primary concern in China-EU relations; the communication passages between China and the EU is on multiple levels; neither China nor the EU is superior to the other regarding disputed issues (Nie, 2009: 38; Mikusevic, 2012).

Efforts merging a liberal approach and a constructivist approach have also been made. Balducci, for example, proposed a liberal constructivist approach merging state-centred liberalism and sociological institutionalism in analysing the deficiencies of the EU's normative approach to Asia regarding human rights issues (Balducci, 2010: 36). Three factors, namely the member state's material and ideational interests, the role of the EU institutions in creating a community of shared values and the interactions between these two factors in EU's foreign policymaking (Balducci, 2010: 37–39) are considered. The advantage of incorporating the constructivist approach into liberalism is that more focus can be given to the role of the agents' wills and their interactions. The rationale behind Balducci's design of the theoretical framework informs the synthesised theoretical framework of this thesis: the agent's ability to influence and constitute the structure should receive its due attention.

1.3.2 Conceptual Gaps between China and the EU

Unlike the realist or liberal approaches in international relations, the constructivist approach brings people's attention to categories including discourse, culture, mentality and identity, which were neglected in traditional theories. This approach to China-EU studies has been welcomed and applied in recent years in Chinese academia.

A significant number of studies, mostly in the Chinese language, attribute the difficulties in China-EU relations to a lack of shared knowledge and different understandings of concepts between China and the EU in aspects including human rights, sovereignty, democracy and soft power (Zhu & Zhang, 2002; Pan, 2010; Men, 2011; Zhou, 2011a; Zhang, 2012a; Weil & Jing, 2012; Chen & Song, 2012).

One of the most comprehensive works on this topic is the book “Conceptual Gaps in China-EU Relations”, edited by Pan Zhongqi, which covers a wide range of conceptual gaps between China and the EU (Pan, 2012b). The contributors mostly reach a consensus that cognitive gaps are a significant source of the disagreements in China-EU relations and have a negative impact on the overall development of the relationship (Zhang, 2012a, 2008a; Shi, 2007; Dong, 2012) although some do recognise the positive effect of these cognitive differences as China and the EU have pushed each other to revise their understandings, address their weakness and improve themselves (Liu & Heathcote, 2000; Shi, 2007).

Existing studies on conceptual gaps between China and the EU have pointed out a few specific differences between the Chinese political view and European notions of human rights. The first is that the Chinese government attaches more importance to collective rights than an individual’s rights (Zhang, 2008a, 2012a; Liu & Heathcote, 2000; Wang, 2006). The second is that traditionally human rights is regarded as a domestic issue in China while international society is seeing an increase in humanitarian intervention approved by the United Nations despite the non-interference principle. These studies argue that in terms of human rights, Taiwan and Tibetan issues have been made use of by the EU as leverage to interfere with China’s domestic issues when China-EU relations do not go in the direction the EU wishes (Men, 2011; Dong, 2012). Third, while the EU commonly agrees on the universalism of human rights, the Chinese understanding of human rights bears more Chinese cultural, religious and local developmental factors (Men, 2011; Zhang, 2008a, 2012a; Wang, 2006; Liu & Heathcote, 2000).

Current studies have also pointed out the conceptual differences between China and the EU on sovereignty. First, while the Chinese government as well as most Chinese people see sovereignty as entitled rights or directly related to a nation’s security, independence and dignity, the EU sees sovereignty more as a “responsibility to protect” (Bills, 2008) rather than rights (Pan, 2012c). Second, China sees sovereignty as an inseparable and non-transferable character of a state. The EU is established on the idea that sovereignty can be shared and pooled (Pan, 2012c). Therefore, the EU is not as particular on the unitality of sovereignty (Risse, 2003). Third, China takes sovereignty as one of the guiding principles of international relations as well as of China’s foreign policymaking. The EU regards that the role of sovereignty as a guiding principle is declining (Pan, 2012c). These differences in understanding sovereignty can explain some of the issues between China and the EU. The conceptual gaps in human rights and sovereignty also help to explain the decline in China-EU relations in 2008 when opinions on Tibetan issues differed between some of the member states of the EU and China. The EU tends to define the Tibetan issue as one of human rights whereas China regards it as absolutely an issue of sovereignty (Pan & Gao, 2011).

Apart from different understandings of human rights and sovereignty, a significant amount of discussion has been held on China and the EU’s different political ideologies, especially the

concept of democracy (Zhu, 2013; Shi, 2007; Pan & Yang, 2013). Some argue that the disputes on human rights and challenges in different sectors in China-EU relations are a result of discrepancies in political ideologies, which is a more fundamental dispute between China and the EU (Shi, 2007). A standard view of democracy among Chinese academia argues that Western democracy is a product of the West based on a series of social, legal and ideological conditions which is connected to private ownership, the focus on individuals, the multiparty system with general elections as well as the correspondent ideology. It may be suitable for Western societies but does not fit the Chinese environment. If China adopts the capitalist form of democracy, there is a high risk of explosive social and political turmoil (Shi, 2007). In other words, the highest level of democracy is not necessarily the best democracy. Only a feasible form of it, which can be localised to the economic, cultural conditions and accepted by the majority of the local people, can be the effective democracy (Shi, 2007, 11). Besides, Chinese political ideology is a socialist ideology where Chinese democracy refers to socialist democracy instead of capitalist democracy (Shi, 2007). Some Chinese studies have pointed out that the EU, despite recognising the economic success China has achieved, views China as belonging to “the other side” of the world and should be “educated” by the West (Shi, 2007; Dong, 2012). Others have pointed out that the EU is experiencing a democracy deficit along with other problems of the EU such as its identity dilemma and the European debt crisis. The EU, instead of projecting the European version of democracy on other countries, should focus on improving its own structural efficiency.

Literature has also pointed out that cognitive gaps exist among political leaders, the media, academia, business industries, as well as the public in both China and the EU. It is, therefore, essential to distinguish between the public’s understanding and the government’s will (Tian, 2009; Zhou, 2011a; Shi, Yi & Li, 2016).

In terms of solutions, the literature has pointed out that it is unlikely that China and the EU will be able to agree with each other on some uncompromisable political concepts. Reducing and mitigating the cognitive differences and enlarging shared ideas are inevitable processes in the development of China-EU relations, although enhancing shared ideas might not be enough to solve the disputes between China and the EU fundamentally. Both China and the EU should focus more on their points in common despite all the existing conceptual gaps (Pan & Zhu, 2011). On the bright side, the Chinese literature has reached a consensus that managing the differences is possible as the two do agree on some aspects of these concepts such as the importance of mutual respect and recognising the legal status of the United Nations in dealing with disputes (Pan, 2010; Pan & Gao, 2011; Pan & Zhu, 2011; Pan, 2012c).

These studies mostly focus on specific aspects of the conceptual gaps between China, such as human rights or democracy. The advantage of this is that the conceptual differences in specific aspects are discussed in an in-depth manner. However, the relations between these

conceptual gaps and the overall policy priorities, strategies and diplomatic approaches in China-EU relations are not discussed. There is a lack of systematic perspective in the research, which makes the current research findings on conceptual gaps fragmented and segmented without a thread which could link these gaps together. The conceptual gaps between China and the EU on human rights, democracy and sovereignty, are interrelated. Research aiming at conceptual gaps on individual aspects in China-EU relations does not probe the commonality behind these gaps.

Plus, existing studies tend to apply a synchronic rather than a diachronic, longitudinal perspective. This is because diachronic research requires a more systematic review of the change of concepts over time which requires the involvement of discourse review. A more comprehensive study on the conceptual gaps between China and the EU needs to consider a more extensive scale of discourse materials, a longitudinal view and a structural perspective.

1.3.3 Visions and Perceptions

Within the constructivist approach in China-EU studies, a group of scholars has observed the differences in the Chinese government and the EU's vision of the world they desire.

Shambaugh pointed out that China and the EU share a narrative of building a multipolar and multilateral world and this makes it possible for the two to form a new axis in the world (Shambaugh, 2004, 2005). On the other hand, several studies have pointed out that China lays more emphasis on multipolarity while the EU stresses multilateralism more (Messner, 2007; Scott, 2007b; Narramore, 2008; Clegg, 2009; Hooft, 2010; Van Langenhove, 2010; Geeraerts, 2011; Makarychev & Morozov, 2011; Wade, 2011; Scott, 2012; Zhang, 2012b; Baeck, 2013; Scott, 2013; Ngeow, 2014; Scott, 2014a; Z. Chen, 2016). Some have also argued a step further: China's world vision is a more realist-based and state-oriented outlook than that of the EU since China is a fully sovereign state while the EU is considered a supranational or intergovernmental organisation whose vision is more procedure-focused. It emphasises multilateralism as the underlying world order and institutional cooperation as the primary manner for entities to deal with international affairs (Baeck, 2013; Scott, 2013, 2014a; Z. Chen, 2016).

These studies have pointed out the possible different focuses of China and the EU in their future visions. However, the studies fail to contextualise how these two terms are used in the official discourse. The question of whether and to what extent the Chinese government and the EU interpret and apply these two terms, in the same way, is not responded to. There is also a lack of focus on China's increasing discourse of multilateralism and its interpretations of multilateralism. This thesis fills this gap by exploring what China and the EU are referring to when they mention multipolarity or multilateralism, what they lay emphasis on with these terms and how this facilitates the political tension between them.

1.3.3.1 Identities

China and the EU's views on each other have been discussed in the current literature as one factor affecting China-EU relations. On China's perception of the EU, the Chinese literature has argued that China treats its relations with the EU as equal to its relations with a "big power" or a "big nation" and in China's foreign diplomacy, Europe is often viewed as paralleling significant powers in the world such as the US (Feng, 2009: 61). On the other hand, the literature has also pointed out that China tends to interact with individual member states when it comes to specific cooperation projects (Godement & Fox, 2009; Otero-Iglesias *et al.*, 2015). The literature has also pointed out that the EU's perceptions of China have undergone a significant change in 2006. Before 2006, the EU saw China as a potential partner who could be influenced ideologically and socially by the EU. After 2006, the EU started to view China more as a competitor as the EU realised that China did not become a large enough market for the EU, whereas the EU has become one of China's most essential markets abroad. The year 2006 also saw the EU's change in its political attitudes to China as it recognised that China would not like to be affected in terms of policy system and ideology (Zhang, 2007).

Current studies have not discussed China and the EU's perceptions of each other using corpus-based discourse analysis. Most of the existing research is based on texts selected in an unsystematic manner, which leaves space for systematic discourse analysis on the perceptions of China and the EU.

On China's perceptions of European integration, a consensus in Chinese literature is that China overall holds an optimistic view on this and does not see the setbacks in European integration, such as the constitutional crises, as signs that the vision of European integration is wrong (Chen, 2005; Zhou, 2011b). Due to its cultural background and experiences of reform, China tends to take a more long-term, historical view when it comes to unification and the Chinese perspective may provide the EU with some inspiration in dealing with European integration (Moncada, 2010).

The EU's perception of China, as argued by some, is the driving force of the political disputes between China and the EU such as the cancellation of EU-China summit in 2008 due to former French Prime Minister Nicolas Sarkozy's meeting with the Dalai Lama while he was the rotating chairman of the EU in 2008 (Tian, 2009).

1.3.4 Strategies and Approaches

Although challenges exist in China-EU relations at many levels and in many forms, one topic which binds the challenges together is the "comprehensive strategic partnership". Since this term envisions all-around cooperation between China and the EU with a long-term vision, it compasses multiple aspects of the relationship.

The 'all-round strategic partnership' (Quanmian Zhanlue Huoban Guanxi) was put forward first in 2003 jointly by former Chinese President Jiang Zemin and French President Chirac on their visions on multipolarity as the world order. Later in the same year, the European security strategy stated that China is the EU's strategic partner (Holslag, 2011). In 2004, Premier Wen Jiabao stated that China and Europe should aim for *comprehensive strategic partnership* (Wen, 2004). The Joint Press Statement of the Seventh Summit between China and the EU confirmed that the partnership was growing and maturing rapidly (Council of the European Union, 2004).

Even though quite a lot literature remains optimistic about the overall positivity of the partnership (Scott, 2007a; Men, 2014), an extensive body of literature argues that the comprehensive strategic partnership between China and the EU has been insufficient and needs improvement (Commission of the European Communities, 2001; Cameron & Zheng, 2007; Scott, 2007a; Caira, 2010; Holslag, 2011; Men, 2014; Zhou, 2016; Berkofsky, 2017; Michalski, 2017).

A significant number of scholars believe that the current challenges are a result of the different engagement styles of the Chinese government and the EU (Naramore, 2008; Feng, 2009; Crookes, 2013; Youngs, 2015). One strong stream of opinion is that the EU's normative approach to China has not been as successful as it could be. The complications of EU bureaucracy have affected its policy integrity on China and the EU (Godement & Fox, 2009; Balducci, 2010; Holslag, 2011; Mattlin, 2012; Otero-Iglesias *et al.*, 2015). Therefore, a prominent suggestion is that the EU should address these internal problems before trying to convert other countries according to European norms and values (Balducci, 2010; Holslag, 2011; Mattlin, 2012).

Furthermore, China-EU relations should shift from a value-based, normative approach, or the "unconditional engagement", to an interest-based approach. With an interests-based approach, the EU should require more benefits from China other than offering China favourable conditions, with the anticipation that China will behave or evolve as the EU wishes (Godement & Fox, 2009; Wang Yiwei, 2009; Holslag, 2010; Freeman & Geeraerts, 2011; Crookes, 2013). Another stream of opinion holds that, for the EU, a pragmatic approach to China will be more beneficial with the rationale that more engaged and disrupted economic cooperation will have spill-over effects on other areas in China such as social and political spheres which have been, or at least were part of the EU's early goals in interacting with China (Islam & Diaz, 2014).

Some others, however, maintain that the EU should keep its normative approach to China. Mattlin, for example, calls for a 'defensive' normative approach to China (Mattlin, 2010). Waegemans holds the view that the EU should not give up its values-based approach to China as its normative power is one major resource of the EU if it wants to remain one of the

“poles” in a multipolar world (Waegemans, 2014). He argues that the EU could develop on its military power but subject to the EU’s budget available for defence, the EU army could not be large enough to sustain the EU as a strong hard power (Waegemans, 2014).

There is also a significant amount of the scholarship in China-EU studies which recognises that there is a trend for a so-called “Strong Economy, Weak Politics”, namely there are strong economic ties between China and the EU, yet the political consensus between China and the EU is comparatively less abundant. Although opinions differ when it comes to whether this imbalance exists and whether this constitutes a challenge and as the Chinese government may have different expectations compared to the EU on what constitutes political cooperation and whether they are desired in China-EU relations (Hammond & Jing, 2016), the topic stands as an on-going debate in China-EU relations.

A stream of literature argues that compared to the achievements in economy and trade, China-EU relations have not yet reached their potential in areas like political cooperation, security engagements and social development projects (Chen, 2003; Caira, 2010; Crookes, 2013; Gaenssmantel & Feng, 2016; Silja, 2016). The literature has also pointed out that this gap could be a result of China’s approach of de-politicisation in order to secure China’s core interests and minimise the EU’s influence on Chinese issues beyond the redline of the Chinese government such as political ideology and sovereignty related issues (Hammond & Jing, 2016).

This approach addresses the gaps between economic and political interactions in China-EU relations; it can be pointed out that the possible reason behind the imbalance is the unmatched core interests. The advantage of this approach is that it notices the dynamics between the economy and politics in China-EU relations and how these two influence each other. The weakness of this approach, however, is that it focuses on the phenomenon of the possibly imbalanced economic and political cooperation without challenging its existence too much, or in other words, whether China and the EU had the same depth and range in political interactions when they agreed on developing a “comprehensive strategic partnership”. Although the literature has looked at the connections between the differences in priorities and interests between China and the EU that challenge political interactions (Hammond & Jing, 2016), it does not offer a clear picture of the priorities of China and the EU and where mismatches exist, nor does it explore the reasons behind the unmatched priorities. The main theoretical framework of this approach remains within the frames of the realist approach in international relations where the economic power changes between China and the EU have been regarded as the main cause; this leaves the findings incomplete as constructive factors such as differences in goals, concepts, culture and ideology are not discussed.

1.3.5 Differences in Chinese and English Literature

1.3.5.1 On the Application Theoretical Approach

Not all the literature on China-EU relations has an explicit theoretical framework. A significant number of publications in Chinese do not have a theoretical framework explicitly stated. In most cases, one of the following situations applies: either the research is primarily a statistical report with some policy analysis, or it specifically focuses on one issue in China-EU relations, mostly trade or law issues, or it applies a realist approach, but the ontological stance is implicit. A lot of literature on China-EU relations is future-oriented and contains predictions for the relationship based on experience. Most Chinese scholars hold an optimistic view of the relations between China and Europe. They argue that interactions between the two will be positive and stable. Others regard the relationship as full of potential challenges and difficulties. Feng and Li pointed out that the relations will involve both cooperation and competition and both sides, especially Europe which has enjoyed a higher degree of development than China traditionally, have to adapt and adjust (Feng, 2009: 59–67; Li, 2008: 10).

This can be since a lot of interactions between China and the EU are presented and summarised in the form of economic data. However, the fact that topics on China's human rights, China's territorial disputes with other Asian countries, China's trade and environmental problems are more frequently discussed in literature written by European authors shows that subconsciously, most European scholars still have a realist mindset in discussing China-Europe relations while realist theories do not have to be the explicit theoretical framework of their writings.

1.3.5.2 Case-specific Analysis

Overall, in China-EU studies, the number of case studies and policy analyses outweigh the studies taking a macro-perspective which take the structural, global or third-party factors into account. This is mostly due to the large amount of research focusing on the trade issues between China and the EU, as topics about trade are in the majority in terms of the numbers of publications. This feature manifests in the Chinese literature more. The positive side of this is that the trade issues, among other cases where disputes exist between the two, have been discussed in-depth and from multiple angles. The downside is that interactions involving economic cooperation and social-political relations and the structural factors such as power transitions in the world system have not been taken into consideration enough. Plus, most efforts have been made to address the difficulties in specific cases without investigating the underlying common forces behind these problems. This has made the findings in China-EU relations fragmented and increased the difficulties of talking to the public in a straight-forward manner about the major problem going on between China and the EU.

1.3.5.3 The Concept of Europe and the EU

In the Chinese and Western literature on China-Europe relations, the connotation of Europe differs. In fact, when many scholars talk about “Europe” in general in the themes of their articles, what they actually take as actors are EU member states such as in Baker’s article (Baker, 2002: 45). The Chinese literature contains more vagueness on this since both “China-EU relations” and “China-Europe relations” can be translated into “Zhongou Guanxi”. Thus, it is sometimes hard to tell from a mere title of a Chinese article whether the author is talking about China-EU or China-Europe relations. This vagueness in expression is also related to the fact that the EU, as the super-national institution of the European countries, cannot always stand for the individual countries’ interests and voices.

In dealing with specific issues, China prefers dealing with member states directly more than confronting the EU as an agent. Theoretically, however, China is trying to balance its focus on the EU and the core member states. Ni mentioned that China would keep learning to deal with not only the EU as a whole but also the 28 EU member states as individual countries (Ni, 2013).

According to Feng, on the one hand, China treats its relations with the EU as equal to its relations with a “big power” or a “big nation”, and in China’s foreign diplomacy, Europe is often treated as a whole, paralleling the US, Russia and Japan. This is because the emphasis of China’s diplomacy includes its relations with peripheral countries, big powers, developing countries and multilateral-organisations. On the other hand, there are two levels for the connotation of “Europe” for Chinese decision-makers and scholars. The first level for “Europe” refers to the traditional developed European countries, including the UK, France, and Germany, who play important roles in international organisations such as the UN Security Council or G8. The second level refers to the EU (Feng, 2009: 61). To guarantee the analysis of this thesis is focused and in-depth, within EU member states, the UK, France and Germany will be given more focus, as these countries traditionally have more interactions with China. The choice of countries is also made based on the availability of discourse materials.

1.3.5.4 Perspectives

An interesting phenomenon in China-EU studies is that scholars with European and Chinese perspectives often have different approaches, methodologies, and conclusions on the same issue. Some authors, especially European authors, intentionally emphasise that they are taking a European perspective. For example, Baker stated that his article “is not written from the point of view of a detached observer” (Baker, 2002: 45). In another example, Edmonds states in the preview for an edited collection that the volume only contains articles which are written from a European perspective (Edmonds, 2002). This suggests that the perspective makes a difference when discussing China-EU relations. Although most authors claim

objectivity in their works, it is undeniable that social science is never value-free, and the author's personal perspective could have an impact on their work.

1.3.6 Reviewing the Gaps in the Existing Literature

Based on categorising the existing approaches and explanations of the challenges in China-EU relations, a few gaps in the existing literature are identified, which will be addressed across the thesis.

Empirically, the literature review identifies four gaps:

First, official discourse in China-EU relations has been under-valued and under-explored. Although Snyder has compiled the key official discourse between China and the EU between 1949 and 2008 (Snyder, 2009), more recent official discourse has not been included. Plus, his work was more for compilation purposes rather than analytical. The lack of application of official discourse as primary data is due to a few reasons: first, official discourse is perceived as dry and sometimes void; second, there are arguments about whether official discourse could reflect the real intentions of governments in the first place; third, the volume of discourse between China and the EU is large, and there are multiple institutions which issue official discourse leading to difficulties in bringing all the sources and documents together to organise and compile them in an organised manner. The complicated hierarchies make it hard to bring them together.

Second, the existing literature has not explained why disputes and frictions exist in areas where China and the EU share strong common interests such as economy and trade. This thesis will address China and the EU's different connotations in their shared interest areas and when they apply the same discourse.

Third, in terms of perspective taken and the entities involved, the approaches focusing on the role of the US in China-EU relations, or on the triangle relationship of China-EU-US, does not give due credit to the autonomy between China and the EU. A focus on the bilateral relations of China and the EU helps to provide an understanding of the tension going on between the two with or without the US influence.

Fourth, China's normative power has not been discussed in the context of China-EU relations with the involvement of China's normative discourse. Although the literature on the EU as a normative power and its effectiveness in its external relations has been extensive, the changes in its normative power, especially its linkage with the changes in its normative discourse, has not been observed. Neither has the potential of China as a normative power in this bilateral relationship been paid due attention.

Theoretically, the main gap is that there is a lack of a comprehensive framework which brings together the conceptual gaps on different topics and at different levels as well as their relationship with the political-economic changes in the international system. Although the

existing literature has covered the gaps between China and the EU's identity, their visions of the future world order, their conceptual gaps on political concepts including human rights, democracy and sovereignty, the relationship among these aspects and their interrelations with the changing economic power and normative power between China and the EU have not been discussed under a comprehensive framework. This thesis develops a synthesised theoretical framework which binds the concept of discourse, normative power and economic power together, bridging rule and norm-constructivist theories, corpus linguistics and international political economy (IPE). Under this theoretical development, it also puts forward the Model of Dynamic Dimensional Mismatches, which offers a possible framework to discuss the interrelated aspects of mismatches in China-EU relations and their impact on the challenges in the bilateral relationship in an integrated, systematic, structured manner with a longitudinal perspective.

Regarding literature in the Chinese language, one of the features of much Chinese research on EU-China relations is that a lot of research in the Chinese language does not explicitly point out the theoretical bases or approaches taken. The lack of enough theoretical illustration is, in fact, a common phenomenon in Chinese social science research. Professor Zhu Liqun has addressed the need to fill in some of these gaps. She proposed a three-nexus framework for China-EU relations studies which combines a social constructivist departure point, a future-oriented approach accommodating a strategic perspective, and considerations of the roles of China and the EU in the international system in China-EU studies. A combination of these perspectives would contribute to looking at China-EU relations with long-term benefits in mind instead of short-term interests (Zhu, 2007). So far, systemic studies incorporating this three-nexus approach have not appeared in solid forms. The involvement of a diachronic perspective of the official discourse interactions between China and the EU for analytical purposes is a missing link in the existing methodologies in China-EU studies.

1.4 Research Aims and Questions

This thesis, based on a diachronic review of the official discourse between China and the EU from 1994 to 2019, aims to examine the challenges in China-EU relations which are hard to find without the involvement of a longitudinal study of official discourse.

The aim of this thesis is three-fold. First, the thesis aims to extend the existing understanding of the challenges in China-EU relations. The departure points taken by this thesis on China-EU relations is that although China-EU relations are on a positive track, they could be better if challenges are further understood, addressed, and dealt with. The intention is not to undermine the degree of success and achievement in China-EU relations, but to address the challenges in the relationship and contribute to the existing understanding of the problems.

Second, the thesis introduces an alternative methodology for the analysis of China-EU relations which applies comparative corpus-driven discourse analysis to China-EU studies.

Third, the thesis aims to establish an analytical framework, underpinned by constructivist theoretical assumptions in combination with methods of corpus-driven discourse analysis, presenting the multidimensional mismatches between China and the EU and the interrelations among them with a longitudinal perspective.

The time range of this thesis is set from 1994 to 2019. The year 1994 is chosen as the starting point of the time range as it was the year when the European Commission issued the policy paper “Towards a New Asia Strategy” which states its aspirations to engage with Asia in general and which framed the direction of the EU’s China approach as well (Commission of the European Communities, 1994). These years have increased engagement between China and the EU. These twenty-five years also witness the problems and challenges in contemporary China-EU relations. The discourse data goes up to the year 2019 to make sure the data output results are up to date.

One thing to note is that although this thesis chooses to focus on the challenges and problems in China-EU relations, overall improvements in the relationship have been constant, especially in the economic area, even in difficult periods. For example, despite the trade issues and political disagreements, up to 2015, China and the US were almost identical in terms of the total volume of trade in goods for the EU, with the US peaking at EUR 3622 billion, only 61 billion more than China (Eurostat, 2017). The point of discussing challenges is to address challenges and reduce the gaps between China and the EU for better prospects.

To achieve the research aims, the main research question leading the analysis of this thesis is:

- **How does a corpus-driven discourse analysis, underpinned by constructivist assumptions and based on the corpora of the official discourse between China and the EU (1994 to 2019), help to examine and explain the challenges in contemporary China-EU relations?**

A few sub-questions will be explored through the chapters in order to respond comprehensively step-by-step to the main research question.

In terms of the context and official discourse in China-EU relations, the thesis will discuss the following questions:

- What characterises the challenges in contemporary China-EU relations?
- What role does official discourse play in contemporary China-EU relations?

Through the empirical chapters, the following questions will be addressed in order to understand the challenges in China-EU relations:

- In what aspects do misunderstandings and mismatches exist in China-EU relations? How do these mismatches and misunderstandings relate to each other?
- How and to what extent do these mismatches explain the challenges in China-EU relations?

Methodologically, the following questions will lead the assessment of the methodological framework:

- What does the corpora established in this thesis (Corpus China PPSP, Corpus EU PPSP, Corpus EU Internal, Corpus China Domestic) offer to understand the levels and aspects where challenges exist in China-EU relations?
- How could the constructivist approach in IR be combined with the ontological and epistemological approaches behind corpus-driven discourse analysis? What are the strengths and limitations of this synthesised, multidisciplinary approach?

Theoretically, the thesis will address:

- What elements of constructivist theories contribute to a corpus-driven discourse analysis approach to China-EU relations?

The main research question and the sub-questions will lead the analysis of this thesis. The response to these questions will provide the components for the contribution and conclusion of the thesis.

1.5 Chapter Organisation

Chapter 4 to Chapter 8 present the core analysis of this thesis. Each chapter discusses one aspect where mismatches or misunderstandings manifest through discourse analysis in China-EU relations and respond to the sub-questions of the main research question, which ultimately contribute to a response to the main questions and the contribution of the thesis.

There is parallel underlying logic behind the organisation of the chapters, empirically and linguistically. The organisation is based on the nature of the empirical findings and their correspondence to the research questions. Since the findings include priorities, identities and perceptions, visions of the world structure, and normative and strategic approaches, the chapter arrangements show the elements impacting China-EU relations from direct manifestations to internal or domestic aspects, followed by external aspects with interactive elements. In other words, the bilateral relations are regarded as an interactive developmental procedure of two entities moving towards the directions they aspire to. The questions leading the organisation of the chapters include:

- What are the manifestations of China and the EU's priorities in their official discourse?

-
- Who do China and the EU want to be and want each other to be?
 - Where do China and the EU want themselves to be in the future world?
 - How, or by what means, do they plan to reach their goals and destinations?

Specifically, Chapter 4 looks at the differences between the hot topic coverage, collocations of key concepts as well as the correlations among some of the hot topics. This deals with the mismatches manifested through the lexical level of the discourse.

Chapter 5 discusses how Europe and China each view themselves and each other as revealed in their official discourse and to what extent these perceptions influence China-EU relations. This is about the internal drives of China and the EU in terms of how they regard themselves and the other.

Chapter 6 discusses the similarities and differences between China and the EU's vision for future world structure and their positions in the future world as manifested through their official discourse. This is about their destinations and where they want to be in the future world.

Chapter 7 looks at the dynamics of normative and strategic approaches between China and the EU. It explores the EU's normative approaches to China as revealed by its normative discourse in the past two decades, reviews the changes in China's normative patterns to the EU and explores the possibility that China is transitioning from a norm-follower to a norm-maker. It also discusses convergence and divergence regarding China and the EU's strategies and engagement styles with each other. It takes a chronological view and reviews the compatibility and synchronisation of China and the EU's approaches to each other over time. This is about the means, and manners China and the EU take to achieve their destinations and realise their visions for the future.

Chapter 8 presents the analytical framework, the Dynamic Multidimensional Mismatches, which combines the aspects of mismatch discussed in the previous sections together. This offers a framework to discuss the interrelations among these aspects as well as the dynamics in this context. The framework follows the underlying synthesised theoretical framework demonstrated in Chapter 3, which considers the interactions among discourse, economic power and normative power.

Chapter 8 also includes case studies, which are categorised into three groups, namely trade issues, persisting issues and cross-continent projects, to apply and assess the effectiveness of the analytical framework developed. Specifically, the cases of trade deficits, anti-dumping disputes, MES, the arms embargo and the EU's questions on China's Belt and Road Initiative will be discussed. This analysis explores the boundaries of the explanatory power of the analytical framework.

Chapter 9 summarises the findings and arguments of the chapters and responds to the research questions. It also discusses the contribution of this research to the existing literature empirically, theoretically, and methodologically. It will discuss how the findings contribute to the literature in Chinese and English. The chapter then reviews the advantages and disadvantages of the methodological approach of this thesis. It also reviews the contribution of the thesis, suggests potential policy implications and sets a possible agenda for further research.

Chapter 2 Theoretical Framework

This chapter discusses the theoretical approaches which have inspired the theoretical framework of this thesis. This thesis is inspired by linguistic relativity (LR), rule-oriented constructivism (ROC) and norm-oriented constructivism (NOC), and constructivist international political economy (CIPE). The conceptual framework of normative power Europe (NPE) will also be presented with its applications in China-EU studies. NPE belongs to the constructivist paradigm, but it has a distinct conceptual framework. It is regarded as one of the theories which informed the synthesised theoretical framework of this chapter.

As the analysis of this thesis follows a mixed theoretical framework, it is necessary to illustrate what theories have inspired and informed the thesis and how. The concepts and elements of each relevant theory will be discussed, as well as the relationship among these elements. This chapter paves the way for the methodological design of this thesis which will be further introduced in the next chapter.

Structure-wise, the chapter is divided into four sections:

The chapter consists of four sections:

Section 2.1 introduces the premises of linguistic relativity and sets the ontological status of language, or more specifically, discourse, in this research and sets the assumption that discourse and social relations are mutually constructive.

Section 2.2 introduces the two main constructivism theories which have informed the perspectives of this thesis: norm-oriented constructivism and rule-oriented constructivism. Instead of presenting the theories in full, the section focuses on the elements of these theories which are relevant to this thesis including the role of culture, shared ideas, identities, states' interests, discourse, rules and rule in constructivist theories. Section 2.2.1 and Section 2.2.2 review the key premises and concepts in norm-oriented constructivism and rule-oriented constructivism, respectively. Instead of the theories in full spectrum, the section focuses on the elements of these theories which are relevant to this thesis as the thesis is primarily empirical research.

Section 2.3 reviews Ian Manner's concept of normative power Europe, which is the concept applied in Chapter 7. It also reviews the application of NPE in China-EU studies, especially the discussions on the effectiveness of the EU's normative power to China and the possibilities of China as a normative power.

Section 2.4 aims at combining the core elements of the theories applied and presents the synthesised theoretical framework.

2.1 Discourse vs Ideas: Linguistic Relativity

The concept of Language Relativity should be mentioned to understand one of the driving forces of this thesis and the gap it tries to fill in China-EU relations. In 1929, Benjamin Lee Whorf and Edward Sapir put forward the idea that the way people think is strongly affected by their native language. There are specific thoughts in one language which can hardly be comprehended by people who speak another language. Sapir argued that human beings do not live in an objective world, but they live through the lens of their language, which is the medium of expression for the world they experience. It is impossible for one to respond and adjust to society without the use of language. Language is not a mere tool of communication but has substance on which the world is largely built (Sapir, 1929: 209).

In 1940, Whorf further argued that: people understand nature “along lines laid down by our native languages” and the world is presented in an impression which is organised by the linguistic systems in people’s minds (Whorf, 1940: 213–214).

These arguments feature the core of what is referred to in Linguistics as the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis, alternatively linguistic relativity (LR), or in its radical form, Linguistic Determinism. LR takes the stance that structural differences between languages are accompanied by non-linguistic cognitive differences. The structure of the language itself affects cognition. For example, the number of words describing basic colours decides how the speaker sees the rainbow (Kay Paul & Kempton Willett, 1984). Research on linguistics has evidenced some degree of LR by pointing out that people of different native languages which contains different words and concepts in terms of spatial relations and colour recognition have different spatial awareness and perceptions of colour categorisation⁵ (Comrie, 2012).

The hypothesis of LR became popular in the 1950s despite the controversies it caused. The followers of Noam Chomsky have offered strong criticism of the hypothesis in the following decades as language is only one factor that influences cognition and behaviour (Comrie, 2012). Meanwhile the extreme (“Weltanschauung”) version of the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis, often referred to as linguistic determinism, regards that all thoughts are constrained by language, and language structure strongly influences or determines the speaker’s world view has been mostly become marginalised in research in recent decades; the opposite extreme that language does not influence thought at all is also widely considered to be false. Most linguistic experts nowadays, however, believe in the weak version of this hypothesis: that language can have some effects on thought (Kay Paul & Kempton Willett, 1984).

⁵ See Stephen C. [Levinson’s](#) experiment at the Max [Planck](#) Institute for Psycholinguistics in [Nijmegen](#), The Netherlands (Levinson, 2001).

This thesis takes the stance that language influences the world view in the sense that world view is expressed through a series of words based on thoughts developed over time. Cognitive decisions are constantly made when we speak, and language as a medium of communication sets the framework that the ideas pass through.

However, this thesis does not take the stance that language decides the world view single-handedly. It is through a combination of social, historical, economic as well as linguistic forces that world views come into being. In this sense, language offers one important way to understand world views and the diachronic change of world views based on the change of language as world views form into shapes through the vessel of language.

Figure 2-1 Language and Thoughts: Mutually Constitutive




Figure 2-1 presents the stance taken by LR on the relationship between Language and Ideas. Language and thoughts are interrelated and mutually enforced. Thoughts in this sense are related to several categories of human intelligence. For example, systematic thoughts related to certain social-political perceptions can evolve into social-political ideology. Thoughts can also lead to expressions which, over time, reveal a relatively consistent tendency or understandings, forming values. The relation between language and human cognition, therefore, is not only tied to the formation of world views which Sapir and Whorf emphasised. The real value of language relativity, instead of exacerbating the differences in languages, should be that it opens new doors for understanding the relations between human languages and human thoughts. It offers one possible way observe the immaterial aspects of human society empirically, namely by looking at the evidence in language to understand the development of values, ideologies, identities, among other things consisting of human thoughts.

Figure 2-2 Mutual Construction between Discourse and Ideas/Thoughts




Figure 2-2 presents the relationship shown in Figure 2-1 in the context of this thesis on China-EU relations. Here language is substituted by discourse as discourse refers to a set of texts, namely the official discourse between China and the EU in the context of this research. Thoughts are expanded to ideas and/or thoughts that ideas are a term utilised by IR scholars to refer to how entities in IR conceptualise terms related to international relations. The concept of ideas will be further explained in Section 2.3 on material power and ideas.

This thesis also assumes that the differences in language structure, lexical features as well as the conceptual references do contain some degree of un-translatability. There will be some part of the meaning which gets lost in translation. In official discourse, the loss of meaning could be caused by not only the translations but also intrinsic features of difference source languages with different levels of vagueness and diversity of connotations. The point of bringing up this aspect in understanding China-EU relations is not to say there are unconquerable problems in communication but to say there may have been misunderstandings between China and the EU created by the different nature of Chinese language and the languages in which the EU documents are issued. The role of official discourse has been largely overlooked and undervalued, and this aspect has not received due attention in the existing research. The hope is that China and the EU could enhance coordination of their communication and policies with a better knowledge of the context and connotations of the other's official discourse manifesting their priorities, visions, strategies and approaches through their official discourse.

2.2 Discourse vs Norms: Norm and Rule-Oriented Constructivism

Constructivism, or social constructivism, arose in the 1980s when the world underwent political divisions and diverse political approaches taken by countries. The ideological and civilisational clashes led to challenges beyond the explanatory power of traditional IR theories. Constructivism opened up a horizon and provided an alternative approach to look at the clashes in the world (Kubalkova, Onuf & Kowert, 1998).

Ontologically, constructivism deviates from traditional IR theories. Realism and liberalism take the "matter over mind" stance and the presupposition of rationalism. They view the international world as one of anarchy. Materials and resources regulate the rationalism of the states and determine the structure and social outcomes and human actions are caused by "measurable structural variables" and are predictable and involuntary (Kubalkova, Onuf & Kowert, 1998: xi). Constructivists, instead of taking an entirely "mind over matter" point of view, often take a dialectical view of mind and matter. They conceive that human actions and social structures are "inseparable, simultaneous" and "co-constituted" (Kubalkova, Onuf & Kowert, 1998). Unlike the realist or the liberal approaches, the constructivist approach focuses on the roles of discourse, culture, mentality, and identity. Constructivists believe that

material objective power is insufficient to define the international system. National interests, power politics as other essentials of realist theories are socially constructed and are therefore subject to changes given the dynamics of human society (Wendt, 1992, 1999).

The constructivist approach has been increasingly applied in international relations studies. The Chinese literature on China-EU studies in the recent decade has shown a tendency to consider more social-cultural and ideological factors rather than traditional factors from realist perspectives, such as the economy and national interests. The studies on the cognitive gaps between China and the EU mentioned in the review mostly apply the underlying rationale of constructivism.

Kurt Burch categorises constructivism in IR into three approaches: rule-oriented constructivism (Onuf and Miami Group), structure-oriented constructivism (Alexandra Wendt) and norm-oriented constructivism (Kubalkova, 2001b). Mainstream constructivism or structure-oriented constructivism represented by the Wendtian approach provides a framework to shift the stress from either the power of states, or the power distribution in the international structure, but to the identities of states. As explained by Kubáľková, "this means a shift from what states can do because of their position in a structure, to what they want to do because of how they see themselves in relation to others" (Kubáľková, 2001a: 33). Mainstream constructivists argue that identities, instead of capabilities, are harnessed to interests (Kubáľková, 2001a).

A significant number of Chinese scholars adopt Alexandra Wendt's version of constructivism as the theoretical assumption in their studies on China-Europe and China-EU relations, as mentioned in the literature review section in Chapter 1. Although the Wendtian constructivist approach has been applied with significant effort in existing literature, the current literature has not yet adopted NOC and ROC as the frameworks of analysis in China-EU studies. This thesis fills in this gap by applying the less mainstream constructivist theoretical approaches in analysing China-EU relations through applying them to the developed corpora. This bridges discourse studies with IR studies. Therefore, NOC and ROC will be the focus of the theoretical discussion of this chapter.

2.2.1 Norm-Oriented Constructivism

NOC argues that norms matter since state interests are not intrinsic but constructed by social interactions and shaped by norms and values. Norms can change states' interests and behaviours and shift patterns of international relations (Green, 2002). The actor's interests are endogenous and socially constructed instead of exogenous and given (Ruggie, 1998).

2.2.1.1 Identity & Culture

One of the definitions of identity proposed by Katzenstein is that it is a "shorthand label for varying constructions of nation and statehood. The process of construction typically is explicitly political and pits conflicting actors against each other" (Katzenstein, 1996: 3). For

constructivists, identity, sometimes referred to as “collective distinctiveness” and purpose, are “variations across countries in the statehood that is enacted domestically and projected internationally” (Katzenstein, 1996: 3). He emphasises that the identities of states “emerge from their interactions with different social environments, both domestic and international” (Katzenstein, 1996: 11). In other words, “international and domestic environments shape state identities” (Katzenstein, 1996: 12).

For norm-oriented constructivists, culture, as defined by Katzenstein, is:

A broad label that denotes collective models of nation-state authority or identity, carried by custom or law. Culture refers to both a set of evaluative standards (such as norms and values) and a set of cognitive standards (such as rules and models) that define what social actors exist in a system, how they operate, and how they relate to one another (Katzenstein, 1996: 4).

The NOC concept of culture focuses more on the role of norms and rules. For Onuf, culture is constituted by consciousness and the rules internalised by people’s mind. Culture, in this sense, is a mixture of correlative rules and consciousness (Onuf, 1989). Dr Feng Xiao elaborated the definition of culture, stating that “culture can be understood within the interactive context where the consciousness of agents affects the constitution of rules and social arrangement” (Feng, 2004: 169). Katzenstein also uses the expression “collectively shared expectations”. He argues that collective expectations can lead to strong causal effects and therefore deserve careful scrutiny (Katzenstein, 1996: 4).

2.2.1.2 Norms

According to Katzenstein, the norm as a concept is applied by norm-oriented constructivists to describe “collective expectations for the proper behaviour of actors with a given identity” (Katzenstein, 1996: 3). He further illustrates that there are two ways norms constitute identities. First, norms can be rules which define the actor’s identity and specify the actor’s actions which leads to the actor being recognised by others by a particular identity. Second, norms can be standards which regulate the proper implementation of a previously defined identity. In the first case, the norms have “constitutive effects” while in the latter case, they have “regulative” effects. These two procedures can coexist in some cases (Katzenstein, 1996: 3).

2.2.2 Rule-oriented Constructivism

ROC was initiated by Nicolas Onuf and developed by the Miami International Relations Group (Kubalkova, Onuf & Kowert, 1998: x–xi). The ontological stance of ROC is based on a lineage of interdisciplinary approaches in social sciences, including language philosophy and sociology in the 20th century. ROC treats language as the primary matter which constructs social reality and takes discourse analysis as the main form of analysis. The point of departure is that discourse has a shaping power in the construction of the actors’ ideas and

the related institutions. Although the Wendtian constructivist approach has been applied extensively, the current literature has not yet adopted ROC as the framework of analysis in China-EU studies.

The core of ROC can be summarised by two main arguments. The first is “saying is doing”, or treating speech at acts (Kubalkova, Onuf & Kowert, 1998: xi). Specifically, different types of discourse shape different forms of relationship (Onuf, 1989). The second core argument is “rules make the rule” (Kubalkova, Onuf & Kowert, 1998: xi).

2.2.2.1 Speech Acts

ROC gives language an ontological position. Based on the speech act theory, Onuf categorised the three patterns of speech acts according to the way they achieve social effects:

- **Assertive speech acts:** We may assert something about the world that others will accept (or reject, qualify, etc.).
- **Directive speech acts:** We may demand that others do what we say.
- **Commissive speech acts:** We can make promises that have consequences for us if others accept them (Kubalkova, 2001a: 66).

Table 2-1 Discourse Patterns and their Correspondent Sentence Structure (Onuf, 1989)

Discourse Patterns	What is it	Typical sentence Structure
Assertive	Stating beliefs which the speaker wants the listener to accept or obey	X counts as Y
Directive	Expressing intentions which the speaker hopes that the listener will act as expected	X person must do Y
Commissive	Making promises which have consequences if accepted by the listener	I state I will do Y

Table 2-1 presents the three basic discourse patterns regarded by Onuf. It explains what each discourse pattern refers to and the typical sentence structure through which they are expressed. As shown in the table, Onuf classifies speech acts, or in the term applied in this thesis, discourse, into three types: assertive discourse, directives and commissive discourse. Assertive discourse usually appears when the speaker hopes the receiver will accept what has been stated. One of the typical sentence types is “X counts as Y”. Directive discourse can be simply understood as discourse giving directions, and the typical sentence structure can be “X person must do Y”. In producing directive discourse, the speaker focuses more on

the receiver's actions rather than that in uttering an assertive discourse. Commissive discourse usually consists of commitments or promises. Sentences such as "I state I will do Y" generate commissive discourse. Table 2-1 offers semantic and lexical features of each discourse type.

2.2.2.2 Rules Make Rule

The second core argument is "rules make the rule" (Kubalkova, Onuf & Kowert, 1998: xi). The concept of rules and rule should be distinguished here as they will be applied in the analysis of this thesis. In ROC, "rules" refer to social rules instead of logic, laws or principles of nature (Onuf, 1989: 79). They are "stated or stable" instructions which can lead to or can regulate human actions. They are often formed through words such as "I must; must not; may, need not; should, and should not" (Max Black cited in (Onuf, 1989: 79)). Rules are generated through repeated speech acts. Rules then determine the distribution of resources and yield rule (Kubalkova, 2001a: 69). The rule refers to the pattern of political society (Onuf, 1989: 196). The three basic types of "rule" identified by Onuf are hegemony, hierarchy, and heteronomy (Kubalkova, 2001a: 66). Table 2-2⁶ shows the correlations among discourse, rules and rule as well as the typical phrases, cultural formations and social-political systems matching each type of discourse.

Table 2-2 Correlations of Discourse, Rules and Rule

Speech Acts	Assertive	Directives	Commissive
Rules	Instruction-rules	Directive-rules	Commitment-rules
Associated Phrases	"I state", "affirm", "report", "characterize", "attribute", "insist", "dissent", "declare"	"I ask", "command", "demand", "caution", "permit"	"I promise", "offer"
Form of Rule	Hegemony Ideas and beliefs seem to do the ruling	Hierarchy Chain of command	Heteronomy Agent's roles defined by roles of others
Cultures/Civilizations /Political Systems /Modes of Activities	Premodern political systems Religions Nationalism, totalitarian and civilizations	"Warrior"-type occupations army Social sciences based on positivism fear/dread culture	Western capitalist/democratic/liberal state Liberal culture Commissive culture of capitalism (rights and duties) Guilt culture, sense of responsibility, concern over performance and failure

Adapted from the "Constructivist Synoptic Table" by (Kubáľková, 2001b: 67–69)

As Table 2-2 presents, assertive discourse is commonly expressed through phrases such as I "state, affirm, report, insist, declare". This type of discourse generates instructive-rules and leads to the rule of hegemony. Assertive discourse pattern is the pervasive discourse pattern in pre-modern political systems, religions, and totalitarian societies. One of the common

⁶ Adapted and edited parts in Italics.

features of these social systems is that the ideological idea plays an important role in ruling the society (Kubáľková, 2001b).

Directive discourse generates directive rules through phrases like “I ask, command, demand, permit”. This type of discourse produces the rule of hierarchy which entails a “chain of command”. According to Onuf, the rule of the hierarchy is the distinguishing feature of warrior-type societies, occupations, military organisations, positivist social sciences and in cultures where dread and fear are dominating features (Kubáľková, 2001b).

Commissive discourse generates commitment-rules which are often associated with phrases such as “I promise” and “I offer”. The rule produced by commissive discourse is termed as heteronomy. In the rule of heteronomy, the actors' roles are defined by each other. In other words, the actors are influenced, balanced and even determined by each other's role. Onuf pointed out that the rule of heteronomy is the defining ruling feature of Western capitalist countries with democratic systems. It is also pervasive in other forms of liberal culture as well as cultures in which the sense of guilt and shame, responsibility and reputations play an important role (Kubáľková, 2001b).

Table 2-2 makes up one of the analytic tools in this thesis. The correlations in the tables make it possible to identify lexical features and sentence patterns consistent with the types in the table and inferences about the type of rules, rule and social culture related to the discourse. For example, if a society is a Western democratic society, one can anticipate that its natural dominating discourse type should be commissive discourse and the rules generated will be commitment-rules with the major ruling pattern being heteronomy.

While ROC offers an analytical tool which can be applied in analysing texts, bridging the gap between the abstract nature of ideas and the discourse on paper, it also entails large numbers of controversies and critiques as the correlations between discourse, rules and rule seem to be too simplified compared with the complexity of language and the connotations behind them. Plus, the classifications of discourse type, which can generate certain types of rule are not exhaustive. The analysis of this thesis will apply this framework with a critical perspective towards the types of discourse as, in practice, ambiguity exists in discourse and the formation of certain types of rules and rule may not conform exactly to what has been presented in Table 2-1 and Table 2-2. There may not be clear cut divisions between assertive, directive and commissive discourse, and each type can transform into another under certain circumstances. Therefore, ROC has been applied in the discourse analysis under the guidance but not completely restricted by the framework offered above.

2.2.3 Normative Power Europe

Ian Manners introduced the concept of normative power in his paper in 2002 “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?”. Manners constructed this concept through first reviewing the debates between Hedley Bull, the ‘English School’ Writer, who argued that in

the 1980s the civilian power of the EU was subject to the military power of the states (Bull, 1982), and writers including François Duchêne who claimed that civilian power was taking over traditional military power in the international arena (Duchêne, 1973). Contributing to this debate, Manners argued that since the 1990s, the EU had been showing a supplemental power which is the ability to define what activities are passed as “normal” in international relations. He argues that this power to define what is normal is the greatest power of all. Normative power, in this sense, is not a term in contradiction. In fact, being able to shape what is norm is the biggest power. The EU's normative power lies not only in what the EU does, but what the EU is (Manners, 2002: 253).

Since then, Manners developed this concept through years of critical reviews of it. In his 2006 paper “Normative Power Europe Reconsidered: beyond the Crossroads”, he reconsiders the relationship between military power, civilian power and the normative power of Europe. Responding to the literature at the time arguing that the EU should enhance its defence and crisis management through increasing its military power, Manners argues that military power does not have to affect the normative power of the EU if it's carried out with critical reflections rather than the pursuit of being a great power. However, military power beyond the EU's crossroads defined by the European security strategy is weakening the normative claims of the EU (Manners, 2006).

In 2009, Manners clarified his conceptualisation of normative power in his paper “The Concept of Normative Power in World Politics” by further explaining the dimensions consisting of normative power including ideational aspects, principles, actions, impact and consequences. He also introduces four possible criteria to judge the EU's impact: clarity, simplicity, partnership and timescale (sustainability) (Manners, 2009a). These criteria provide a way not only to understand the EU as a normative power but also to explore the potential of other entities, such as China, being a normative power.

The core of his concept roots from his vision of a future world not merely regulated by material power only but by the power of ideas, culture, and visions. This, again, is related to the creation of the European Union to make wars in Europe unthinkable mind-wise and impossible material-wise. Manners believes that by exercising normative power, the EU can contribute to this future of world politics (Manners, 2009a).

Manners pointed out in 2009 that normative power as a concept emphasises holistic thinking and practices which can be justified. The concept also helps promote the respect of both material power and the power of the idea in the world which, according to Manners, contributes to “a more sustainable world politics” (Manners, 2009a: 4). From this perspective, Manners, without undervaluing the power of materials, has a vision of a world respecting the power of ideas. This vision stands behind the creation of this concept and its dimensions. This emphasis on the power of ideas also connects with the possibility of a normative power

in China as China bears a culture which has deep roots and the power of Chinese traditional ideas penetrates all areas of Chinese society, including the government's policymaking.

Manners argues that the EU is a normative power as it creates new norms and standards which differ from the traditional state-centrality in international politics, although he retains doubts about whether the EU has been acting ethically to reach the true standards of being normative (Manners, 2008). The major source of the EU's normative power is its values and rules. The EU's fundamental values include the protection of human rights, the rule of law and democracy. As the preamble of the Lisbon Treaty states, the member states of the EU:

(...)draw(ing) inspiration from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe, from which have developed the universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law (The European Union, 2008).

The EU feels responsible for impacting the world with its norms. As former High Representative Javier Solana commented:

The EU has the responsibility to work for the 'global common good'. That is a fitting way of describing the EU's global role and ambition (Aggestam, 2008: 6).

According to Manners, the EU has aimed at "prosperity in Europe and beyond" since it was established (Manners, 2009a: 22). In this sense extending its values to other parts of the world is one of the EU's intrinsic features or the foundation it is built on. Referring to EU official discourse, the primary normative goals and principles are stated in the Treaty on European Union:

The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law (The European Union, 2008)

This part titled "general provisions on the Union's external action" confirms that promoting democracy, the rule of law, human rights, equality and solidarity and respect for the UN charter are the prioritised goals of the EU's normative practices.

2.2.4 Application and Debates in China-EU Studies

Although the EU claims to work to promote "the common good in international society" (Aggestam, 2009), there are many voices against the legitimacy of its ambition. Is the EU an eligible normative power? While the EU tries to promote its values, do these values sound attractive to other countries? Manners is critical about the ethics of the EU as a normative

power. In his article "The Normative Ethics of the European Union", he argues that the EU is a normative power but that it does not necessarily act in a normative, or an ethical way (Manners, 2008).

Similarly, the legitimacy or the justification of the EU's normative power has been viewed critically by both Western and Chinese scholars. For the EU, one of the central themes is the EU as a normative power and how this would affect its approach to China. Although the EU as a normative power has been widely accepted since Ian Manners put forward the concept, the legitimacy, or the justification of the EU's normative power has been viewed critically by both Western and Chinese scholars. Despite the EU's claims to work to promote "the common good in international society" (Aggestam, 2009), there are voices against the legitimacy of this ambition. On this, Manners himself is critical about the ethics of the EU as a normative power. In his article "The Normative Ethics of the European Union", he argues that the EU is a normative power but does not necessarily act in a normative, or an ethical way (Manners, 2008). Many other Western scholars point out that the universality of the EU's norms is problematic. Gerrits pointed out that Europe has misplaced a sense of universalism (Gerrits, 2009). Aggestam, while recognising part of the eligibility of the EU norms as they are derived from the United Nations, does raise questions about whether the EU can force other actors to change and whether the norms are attractive to developing countries (Aggestam, 2009).

In terms of the universality of the EU's values, Chinese scholars are, in general, critical, although most of them do recognise the good intentions of the EU. Song Lilei recognises that the EU, as a normative power, bears a sense of responsibility and a historical perspective. Due to its experience in the war, the EU feels obliged to promote the values of peace, democracy and the structural model of itself (Song, 2008). Wang Yiwei doubts the legitimacy of the EU's "responsibility". He takes the position that while the EU represents a small population in the world who live in a post-modern society with post-modern values, most countries in the rest of the world are not in post-modern stages. There is a gap between the EU's idealism and the realities of other countries. Particularly, he emphasised that China-EU relations should not be mistaken for "teacher-student" relations (Wang Yiwei, 2009). Others argue that it is not so much about which norms are universal, but whether the promoters of the norms are in the power centre of the world's politics. The normative power is just the pursuit of self-interest and real political power under another name (Cui, 2007; Wang, 2015).

Kavalski draws attention to the potential growing significance of normative powers in Asia, including China, India, and Japan. He argues that normative power is the one which is deemed as such by others. He argues that in Manner's theoretical system on normative power, one of the core criteria is that a normative power can "shape what can be 'normal' in international life" (Kavalski, 2013: 247). Normative power emerges from their interactions

with others. One essential of being a normative power, therefore, is to be recognised by others as one (Kavalski, 2013).

Kavalski found that most Asian scholars apply the framework of soft power in defining these powers instead of normative power. The reasons, according to him, could be that the Asian scholars are "disinterested in engaging with the propositions and concepts of European IR" due to the complexity of the EU. He also pointed out that "European international relations scholars have expended little effort to translate the applicability of their terminology to non-EU actors and contexts (both because of the all-persuasive nature of the EU and also because of the positioning of Asian Studies outside the international relations curriculum)" (Kavalski, 2013: 248). Besides, he noticed that both European and Asian IR scholars tend to apply the US IR view which leads to a further rift between Asian and European IR approaches instead of bridging the differences between the two groups (Kavalski, 2013).

Guo, Wang and Yang argue that China's normative power in Central Asia is embodied in three well-received principles: first, the independent sovereignty; second, mutually beneficial peaceful development; third, harmonious world seeking common grounds and keeping differences. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) (China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) is the platform where China's normative power in central power mostly shows (Guo, Wang & Yang, 2016). They have been very positive about China being a normative power and have stated that:

Normative power is a goal many countries pursue. Although due to power relations between big countries, regional regulations, competitions among organisations and self-constraints, the space and scope of China's normative power in central Asia is limited. However, it is certain that rising China will become a normative power. (Guo, Wang & Yang, 2016: 85).

Wang Zhengxu considers that China's current strategy is to transfer part of the power in the previous European and American centred international order to emerging countries represented by China as well as other developing countries. He names this strategy "Incremental Inter-Continentalism" (Wang Zhengxu, 2015). He thinks that the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), BRICS cooperation mechanism, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP) as well as Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) are all manifestations of Incremental Inter-Continentalism. They all aim to open new fields and platforms in international cooperation without challenging the existing platforms of international cooperation and global governance (Wang Zhengxu, 2015).

What would be the values, or norms China holds for this Incremental Inter-Continentalism? Wang argues that Peace and Development are two central values of this strategy. Peace

and Development, according to Wang, guide both China's domestic development and its global diplomacy.

On this, Wang Zhengxu and Zheng Yongnian have similar views on that the rise of China which has brought the world the value of peace, openness, and an inclusive developmental style (Zheng cited in Wang, 2015). They argue that China's value behind its global strategy is different from the US value and the European. Peace and development are also what the world needs, especially among developing countries as well as countries suffering from economic recession such as developed countries in Europe (Wang, 2015). In this sense, China's rise has an apparent normative impact. The rise of China is not only a rise geopolitically and geoeconomically but the rise of Peace and Development as two values (Wang, 2015).


2.3 Constructivist IPE: Material Power vs Ideas

International political economy (IPE) traditionally discusses how the economy works in the international system. Throughout the years, Constructivist IPE, or CIPE, has arisen and developed to integrate considerations of the power of ideas and thought within the international political-economic system.

Nowadays, most IPE scholars have adopted more or less a consensus that some constructivist understandings of IPE are necessary. The main assumptions of constructivist IPE include the idea that interests are not predetermined but constructed through identities; ideas have some causal efficacy; values are constituted through social principles, and human actions are influenced continuously by their reflections on the actions. The methodological approach in line with this is that hermeneutics, instead of purely data, should be integrated into social science. The constructivist perspective gives IPE the conceptual framework through which institutional facts are constructed and bear the features of being observer-dependent (Martijn Konings, 2015).

The earlier version of constructivist IPE was closely associated Robert Cox's historical materialism, especially the Gramscian-inspired version. Coxian Critical Theory (CCT) has been one crucial source of inspiration for the British school of IPE (Leysens, 2008). Cox, in his paper "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory", put forward the model of the Three Categories in Historical Structure in order to capture the operation of the economy in the world system with a historical view (Cox, 1981).


Table 2-3 Cox's Historical Structure of International Political Economy (Cox, 1981)



Cox argues that in this structure, material capabilities are both productive and destructive and they exist in the form of technological and organisational capabilities as well as natural resources, equipment and wealth (Cox, 1981). In this system, ideas exist in two forms: one is intersubjective meanings, or as Cox puts in, the “shared notions of the nature of social relations which tend to perpetuate habits and expectations of behaviour”. In practice, these include the rules and norms regulated by states and other political entities. Another form of ideas is a historical structure which is “collective images of social order” such as the meaning of justice and public good (Cox, 1981: 136).

Although Cox’s model has wide meanings, the element particularly contributing to the theoretical framework of this thesis is the mutually constitutive relationship between material capabilities and ideas. Figure 2-3 takes this element out and presents this mutual construction between material power and ideas/thoughts.

Figure 2-3 Mutual Construction between Material Power and Ideas/Thoughts



Now if we combine Figure 2-2 and Figure 2-3, we can get a triangle relationship: the mutual construction among ideas/thoughts, material power and discourse power as shown in Figure 2-4.

Figure 2-4 Mutual Construction Among Ideas/Thoughts, Material Power and Discourse Power (Source: own work)




Figure 2-4 demonstrates three sets of mutual constitution: between ideas/thoughts and discourse power, between ideas/thoughts and material power and between material power and discourse power. The first two sets are derived from Cox's constructivist IPE, and the second set is derived from ROC, especially the part about speech acts. This synthesis of theoretical approaches paves the way for the next step of theoretical framework development as the framework is developed in a manner that the relationship between elements is discussed set by set and at last, leads to the final model as will be shown in Figure 2-5.

This thesis takes the position that there are dialectic relations between market and society. Apart from Cox, this dialectic relationship is also close to Karl Polanyi's arguments of the double movements between national societies and the international economy. In his book *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time* published in the 1940s, sampling on how the unregulated market threatened society and people's lives in England in the 19th century, Polanyi argues that market is embedded in the society and there has been a dialectical process of marketisation and social-cultural trends to protect against the changes.

On the one hand, the development of market institutions leads to the social culture of free trade as laissez-faire reformers, who believed that the market is self-regulated and attempted what Polanyi has called a "market society" where everything is commodified. On the other hand, marketisation led to a countermovement where social protectionist actions such as the creation of labour laws and tariffs arose (Polanyi, 1944).

Despite the age of Polanyi's book, his critiques of market liberalism, especially on the idea that the self-regulating market is the organising force behind both national societies and international economy (Polanyi, 1944), is still relevant and significant in understanding the

global situations today. The idea of Double Movement is applied in this thesis as a link between social factors and the international economic system. The commonness of CCT, Neo-Gramscian School and Polanyi's Double Movement theory is that ontologically and epistemologically, they hold on to dialectic views instead of the traditional empirically-oriented approach as in realist and liberalist theories of IPE (Bai, 2011).


The thesis is taking this dialectic historical constructivist view that social realities are the result of interactions between discourse, human cognition, cultures and those of the material resources in the world. The analysis in this thesis, therefore, will be based on the empirical data which arises from the discourse materials. However, these data will be considered in the context of the changing economic status of China and the EU in the world system and the cultural and ideological dynamics which come with the economic changes.

2.4 Synthesised Theoretical Framework: Discourse, Normative and Economic Power

This thesis takes a theoretical approach which considers the interactions among these three aspects in understanding the challenges in China-EU relations. Official discourse is taken as the primary source consisting of discourse between China and the EU, constituted by thoughts and constituting thoughts and ideas, and then shaping norms and in the meantime being shaped by norms in China-EU relations.

A synthesised theoretical framework is demonstrated in Figure 2-5. This framework is an original theoretical device for this thesis and will guide the data code, theme-searching and data analysis of this thesis.

Figure 2-5 Mutual Construction among Normative Power, Material Power and Discourse Power (Source: own work)



The theories informing the thesis originate from multiple disciplines, including Linguistics, IR and IPE. Three essential elements, namely normative power, material power, and discourse

power, form the elements of this triangle relationship where all elements construct each other. The rationale of this framework is based on the step-by-step development of the mutual constructive relationship between norms and discourse, material power and ideas/thoughts, and languages and ideas/thoughts as illustrated in previous sections of the chapter.

The framework binds Linguistics, IR and IPE through NOC and ROC which treat languages as having an ontological status. The premises of NOC and ROC inform the mutual constitution between normative power and discourse power. ROC argues that speeches are actions, and they shape rules, which then have the potential to evolve into rule. Rule is a form of political paradigm in a society such as the rule of hegemony, heteronomy and hierarchy. Such rule, or social structures, are formed by collective norms. In this sense, discourse and norms are also mutually constructive.

The mutual construction between material power and discourse power is an extension of the assumptions of CIPE and especially its earlier inspiration from Robert Cox's historical materialism, which incorporates and role of ideas and thoughts in the formation of social, political-economic structures.

These two sets of mutual construction with the common element of discourse power leads to the mutual constructive relationship between normative power and material power, thus creating the full triangle of relations among the three elements which are mutually constructive.

This synthesised theoretical framework, informed by NOC and ROC, IPE, and the linguistic philosophy of Language Relativity bridges multiple disciplines and is one of the original creations of this thesis. The analysis in the empirical chapters will be carried out within this framework.

Chapter 3 Methodology

The thesis develops a machine-readable specialised corpus and carries out corpus-driven discourse analysis on China-EU challenges. The establishment and application of the corpora make the thesis methodological driven. It is interdisciplinary research combining international relations (IR) studies, discourse analysis and corpora linguistics. The techniques of corpora linguistics have assisted the discourse analysis of the official discourse between China and the EU, contributing to examining and understanding the challenges in China-EU relations from a discursive perspective.

This chapter consists of five sections.

Section 3.1 reviews the constructivist discourse analysis in IR studies in general and the application of this approach in China-EU relations. It then presents the definitions of discourse as applied in this thesis.

Section 3.2 reviews the existing foreign policy analysis in China-EU studies with a special focus on the research incorporating discourse and norm-oriented foreign policy analysis.

Section 3.3 presents the research design, including the ontological and epistemological stances, and decision making about the time scope covered by the thesis.

Section 3.4 introduces the research methods applied in this thesis and the approaches for data analysis. These include the grounded theory-informed constructivist discourse analysis and the specific research methods applied in the thesis, including corpus-driven discourse analysis, content analysis and critical discourse analysis. It also presents the methodological framework, which combines different aspects of mismatches with the levels of discourse.

Section 3.5 introduces the steps of corpora establishment in this research, including the selection of materials, handling translations and versions, the structure of the corpora as well as the selection of software to assist data organisation and analysis.

3.1 Constructivist Discourse Analysis

Discourse analysis is not only a research method but also entails an ontology which endows human language with primary importance in creating social realities. Discourse analysis can be viewed as both a theory and a method as it is one of the approaches where research methods are closely intertwined with theoretical and methodological bases (Cameron, 2001; Jorgensen & J.Philips, 2002). It can focus on both the formal and functional aspects of discourse (Cameron, 2001; Jorgensen & J.Philips, 2002). Discourse analysis in IR studies has developed for more than thirty years since it emerged in the 1980s. Although different approaches have been taken by scholars, the common ontological stance of the discourse-oriented approach in IR studies remains the same: discourse is deemed not only as the

reflection of the real world but also a creating and shaping power for social facts. Discourse analysis in IR illustrates how texts and social process are interconnected and explores the implications of the double movements between discourse and facts in specific cases in international relations (George, 1994: 191).

3.1.1 Discourse: Definition and Application

While discourse can simply refer to “the general domain of all statements” (Foucault, 1972: 80), or “the language in use” (Brown & Yule, 1983), the definition of discourse taken in this thesis emphasises the social functions of discourse. The connotations of discourse in this thesis are close to those given, respectively, by Foucault, Fairclough and Yule. George Yule defines discourse as “language beyond the sentences”, and discourse analysis is the study of language in texts and conversations (Yule, 2010). According to Foucault, discourse is:

[A] Group of statements which provide a language for talking about a way of representing the knowledge about a particular topic at a particular historical moment: discourse is about the production of knowledge through language. However, since all social practices entail meaning, and meaning shapes and influences what we do — our conduct — all practices have a discursive aspect (Foucault cited in Hall, 1997: 44).

Fairclough distinguishes the definitions of discourse as an abstract noun and as a countable noun:

Discourse (as an abstract noun) is “language use conceived as social practise” (Fairclough, 2013: 135).

Discourse (as a countable noun) is a “way of signifying experience from a particular perspective” (Fairclough, 2013: 135).

These definitions of discourse emphasise the social function and constructive power of discourse. This is compatible with Nicolas Onuf’s language-oriented constructivist assumptions that discourse constructs social realities: discourse shapes people’s conduct and the social world. Social nature is the defining feature of the discourse in this thesis. Therefore, instead of taking discourse as simply arbitrary human signs, in this thesis, I take discourse as purposeful social activities expressed through human language.

Discourse analysis is the main method applied throughout the thesis. While the thesis does not reject that social interactions can also shape language, in turn, as the constructive process between language and social realities can be mutual, most chapters focus on the constitutive power of discourse instead of the other way around since corpus-driven discourse analysis contributes more to the former than the latter. Chapter 8, however, incorporates discussion on the double-direction interactions between economic power and normative discourse between China and the EU.

3.1.2 The Constructivist Discourse Analysis in IR

Traditionally, discourse analysis is not what mainstream IR scholars would do to interpret problems. However, since the 1980s, more and more people have started to shift their attention from military clashes, security issues and other material variants to the role of languages, cultures, and softer variants in IR. Many scholars have, consciously or unconsciously, adopted methods of discourse analysis in their works.

Discourse analysis, in combination with the constructivist approach in international relations and foreign policy analysis, has been adopted by an increasing number of scholars in IR studies, especially in the last decade. Constructivism and discourse analysis share similar ontological and epistemological considerations regarding the constructive power of language. Constructivist discourse analysis entails an ontology which endows human language with primary importance in creating social realities. Individuals' efforts (Li, 2006; Scott, 2007b; Pickering, 2014; Holslag, 2010; Zhang L., 2016) have been testing various ways to merge discourse analysis and constructivist theories as mentioned in the last section. Despite the existing efforts, some challenges in a discourse-oriented constructivist analysis of China-EU relations stand out. It is hard to tell how significant the existing records and documents on China-EU diplomatic relations are since a lot of official EU papers merely present expectations rather than specific plans for action. Furthermore, when some Chinese scholars discuss the relationship between China and Europe, they fail to define whether it is the EU, or the EU member states they are working on. In addition, there is a lack of integrated policies towards the EU as China tends to interact with individual member states quite actively and the policies towards the EU are sometimes mingled with policies towards Europe and EU member states (Chen, 2003).

3.1.3 Discourse Analysis in China-EU Studies

In China-EU studies, discourse analysis has developed significantly in the last decade. In 2009, Professor Snyder published the book *The European Union and China, 1949-2008: Basic Documents and Commentary* (Snyder, 2009) which is a refined, well-balanced combination of the key documents with observations by Snyder based on his cumulative research work over the years (Zeng, 2011). The document list on "EU and China Policy Papers" in this masterpiece (Snyder, 2009: 311) provides the selection criteria for the documents analysed in this paper. As this book is primarily a collection of all the essential official documents in EU-China relations, the commentaries are sometimes brief. The analysis of the documents is based on the author's understanding of the policymaking instead of on contents and policies conveyed in the documents. It is more of an encyclopaedia-like collection on China-EU official documents rather than an argumentative book. It offers a valuable resource for building the specialised corpus in this thesis, especially for the Corpus on the EU's discourse on China.

A few pieces of work have adopted discourse analysis as a primary method in analysing China-EU bilateral relations (Li, 2006; Scott, 2007b; Pickering, 2014). Although this approach has not been the mainstream in China-EU studies, the past decade has witnessed a significant improvement in the application of discourse analysis in China-EU studies. One significant attempt has been made by Holslag who worked on the proportion of the clauses on four different topics in the EU's agreements, statements, and sectorial dialogues with BRICS countries in order to explore the EU's policy preferences with the emerging powers. The sentence patterns, more specifically, the themes of the clauses were counted and organised with the findings presented (Holslag, 2010). This piece of work offers an alternative look at the policy priorities from a semantic perspective, which shares some similarities with the methodology of this paper. However, this attempt does not involve corpus establishment, or computer-assisted analysis as the number of documents was small (only four official EU documents). In a more recent attempt taking a discourse analysis approach on EU-China relations, Dr. Zhang carried out an analysis of media discourse on the profile of the EU and that of EU-China relations based on several sets of discourse data, in turn based on Chinese news articles published by the Chinese state-media (Zhang 2016). This study is data-bounded and takes a longitudinal perspective to observe the evolution of China's perceptions of the EU over the years. However, official policy papers were not used as part of the materials (Zhang L., 2016).

In some other pieces of work, discourse analysis has been adopted as a supporting method in analysing conceptual differences (Zhu & Zhang, 2002; Zhang, 2008b, 2008a; Men, 2011; Zhou, 2011a; Chen & Song, 2012) and strategic divergences (Scott, 2007a; Murray, 2010; Cairn, 2010; Mattlin, 2012) between China and the EU.

Although quite a few studies have applied discourse analysis, there is a lack of systematic discourse analysis based on official documents and speeches which take a comparative and temporal perspective. Official discourse has been undervalued as it is commonly regarded as dry, vague and sometimes empty. Established corpora of China-EU official discourse in combination with domestic official discourse of China and the EU's foreign policy discourse do not yet exist. Understanding challenges in China-EU relations from a discursive point of view based on such a corpus offers an alternative way to look at the interactions between discourse construction and the ups and downs in China-EU relations from a dynamic, diachronic perspective. This is what this thesis strives for: exploring the potential of the large numbers of official discourse papers, which are considerably undervalued, so as to understand the problems and tensions between China and the EU and offer findings, or explanations to the puzzle, in ways which are hard to achieve without the involvement of official discourse.

Modifiers set the directions and reflect the motivations of the speakers. Regarding international relations, the modifiers of strategic terms imply the policy-makers' intentions.

One example is the modification of 'engagement' in China-EU relations. While the notion of "reciprocal engagement" emphasising a mutual-beneficial approach was raised by EU think tanks (Godement & Fox, 2009), in contrast, the Chinese side raised the notion "constructive engagement" which was result-oriented (Feng, 2009: 67). The connotation of engagement, according to Caira, is that as China's economic ability increases, the EU started to regard China as important source of solutions to global problems. The EU expects China to make more contributions to global governance (Caira, 2010: 265). It is also said that from the EU's perspective, "engagement implies opposing containment, especially in the mind of the Chinese leaders, and it underlines the different European, and the US approaches China's rising role in the world" (Caira, 2010: 265). However, this connotation of engagement is based on the EU's perspective on China's role in the world and is likely to be interpreted in another way again by the Chinese authority. The future policy guiding China-EU relations might, therefore, have to be a combination of the proposals from both the EU and Chinese perspective to make sure the cognition of both sides remains consistent.

Another thing to notice is that the EU contains complications as a discourse producer. Each of the EU's member states has its own discourse towards China. The discourse patterns produced by states diverge, and the EU cannot always represent their member states' voices. Regarding EU institutions, the European Mission, the European Council and the Parliament have played different, sometimes contradictory roles in carrying EU's China policy which makes China confused. Furthermore, member states of the EU have different China policies which increase the difficulties for China to respond coherently (Caira, 2010).

3.2 Constructivist Foreign Policy Analysis

Methodologically, there has been a demarcation between IR analysis and foreign policy analysis (FPA) in IR studies. While IR focuses more on structure, FPA focuses on agents. Discussing FPA is helpful for understanding the methodological design of this thesis in terms of the methodological gaps it fills.

This part, therefore, reviews the literature on constructivist FPA with a focus on the pieces applying discourse analysis in their FPA regarding the EU's external policies and the foreign policy-making styles in China-EU relations.

Among the FPAs in China-EU relations, the increasing autonomy of China-EU relations as a bilateral relationship has often been undermined. The role of the US is often involved in the discussion as proved in some scholarly research. While the US position does have a strong impact on China-EU relations, particularly on the EU's attitudes to China, the autonomy of China-EU relations as bilateral relations and the dynamics between the two as two large entities in the world should be addressed.

3.2.1 Level of Analysis: Structure vs Agent

Methodologically, efforts have been made to synthesise discourse analysis with IR theories and create an analytical model like that of Nikola Tomic (Tomic, 2013). Nikola Tomic put forward a discursive, institutional model for analysing EU foreign policies. He mentioned that, as shown in the table below, traditionally discourse analysis in FPA is in line with the structure-oriented approach, while cognitive and psychological approaches and other micro and mid-level analysis are agency-oriented.

Table 3-1 Positioning Discourse Analysis in Foreign Policy Analysis Based on Tomic (2013: 224).

Orientations	Structure-oriented	Agent-oriented
Level of analysis	Macro analysis	Micro and/or mid-level analysis
Approaches	Discursive analysis	Cognitive and psychological approach Bureaucratic politics approach

Tomic tries to merge the traditionally structure-oriented discourse analysis with the agent-oriented approach since a micro analysis from an institutional perspective is more suitable for analysing EU foreign policies. It is natural that macro analysis of China-EU relations starts with the overall structure, but considering the complications going on among the EU member states and the drastic changes and reforms going on inside China, a bottom-up analysis which incorporates domestic policy analysis could contribute to the weak links in the existing big-picture research on China-EU relations.

3.2.2 The EU's External Policymaking on China

The literature on the EU's foreign policy on China includes two general focuses: one that focuses on the decision-making with the EU and one that focuses on the engagement style between China and the EU.

There is less literature in the former group, perhaps due to the complexities of the EU's policymaking in the first place and the context of China-EU relations creates more challenges for researchers who are experts in European studies. A remarkable effort is made by Stumbaum, who provided an analytical framework for understanding the variables in the EU's policymaking when it comes to China. She highlighted four independent variables (IV) in the EU's policy-making on China, which include the role of parliaments, public opinion and media reports, business lobbies and external actors (Stumbaum, 2009). Later in 2012, she extended the scope from the EU's internal policymaking to the conceptual gaps between China and the EU which takes a constructivist perspective which is closer to the second type of approach (Stumbaum & Xiong, 2012).

A significant number of scholars took the second approach and have argued that the problems in the China-EU relationship are a result of the different engagement styles of the Chinese government and the EU. One of their proposals is that the EU should take a benefits-oriented approach in its relations with China rather than the “unconditional engagement” or “value-based” approach which is adopted. They think the EU should require more benefit from China other than offering China favourable conditions and expecting China to behave as the EU anticipates (Godement & Fox, 2009: 1–2).

In *A Power Audit of EU-China Relations*, Godement and Fox categorise the 27 EU member states into four groups, namely: “Assertive Industrialists”, “Ideological Free-traders”, “Accommodating Mercantilists” and “European Followers” based on their approaches to deal with a rising China (Godement & Fox, 2009: 3–5). Following a similar logic of categorisation, Mattlin, in studying the EU’s normative policy toward China, tried to put EU-China policies into the wider context of the EU’s foreign policies with all other nations. Based on the different forms the EU’s normative policy takes, he put the “target countries” of the EU into four groups, namely: “prospective accession countries”, “small developing countries”, “established democratic countries” and “major non-democratic countries” (Mattlin, 2012: 184).

Mattlin further pointed out that for different blocks of countries, the EU has different leverages and the leverage for the first group is the biggest. The second group mainly refers to African countries, and the third includes the US, Japan, Canada and Australia. China sits in the fourth and most interesting group since countries in these groups have distinct cultures and values compared to those of the EU (Mattlin, 2012: 184).

3.2.3 Discourse and Norm-oriented Foreign Policy Analysis

These efforts, although not explicit discourse analysis, can be viewed as efforts to categorise the discourse type of the EU member states in their relations with China and vice versa. Regarding my thesis, it will be interesting to discuss how a discourse producer, facing a different type of partner, applies a different type of discourse pattern. There can be arguments that discourse pattern is influenced by the power of the participators in the dialogue. This also leads to the question of assessing China’s power and globalisation.

Holslag combined discourse analysis with quantitative analysis. He incorporated the analysis of sample quotations in investigating the effects of the EU’s normative approach in its relations with BRICS countries (Holslag, 2010: 4–7). He calculated the agreements and protocols made between the EU and the BRICS countries from 2003 to 2010 and found out that only 3 of the 24 related to international political and security issues. All the rest were about trade matters. He then made a quantitative analysis of the EU’s articles, sections, clauses, sectorial dialogues and working groups with the BRICS countries and got similar results: most cooperation between the EU and the BRICS were in the field of trade rather

than on issues of international order, politics and security (Holslag, 2010: 1). This does not match the EU's ambition which is to develop "a stronger international society, well function international institutions and a rule-based international order" (Council of the European Union, 2003: 9).

Mattlin's and Holslag's approaches incorporate features of discourse analysis. After all, norms and values are soft powers which have to be expressed through language. What they did is to generalise the ideas of the documents based on their experiences and understanding. In other words, they take their generalisation of the EU's normative power for granted without proving it. This thesis tries to fill this gap by collecting actual discourse materials and investigating the discourse patterns of these documents by the application of words, sentences, the figure of speech, rhetorical devices and other indicators of discourse patterns.

Murray has compared the EU's goal of engaging with East Asia as a "regional interlocutor" with East Asia (Murray, 2010: 253). This ambition has met both opportunities and challenges. On the one hand, there are increasing meetings and dialogues between the EU and Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), such as the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM). Besides, the EU has been taken by some East Asian countries as a model regarding regional integration (Murray, 2010: 255). On the other hand, however, the EU's approach to and experiences with regionalisation are different to what the East Asian countries want. It, therefore, has to be cautious when approaching East Asia and properly handle the clashes between some Asian countries such as that between China and Japan (Murray, 2010: 260). Despite these difficulties, the EU's determination to become a regional interlocutor with East Asia will not change (Murray, 2010: 260).

Scott also incorporates discourse analysis, though not completely, in his investigation of the difficulties and possibilities of China-EU relations by looking into some key concepts and official terms of both sides. He regards that the concept and the formation of the "strategic dialogue" mechanism between China and EU in 2005 ironically reflects the ineffectiveness of the existing "strategic partnership", a term applied since the 2003 EU-China summit (Scott, 2007b: 13). He also discusses the ambiguities and paradoxes reflected by the term "peaceful rise", which was adopted by the Chinese government in 2003 and revised into "peaceful development" in 2004 (Scott, 2007b: 21–23). Furthermore, he looks into the official Chinese concept of "multi-polarity" and quotes many related Chinese official discourses including Tang Jiaxuan, Zhu Rongji and Hu Jintao's speeches as well as the illustrations in *Beijing Review* (Scott 2007: 28–33). Scott pays special attention to when and where terms came into usage. While Scott does not highlight that he was taking a discursive approach, there are clear indications that discourse analysis is a big part of his research method.

Caira gives credit to the role of discourse between China and the EU and the interrelations between official discourse and cooperation projects. She identified that the years between 1998 and 2006 formed a period when China and the EU had a “peer approach to issues” in terms of the pattern of the relationship. In this period, political dialogues, sector dialogues and cooperation projects are the main components of the China-EU relationship. She observed that many EU documents towards China were issued in this period. She further pointed out this pattern of dialogue has proved to be effective since the three elements, namely the sector discourse, the political dialogues and the cooperation projects, are interrelated. While sector discourse, playing the role of a “conveyor belt”, enhances the overall political dialogues and facilitates the progression of cooperation projects, the overall political dialogues and cooperation projects are mutually enhancing as well. The policies and guidelines were implemented through dialogues and embodied as projects (Caira, 2010: 265).

Some others, being critical about the EU’s normative approach to China, argue that the problems in China-EU relations have resulted from the complications and incompetency of the EU itself and therefore the EU should address its internal problems first instead of trying to convert other countries to European norms and values (Balducci, 2010; Mattlin, 2012; Holslag, 2010). Balducci, for example, considers that the EU and its member states have different norms which lead to a disunited and disintegrated norm of the EU. This incoherence in normative contents can be a “normative trap” in bilateral relations (Balducci, 2010).

A common focus of the above arguments is the EU’s normative approach, and norms and values play essential roles in the ideology of the EU. The notion of NPE was raised by Ian Manners in 2002. He introduces this notion to explain Europe’s approach from another perspective other than the previous “Civilian Power Europe” and “Military Power Europe” (Manners, 2002). For him, “normative” means the “ability to shape conceptions of normal” (Manners, 2002: 240). He also pointed out that the basis of normative Europe includes the centrality of peace, the idea of liberty, democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights (Manners, 2002: 242).

Although these scholars have noticed the disjunction between a normative EU and a realist China, they do not fundamentally oppose the normative nature of the EU. Their emphasis is that the EU should reserve its normative nature to itself rather than regarding exporting it to China as the priority (Holslag, 2010: 2). What is more, while norms are the focus of these two approaches and both consider non-material facts such as the power of values and norms, the approaches mentioned above do not take constructivism as their theoretical framework. The first approach is, in fact, closer to a realist approach while the second reflects liberal ideas about the development of the EU.

Furthermore, although authors of the policy analysis approach noticed the influence of the different engagement styles of China and the EU in their mutual relations, how the engagement styles were shaped was not sufficiently researched. The intentions and values of the policymakers were neglected. This may be due to the language barriers between China and the EU since Chinese is the only official language while the EU countries can adopt English as a common language when necessary. Carrying out a discourse-based constructivist approach may contribute to the understanding of the underlying intentions of the policymakers of the two sides and promote mutual understanding between China and the EU.

3.3 Research Design

The research design of this thesis is to analyse the official discourse of China and the EU from 1994 to 2019 via constructivist discourse analysis. More specifically, corpus-driven content analysis (CCA) in combination with critical discourse analysis (CDA) are applied in the thesis as the methods for implementing constructivist discourse analysis.

For the sake of consistency, the overall research method adopted in the thesis can be referred to as a corpus-driven content analysis. Each element of the methods involved, including corpus linguistics (CL), content analysis (CA), and critical discourse analysis (CDA) plays a role in this synthesised methodological approach. CL provides guidance in establishing and coding the discourse database, or corpora, and offers a top-down perspective of the discourse content in terms of the consistency of certain content and the changes in the topic priorities and some terms over the years. One thing to note is that although machine-reading forms a large part of corpus linguistic analysis and corpus-linguistics tools such as Nvivo and Lancsbox are involved in the analysis of the discourse, it would be wrong to assume that this does not involve human effort as the design of queries (specific searches of discourse) is entirely up to the design of the researcher, and using the tools wisely to get meaningful results forms a separate task in the thesis. CA selects relevant discourse on certain themes and reads them in-depth with a comparative perspective so that the gist of China and the EU's thoughts and goals can be understood. This part does not involve machine-reading and is done purely through human effort in selecting and categorising discourse on different topics and themes based on the themes and aspects that stand out in the top-down computer-assisted corpus linguistic analysis. CA also complements the top-down approach of the Corpus Linguistic analysis with a bottom-up approach, so the macro-perspective of the discourse with a longitudinal view (studying the discourse over time) is supplemented by human reading and analysis. CDA is used to support the CA as it takes the discourse's contexts, authors and audiences into consideration when analysing the aims of the discourse and the underlying implications behind them.

The thesis takes this approach for three reasons. Firstly, as the literature review on the existing methodologies on China-EU point out, currently there has not been a systematic study on the content and the role of the official discourse between China and the EU. Existing discourse analysis on China-EU relations is mostly based on sporadic pieces of discourse instead of organised and selected discourse made into corpora which is machine-readable. The thesis explores the hypothesis that discourse plays a constructive role in shaping and influencing China-EU relations as well as reflecting the challenges in China-EU relations based on the relations between language and social realities as discussed in the theoretical assumptions in the last chapter. The thesis aims to explore whether and to what degree the hypothesis stands. Second, the author's background in translation studies (Chinese-English translation) and IR makes an interdisciplinary approach as well as the reading and comparison of the Chinese and English documents possible. Third, the field of study is seeing transformational changes caused by technological involvement in social science, especially the development of big data as artificial intelligence. The author believes that combining computer-assisted methods in discourse analysis offers a chance to reveal facts and trends in the discourse, which are otherwise impossible if based solely on human reading. However, the difficult point of this interdisciplinary effort would be how corpus linguistic analysis tools and methods should be applied in analysing a specific case in IR, namely what themes and aspects are worth exploring and what techniques should be applied in investigating the potential areas. The thesis explores the possible ways to conduct computer-assisted discourse analysis through applying it to China-EU relations and extends the findings through trial and error so that further research taking this approach can learn from the experience and the lessons of this thesis.

3.3.1 Ontology and Epistemology

Ontologically, Constructivism brings intersubjectivity into the international structure. Wendt argues that "Anarchy is what states make of it" (Wendt, 1992: 395). By this, he argues that anarchy is not an intrinsic nature of states which objectively exist but the result of intersubjective agreements among them. In this way, intersubjectivity becomes a feature of the international structure (Kubáľková, 2001a).

The ontological stance taken by the thesis is in line with constructivism which takes the position that human cognition and interpretation play a large part in constructing social realities. Constructivists hold that the social world is under continuous creation and revision by social actors. Knowledge and the "truth" are always presented by certain social actors in specific ways and subject to different interpretations and are, therefore, indeterminate and relative (Bryman, 2012: 33).

The thesis does not, however, reject the idea that materials play an important role in the human world. Unlike radical materialism or constructivism which either argues matter over

mind or mind over matter, this thesis takes the interactions between mind and matter as being continuous: realities are shaped in the manner of a pendulum swinging between human constructions and materials. Discourse, as a result, is both a constructive force of social realities but also a reflection as well as a form of social interaction. The thesis also takes the position that there are constant interactions between national societies and the international economic system which impact on the relationships between entities in the world.

Interpretivism is the epistemological basis of this thesis. A hermeneutical perspective, one that focuses on interpreting human actions (Bryman, 2012: 28) which in this case refers to the values, ideologies and ideas behind discourse, is taken to explain and understand the role of official discourse in explaining the challenges in contemporary China-EU relations. As economic factors will also be considered, interpretations of the economic figures will be incorporated in places of need. The perspective this thesis takes will also be an ahistorical and systemic one which considers the changes in discourse over time and the economic factors within the context of the international political-economic system.

This epistemological approach is taken due to two reasons. First, interpretivism is in line with constructivism in terms of regarding that the world's truths are not "fixed" but subject to different interpretations and the influence of constructivist forces. Second, the existing approach in China-EU relations has not integrated the development of official discourse as part of the changes in China-EU relations. It has neither pointed to the constructivist forces of the discourse on China-EU relations nor taken the differences and the changes in the discourse as a way to study the issues in China-EU relations. The interpretivist approach offers a chance to consider fully the role of official discourse in China-EU relations, in terms of being both a constructing force and a reflector of the relations. Finally, the changes in the positions of China and the EU in the international economic system offers the perspective to view the changes in the discourse in a broader context, or within a structure. In this way, it avoids the trap of viewing only the internal intentions of China and the EU without considering the wider context between the two.

3.3.2 Scope of Time

There are three reasons behind the selection of the time range of this thesis which is set between 1994 and 2019. First, it was during this period that major challenges appeared in China-EU relations, including the EU's arms embargo on China and the trade disputes took place. Second, this is the period when the greatest amount of official discourse and documents from China and the EU were published. For example, in 1994, the EU issued its first policy paper on Asia (Commission of the European Communities, 1994) in which China was one of the main focuses of discussion. Thereafter the EU started issuing policy papers

as well as policy reviews on China on a more regular basis⁷. The increasing volume of the official discourse between China and the EU makes it now possible, resource-wise, to take official discourse as the primary source and establish corpora specialised in China-EU relations. Third, this is the period when the speed and scale of China and the EU's development boosted the prospects of cooperation between China and the EU. China's economy started to surge, and its international status began to rise as a result of its economic and social reforms. The EU, founded in 1992 through the Maastricht Treaty, has expanded since then from an economic organisation to an intergovernmental community which issues broader policies regarding the economy, politics, security and other social aspects concerning China (Snyder, 2009). The period starting from the 1990s has seen the EU with more capabilities and integrated external actions (Snyder, 2009). The year 2019 has been chosen as this is the year this research finished and the year 2019 has also seen some important speeches containing some evolution in terms of the discourse between China and the EU.

The longitudinal perspective in this thesis is supported by both corpus-driven discourse analysis and content analysis. For example, when searching for the frequency of a word or a term, the trend in the frequency over the searched period will be shown. This is mostly applied in Chapter 4 when topic coverage over the 25 years is searched, and trends are analysed when relevant. For the content analysis, discourse is chosen from discourse blocks, or themes arising from the corpus. In these cases, the discourse is more focused on recent years partly due to greater amount of discourse available especially on the Chinese side in recent years and familiarisation of more recent years' discourse and trends for both China and the EU.

In Chapter 6, when discussing China and the EU's vision for the world, longitudinal changes in the terms "multipolarity" and "multilateralism" have been considered. This is to show the changes in the application of these terms, and the chapter found that China has been applying "multilateralism" more in recent years.

In Chapter 5 and Chapter 8, discussing identity, perception and normative differences, the analyses focus more on recent discourse when content analysis is applied. This is primarily because, in these aspects, the focus is on more recent mismatches between China and the EU, which connect to current, up-to-date challenges and therefore there is more potential for policy implications. This is also since the analyse is corpus-driven and combines content analysis. Therefore, content analysis, which is more relevant to the scope and focus of the chapters, is carried out. In addition, the selection of the discourse for content analysis, for example, in discussing China and the EU's identities and their perceptions of the other, are selected to represent the more distinctive mismatches between the two and the focus is on

⁷ On average every one or two years.

categorising the aspects of their identities, especially in terms of China's identity, when the official discourse describes identities. In other words, the selection of the discourse for content analysis is based on aspects which arise from across the corpus regarding themes of each chapter based on human reading as well as computer-assisted searches. Thus, not all chapters are able to include the full range of longitudinal analysis.

Chapter 8 again includes more longitudinal analysis of China and the EU's normative engagement styles to each other over the researched period, applying primarily content analysis focusing on the terms framing China-EU relations as well as their approaches to each other.

3.3.3 Methodological Framework: Constructivist Corpus-driven Analysis

Figure 3-1 Correlations between Chapter Aspects and Discourse Levels
(Source: own work)




Figure 3-1 shows the methodological framework applied in the analysis of this thesis. Constructivist discourse analysis, more specifically, corpus-driven content analysis with a comparative perspective are the main methods of analysis of the data, although elements of critical discourse analysis are also incorporated. Comparisons exist between China's official discourse on the EU and the EU's official discourse on China and between China's EU discourse and China's domestic discourse. The themes arising from the open coding, theoretical assumptions and literature review form the subjects of the chapters: the mismatched priorities, visions, identities and goals, norms and strategic approaches between China and the EU. These mismatches, as revealed by the official discourse between China

and the EU, provide additional information and an alternative approach in understanding the challenges in China-EU relations.

The methodological framework developed through the thesis shown in Figure 3-1 follows two logic orders: linguistic-wise, it focuses on the lexical levels of the corpora first, then the context of the words used, or collocations of words and phrases, and then goes on to analyse contents and context around certain concepts and themes, and after that, tones and sentence patterns of the texts. Content-wise, it starts with discussing the potential convergence and divergence of China and the EU indicated by their official discourse and goes on to their potential differences when talking about the same terms and concepts which suggests their different goals for development, and then their identity and expectations for the self and the other, and finally their normative patterns in their interactions. Overall, the analyses follow from specifics to abstracts, and from searches with a low level of context to searches with a high level of context.

3.4 Research Methods

The rationale behind the data analysis is informed by grounded theory which proposes open coding of empirical data and conceptualisation or theorisation based on the themes that arose from the data as well as the findings based on the relations between themes (Charmaz, 2006a, 2008). As the analysis applies corpus-driven discourse analysis, qualitative analysis will be the main approach with quantitative analysis providing relevant data on the features of the corpora such as word frequency and collocation.

3.4.1 Grounded Theory

Published in 1967 by Glaser and Strauss (Glaser & Strauss, 2009), grounded theory (GT) starts from the analysis of data and arrives at the construction of theories (Faggiolani, 2011). It was designed to generate theories empirically derived from real-world circumstances to avoid theories which are abstract and impossible to empirically test in real life. GT aims to contribute both to theoretical development but also to indicate how practitioners can apply the theory derived to improve social practices (Oktay, 2012).

Over time, three branches of GT have been formed: the “classic grounded theory” initiated by Glaser with the aim of establishing systematic positivist methodology; Strauss’s “programmed grounded theory” which focuses on the procedures of the qualitative analysis methods; and Charmaz’s constructivist GT (Charmaz, 2011).

Among the different branches of GT, this thesis’ approach is informed by the approach of Charmaz which takes a constructivist perspective of GT which recognises the interactions among the author’s interpretations, the theories preoccupying readers’ minds and the empirical data itself (Charmaz, 2006a, 2008). Unlike Glaser’s positivist standpoint in GT, Charmaz promotes a constructivist approach (Glaser, 1978). She contends that researchers’

interpretations have a constructive force (Charmaz, 2006a, 2008; Bryant & Charmaz, 2007). Similarly, Strauss and Corbin claim that they are taking a relativist epistemological stance which rejects the position that truth is enacted (Mills, Bonner & Francis, 2006). This thesis takes this approach as it contends that the interpretation of the discursive data can never be completely enacted from the author's backgrounds and values which will inevitably influence the analysis of the data, the findings as well as the ways concepts are constructed and related to each other.

One possible process of GT is to read and re-read a textual database, for example, a corpus, discover and label categories, concepts and properties as well as their interrelationships. The ability to discover the themes, or categories, as well as their relationship, represents the "theoretical sensitivity" GT values. One way to carry out the data analysis with a GT approach is to follow the steps open coding, axial coding and selective coding (Glaser & Strauss, 2009). For Charmaz, the procedure is referred to as initial coding, focused coding, axial coding, and theoretical coding. Coding means to categorise the data with labels so that data are sorted and selected. It is the link between gathering data and developing the theory emerging from the codes. Initial coding should stay open and stay close to the data with comparative methods involved. Focused coding is based on the frequent codes emerging from initial coding, and it involves selecting the most relevant and significant categories of data so that further coding can be done to these categories. Axial coding links categories to subcategories, pins down the properties and reorganises the data based on initial coding for more coherence and further analysis. The last step is theoretical coding which aims to relate the codes to each other so that they can be integrated into a theory (Charmaz, 2006b).

The data gathering and analysis for this research are inspired by Charmaz's approach to GT. However, the opening coding of this research is not done in a word-by-word and line-by-line manner. This step, in this research, is done through human reading of the discourse in the document in combination with literature reading on China-EU relations. In other words, the open coding and focused coding are merged in this research. Therefore, the data collection and analysis in this research are inspired by GT but use a customised approach which integrates this author's understanding of the themes regarding the challenges in China-EU relations.

3.4.2 Corpus-driven Discourse Analysis

Corpus linguistics analysis (CLA) assists the qualitative analysis by providing quantitative data for large amounts of texts. CLA views the discourse, first and foremost, from a top-down perspective, drawing out the features of word frequency, collocations, and colligations.

CL started to develop on a large scale in the 1980s. In 1967, the Brown Corpus was established, which acted as a watershed for the development of CL. Before the Brown

corpus, there was no machine-readable corpus, and CL was referred to as Quantitative Linguistics, Statistical Linguistics which takes language use as Chance, or Stylostatistics, which takes language as Choice. Since the establishment of the Brown Corpus, CL entered the age of computer-assisted analysis and was developed with new technologies and perspectives (Gui, 2014).

CL has revolutionised the study and research of language-related areas. Similar to discourse analysis, there has always been discussion on whether CL is a theory, as it contributes specifically to other applications, or a method to be applied in different areas (Tognini-Bonelli, 2001). Tognini Bonelli put forward the concept of “pre-application methodology” (Tognini-Bonelli, 2001), which sets the foundation for further efforts on the theoretical implications of corpus linguist research (Gatto, 2014). Nowadays, CL is often seen as not only a methodology but also an approach, or a discipline, with its own theoretical assumptions (Mahlberg, 2005).

CL, in this sense, focuses more on the quantitative features of the language. It could be said that corpus linguistic essentially focuses on what is very likely to happen in language, while Generative Linguistics focuses on what is grammatically possible. Noam Chomsky is against structuralist and behaviourist approaches in linguistics. He regards the core of linguistic research to be “linguistic competence” instead of “linguistic performance”. His generative linguistic approach had a large influence in North America as well as Europe and has, therefore, led to stagnation in the development of CL. CL, together with Pragmatics, Social and Historical linguistics, follows the functionalist approach. Functionalist thinking focuses on the question “What is probable?” instead of the core question of generative linguistics “What is possible?” (Gui, 2014).

The notion of what constitutes a corpus also depends on the form and purpose of the corpus. Gatto defines CL as an “exploration of language based on a set of authentic texts in a machine-readable format” (Gatto, 2014: 7). Corpus, according to him, is

usually of a size which would not allow manual investigation but requires the use of specific tools to perform a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the data, through such tasks as producing frequency lists of all the words appearing in the corpus, providing data concerning recurring patterns, and computing statistics about relative frequency by comparing different data sets (Gatto, 2014: 7).

This definition describes the process of corpus linguistic analysis and defines a corpus through what could, or should, be done to it. Sinclair, on the other hand, offers a broader version of the definition of the corpus. For him, a corpus is “a collection of naturally-occurring language chosen to characterize a state or variety of a language” (Sinclair, 1991: 171).

With the development of CL in recent years, a consensus has been reached that the core features of a corpus should be the authenticity of language and a machine-readable format (Gatto, 2014). Another criterion for making a corpus is representativeness, or as Biber puts it:

A corpus is not simply a collection of texts. Rather, a corpus seeks to represent a language or some part of a language. (...) The representativeness of the corpus, in turn, determines the kinds of research questions that can be addressed and the generalizability of the results of the research (Biber, Conrad & Reppen, 1998: 246).

The value of a corpus, therefore, depends on elements including the genre of texts, the number and length of the texts, the selection of samples from within the texts and the length of the selected samples (Biber, Conrad & Reppen, 1998: 11).

Strictly speaking, the main discourse analysis method of this thesis should be called a corpus-driven discourse analysis (CDCA) instead of corpus linguistic analysis as the technique incorporates other discourse analysis techniques and that of CLA partially informs the procedure. CLA provides the guidance for establishing the specialised corpora and exploring the corpora's potential in providing quantitative data and the changes in the data over the years. This method of content analysis is sometimes referred to as computer assisted qualitative data analysis (CAQDAS) (Schreier, 2012: 241).

3.4.2.1 Word Frequency

The steps of corpus analysis, although they can have various forms, generally include Word Frequency, sometimes referred to as wordlists,⁸ collocation and colligation,⁹ and semantic associations. Word Frequency and Collocations will be the two aspects this thesis applies. Colligation and semantic associations have not been largely applied¹⁰ as the thesis focuses on the meaning and implications instead of the grammatical patterns of the discourse and their role in forming ideas and values.

Word Frequency is applied in the thesis in two ways. The first way is that lists of all the words that occur in a corpus with the frequency of each word shown are generated. For example, the first one hundred words from the corpus of the EU's policy papers on China from 1994 to 2019 would be a wordlist, ordered according to the raw frequency of the words. This is applied in Chapter 4 in the form of the Top Frequency Meaningful Words. This is named so because words without a solid meaning or which are not helpful to understand the

⁸ For consistency, Word Frequency will be used as it is closest to the methods used in the analysis.

⁹ Colligation is another aspect CL looks at. Colligation is "the occurrence of a grammatical class or structural pattern with another one, or with a word or phrase" (Sterkenburg, 2003: 173). Colligational relations require more human reading and investigation of the concordance lines as it is as obvious as the word frequency or concordance.

¹⁰ Although Chapter 7 on the normative shift in China-EU relations does involve the study of sentence patterns with normative discourse, one could argue this is closer to text search.

themes in China-EU relations, such as prepositions, pronouns and articles, will be removed manually from the list. The second method does not involve the simple generation of top frequency words but involves designing multiple words to be searched at the same time—the searches containing multiple terms or criteria to be searched for a query. For example, a search for every word close to the meaning “economy” will be designed as searching for “economy OR economic OR trade OR business OR commercial OR financial OR tax OR tariff OR investment OR deficit OR budget OR investment OR finance”. The design of the query is decided based on consideration of both coverage of the words as well as avoiding overlap although text searches will never generate a precise coverage of a topic due to the nature of the searches. A list of the queries designed in the thesis is attached in the Appendix.

3.4.2.2 Collocations and Concordance

In this thesis, collocations refer to the “habitual co-occurrence of individual lexical items” (Crystal, 2008: 86). A collocation is “a combination of two or more words which occur together or in close proximity to each other in both written and spoken discourse” (Walker, 2011: 292). More specifically, a word’s collocates are words that frequently appear within five words, left or right, to its side (Wynne, 2008).

A vertical list of the collocations of a word is called a concordance. Concordance shows “the tendency of words to co-occur” (Wynne, 2008: 26). Concordance makes a difference between reading a text and reading a corpus as the text is read horizontally while the corpus, with the assistance of machine reading, is to be read vertically, scanning for the reoccurring patterns near the node.¹¹ The meaning of concordance is that it reveals features of texts which are otherwise invisible, or only intuitively sensed but not evidenced empirically (Wynne, 2008).

Collocations offer a way to see how keywords are connected to other words. In this way, the cluster of themes, or what themes usually appear together, can be found out. Both collocations and concordance in this thesis are carried out with the assistance of Lancsbox. Collocations are presented through the tool GraphColl. The purpose is to see how the keywords in China and the EU’s discourse on each other are connected to other words, or what the context is in which they have appeared.

As each chapter applies the techniques of CL with different emphasis, although Word Frequency and Collocations are the main methods used, the designs of Word Frequency searches, collocations as well as other text searches will be described in detail in the chapters.

¹¹ A node is a word, phrase, or any defined features, acting as a root, a tag, or a starting point, to search for or categorise related features. In the case of a concordance, a node is usually a word or phrase

3.4.3 Content Analysis

Content analysis is a quantitative analysis of message characteristics (Neuendorf, 2017). It “entails a systematic reading of texts and symbolic matter not necessarily from an author’s or user’s perspective” (Krippendorff, 2012: 3). Neuendorf provides a version of the definition with fuller details. He states that:

Content analysis is a summarizing, quantitative analysis of messages that relies on the scientific method (including attention to objectivity-intersubjectivity, a priori design, reliability, validity, generalizability, replicability, and hypothesis testing) and is not limited as to the types of variables that may be measured or the context in which the messages are created or presented (Neuendorf, 2017: 10).

Two main types of content analysis are human coding, which is based on codebooks and computer coding. This thesis integrates human coding with computer coding through the assistance of Nvivo 12 and Lancsbox. Content analysis provides a bottom-up approach for discourse analysis in terms of organising, categorising, thematising and comparing the official discourse between China and the EU. The bottom-up approach here refers to the process that discourse on a theme, for example, the discourse on “multilateralism” of China and the EU are searched for within and beyond the established corpora in order to get the most relevant pieces of discourse on a certain theme for the sake of comparing the contents attached to that theme from China and the EU respectively. Meanwhile, the top-down discourse analysis is mainly done through applying the CL tools, Nvivo and Lancsbox, to offer “bird views” of the word frequencies, topic priorities and concordances of the certain themes. Content analysis is applied throughout the thesis but is used most in Chapters 5 to 8 as Chapter 4 applies primarily Corpus-based analysis, especially Word Frequency, to compare the topic priorities of China and the EU.

3.4.4 Critical Discourse Analysis

Critical discourse analysis (CDA) seeks to reveal the unequal relations and prejudices behind the language (Maingueneau & O’regan, 2006: 229). It is also a combination of qualitative analysis based on human understanding and quantitative data analysis. The emphasis and aim of CDA are to discover how ideologies are formulated, enhanced and reproduced through discourse and what kind of social relations the discourse entails (Paltridge, 2012: 194).

There are two approaches within CDA: one is Fairclough’s analytical framework which investigates text from three levels: the textual level, the discursive practice, and the social practice (Titscher *et al.*, 2000). The other is the discourse-historical method as taken by Ruth Wodak (Titscher *et al.*, 2000). The approach taken in this thesis is closer to Fairclough’s because of the strong connections between discourse and social practices.

According to Fairclough, there are two types of textual analysis which are complementary to each other: linguistic analysis and intertextual analysis. The linguistic analysis covers the analysis on the lexical, semantic, phonological, and grammatical and other linguistic features of the text, as well as the “textual organization above the sentence”, such as cohesion and structure. The intertextual analysis focuses on how and why orders of discourse such as genres, discourses, narratives are selected by text producers and interpreters in certain social contexts (Fairclough, 1995: 188).

CDA is applied in this thesis to take into account the historical contexts, the audience and the publishers and translators of the official discourse. More specifically, this thesis will compare China and the EU’s foreign publicity discourse with their domestic discourse to find out how the differences in audience influence the content of the discourse. There is no fixed procedure in CDA. However, there are some traditional ways to carry out the analysis. Table 3-2 is adapted from the steps of CDA summarised by Brian Paltridge:

Table 3-2 Steps of Critical Discourse Analysis

Genre	what the text presents and how it conforms to it
the Framing of the Text	the perspective taken; foregrounding(what concepts and issues are emphasized)/back grounded (what has been played down), the assumptions of the text
Lexical Level	connotation of words and phrases, degree of formality, technicality, words showing attitudes, whether the target readers are expected to share the views
Sentence Level	what has been topicalized, agent-patient relations, authority and power, omissions, passive voice

(Paltridge, 2012: 194)

As Table 3-2 shows, the first step of analysis is to view the historical context in which the discourse was generated. This step aims to answer the questions including when, where, under what occasion, and by whom the discourse was produced, publicised, or spread. In addition, attention should be paid to what has been emphasised or foregrounded and what has been downplayed. The second step is to seek out the lexical features, or the use of the words in the texts including the connotations of the words, the emotions and attitudes of the words and, in this thesis, the collocations and concordances. The last step is to observe and spot the sentence features including topics, authority and power behind the relations as well as other features. The discourse analysis in this thesis has drawn upon these steps. In the analysis, CDA is mainly applied in analysing the differences in contents between corpora with different groups of target audiences. For example, the application of the terms “multipolarity” in Corpus China PPSP and Corpus China Domestic will be compared in Chapter 5.

3.4.5 Processing the Data

As the synthesised theoretical assumptions underpin the analysis, the data analysis consists of a combination of quantitative and qualitative, deductive and inductive approaches.

There are four stages involved in processing the data.

The first stage involves document collection and corpora establishment. Documents in both the Chinese language and their official English translations, if available, are included to the corpora on China. For the EU, the English versions of the issued documents are used.

The second stage, open coding, has an important role in deciding which themes the chapters focus on for further, in-depth analysis. The aim of open coding and data collection, as suggested by the GT approach, is to discover categories or themes which occur repeatedly and are relevant to the topic or the research question (Scott, 2009). As several theories including ROC and critical discourse analysis have exerted influence on the category spotting in the thesis, the open coding stage of this research was affected through a comparative reading of China and the EU's official discourse until themes and categories emerged naturally. The topics and debates in the existing literature and core aspects of the relevant theories have also assisted in spotting the core categories in China-EU discourse. Through the comparative reading, categories or topics which frequently occur in the discourse of both sides arise. The emergence of core categories was also derived from the topics and debates in the existing literature. This forms the second step of data analysis.

In the third stage, selective coding and data organising were done based on the categories that emerged. This means a constant review of the literature to determine what themes in China-EU relations have been prominently discussed. A theme was chosen if it closely connects to the existing debates in China-EU studies and if the discursive data can contribute to puzzling out the debated areas.

The last stage focuses on conducting the corpus-driven content analysis of the discourse data. More specifically, the analysis compares the official discourse of China and the EU in the key themes arising from the open coding and literature review and then explores the differences in the understanding and approaches of China and the EU in these aspects and discusses how these differences relate to the challenges in China-EU relations. Techniques of CL, including Word Frequency and Collocations, will be the main methods applied in the analysis of the chapters. Critical discourse analysis (CDA) will be applied when it comes to analysing the historical contexts, the target audience, authors and translation-related issues as well as other backgrounds and information of the selected discourse which could influence, or play a role in the results of data analysis.

3.5 Corpora Establishment and Application

Specialised corpora focusing on China-EU relations are established as the database for this thesis. Although the larger a corpus is, the higher the chance that it will output data with more accurate probability, the length and the numbers of the texts in a corpus do not have to exceed a strict number. On this, Bower and Pearson argue that “well-designed corpora that are anywhere from about ten thousand to several hundreds of thousands of words in size have proved to be exceptionally useful in LSP (Language for Specific Purpose) studies” (Bowker & Pearson, 2002: 205).

3.5.1 Material Selection

The discourse selection for this thesis aims to establish a specialised corpus on the key official discourse on China-EU relations from 1994 to 2019. The materials applied in this thesis include two major categories: Chinese official documents and the English versions of the EU’s official documents.

Discourse materials selected in this thesis are based on accessible and available on-line resources. More specifically, most of the EU policy papers on China are issued by the European Commission (EC)¹² and are available from EUR-Lex which is an official website of EU law and other EU public documents are available in the EU’s twenty-four official languages.¹³ The EU’s internal official discourse on the EU’s foreign policies in general, which are also included in the corpora, are mostly available from the European Union and its institutions’ websites including Europa.eu¹⁴ and EU Publications.¹⁵ The Chinese official documents are available from the website of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Relations, the website of the Mission of the People’s Republic of China¹⁶ to the European Union¹⁷ and other state media such as Chinanews, CPC News and Xinhua News. The specific organisation of the discourse will be introduced in Section 3.3.3.

The corpora established in this thesis are not as large as some web-based corpora, but it is focused and only contains relevant materials. This thesis applies a series of the criteria to select the relevant documents for making the corpus or the discursive database:

First, the document should be about the long-term, overarching policies and strategies between China and the EU instead of a specific aspect, for example, trade and the economy only. The document should be a key document with the potential to exert long-term, strategic

¹² The former name (until 1993): Commission of the European Communities.

¹³ Available at <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html>. Last accessed on 11/12/2020

¹⁴ A list for the EU official documents database is available at https://europa.eu/european-union/documents-publications/official-documents_en.

¹⁵ Available at <https://publications.europa.eu/en/home>. Last accessed on 11/12/2020

¹⁶ Available at <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn>. Last accessed on 11/12/2020

¹⁷ Available at <http://www.chinamission.be/chn/>. Last accessed on 11/12/2020

impact on China-EU relations. A key document should be either policy papers, or keynote speeches made by high-level officials (ambassadors, ministers and above) on or delivered at important events or meetings. By specifying “long term” and “strategic”, I am excluding documents with a narrow focus not relevant to policymaking, although I am aware these criteria involve my limited personal understanding.

Second, the document should be either issued by official institutions of the Chinese government or the EU or delivered by Chinese or EU high-level officials.

Last, the translations, where accessible, should be carried out by qualified, authorised agencies or governmental bodies such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China International Publishing Group (CIPG) and the Compilation and Translation Bureau of the CPC Central Committee. The way to verify this is to check the source of the translations. Valid official translations are extracted from official institutions’ websites or top state media such as Xinhua News, China-daily or CPC China as these websites do not publish unauthorised translations. Translations done by individuals or unofficial channels are not applied in this thesis. When translations are not available or accessible, or a different translation would be more accurate, the author provides her own translations.

These criteria have been designed and applied for the sake of narrowing down the numbers and types of documents so that the most relevant and overarching ones can be included.

This makes a combination of human-reading and computer-assisted, comparative analysis feasible.

3.5.2 Translations and Versions

The translated English versions of the Chinese documents released by relevant Chinese authorities are applied in some content analysis with the original Chinese texts attached when these translated versions are accessible and regarded as identical to the original version.

The official English versions of these Chinese documents are sometimes also available on these websites or on the websites from the Central Compilation and Translation Bureau (CCTB), or China International Publishing Group (CIPG). Occasionally the officially translated versions are only available on the website English Tips, a section page of the *China Daily* or other websites with the audience being mostly English learners. In these cases, the authority or affiliations of the translators are not certain although most likely they were done by the interpreters of the Foreign Ministry, CIPG or CCTB. For all these cases my own translations are offered whenever I regard the translations available as not precise. However, as this research is based on machine-readable texts, the goal is to develop, potentially, a framework which paves the way for future methodological developments incorporating techniques of CL, machine-based text retrieval and big data analysis; my own translations are not provided for each and every piece of Chinese text when the official,

electronic versions are available online as human translations are not practical for use with larger corpora. Translations do play an important role, however, in critical discourse analysis, as meaning can be lost in translation. Therefore, I will provide my own translations when it makes a difference for the sake of making the parts reliable where critical discourse analysis techniques are applied in this thesis. If not noted otherwise, the translations of the Chinese quotations are translated by the official source.

The EU normally offers its documents in all its twenty-four official languages. As comparing each version of the EU's documents in different languages is not relevant to the focus of the thesis, only the English versions will be applied. The EU's official documents applied in this thesis include the EU's China policy papers, the EU's Global Strategy papers, the EU's officials' keynote speeches and other EU proposals on China issued between 1994 and 2019.

3.5.3 Corpora Structure

The discourse is organised into written, machine-readable specialised corpora and imported into Nvivo (version 12) and Lancsbox for data analysis.

Corpus China PPSP and Corpus EU PPSP contain the key policy papers and keynote speeches of China and the EU on each other between 1994 and 2019 as well as other key documents including review ports, action plans, etc. Here PP stands for Policy Papers while SP stands for keynote speeches. PPSP is used for the sake of identifying and addressing the corpora in a simple manner.

Corpus EU PPSP contains the EU's six policy papers towards China, the EU's policy implementation paper and mid-term policy reviews on China, the EU's country strategy towards China, the keynote speeches made by the president of the European Council, the European Commission as well as High Representatives¹⁸ of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Corpus China PPSP includes China's three policy papers on the EU issued in 2003, 2014 and 2018, the keynote speeches made at a presidential, prime ministerial, ministerial or ambassadorial level and also, the presidential and prime ministerial speeches during summits and state visits to Europe.

Although documents in the corpus EU PPSP and corpus EU internal consist of different types of discourse issued by multiple institutions of the EU and for different purposes, they are treated overall as parts of the corpus, and their individual purposes are not discussed in-depth. In cases where some contents in a document are helpful for illustrating the features or themes shown based on the corpora, their issuers, audience, and purpose will be analysed. However, it is necessary to discuss the different issuers and purpose of the documents of

¹⁸ The chief co-ordinator and representative of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

the EU corpora due to the complexity of the institutions as well as their functions for the EU.

Corpus EU PPSP contains several document types, including:

- Commission working document
- Communication from the commission to the Council and the European Parliament
- Commission policy paper national indicative programme
- Remarks of the president of the EC
- Remarks of HR/VP
- Report on EU-China Relations Committee on Foreign Affairs
- Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council
- The opinion of the Committee

Corpus EU PPSP contains documents about the EU's policies, plans, relationship reviews as well as reports on China and EU-China relations. Most of the documents in corpus EU PPSP were issued by the European Commission. They were guiding policy papers and were issued for communicating with the European Council and the European Parliament, for example, the policy paper "EU – China: Closer partners, growing responsibilities" issued in 2006 (Commission of the European Communities, 2006b). These policy papers, although not directly issued for the Chinese audience, contain guiding, or trendsetting overarching policies of the EU to China for the next few years. Working documents are sometimes issued to accompany the implementation of these policies defined in the major policy papers. Although working documents are not as fundamental as the policy papers, their contents are relevant, and they expand the corpus.

Some papers regarding the implementation of external relations policies are issued by the Common Security and Defence Policy Committee on Foreign Affairs. These are included as these discuss China-EU relations on the level of the EU's external policies with strategies stated and the EU's approaches to other regions and the world as the context.

Others are speeches of the President of the European Council, President of the European Commission, or High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP). The speeches are less formal, in most cases, but contain more personal interpretations of the officials on the EU's approaches to China.

There are also a few documents (for example, "Belt and Road Forum- EU Common Messages 2017") in which the topic is specific, but it contains key policy or relevant guiding information on the EU's attitudes to China. In these cases, they will be included, but they only happen in exceptional cases.

Although documents are issued from different institutions, the criteria for document selection for the corpora are that they are key EU documents or keynote speeches towards China with a comprehensive focus instead of specific topics. The choices of documents are made with a balanced consideration of their relevance to China-EU relations, their importance as

comprehensive, guiding papers as well as the need for an appropriate corpora size to guarantee the reliability of the corpus-driven data output.

Corpus China PPSP and Corpus EU PPSP are designed and applied as the core corpora of this thesis based on two considerations. First, one may already notice in Table Apx 3 (Appendix) that China so far has only two policy papers on the EU, and the numbers of documents are therefore not balanced. This lack of policy papers on the Chinese side is complemented by the speeches of high-ranking leaders in China. The number of documents and the overall text length of the corpora is beneficial to accurate, meaningful data output. Second, in China, the leaders' speeches, especially those of the Secretary-General, the Premier and Ministers, are, in some ways, as important as policy papers. Meanwhile, official speeches made by the EU's top-level officials such as the speeches of the President of the EU Commission, the President of the EU Council, and the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy are also essential for understanding the EU's approaches on China.

Corpus China Domestic includes China's Five-Year Plans, Reports on the Government's Work on National Congress, and China's official white papers on its foreign policies and its developmental path. Corpus EU Internal includes the EU's Global Strategies as its internal official discourse on its external policies to the rest of the world. Table Apx 5 and Table Apx 7 (Appendix) are the lists of the documents contained in these two corpora. The documents are selected based on their level of importance and relevance to the chapters in this thesis.

It is necessary to mention that the document selection process for Corpus China PPSP and Corpus EU PPSP is different from that of Corpus China Domestic and Corpus EU Internal. The documents in the Corpus China Domestic and Corpus EU Internal are collected through searching and filtering of documents relevant to the themes which have arisen from the texts: identity, developmental goals, strategies and approaches in foreign relations. This is because Corpus China PPSP and Corpus EU PPSP contain definite numbers of policy papers and keynote speeches as the number of China and the EU's issued policy papers and high-level discourse each makes about the other is large but humanly countable. However, the amount of China and the EU's domestic discourse, even within the time span of 1994 to 2019, is humanly uncountable, or indefinite. Therefore, it is worth mentioning that the principle of Representativeness is applied here in the selection of documents for the domestic discourse. Only representative and relevant domestic discourse is included for the sake of making the analysis and comparison possible.

The corpora are structured in this way in order to make possible comparisons on two levels: the first is to make possible the comparison between the EU's values, policy priorities and strategies in its official discourse on China and China's values, policy priorities and strategies in its official discourse on the EU; the second is to make possible the comparison between

China and the EU's external action policies to each other and their domestic¹⁹ discourse on their visions for the future world and their own development. Overall, there is a balanced quantity of Chinese official documents and EU official documents, although the types of sources differ between China and the EU, to make comparisons possible and increase the reliability of the corpus.

Through the empirical chapters, Corpus China PPSP and Corpus EU PPSP are the core corpora applied. In Chapter 5, Corpus China Domestic and Corpus EU Internal are involved in analysing China and the EU's self-perception.

3.5.4 Software Selection

The data are retrieved, organised, and coded through Nvivo (version 12) and Lancsbox. Nvivo is a qualitative analysis assistance tool which can store, organise, and code texts. It supports processing both Chinese and English texts. It includes the main corpus analysis tools such as a word frequency search, word lists, and shows the references in a narrow or broad context for the searched words or expressions.

However, as a general qualitative data analysis tool, Nvivo does not specialise in processing corpora. It cannot tag the figures of speech of the corpora, nor does it come with any meta-corpora, while these features are useful when discovering distinct language features of self-designed corpora. Therefore, a specialised corpus linguist analysis tool, Lancsbox, is used to extend the data processing in this thesis.

Lancsbox is a text analysis tool made by the research team of Lancaster University (Brezina, McEnery & Wattam, 2015). There are a few reasons behind the application of Lancsbox even though quite a few similar tools exist.²⁰ The first reason is that Lancsbox is an open-access tool for corpus linguistic analysis. Second, it is one of the few existing tools which can process both English and Chinese data. Third, Lancsbox includes some meta-corpora, including the Lancaster-Oslo/Bergen (LOB)²¹ and corpus Chinese Mandarin, which is used as a source for corpora comparison to explore the distinct language features of the corpora designed in this thesis.

¹⁹ For the EU, this refers to the EU's global strategies and external actions policies.

²⁰ A list of available CL analysis tools can be viewed at <https://corpus-analysis.com/>. Last accessed on 11/12/2020.

²¹ LOB is one of the first modern corpora designed and processed by computer. It contains one million running words (tokens) (Brezina, McEnery & Wattam, 2015).

Chapter 4 Shared Topics, Mismatched Priorities and Connotations

This chapter aims to explore the convergence and divergence in China and the EU's priorities and emphases in their shared topics through analysing the coverage of the topics representing key policy areas and their changes over the years as well as the topics' collocations and concordance in China and the EU's official discourse on each other. Methodologically, the chapter's goal is to explore the effectiveness of involving wordlists, longitudinal word frequency searches, as well as collocations and concordance in examining the differences in priorities and emphasis between entities.

The analysis of this chapter is based on the data derived from Corpus China PPSP and Corpus EU PPSP derived from the qualitative analysis tool Nvivo 12 and the text parsing and retrieving tool Lancsbox (version 2019). Word Frequency searches and Collocation searches are two main methods applied. Word Frequency was applied in two types of searches: first, the top frequency meaningful²² wordlist for Corpus China PPSP and Corpus EU PPSP; second, the hot topics' coverage in the two corpora. Collocations of the selected keywords representing the hot topics were conducted as this offers a way to look into the different emphases between China and the EU in terms of their shared topics.

As the purpose of this chapter is to explore whether China's priorities and emphases match those of the EU in the bilateral relationship as manifest in the official discourse on each other, keywords signifying the hot topics in contemporary China-EU relations need to be selected in order to undertake targeted topic coverage and connotation analysis. The selection criteria are primarily the main sectors of societies and relationships, including economy, politics, culture, and other major areas. More specifically, the criteria for a policy issue being regarded as a hot topic are that it should be:

- Represented by the top fifty frequency for meaningful words in Corpus China PPSP and Corpus EU PPSP; or
- The topics listed in the official introductory web-page China and the EU about the basic frameworks of China-EU relations; and
- A frequent theme containing a significant amount of research in existing China-EU literature

The criteria make sure that it is not only a topic that appears frequently in official documents but also a policy issue meaningful for research and debates. The last list serves as a final

²² Here "meaningful" words refer to words which bear meaning helpful to understanding the associations of the keywords. This usually means most of the nouns, verbs, adjectives and adverbs but not the prepositions, articles, or pronouns unless they contribute to the purpose of analysis. In some cases, modal verbs such as "will" and "should" are included as they indicate normative discourse.

check of the hot topics to make sure they are among the officially recognised policy priorities as listed on China and the EU's official websites.

The topics are not exhaustive or complete but are narrowed down in such a way that the major parts are covered, and the topics are broad enough to cover one main policy area but specific enough to match with a policy area. The goal of topic selection is to guarantee a finite and reasonable number of the main policy areas in China-EU relations so that data retrieval and comparison of the coverage are feasible and major comparable policy areas are covered.

One thing to note is that in cases when the same term may share different connotations as suggested in the existing literature, such as "human rights", "sovereignty", connotation instead of frequency comparison should be carried out since the difference in connotations will be more relevant and significant in these cases instead of pure coverage.

In terms of the choice of tools, Word Frequency searches were done through Nvivo as Nvivo offers a tool to search for synonyms and same rooted words as well as the options to use wildcards in queries. Table Apx 10 and Table Apx 11 in the Appendix present the designs of the queries. Word Frequency searches with a part of speech (POS) attached to them, or "lemma" as defined in the searching tool, are done through Lancsbox as Lancsbox can tag words with POS and output the wordlist of certain types of words such as verbs, nouns, NPs (Noun Phrases) and VPs (Verb Phrases). Lancsbox was used to generate collocations of keywords as it can output visualised results of the collocations of words, phrases, or a group of words.

The analysis in Section 4.3.4 also involves the Lancaster-Oslo/Bergen Corpus (LOB). LOB is a British English corpus which is regarded as a counterpart for the American English corpus Brown Corpus. It contains five hundred pieces of text of two thousand words, covering fifteen text genres. The version applied in this thesis is the POS (Part of Speech) tagged version (Leech et al., 1978). LOB is used as a meta-corpus for comparison with the corpora in English in this thesis in order to explore the differences in language features in the English versions of the EU's official discourse to China as compared to general British English. The meta-corpus used for the Chinese language in this thesis is LCMC (Lancaster Corpus of Mandarin Chinese).

4.1 Word Clouds and Topic Selection

There are a few reasons to apply top frequency wordlists searches as the first step in this research. First, it is a necessary step to narrow down top selections for further data output on topic coverage. Second, it can generate a quick impression about whether top frequency meaningful words are, overall, in line with the areas of interests for China and the EU as they stated in their official discourse stating their core interests and values. Last, it gives hints on how the topic coverage may converge and diverge in Corpus China PPSP and EU PPSP,

and the EU have shared interests on topics including economic, social and political development and share expectations regarding promoting mutual development, fostering cooperation, facilitating communication and improving political interactions. A few differences exist at the same time. Corpus China PPSP contains the words “和平 (peace)” and “稳定 (stability)” and “文化(culture)” and “人民 (people/mass public/citizens)” in its top fifty frequency wordlist while Corpus EU PPSP has words including “energy (能源)”, “环境 environmental (环境)”, “law(法律)”, “WTO” and “sustainable (可持续)” and “rights (权力)” in its top fifty list. On the other hand, a list of China PPSP contains a group of actions words including “加强 (enhance)”, “推动 (push forward)”, “维护 (maintain)” and “支持 (support)” while Corpus EU PPSP has only one verb “support” on its list.

To be selected as a hot topic, a word needs to be in the fifty top frequency meaningful word list and needs to be related to a policy area. After being filtered according to this criterion, the words standing out in the China PPSP include “economy”, “communication”, “dialogue”, “culture”, “trade”, “reform”, “society”, “civilisation”, “security and safety”, as well as “technology”. The verbs and adjectives such as “maintain”, “positive”, and “promote” do not signify specific policy areas and are therefore not selected as words representing hot topics.

For Corpus EU PPSP, the words signifying a policy area and a potential top topic include “economic”, “trade”, “dialogue”, “social”, “human”, “rights”, “reform”, “environmental”, “energy”, “relations”, “investment”, “market”, “economy”, “security”, “environment”, “law”, and “society”. One may notice that some areas are repetitive in this list of words, such as “economic” and “economy”. This is because although they have the same word roots, they are regarded as two different words by the frequency count system. Similar situations apply to other words which refer to overlapping areas or issues belonging to the same topic in the broader sense. This includes words like “investment”, “market”, “economy”, as overall, they all belong to the topic “economy and trade”.

The term or phrase representing a hot topic does not have to appear in both the top fifty lists of China PPSP and EU PPSP. However, in fact, the most meaningful keywords signifying a policy area in one list often appear in the list of the counterpart. If not, they often appear in the top 100 word frequency list of their counterpart corpus.

It is necessary to note, however, that top fifty frequency wordlists contain only fifty words which is quite limited. If the searching criteria change to the top one hundred or top one hundred and fifty, words which do not show convergence in the current figures and lists may appear convergent. This also means that similarities and differences in the wordlists are useful for giving quick impressions of priorities, but data output is dependent on search criteria. The relations between words and policy areas should not be read and interpreted as strictly causal or correlating but mutually constitutive and dynamically interacting.

Now the words representing topics are reviewed by comparing them to the most discussed policy issues in China-EU relations. As the numbers of the topics in the literature are indefinite, the focus of this step is to double-check that the topics arising from the first step are within the interest range of the current research on China-EU relations. At last, the current topics chosen are reviewed to see whether they echo with the policy areas listed on the introductory webpage of China's EU policy and the EU's China policy.

According to the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' introductory article on China-EU relations, the main cooperation aspects between China and the EU include the economy and trade, energy, technology, climate, urbanisation, culture and education, youth as well as other areas such as industry, agriculture, environment, quality check and custom (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2017).

The EU's external action service has also listed several aspects of EU-China relations in introducing the basic framework of EU-China relations. These include political relations, human rights, economic relations, trade, research and innovation, environment, energy and climate change, food industry and consumer production, communication networks, content and technology, development cooperation as well as partnership instrument (EEAS, 2016). These basics frameworks in bilateral relations between China and the EU offer the initial topics on which textual analysis should focus.

Combining these three sources, namely the top frequency meaningful words, the hot topics in the literature, and the stated areas by the official websites on bilateral relations on both sides, ten hot topics, which have appeared repeatedly in all three sources, have been chosen for comparison of topic coverage. These topics include:

Economy and Trade (经济与贸易), Communication and Dialogue (交流与对话), Security and Defence (安全与国防), Reform (改革), Politics and Diplomacy (政治与外交), Society and Social Issues (社会), 环境与能源 (Environment and Energy), Laws and Regulations (法律和法规), Culture and Art (文化与艺术), Education and Research (教育与科研), and Technology (科技).

There are a few topics which emerged from one of the sources mentioned above but are not included in the top ten hot topics, including Reform, Human Rights, Primary Sector, Secondary Sector, and Service Sector. This is because Reform is a topic which could be categorised at a social, political or economic level. It is more of a hot word instead of a topic which covers a sector of society. Human Rights is an important topic for both China and the EU, but current research strongly suggests that human rights as a concept bears different connotations in China and in the West (Zhu & Zhang, 2002; Zhang, 2008a, 2012a; Men, 2011; Liu & Heathcote, 2000; Dong, 2012). Therefore, in Section 4.2.2, the collocations of

human rights as a key concept will be explored and compared based on the established corpora.

It should be mentioned that this method of combining synonyms into a phrase which signifies one hot topic is not perfect as some issues such as investment and reform could be overlapping if it is a reform in investment the text is referring to. However, the hot topics are selected in such a way that frequency is a factor, important policy issues are not missed out, and topics are not overlapping as far as possible. This selection of topic is a way to make corpus-driven discourse analysis possible, paving the way for a combination of quantitative and qualitative analysis on the potential mismatch of priorities and emphases as well as further themes coming up in later chapters.

4.2 Comparing Coverage of Shared Topics

The ontological assumption and the methodology link the presence of the topics in the corpora and the policy areas in China-EU relations. Although positivists may argue that topics' coverage and connotations of keywords do not manifest policy priorities and emphases of policy areas, from a language-oriented constructivist perspective taken in this thesis, the former play a part in constructing the latter and vice versa as discourse and social interactions are mutually-constitutive. Coherent, sustainable official discourse should, in time, manifest in China and the EU's policies towards each other and ultimately, the interactions between China and the EU. The corpus-driven discourse analysis offers an opportunity to engage with the coherent and sustainable parts of the official discourse between China and the EU as only the long-standing, prominent topics having a consistent presence in the corpora across the years were selected.

A topic's coverage is counted by the reference number for each query result divided by the total word length of each corpus. Word frequency searches output for the coverage²³ of these topics over the years for China and the EU, respectively. The data show both the overall rankings of the topic coverage for both corpora and the changes in the topics' coverage over the twenty-five-year time span. In the searches, the context, namely the words around the keywords which were targeted in the searches, are not counted. The reason that context, either narrow (such as a few words to the left and right of the words, or the paragraph which contains the keywords) were not counted is because neither narrow context nor broad context reflects the accurate coverage of the topic as situations arise when the surrounding paragraph or sentence does not talk about precisely the same topic as the keywords suggest or contains more other topics. It is methodologically impossible to get the perfect proportion for a topic's coverage. To avoid the situation of overfitting, in this research,

²³ Here coverage refers to the frequency of words which meet the query design requirement. It does not mean that paragraphs talking about a certain topic count based on their length; it simply counts how many times the words appeared and divides the number by the document length where these words appear.

the simplistic approach was adopted, which is to count coverage with no context, but the frequency of the keyword is applied throughout the thesis. This standard has been applied for both Corpus China PPSP and Corpus EU PPSP.

The specific queries for the design considerations are available in Section A.3 in the Appendix. The searching criteria presented in Table Apx 10 and Table Apx 11 in the Appendix (Query Design) generated the data in the following section.

4.2.1 Topic Coverage

Table 4-1 and Table 4-2 shows the coverage of the top eleven hot topics in Corpus China PPSP and Corpus EU PPSP:

Table 4-1 Rankings of the Top Eleven Hot Topic Coverage in China PPSP

	Topics	Reference	Percentage
1	经济与贸易 (Economy and Trade)	1437	27%
2	交流与对话 (Communication and Dialogue)	654	12%
3	安全与国防 (Security and Defence)	562	11%
4	政治和外交 (Politics and Diplomacy)	396	7%
5	改革 (Reform)	393	7%
6	社会 (Society and Social issues)	381	7%
7	环境与能源 (Environment and Energy)	379	7%
8	法律和规范 (Laws and Regulations)	324	6%
9	文化与艺术 (Culture and Art)	306	6%
10	教育与科研 (Education and Research)	291	5%
11	科技 (Techonology)	170	3%

Table 4-2 Rankings of the Top Eleven Hot Topics' Coverage in EU PPSP

	Topics	Reference	Percentage
1	Economy and Trade	4429	21%
2	Communication and Dialogue	3190	15%
3	Politics and Diplomacy	2626	13%
4	Law and Regulations	2514	12%
5	Environment and Energy	2349	11%
6	Society and Social Issues	1705	8%
7	Security and Defence	1394	7%
8	Education and Research	1109	5%
9	Reforms	851	4%
10	Technology	546	3%
11	Culture and Art	219	1%

Figure 4-3 and Figure 4-4 present the pie charts based on Table 4-1 and Table 4-2, showing the relative coverage of each topic. Relative coverage is counted as compared to other hot topics (assuming all hot topics form 100%). It is different from coverage applied in other places where the total length of the entire corpus is counted as 100%. A comparison of the top frequency topic distributions for Corpus China PPSP and Corpus EU PPSP leads to several key findings in this chapter.

Figure 4-3 Ratio of Hot Topics' Relative Coverage in Corpus China PPSP (source: own work)





Figure 4-4 Ratio of Hot Topics' Relative Coverage in Corpus EU PPSP (source: own work)



We are going to look at Table 4-1 and Table 4-2 as well as Figure 4-3 and Figure 4-4 by dividing the topics into three tiers for the sake of step-by-step comparison: the top four

reference topics belong to the first tier, the middle four belong to the second, and the last three belong to the third tier.

For the first-tier topics, unsurprisingly, for both Corpus China PPSP and EU PPSP, Economy and Trade, as a topic, has the highest coverage for both corpora. It has a coverage of 27% in Corpus China PPSP and 21% in Corpus EU PPSP. This implies that Economy and Trade has the utmost importance for both China and the EU, although the relative proportion of importance of the topic for China is slightly higher than the EU.

Communication and Dialogue is the second-largest coverage topic for both corpora, at 12% and 15% in Corpus China PPSP and EU PPSP respectively. This suggests that Communication and Dialogue share a similar level of priority for China and the EU, surpassing that of Politics and Diplomacy and Security and Defence for both sides. Communication and Dialogue is a topic which focuses on the connections between China and the EU, where discourse plays a significant role. This indicates that discourse interactions play a large part in China-EU relations, which is also in line with the context of this research as introduced in Section 1.2 about the scope and scale of the official discourse between China and the EU. As here the keywords Communication and Dialogue were searched in a way that not only official dialogues but also other forms of communication are included, the indication of this extends beyond the volume of official discourse interaction to all forms of exchanges between China and the EU on all levels.

Politics and Diplomacy are 4th in corpus China PPSP and 3rd in EU PPSP, at 8% and 13% respectively. For this topic, the differences in proportion are small. The more obvious trend is that the top three topics for both Corpus China PPSP and EU PPSP are the same, which indicates strong compatibility in their priorities.

A more outstanding difference is that Corpus China PPSP shows an emphasis on Security and Defence with its coverage ranking the 3rd, while this is a topic ranking 7th sitting in the second tier for EU PPSP. This is the only difference in the first-tier rankings between China PPSP and EU PPSP but indicates an important divergence: for China, Security and Defence has a higher priority than for the EU. The ranking difference between Security and Defence is one of the biggest divergences shown in this comparison. This is in line with China's emphasis on national security. China is a nation-state and has a traumatic past of being colonised and taken apart. This identity of China is different from that of the EU. The EU is a supranational and intergovernmental organisation in which member states are bound together by shared norms and values, among other factors. Therefore the EU's emphasis on Security and Defence isn't as great as that of China although the EU has been increasingly attaching importance to developing its hard power along with soft power as well (European Union Global Strategy, 2016). These differences in history and identities will be further discussed in Section 5.2.1.1 about the EU's increasing emphases on its hard power.

For Corpus EU PPSP, Law and Regulations come straight after Politics and Diplomacy, ranking 4th in coverage whereas for Corpus China PPSP the 4th position is taken by Politics and Diplomacy. This is in line with the fact that the EU is established upon a set of norms and is a conventional normative power. It places the rule of law as one of its core values and has a large number of laws and regulations in the EU, due to the nature and hierarchies among the institutions. This normative nature of the EU will be further discussed in Chapter 7. The longitudinal changes in these topics will be further looked into in Section 4.2.2, which also feeds into the analysis on the dynamics of the normative nature of the EU and China's normative potential will also be discussed in Chapter 7.

In the second tier, two of the topics, Society and Social Issues as well as Environment and Energy appear in both corpora. This suggests that these areas share similar levels of priority for both China and the EU. Although China and the EU have different social and environmental concerns and challenges in the context of the bilateral relationship, the importance they attach to this area is shared. This indicates that China and the EU have a similar level of interest in these topics. Although the scope of this thesis does not cover social issues and environmental issues in China-EU relations, this does offer a piece of evidence from a discursive perspective that these areas could be a good place to start more cooperation in the China-EU context.

The differences in the second tier are that for China PPSP, Reforms follows closely after Politics and Diplomacy, ranking 5th, while for the EU PPSP, it ranks 9th. This indicates that reform is a high-frequency topic for China and is what China emphasises in China-EU relations. However, the relatively lower ranking of Reform in EU PPSP does not seem to be contingent with the fact that the EU is an entity constantly facing challenges and reforms as well. This may be related to the fact that the EU focuses more on its normative approach to China in its official discourse on China and less on its internal reforms. If the database included the EU's domestic discourse, the result could be different. Another possibility is that the EU's emphases on reform have been high at points when the EU faced crises but low at other times. This will be further investigated in Section 4.2.2 on the longitudinal changes in the topics.

Education and Research for Corpus EU PPSP ranks 8th, sitting in the second tier. Its proportion is 5%, the same as that of Education and Research for China PPSP. This indicates that this is an area where both share a similar level of interest.

In the third tier, the two corpora share the topics Science and Technology as well as Culture and Art. Culture and Art take 6% of the total of selected topics' coverage for China PPSP while for Corpus EU PPSP it is only 1%. In terms of Culture and Art, China attaches larger importance. This is consistent with China's approach to foreign relations, which is largely born of Chinese traditional values and culture.


Overall, Corpus China PPSP and Corpus EU PPSP present a high degree of similarity when it comes to how they order their preferences or priorities. There is a consistency between the data with the goals and “pillars” of China-EU relations. As described in the 2020 agenda, China-EU relations are expected to be more intricate and comprehensive where the nexus of economy, politics, and culture intertwine (European Commission, 2013). With the three top coverage topics identical to each other, the indication is that the common ground between China and the EU is firm and similarities are predominant across the topic range.

However, differences in the priorities also exist. China PPSP demonstrates a higher emphasis on Security and Defence while the EU emphasises Laws and Regulations. This difference is constituted by the different identities of China and the EU, as will be argued in Chapter 5. Plus, the EU emphasises Laws and Regulations, which is in line with the EU’s normative nature. These two differences in priorities are shaped by the identities of China and the EU.

4.2.2 Longitudinal Coverage

Figure 4-5 and Figure 4-6 present the stacked line charts, categorised by years and by topics, to demonstrate the longitudinal trend and patterns of changes in the topics’ coverage. They offer an overview not only of the proportion but also the stability of the frequency of the topics over the years, which contributes to an understanding of how the topic priorities have changed over the years for China and the EU.

Figure 4-5 Coverage of Hot Topics in Corpus China PPSP 1996-2019 (Categorised by Topics) (source: own work)



As Figure 4-5 shows, Economy and Trade have been the top coverage topic across the years in Corpus China PPSP despite a brief period when it was surpassed by Security and

Defence, with Economy and Trade covering 0.41%, and Security and Defence covering 0.43%, in 2015. The coverage of Economy and Trade is significantly more extensive than the rest of the topics in the rest of the years.

The second prominent topic is Communication and Dialogue (shown by the dark blue section). In the year 2003, the coverage of Communication and Dialogue is close to that of Economy and Trade. In 2018, it spiked again, becoming the second-largest coverage topic among the eleven topics, only second to Economy and Trade.


Other topics which stand out at certain points include Environment and Energy (shown by the light blue section), which experienced highs during periods including 2001-2004, 2008-2010, and 2016-2018 although 2001-2004 shows the most obvious surge.

Security and Defence experienced highs during 2003-2008 with a surge in 2006, 2012 as well as 2014-2018. Concordance analysis of Security and Defence (with the same criteria as for the topic coverage searching query) shows that most of the security and defence-related context in Corpus China PPSP is about the term “和平” (peace) before 2017 and “安全” (security) after 2017. Since 2004, there have been more contents on non-traditional security issues including “weapons proliferation, illegal migration, cross-border crimes and HIV/AIDS” (Wen, 2004) and preventing and managing avian influenza and other communicable diseases (Wen, 2006).

In 2002, Laws and Regulations is the second topic coverage topic among the eleven selected hot topics and in 2018, it is the third-largest coverage topic of the year following Economy and Trade, and Communication and Dialogue.

These findings indicate that Economy and Trade have been the most discussed topics in Corpus China PPSP across the years and its percentage largely outweighs the rest of the fourteen topics. This implies that Economy and Trade is a prioritised policy area in China’s policies to the EU, and its importance stands out. Communication is another critical area for China in its bilateral relations with the EU. Security issues, environmental and energy concerns, as well as issues regarding laws and regulations, from time to time, also stand out, but the importance of economic issues and communication is robust and consistent for China.

Figure 4-6 Coverage of Hot Topics in Corpus EU PPSP 1994-2019 (Categorised by Topics)



(source: own work)

Figure 4-6 shows the changes in topic coverage for Corpus EU PPSP. For Corpus EU PPSP, Economy and Trade are predominant across the years as well. However, cases where the coverage of other topics surpasses Economy and Trade happen several times: Communication and Dialogue passes Economy and Trade in 2000, 2003, 2017, 2018 and 2019. Environment and Energy passes Economy and Trade in 2010, and Politics and Diplomacy pass Economy and Trade in 2016.

In terms of rule-related topics, the EU has been consistent. This indicates its normative nature as well as its determination to support China in regulations and standards. An emerging topic is Education in the EU's documents towards China. This is due to the surge in educational cooperation, joint degree programmes between European countries and China in recent years.

Overall, the topics' coverage in Corpus EU PPSP has a more stable, or less fluctuated, coverage across the years especially for the topics Economy and Trade, Communication and Dialogue, Politics and Diplomacy, Laws and Regulations. This, on the one hand, indicates that the EU has a stable feature of keeping its norms emphasised. Although at different times the proportion of topics may change, it seems that its main topics, or policy areas, do not reduce or increase in terms of attention too much regardless of times and events. This could be connected to the EU's normative nature as the EU's external actions are rooted in its fundamental values and norms of which the contents and aspects stay stable. On the other hand, this could be related to the fact that the EU's official documents on China are part of the EU's official discourse system, which bears the features of being systematic and content rich. The structures and content arrangements of the EU documents

usually follow the patterns or traditions passed on from previous years. This institutional background assists the stability of the topics' coverage.

Apart from the overview of topic coverage in the two corpora, it is necessary to compare the changes of each topic's coverage in order to get a more specific idea on how China and the EU's preferences on topics have changed over the years. This section shows the longitudinal coverage of the key topics. The first comparison is between the coverage of Economy and Trade in Corpus China PPSP and Corpus EU PPSP, as shown in Figure 4-7 and Figure 4-8.

Figure 4-7 Longitudinal Coverage of Economy and Trade in Corpus China PPSP and EU PPSP (with Trend Lines)




Figure 4-8 Longitudinal Coverage of Economy and Trade in Corpus China PPSP and EU PPSP (Normalised by Mean)²⁴




Figure 4-7 and Figure 4-8 demonstrate the coverage of Economy and Trade in Corpus China PPSP and Corpus EU PPSP. The trendlines in Figure 4-7 show that overall, the coverage of Economy and Trade for both corpora are both consistent and stable over the years. The coverage of this topic for both corpora slightly dropped across the years. The differences between the coverage of Economy and Trade for the two corpora are small. This indicates

²⁴ The normalised data in this thesis, unless otherwise specified, are calculated with the mean referring to the overall average of a topic's coverage in the combined total text length of Corpus China PPSP and Corpus EU PPSP. In the years where there is no data or where the topic's coverage is zero, the lines are smoothed out.

that although Economy and Trade is the main topic for China and the EU, in recent years, other topics start to play a greater part in the discourse.

Despite the overall high frequency of economy-related topics in both corpora, we can see that both Figure 4-7 and Figure 4-8 indicate that the frequency of economy and trade-related topics experienced a gentle drop in the year 2003 and 2004 respectively for Corpus China PPSP and EU PPSP. Relating to the background in China-EU relations, the year around 2004 was the time when China-EU relations experienced a slightly cooled-down period after the honeymoon as the two sides had disputes on trade issues as well as human rights issues. Although it is hard to tell, just based on the figure, whether they are directly related to the specific events around those years, the general trend of change in the topic frequency is reliable and does indicate the preferences for the topic over the years as well as its slight shrinkage.

CL can offer quantitative data which are otherwise unavailable, but one could only infer the relations between the discourse data and events in China-EU relations so much without assistance of other methodologies. Analysing, or sometimes “guessing” the factors in the big picture of China-EU relations offers insights into the context behind the data as well as creating a link between discourse and activities between China and the EU. However, it would be wrong to state that if the economy and trade-related discourse dropped, it must indicate that the role of the economy and role dropped as it could be that a discourse on other topics arose over the years, making the discourse on the economy less when in fact economic activities between China and the EU did not decrease. Other factors which can impact the data will be mentioned in the Discussion section of this chapter.

Figure 4-9 Longitudinal Coverage of Communication and Dialogue in Corpus China PPSP and EU PPSP (with Trend Lines)





Figure 4-10 Coverage of Communication and Dialogue in Corpus China PPSP and EU PPSP (Normalised by Mean)



In terms of Communication and Dialogue, corpus China PP+SP and corpus EU PP+SP both have a high frequency, as demonstrated in Figure 4-9 and Figure 4-10. For the EU, the topic frequency gently rises over the years, meeting its highest point in 2018, while for China, the highest point happened in 2003, and the year 2018 saw the second-highest point. The data point to the idea that both China and the EU attach high value to culture and communication. However, the EU seems to have maintained a slightly more stable coverage, especially before 2008.

Figure 4-11 Coverage of Politics and Diplomacy in Corpus China PPSP and EU PPSP (with Trend Lines)





Figure 4-12 Coverage of Politics and Diplomacy in Corpus China PPSP and EU PPSP (Normalised by Mean)



There are more fluctuations over the years in the coverage of Politics and Diplomacy in Corpus China PPSP than in Corpus EU PPSP. In Corpus China PPSP, the year 1998 and 2008 have a low percentage of politics-related topics.²⁵ In relation to the background of China-EU interactions around the year 2008, this was during the relative “ice age” of China-EU relations when disagreements related to human rights between the two took place as mentioned in the Introduction chapter. It was the year of the disturbance of the Olympic torch relay in Paris, and the EU-China summit was cancelled as German Chancellor Angela Merkel as well as then French President Nicolas Sarkozy arranged meetings with the Dalai Lama. Overall, in Corpus China PPSP, the frequency related to politics did not experience an apparent rise while that in the Corpus EU PPSP has a slight rise despite the drop around 2004.

In Corpus EU PPSP, from 1994 to 2019, the frequency of politics-related topics is overall stable. It met its lowest point in 2004, with a frequency of 0.35%, but bounced back to 1.09% in 2016. This shows that overall, the EU’s official discourse involving China contains large amounts of politics-related contents. Even though official discourse is political discourse in the first place, the proportion of the relatively narrow sense of politics-related contents in Corpus EU PPSP is higher than that of Corpus China PPSP.

²⁵ Politics-related topics here refer to the topics regarding a narrow sense for politics and diplomacy as defined in the query design, although the author is aware other topics not counted here may be classified as political. However, a narrow definition is applied to make searches feasible.

Figure 4-13 Longitudinal Coverage of Security and Defence in Corpus China PPSP and EU PPSP (with Trend Lines)





Figure 4-14 Longitudinal Coverage of Security and Defence in Corpus China PPSP and EU PPSP (Normalised by Mean)



On security, Corpus China PPSP has a sharper rise over the years on the topic frequency compared with that of the EU. However, the EU experiences a quick rise between the years 2010 and 2016, which is consistent with the EU's policy tendencies in recent years to improve its hard power, or military power, and revise the image of the EU as just a "soft power", as it is stated in its Global Strategy that soft and hard power should go hand in hand (European Union Global Strategy, 2016). The EU's increasing focus on defence and hard power since 2010 will be further discussed through the content analysis in Chapter 7.

In 2014, due to the fact that it was the year President Xi Jinping visited Europe, there were five appearances of the term "peace, prosperity, reform, civilization" (和平, 增长, 改革, 文明) as shown in the concordance reference of the Security and Defence in Corpus China PPSP for the year 2014 in Table Apx 13 in the Appendix. Peaceful development is another high-frequency theme represented in this concordance. For example, "peaceful development" (和平发展) as a developmental plan has been mentioned seven times in Table Apx 13.

Meanwhile, since 2014, the content about security further diversified to include more international security issues such as peacekeeping in Somali, prevention of the arm competitions in the outer space and controlling of the Ebola virus (Table Apx 13, Corpus China PPSP).

In 2018, there are two references to the emphasis that China hopes the EU does not sell arms or other facilities serving a military purpose to Taiwan (Table Apx 13, Corpus China PPSP).

Figure 4-15 Longitudinal Coverage of Society and Social Issues in Corpus China PPSP and Corpus EU PPSP (with Trend Lines)






Figure 4-16 Longitudinal Coverage of Society and Social Issues in Corpus China PPSP and Corpus EU PPSP (Normalised by Mean)




On Society and Social issues, Corpus EU PPSP has an overall consistent coverage, but the trend line shows that the coverage has dropped slightly over the years. For Corpus China PPSP, the coverage on this topic was less than that of the EU in general until after 2010.

Figure 4-17 Coverage of Laws and Regulations in Corpus China PPSP and EU PPSP



As Figure 4-17 shows, the topic related to laws and regulations has occupied an overall more stable percentage in Corpus EU PPSP than that of China PPSP, except for the plunge in 2012. The general trend is that contents relating to this topic have been gradually rising over the 12 years examined. This is consistent with the fact that the EU is rule-based. Potentially the percentage of law-related contents could be even higher than the data indicate given that some of the words and expressions related to law in a broader sense, such as Directives, Decisions, Recommendations and Opinions are not included in the query design. For China, the topic coverage met its peaks in 2002 and 2018. However, in the rest of the years, the coverage on Laws and Regulations is consistently below 0.20 % with the percentage dropping below 0.1% in some of the years until 2015 when the coverage surged to 0.71% in 2017 and 0.62% in 2019. Comparatively speaking, Corpus EU PPSP has a higher coverage rate on Laws and Regulations as compared to that of Corpus China PPSP. However, the topic coverage has been rising rapidly overall for six years in a row with the rate in 2019 dropping slightly but still reaching 0.18% which is relatively high compared to the years before 2013.

Figure 4-18 Coverage of Reforms in Corpus China PPSP and EU PPSP



Reform is one of the key words which stands out in the word frequency list.

Figure 4-18 shows that both China and the EU have been consistent in including the topic of reform over the years in their official discourse. However, China has two peaks in the coverage of reform: the year 1998 and the year 2004. The first period can be related to the blooming stage of the Chinese market after the adoption of reform and opening-up policy and the second one relates to the time when the current administration started in 2013.

The EU has experienced a steadier coverage between 1998 and 2006, with the official discourse having around 0.2% coverage on Reforms every year. Since 2004, the coverage for Reforms reduced slightly.

The data indicate that the topic of reform is essential to both China and the EU and the importance, or proportion, in their discourse shares a high degree of similarity. Reform has been a hot topic consistently for both, although it is not at the top of the favourite topics.

Figure 4-19 Longitudinal Coverage of Culture and Art in Corpus China PPSP and Corpus EU PPSP (Normalised by Mean)





Figure 4-20 Coverage of Culture and Art in Corpus China PPSP and Corpus EU PPSP (with Trend Lines)



In terms of Culture and Art, Corpus China PPSP and Corpus EU PPSP both have a high frequency, as demonstrated in Figure 4-19 and Figure 4-20. For the EU, the topic frequency gently rises over the years, meeting its highest point in 2010 and 2015, while for China the highest point happened in 2004. Although in Corpus China PPSP, there has been a slight drop in the frequency over the years, the coverage of this topic in Corpus China PPSP outweighs that in Corpus EU PPSP in most years.

Figure 4-21 Longitudinal Coverage of Technology in Corpus China PPSP and Corpus EU PPSP (with Trend Lines)




Figure 4-22 Longitudinal Coverage of Technology in Corpus China PPSP and Corpus EU PPSP (Normalised by Mean)




Figure 4-21 and Figure 4-22 show the coverage of Technology in Corpus China PPSP and Corpus EU PPSP. Both China and the EU have mentioned topics on technology in an overall consistent manner over the years. Both lines experience a slight rising trend. However, the coverage of Technology in Corpus China PPSP has fluctuated more frequently than that of EU PPSP, although the fluctuations are not huge.

Figure 4-23 Longitudinal Coverage of Environment and Energy in Corpus China PPSP and Corpus EU PPSP (with Trend Lines)




Figure 4-24 Longitudinal Coverage of Environment and Energy in Corpus China PPSP and Corpus EU PPSP (Normalised by Mean)




Figure 4-2 and Figure 4-24 demonstrate the changes in the coverage of Energy and Environment in the discourse over the years. Overall, the coverage of Environment and Energy for both China PPSP and EU PPSP has increased over the years with the coverage in Corpus EU PPSP higher than that in Corpus China PPSP and a slightly higher rate of increase. As Figure 4-2 shows, China had a surge in the coverage of Environment and Energy in 2003 and 2017, respectively. From 2001-2004, the coverage in Corpus China PPSP experienced a rising period, as did 2015 to 2018. Looking at the time where these surges happened, some events happened which may have been relevant. In 2002, China had the fifth Conference on Environmental Protection during which it was proposed that “protecting the environment is one important duty of the government. The society should be motivated to fulfil the task of environmental protection in line with the requirements of the socialist market economy” (Wenhai, 2018: 2). In 2015, the revised version of the Environmental Protection Law was put into action (Wenhai, 2018). Plus, during the decade of 2010, China’s air quality issue has become a big concern worldwide. Although the data do not indicate direction relations between these events and the increase in environment-related discourse in official documents, the association may be helpful in terms of understanding the overall social condition behind the discourse making.

4.3 Collocations and Concordance of Shared Terms

The current literature has suggested that China and the EU have talked past each other in policy areas of shared interest (Godement, Vasselier & European Council on Foreign Relations, 2017; Gaenssmantel & Feng, 2016). This section carries out collocations’ analysis of the topics with the top coverage of keywords signifying hot topics when the findings are helpful for understanding the challenges and misunderstandings between China and the EU.

This thesis has listed a range of challenges in China-EU relations. However, as economic cooperation is the area which stands out in the bilateral relations both in terms of history but also in terms of the scale of common interests involved, this section will focus on economic terms which are relevant to case analysis in Chapter 8 and see whether collocation analysis

of these terms gives useful findings on the mismatches between China and the EU in these cases.

4.3.1 Economy and Trade

Figure 4-25 and Figure 4-26 present the collocations of the topic Economy and Trade.²⁶ This search looks for the high-frequency words appearing to the left and right (within a distance of five words) of the core words related to the economy. The threshold of frequency is set at 60 to include a reasonable amount of words. One note here is that the words appearing next to the searched term but without a helpful meaning (such as “a”, “is”, “and”), to understand the associations for the Economy in corpus EU PPSP, have been eliminated from the list.

Getting the implications of collocations is a challenging task as one needs to stitch the words together for a bigger picture of the frequency associations of a term.

As in Figure 4-25 and Figure 4-26, the word appearing to the left of the central dot in the circle are the ones located to the left of the economy-related words in the sentence and those to the right located to the right of the central words in the sentence. A small distance to the central word means strong collocation. Darker dots mean the words have higher frequency.

²⁶ This search involves the usage of a wild card. Specifically the searching criteria is: /(econom[a-zA-Z]*|trad[a-zA-Z]*|commerc[a-zA-Z]*|financ[a-zA-Z]*|tax|tariff|invest[a-zA-Z]*|deficit|budget|savings)/i. This searches for words with the same roots as “economy”, “trade”, “commercial”, “finance” and other relevant words including tariff, invest, deficit, budget, savings. [a-zA-Z]* searches for any letters more than one letter (the same as the function of wild cards in Nvivo) and “|” means OR.

As Figure 4-25 and Figure 4-26 demonstrate, the term economy frequently collocates with the words “China”, “reform”, “growth”, “development”, “political”, “trade”, “world”, “global”, “market”, “rights” and “cooperation”. These collocated words give an idea of what appears together with economy-rooted words and offers a context for how the economy was talked about.

One quick impression and assumption of the collocations of economy-related words in Corpus EU PPSP is that the EU focuses not only on the growth of the economy but also how China’s economic system could be integrated into the global one with necessary reforms.

Table 4-3 Collocation of Economy and Trade in Corpus EU PPSP

Corpus: Corpus EU PPSP				
Index	Position	Collocate	Freq (coll.)	Freq (corpus)
1	L	china	340	3094
2	R	trade	293	839
3	L	social	290	570
4	R	eu	194	2304
5	L	european	190	1124
6	L	development	184	1047
7	L	growth	174	389
8	R	political	129	449
9	L	cooperation	125	816
10	L	foreign	112	333
11	R	chinese	111	1034
12	R	world	110	532
13	R	asia	107	710
14	R	sustainable	107	421
15	R	global	98	630
16	R	co-operation	94	718
17	L	market	90	373
18	R	china's	88	455
19	L	economic	87	1062
20	R	will	82	1281
21	R	support	81	602
22	R	more	77	708
23	L	china's	74	363
24	R	process	74	303
25	R	into	70	333
26	R	agreement	69	385
27	L	programme	69	739
28	L	should	69	956
29	L	investment	67	538
30	R	relations	67	405
31	L	eu-china	66	714
32	R	europe	66	462
33	L	issues	66	532
34	R	international	64	625
35	L	rights	62	664
36	R	policy	60	771
37	L	environmental	57	471
38	R	bank	55	125
39	R	countries	55	529
40	L	further	54	406
41	L	bilateral	53	265
42	R	infrastructure	53	150
43	L	we	53	703
44	R	projects	51	368
45	R	services	51	173
46	L	financial	50	255
47	L	reforms	50	148
48	L	asian	49	265
49	R	both	49	504
50	L	dialogue	49	706
51	R	direct	49	89
52	L	towards	49	260
53	R	well	49	332
54	R	including	44	408
55	R	public	44	209
56	L	connectivity	43	267
57	R	environment	43	333
58	R	climate	41	276
59	R	new	41	537
60	R	all	40	491
61	R	promote	40	231
62	L	system	40	305

Table 4-4 Collocation of Economy and Trade in Corpus China PPSP

Corpus: Corpus China PPSP				
Index	Position	Collocate	Freq (coll.)	Freq (corpus)
1	L	中欧	126	1486
2	L	贸易	95	197
3	R	合作	85	990
4	R	投资	80	181
5	L	中国	74	1017
6	L	促进	58	254
7	L	亚欧	52	473
8	R	发展	52	729
9	L	双方	50	364
10	L	欧盟	49	792
11	L	推动	47	302
12	R	协定	42	63
13	R	领域	37	290
14	R	便利	36	39
15	L	共同	36	293
16	R	对话	36	283
17	R	全球化	35	49
18	L	加强	34	342
19	L	自由	33	29
20	L	世界	31	255
21	R	增长	31	103
22	R	谈判	28	52
23	L	国际	27	236
24	L	欧洲	27	434
25	R	稳定	26	120
26	L	经济	26	175
27	R	伙伴	25	38
28	R	摩擦	24	24
29	R	积极	24	153
30	R	金融	24	47
31	R	问题	24	150
32	R	自由化	22	12
33	M	扩大	21	84
34	R	全球	20	152
35	L	关系	20	578
36	L	开放	20	100
37	R	政治	20	117
38	R	互利	19	111
39	R	保护主义	19	26
40	L	双向	18	15
41	R	推进	18	112
42	R	文化	18	87
43	L	社会	18	85
44	R	经贸	18	73
45	L	作用	17	128
46	L	市场	17	51
47	L	维护	17	166
48	L	互联互通	16	48
49	R	保持	16	57
50	L	社会发展	16	24
51	R	全面	15	214
52	R	公平	15	25
53	R	创新	15	49
54	L	国家	15	214
55	L	多边	15	74
56	R	重要	15	215
57	M	高层	15	46
58	L	共赢	14	107
59	L	实现	14	110
60	R	建设	14	121
61	L	机制	14	107
62	R	相互	14	65

Table 4-3 and Table 4-4 show the data behind Figure 4-25 and Figure 4-26. There are quite a lot of overlapping terms in the top 62 collocated words for Economy and Trade for the two corpora. These include trade, cooperation, globalisation, dialogue, connectivity and many others. There are also some collocated terms distinct for each. For the Corpus EU PPSP, the words “sustainable”, “environment(al)”, and “climate” stand out. Corpus EU PPSP also contains the words “will” and “should” which indicate normative contents. For Corpus China PPSP, the words “自由 (freedom)”, “自由化(liberalisation)”, “问题 (problems)”, “摩擦

(frictions)”, “保护主义(protectionism)”, “反对 (against)” and “双向 (mutual)” are distinct. These differences indicate that Corpus EU PPSP emphasises maintaining a sustainable developmental pattern when it comes to the economy and trade. China emphasises free trade, mutual respect, handling trade disputes and anti-protectionism. This indicates that although Economy and Trade is the biggest shared topic between China and the EU, the two still have differences in their priorities and emphases on this topic. This forms one source of misunderstandings as the two may have agreed on enhancing economic cooperation without clearly laying out each other’s priorities and interests in the area of economic and trading activities.

4.3.2 Market Economy

This section looks at the concordance of “Market Economy” as the recognition of China’s MES has been a persisting issue between China and the EU and has caused tension on both sides within and beyond the economic area.

For these more specific terms, concordance searches, instead of collocation searches, have been applied. While collocation searches are more effective when an impression of related areas is needed and when the central term has a high quantity of frequency in the corpora, concordance searches provides more details of what is specifically mentioned together with the term instead of a general impression of topics linked as provided in collocations.

Table 4-5 shows the concordance of the term “市场经济 (Market Economy)” in Corpus China PPSP:

Table 4-5 Concordance of 市场经济 (Market Economy) in Corpus China PPSP

File	Left	Node
2003	妥善解决 不合理 限制 及 技术性 壁垒 放宽 高技术 出口 限制 发挥 技贸 合作的 巨大 潜力 尽早 给予 中国 完全	市场经济
2004	全方位 宽 领域 多 层次 的 对外开放 格局 社会主义 市场 经济体制 日益完善 不久前 东盟 各国 正式 承认 中国 的 完全	市场经济
2009	这一 政治 歧视 为什么 欧方 方对 中国 市场 经济建设 取得 的 巨 视而 而不 大成就 见 却在 承认 俄罗斯	市场经济
2009	取得 的 巨 视而 而不 大成就 见 却在 承认 俄罗斯 市场经济 地位 的 同时 拒绝 承认 中国 的	市场经济
2010	一个 最终 成为 现实 所以 在 西方 一直 存在 着 这样 的 困惑 为什么 中国 看 上去 并非 西方 定义 的	市场经济
2010	双边 捞 实惠 多 边做 恶人 感到 沮丧 对 欧盟 当断 不断 迟 迟 不能 解除 对华 军 售禁令 和 给予 中国	市场经济
2011	关系 在 更高 的 水平 上 向前 发展 希望 欧盟 尽 早 解除 对华 军 售禁令 并 承认 中国 的	市场经济
2014	我们 从 中国 国情 和 时代 要求 出发 探索 和 开拓 国家 发展 道路 形成 了 中国特色 社会主义 提出 要 建设 社会主义	市场经济
2017	也 希望 欧方 方在 投资 审查 等方面 公正 对待 中国 企业 在 签证 等方面 给予 更多 便利 产能 过剩 是	市场经济
2019	速度 是 难得 的 也是 值得 肯定 的 二是 欧盟 要求 中国 加大 开放 力度 的 同时 自身 也应 坚持	市场经济
2019	推进 改革开放 成效 显著 营商环境 排名 连续 两年 大幅 提升 欧盟 在 要求 中国 扩大 开放 的 同时 自身 也应 坚持	市场经济
Node	Right	
市场经济	地位 减少 并 消除 对华 反倾销 及 有关 歧视性 政策 和 做法 慎用 特保 措施 合理 补偿 因 欧盟 扩大	
市场经济	地位 这是 对 中国 市场 经济发展 成就 的 肯定 中国 将 继续 深化 改革开放 继续 认真 履行 加入 世贸组织 的 承诺	
市场经济	地位 的 同时 拒绝 承认 中国 的 市场经济 地位 这些 问题 不仅 极大 地 困扰 着 我 和 我 的 同事 们	
市场经济	地位 这些 问题 不仅 极大 地 困扰 着 我 和 我 的 同事 们 更 是 广大 中国 老百姓 心中 挥之 不 去的	
市场经济	国家 却 能 取得 经济 持续 快速 的 发展 为什么 中国 是 西方 方所 认定 的 非 民主 国家 却 实现 了	
市场经济	地位 非常 失望 这些 认知 上 的 差距 和 欧盟 对华 负面 消极 举动 在 一定 程度 上 影响 了 中欧 互信	
市场经济	地位 以 增进 彼此 的 信任 阿什 什顿 表示 欧盟 希望 看到 一个 强大 发展 成功 的 中国 中国 的	
市场经济	民主 政治 先进 文化 和谐 社会 生态 文明 维护 社会 公平 正义 促进 人 的 全面 发展 坚持 和平 发展 全面 建成 小康 社会	
市场经济	条件 下 的 周期性 现象 是 结构性 问题 也是 全球 性 问题 国际 金融危机 爆发 以来 世界 经济 下行 导致 需求 萎缩	
市场经济	的 基本 原则 为 中国 企业 提供 5G 问题 公平 公正 非 歧视 待遇 包括 在 上 秉持 客观 公正 态度	
市场经济	的 基本 原则 为 中国 企业 提供 公平 公正 非 歧视 待遇 现任 欧盟 委员会 农业 委员 候任 贸易 委员 霍根	

A few theme emerged from the concordance searches of 市场经济 (Market Economy) in Corpus China PPSP:

First, China sees the EU's refusal to grant MES as political discrimination (政治歧视) as shown in the concordance of 2003 and 2009. In this concordance search, the term “discrimination” appeared four times. Among them, in 2009, the activity of the EU was referred to as “political discrimination” and was compared to the EU's granting MES to Russia.

Second, China attaches great importance to its economic and social achievement being recognised (承认) and validated (肯定) as shown in the concordance of 2004 and 2009. This also means China respects the EU and WTO and have expectations to these organisations in terms of making justified decisions.

Third, the MES issues, from the perspective of China, have hurt the mutual trust (信任) between China as shown in the concordance in 2011, including the Chinese public, and the EU.

China's main pursuit shown in the concordance text is that it hopes its achievements will be recognised and a justice response be given. The Chinese government and people think it unfair that Russia has been granted MES but not China. MES is not only about economic benefits, but also a symbol of respect and recognition of China's respect of the WTO regulations as well as China's reform, social development, and its trust in the fairness of the EU. The hope for recognition suggests a level of respect from China for the EU's normative

power which was reduced due to disappointment over the EU's refusal to grant MES to China.

China's main disappointment in the case shown in the concordance text is that the EU's supports are conditioned by the EU's values, and these fundamental gaps have caused frustrations in China. Plus, it seems that one major disappointment comes from not being clearly communicated with about the EU's decision before 2016, creating a shock when the decision came in 2016. This indicates a mix of fundamental gaps and lack of communication (could be the avoidance of communication).

Although it is not the position of the thesis to suggest specific policies for the future, the textual analysis indicates that a clear explanation of the conditions is desired for future cases like this. China and the EU should also negotiate an alternative mechanism which can enhance trade between China and Europe within or beyond the sphere of MES.

Table 4-6 Concordance of Market Economy in Corpus EU PPSP

Corpus: Corpus EU PPSP Search Term: Market Economy Occurrences: 38 (1.31) Texts: 11/15					
Index	File	Left	Node	Right	
1	1995	in China's Constitution, of creating a "Socialist	Market Economy	by the turn of the century (see	
2	1995	falls well short of having a full	market economy	with adequate social protection including freedom of	
3	1995	of China's reform process until a mature	market economy	is established, and for China it would	
4	1995	progress towards full integration in the world	market economy	strengthening of civil society, poverty alleviation, environment	
5	1995	of clear commitments to create a fully-fledged	market economy	• to contribute to reform inside China	
6	1995	four coastal areas. Efforts towards creating a	market economy	b) Efforts towards creating a market economy(October	
7	1995	Constitution under the new formula of socialist	market economy	Since the launching of reforms, China	
8	1995	million people. The making of a "Socialis	Market Economy	with Chinese characteristics The effects of over	
9	1995	terms of the degree to which the	market economy	has developed in China, both as a	
10	1995	clear indication of the development of a	market economy	In 1978, 77.6% of industrial output and	
11	1998	are found to operate within clearly defined	market economy	conditions, will be granted market economy treatment.	
12	1998	defined market economy conditions, will be granted	market economy	treatment. This means that the domestic prices	
13	1998	in step with China's move towards a	market economy	China's WTO accession process, as well as	
14	2000	operating in a market environment are granted	market economy	treatment. This new regime has already been	
15	2000	of cases, resulting in the granting of	market economy	treatment to some Chinese firms. More and	
16	2000	and more Chinese companies will benefit from	market economy	treatment in the future, as the legislative	
17	2000	the future, as the legislative framework for	market economy	conditions in China develops, and awareness of	
18	2001	highly centralised economy to that of a	market economy	through a number of reforms in the	
19	2001	change to meet the demands of the	market economy	and the rule of law will need	
20	2001	been around 10%. The concept of a	market economy	now incorporated in China's constitution, has allowed	
21	2001	food supply, and establishment of a systematised	market economy	are also now important	
22	2001	the support to the transition towards a	market economy	The reform of the SOEs and the	
23	2001	Support to economic reform and promotion of	market economy	Biodiversity protection Human rights (civil and political,	
24	2001	resources • Support to transition to a	market economy	• Minimising social consequences of the reform	
25	2001	field. 5 Support to transition to a	market economy	The promotion of the market economy and	
26	2001	a market economy The promotion of the	market economy	and the integration into the WTO will	
27	2003	2004.Analyse China's formal request for full	'Market Economy	Status' for the entire Chinese economy under	
28	2003	taking account of China's progress towards EU	market economy	criteria as documented in the request; continue	
29	2003	the requests of individual Chinese companies for	'market economy	treatment in anti-dumping investigations. 20! Make full	
30	2003	Environment and Accelerating the Transition to a	Market Economy	Theme II: Addressing Needs of Poorer and	
31	2004	Environment and Accelerating the Transition to a	Market Economy	Theme II: Addressing Needs of Poorer and	
32	2006	justified. At present, the conditions for granting	Market Economy	Status (MES) to China for anti-dumping investigations	
33	2006	change and energy, illegal migration, human right	Market Economy	Status, market access, IPR, and the arms	
34	2010	law, setting a legal framework for a	market economy	and creating a judicial system. 73. However,	
35	2015	in China and of the implementation of	market economy	principles and the elimination of discrimination and	
36	2018	pu it simply, to become a real	market economy	Commensurate with China's growing role in the	
37	2018	of commercial viability and ensure a rules-based	market economy	and non-discriminatory public procurement also apply.	
38	2019	and level playing field, and protect its	market economy	from possible distortions." Today's Joint Communication proposes	

Table 4-6 shows the concordance of "Market Economy" in corpus EU PPSP. A few inferences can be drawn based on a reading of these concordances.

First, The EU is aware of China's plan to create a "Socialist Market Economy". This shows that the EU, from the beginning of these issues, was clear that China plans to pursue a

different kind of market economy. The EU has had unrealistic expectations of China not due to a shortage of knowledge but due to the EU's perception of itself and the EU's fundamental world view which involves a belief that it can, over time, impact China's political choice.

Second, one of the EU's main pursuit regarding the issue of MES is to promote the European style rule of law and human rights in China. However, the difficult part is that rule of law and human rights bear different connotations for China and the EU. A concordance analysis was carried out for "human rights" for Corpus China PPSP and Corpus EU PPSP in Section 4.3.4.

Last, in recent years, the EU mentioned that it will facilitate protection from possible distortions of MES, which is basically closing the door for this issue for China. It seems like the issue has developed to a stage of hard stagnant until new alternative routes or solutions emerge.

4.3.3 Politics and Diplomacy

Table 4-7 Collocation of Politics and Diplomacy in Diplomacy Corpus China PPSP

Corpus: Corpus China PPSP									
Index	Stat	Collocate	Freq (coll.)	Freq (corpus)					
1	L	欧盟	82	792	26	L	增进	16	85
2	L	中欧	71	1486	27	R	中的	15	41
3	L	中国	67	1017	28	R	经济	15	175
4	R	对话	65	283	29	R	我们	12	261
5	R	合作	53	990	30	R	研讨会	12	54
6	L	加强	44	342	31	L	能源	12	61
7	L	安全	39	122	32	R	莫盖	12	22
8	R	交流	32	258	33	L	交往	11	55
9	L	关系	31	578	34	R	国家	11	214
10	R	代表	30	60	35	R	委员会	11	53
11	R	高级	29	43	36	L	支持	11	169
12	L	发展	27	729	37	R	文化	11	87
13	L	交与	25	26	38	R	社会	11	85
14	L	双方	23	364	39	L	经贸	11	73
15	L	欧洲	23	434	40	L	高层	11	46
16	R	促进	21	254	41	R	不断	10	113
17	R	领域	20	290	42	M	国际	10	236
18	R	协调	19	91	43	L	开展	10	102
19	R	作用	18	128	44	R	推动	10	302
20	R	发挥	18	80	45	R	沟通	10	76
21	R	文件	18	29	46	R	盖里	10	19
22	R	深化	18	125	47	R	磋商	10	41
23	M	重要	18	215	48	R	维护	10	166
24	R	互信	17	69	49	L	进一步	10	106
25	R	机制	17	107					

Table 4-8 Collocation of Politics and in Corpus EU PPSP²⁷

Corpus: Corpus EU PPSP				
Index	position	Collocate	Freq (coll.)	Freq (corpus)
1	L	eu-china	41	714
2	L	our	34	679
3	L	economic	21	1062
4	L	bilateral	16	265
5	L	trade	16	839
6	R	china	15	3094
7	L	more	14	708
8	R	political	14	449
9	L	reciprocal	14	34
10	R	eu	12	2304
11	M	this	12	1417
12	L	important	11	318
13	R	partnership	9	240
14	R	policy	9	771
15	L	balanced	8	63
16	M	development	8	1047
17	M	new	8	537
18	L	investment	7	538
19	R	these	7	452
20	R	towards	7	260
21	R	dialogue	6	706
22	L	eu's	6	171
23	L	relations	6	405
24	R	action	5	371
25	L	comprehensive	5	161
26	L	discuss	5	38
27	L	element	5	43
28	R	global	5	630
29	L	importance	5	207
30	R	issues	5	532
31	R	joint	5	318
32	L	key	5	360
33	R	level	5	337
34	R	relationship	5	184
35	L	strengthen	5	190
36	L	strong	5	111

Politics and Diplomacy in Corpus EU PPSP has collocations with the term balanced, investment, comprehensive, and global. Corpus China PPSP on this topic has collocations with security, coordination, mutual trust, high-level and energy. Both collocate with economy and dialogues. This indicates that for both China and the EU, politics and diplomacy are connected to the smoothness of the economy and investment. The EU is inclined to emphasise a balanced, comprehensive approach in political communication while China


²⁷ Search Term: /politic[a-z].*|policy|diplomacy|diplomactic|international|affairs|relations[a-z].*|foreign affair|international affairs|foreign relations|international relations|domestic affairs|foreign policy|i| threshold: 5.

emphasises maintaining security, high-level communications and potentially energy security concerns. China's emphases on security are consistent with the findings in earlier sections of this chapter. Both corpora contain several action words indicating positively enhancing cooperation, which is a major similarity between the two corpora in this collocation comparison.

4.3.4 Human Rights

The topic of human rights is a heated topic in China-EU relations. As mentioned in the literature review, existing research has pointed out that China and the EU have different connotations and definitions of the concept of human rights (Liu & Heathcote, 2000; Men, 2011; Freeman & Geeraerts, 2011; Zhang, 2012). Therefore, collocation analysis is done on this topic to explore whether this method offers any new findings on this issue.


Figure 4-27 Collocation of Human Rights in Corpus China PPSP



As Figure 4-27 shows, “Human Rights” in Corpus China PPSP collocates with dialogues, promotion, security, justice/fairness, objective, domestic politics, interfere, stability, internet. It indicates that China relates human rights issues to national security and stability. It hopes that the EU will view China’s human rights situation with justice and respect but without

interference. There is also the word “in the name of (之名)” in the collocation, which indicates that China has expressed dissatisfaction about the EU interfering in China’s domestic issues in the name of human rights issues.

Figure 4-28 Collocation of Human Rights in Corpus EU PPSP



As Figure 4-28 shows “human rights” in Corpus EU PPSP collocates with law, rule, economic, democracy, protection, governance, freedoms, promotion, fundamental, standards. Mostly, human rights as a term is related to the founding values of the EU. It does not relate so much to state security as in Corpus China PPSP.

The two corpora share collocations with “mutual respect (相互尊重)” and “cooperation (合作)” which shows that the two are open to improved understanding and cooperation in this area.

Overall, the differences in the collocations for “human rights” between Corpus China PPSP and Corpus EU PPSP are consistent with the findings in the existing literature that China focuses more on economic and collective rights while the EU focuses more on individual rights. However, the collocations do not output data sufficient to establish whether the connotations of human rights should be universal (Liu & Heathcote, 2000; Men, 2011; Zhang, 2012). Findings in the collocation comparison are also in line with the previous findings that Security and Defence has a higher position on China’s priority list than that of the EU.

4.4 Top Verbs and Nouns

Table 4-9 shows the top fifty frequency verbs in China and the EU's policy papers on each other.

Table 4-9 Top Verbs: Corpus China PPSP vs Corpus EU PPSP

Corpus: China PP+SP Language: Chinese 12 files 22814 tokens 4626 types 1712 lemmas				Corpus: China PP+SP Language: Chinese 12 files 22814 tokens 4626 types 1712 lemmas			
	Lemma	Frequency: 02 - Relative freq	Dispersion: 06_DP		Lemma	Frequency: 02 - Relative freq	Dispersion: 06_DP
1	致力于_v	10.081529	0.461734	26	多边合作_v	1.753309	0.549202
2	改革开放_v	6.574910	0.412872	27	将会_v	1.314982	0.867099
3	反恐_v	6.574910	0.550592	28	不支持_v	1.314982	0.535592
4	共赢_v	6.136583	0.349497	29	面临着_v	1.314982	0.547003
5	相互了解_v	5.698255	0.388446	30	深化改革_v	1.314982	0.607054
6	愿与_v	5.698255	0.443938	31	共克_v	1.314982	0.566421
7	妥善处理_v	5.698255	0.263876	32	区域合作_v	1.314982	0.799202
8	积极参与_v	5.259928	0.491876	33	共创_v	1.314982	0.876436
9	相互尊重_v	5.259928	0.313762	34	响着_v	1.314982	0.644736
10	充分发挥_v	3.944946	0.333436	35	坚持走_v	1.314982	0.581923
11	已成_v	3.506619	0.388687	36	办了_v	1.314982	0.566421
12	防扩散_v	3.068291	0.685187	37	技术转让_v	1.314982	0.840624
13	在一起_v	3.068291	0.448265	38	向前进_v	1.314982	0.608398
14	办好_v	2.629964	0.744499	39	恐怖袭击_v	1.314982	0.921452
15	干涉内政_v	2.191637	0.557640	40	涉藏_v	0.876655	0.644736
16	互鉴_v	2.191637	0.535592	41	资源管理_v	0.876655	0.890111
17	不允许_v	2.191637	0.484834	42	取得成效_v	0.876655	0.912773
18	互利互惠_v	2.191637	0.757956	43	相互依存_v	0.876655	0.557509
19	互联互通_v	2.191637	0.566187	44	愿同_v	0.876655	0.644736
20	持续发展_v	2.191637	0.702463	45	用好_v	0.876655	0.557509
21	合起_v	2.191637	0.644736	46	争取到_v	0.876655	0.644736
22	密结_v	1.753309	0.644736	47	为本_v	0.876655	0.862321
23	重要贡献_v	1.753309	0.557509	48	加深了解_v	0.876655	0.535592
24	相互交织_v	1.753309	0.797887	49	认识到_v	0.876655	0.644736
25	高度重视_v	1.753309	0.494696	50	期待着_v	0.876655	0.581923

Corpus: EU PP+SP Language: English 11 files 181293 tokens 11737 types 8614 lemmas				Corpus: EU PP+SP Language: English 11 files 181293 tokens 11737 types 8614 lemmas			
	Lemma	Frequency: 02- Relative freq	Dispersion: 06_DP		Lemma	Frequency: 02- Relative freq	Dispersion: 06_DP
1	be verb	234.2065	0.075699	26	establish verb	7.115553	0.166065
2	have verb	82.40804	0.102259	27	implement verb	6.950075	0.102752
3	will verb	45.23065	0.087085	28	grow verb	6.839757	0.166479
4	should verb	40.70758	0.242158	29	become verb	6.784597	0.134831
5	include verb	22.39469	0.081762	30	build verb	6.729438	0.153871
6	develop verb	17.48551	0.103051	31	focus verb	6.729438	0.157274
7	support verb	17.15455	0.077184	32	encourage verb	6.619119	0.283622
8	make verb	15.27913	0.13109	33	follow verb	6.453641	0.200352
9	take verb	15.22397	0.08009	34	do verb	6.398482	0.266312
10	continue verb	14.89302	0.105224	35	set verb	6.122685	0.179171
11	increase verb	13.40372	0.106827	36	base verb	6.067526	0.174319
12	provide verb	13.07276	0.17069	37	achieve verb	5.791729	0.144694
13	promote verb	12.52117	0.136206	38	see verb	5.405614	0.197756
14	strengthen verb	12.52117	0.236392	39	contribute verb	5.129817	0.194189
15	improve verb	12.24537	0.142619	40	enhance verb	5.074658	0.212678
16	can verb	11.8041	0.148961	41	cover verb	5.019499	0.216922
17	ensure verb	10.59059	0.093218	42	aim verb	5.019499	0.218499
18	remain verb	10.14932	0.1267	43	agree verb	4.90918	0.226241
19	would verb	9.81836	0.198623	44	come verb	4.854021	0.180487
20	work verb	9.101289	0.22938	45	launch verb	4.798862	0.22437
21	address verb	8.880652	0.165866	46	identify verb	4.743702	0.199973
22	could verb	8.715174	0.288895	47	consider verb	4.743702	0.245214
23	give verb	8.660014	0.14267	48	seek verb	4.633384	0.306991
24	help verb	7.887784	0.19137	49	involve verb	4.633384	0.24751
25	need verb	7.667147	0.183322	50	bring verb	4.633384	0.185284

As Table 4-9 shows, “will” and “should” rank high in the Corpus EU PPSP, indicating that the EU’s discourse includes a lot of commissive features. The modal verbs including “can”, “would” and “could” also continue to stay at the top of the frequency list. Verbs bearing positive meanings related to development such as “develop”, “support”, “promote”, “enhance”, “contribute” are the largest group of verbs in this list. Also, “help” and “encourage”, which are words indicating assistance to others, or in some cases expectations of others, rank high in the list.

The top fifty verbs in China’s official discourse on the EU are mostly verbs with a positive sentiment. Among these fifty verbs, a few themes can be seen: mutual respect and understanding, resolving problems with care, development and handling specific issues. The most prominent pattern is verbs which indicate mutual respect and efforts, including “相互尊重 (to respect mutually)”, “相互了解 (to understand mutually)”, “互利互惠 (to benefit each other)” and “互鉴 (to learn from each other)”. Another category is to solve the problems well, which includes words like “妥善处理 (deal...well)”, “慎重处理 (deal...with prudence)” and “妥善解决 (resolve-...well)”, “问题解决 (solve the problems)” and “政治解决 (solve politically)”. A third group includes words which share similar meanings to working hard, or improving and enhancing, for example, “致力于 (dedicated to)”, “办好 (organise...well)”, “积极参与 (actively participate in)”, “扩至 (expand to)”, “取得成功 (gain success)”, “努力实现 (make efforts to realise)”, “认真执行 (implement with care)”, “逐步完善 (improve gradually)”, “建立健全 (establish and improve)”, “稳定发展 (make...develop steadily)”, “继续进行 (continue to carry out)”, “持续发展 (develop sustainably)” and “抓住机遇 (seize the opportunity)”.

This comparison shows that both China and the EU have been using positive verbs most of the time in terms of China-EU relations. Both have applied a high ratio of verbs which indicate development, cooperation, and implementation. A few differences are indicated from the results. First, China has the tendency to mention more mutual respect, the sense of learning from each other and about prudently handling disputes compared with the EU. Second, the EU applies more words indicating help and support as compared to China. This may be related to the EU’s normative values and will be further analysed according to the collocations of these words. A third notable difference is that the EU applies modal verbs, or auxiliary verbs expressing necessity and possibilities, such as “can”, “would”, “could” which also rank relatively high. This can be related to a feature of the English language as modal verbs rank high in Corpus LOB (Lancaster Oslo/Bergen) (see Table Apx 9 in Appendix for a wordlist of top verbs in LOB).

4.5 Discussion

This section reviews the findings, their implications for China-EU relations, and how they interact with the existing literature. It also takes a critical perspective in reviewing the

effectiveness of the corpus-driven analysis, especially the application of word frequency, connotations, and concordance in mapping policy priorities and emphases.

4.5.1 Findings and Significance

The findings of this empirical chapter contribute to several discussions and debates in the existing literature on contemporary China-EU studies.

First, the topic coverage comparison shows that China and the EU share solid common ground and interests in several core policy areas but especially in economy and trade, communication, and dialogue as well as politics and diplomacy. This is consistent with both China and the EU's official statements and illustrations on their interests, visions and framework for the bilateral relationship (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2017; Delegation of the European Union to China, 2016). There has been a consensus in the existing literature, both in the Chinese and English language and official statements on the foundation of China-EU relations about there being no fundamental conflicts of interests between China and the EU (Shambaugh, 2004; Chen, 2006; Wang, 2019; Yang, 2020). This finding on the shared three priority topics enhances this claim by providing empirical evidence from the official discourse on specific policy where the two have shared interests and preferences. The preference ranking comparison based on the two corpora also suggests that Economy and Trade is the top shared priority between China and the EU, followed by Communication and Dialogue, then Politics and Diplomacy.

While the common interests in the economy are well known, their shared priority of politics and diplomacy provides new insights to the existing debate in the literature on whether the phenomenon of “strong economy, weak politics” exists in contemporary China-EU relations. The discourse evidence suggests that China and the EU have shared interests in politics and diplomacy. This implies that politics and diplomacy as a policy area include space for China and the EU to discover their converging interests. While the existing literature has pointed out that there are areas such as political systems and territorial issues which are core interests to China and cannot be compromised (Men, 2012), there are less divergent areas such as anti-corruption, environmental protection which may be areas where China and the EU have shared interests in terms of their political agenda (Hammond & Jing, 2016).

The connotations on Politics and Diplomacy provide further details showing that a large part of the political interactions between China and the EU relate to the Economy and Dialogue. This indicates that there are strong correlations between economic cooperation and political interactions as well as communications in China-EU relations. Future cooperation in politics and diplomacy should seek out areas where the two have common interests to turn political interactions into economic benefits through communication and dialogue. This suggests that the argument of “strong economy, weak politics” is not comprehensive, as the two topics are interconnected with each other and have impacts on each other. Plus, the empirical

evidence supplements the existing literature by specifying the different pursuits of China and the EU in political interactions. China emphasises mutual trust, enhancing communication between high-level officials and maintaining security while the EU emphasises keeping a balanced and comprehensive approach.

The finding that the topics of society, environment and tertiary industry share similar ranks in China and the EU's interest lists indicates that these are the topics which have the potential for both sides to cooperate further beyond the strong links in Economy and Trade, Communication and Dialogue as well as Politics and Diplomacy.

Second, differences in the topic preference between China and the EU exist despite the overall compatible priorities and equivalent top three priorities. As a part of China's traditional national core interests, Security and National Defence have a higher position in the coverage ranking for Corpus China PPSP than that for Corpus EU PPSP, indicating the importance of this area to China. Law and Regulation rank higher in Corpus EU PPSP, indicating the importance of the rule of law and normative power to the EU. Although existing literature has pointed out that China is a sovereign state and is, therefore, focusing more on state sovereignty and defence as compared to the EU's post-modern perceptions of sovereignty (Pan & Gao, 2011; Pan, 2010a; Men, 2011), the longitudinal changes in China and the EU's focus on these topics were not discussed.

Although a historical view of the development of mismatches in China-EU relations exists in Men Jing's work (Men, 2012), the longitudinal changes in their priorities have not been addressed. The approach of this thesis makes it possible to look at the changes in topic preferences and priorities over the years, which provide a way to investigate the interactions between discourse and events.

Third, the chapter engages with the literature on the conceptual gaps between China and the EU. The current literature has pointed out that China and the EU have different understandings or, as they put it, cognitive gaps, in shared concepts including human rights, sovereignty, democracy and soft power (Zhu & Zhang, 2002; Pan, 2010a; Men, 2011; Zhou, 2011a; Zhang, 2012a; Weil & Jing, 2012; Chen & Song, 2012). The findings of the connotation analysis in the chapter show that even in traditional sectors such as the economy, politics and communication, laws, and security, the two have different emphases. This complements the gap and explains why China-EU disputes also exist in the economy to which both attach utmost priority. This indicates that there could be cases in China-EU relations where the two achieve consensus but in fact, have different interpretations of the consensus. This happened in the case of recognising China's MES, where China assumed it would be granted MES in 2016 when the EU held back.

At the level of strategies and visions, this chapter also engages with the debate on whether the comprehensive strategic partnership between China and the EU has been insufficient

(Michalski, 2017; Berkofsky, 2017; Cameron & Zheng, 2007; Caira, 2010; Commission of the European Communities, 2001; Men, 2014; Holslag, 2011; Scott, 2007a; Zhou, 2016). The findings of this chapter imply that on the one hand, China and the EU have a solid foundation of cooperation due to their highly compatible priorities in major policy areas. On the other hand, however, divergence exists in areas where China and the EU have different priorities, such as in Security and Defence and Politics and Diplomacy, but also in traditionally converging areas including Economy and Trade and Communications.

4.5.2 Factors Impacting the Data

Theoretically, this chapter applies ROC, especially in terms of the power of language in shaping rules and social interactions. The rationale behind studying the topic frequencies in China and the EU's official discourse on each other is based on the ontological approach illustrated in the previous chapter which adopts the view that language and social realities are mutually constructive, and language has a shaping power in constructing social realities. However, the process by which language shapes social realities, which in this case is China-EU interactions, is not simple and the actual policies and actions of entities do not always synchronise with the discourse (Han, 2017).

Methodologically, the chapter explores the strength and limits of corpus-driven discourse analysis in studying the priorities and emphases of entities. This approach of topic coverage analysis and connotation analysis is the first of its kind in terms of the scale of discourse, the time frame covered and the involvement of both Chinese discourse and EU discourse. One existing piece of literature has adopted Chinese official media discourse in analysing China's expectations of the EU longitudinally (Zhang, 2016b), but adopting official discourse between China and the EU for longitudinal corpus-based analysis is a novelty of this research in terms of methodology in current China-EU studies.

While this method and the findings offer a direct, visual output of the priorities in China's discourse towards the EU in the policy papers and related documents, the chapter recognises the limitations of Word Frequency as an indicator for policy priorities for China and the EU, but the aim is to explore the implications one can derive from the quantitative data and analyse them in the context of the interactions of China-EU relations and compare the data results with the arguments in the existing literature.

First, not all discourse is sustainable and coherent. Some of the social events or interactions are not sustained. They pass as they are not in line with the stable, core meaning, and values embodied in the discourse and vice versa. Discourse which does not produce sustained realities will also be updated and changed. However, this could be viewed as a mixed view of the realist perspective and constructivist perspective. However, due to the limited scope of this thesis and its methodological ambition to explore the functionality of corpus linguistics in IR studies, it primarily focuses on the first half of the process where

language creates and shapes realities. Based on this logic, the thesis argues that comparing discourse helps to understand the policy convergence and divergence between China and the EU. A large sum of discourse only appears for a short time or is updated and revised and therefore not manifest in the manner of social realities. Some of the discourse is revised and substituted before social realities show correspondence. There is a time lag between discourse and social realities. Sometimes discourse gives early signs of how things could develop in the future. This feature is useful when predictions are required, although it is not what this thesis will focus on.

Second, several factors affect the extraction of discourse data. For example, this thesis only adopts Corpus China PPSP and Corpus EU PPSP.²⁸ When conducting collocation comparisons, documents on specific themes such as trade, cultural communications, and human rights, are not included, although China and the EU have sectoral dialogues and communications in these areas.²⁹ Thus, when the collocations of the word “economy” are made, for example, only those collocations in the corpora applied can be seen and compared. Therefore, the topics’ coverage and connotation of keywords are just a partial representation of their whole presentation in the discourse. This is setting aside the fact that the official discourse is part of the whole discourse of interactions between China and the EU. However, the corpus-driven analysis combined with human reading must be controlled in terms of scale and amount for the sake of feasibility; as a result, only official discourse which met the selection criteria are included in the corpora of this thesis.

Another factor is the design of queries. While the queries were designed in such a way that most topics represent a distinct topic area, it is impossible to make queries completely independent of each other. Some of the queries have overlapping areas such as those between “economy and trade” and “social” or “social” and “environment”. These unavoidable overlaps make it unwise and incorrect to infer the relations between topic coverage and policy preferences as directly correspondent.

The above reasons make it insufficient to rely merely on word frequencies to decide whether the priorities and interest areas between China and the EU align with each other. The rankings of topic coverage over the years just offers a quick impression of the potential emphasis of shared topics between China and the EU but should not be viewed as an absolute representation of the policy emphases. Therefore, topic coverage is looked at in a more longitudinal manner instead of static and connotations and collocations are necessary to further investigate the potential differences regardless of shared terms.

²⁸ Document selection criteria are available in Section 3.3.3.

²⁹ Sectoral dialogue and communications are beyond the scope of this thesis but future research applying corpus-driven methods could consider establishing corpora on these sectors.

However, with these limitations in mind, it is also important to note that the potential of this method goes beyond merely bilateral relations in international relations as the techniques are transferrable to other types of relationships in business, communication or other sectors of society. With further development, it can also contribute to triangle relationship analysis and multilateral analysis.

4.6 Conclusion

This chapter has examined what corpus-driven discourse analysis, especially with the assistance of word frequency searches, collocation, and concordance analysis, can reveal about convergence and divergence in China and the EU's priorities and emphases in terms of their shared topics.

The chapter finds that while China and the EU share the top three priorities in the form of Economy and Trade, Dialogue and Communication and Politics and Diplomacy, their emphases for these three areas are different. Outside these top three topics, there are differences in the priorities between China and the EU. China stresses Security and Defence, and the EU emphasises Laws and Regulations. The reasons for these differences are connected to Chapter 5 and Chapter 7 about the identities and normative power of China and the EU. The chapter also presents the longitudinal changes of the topic coverage, which aims to explore the connections between the changes in topic coverage and policy emphases as well as the historical events.

Plus, through concordance and connotation comparison, the chapter finds that on the shared topics and discourse of Economy and Trade, Market Economy, Politics and Diplomacy, as well as Human Rights, China and the EU have different stresses and emphases.

The chapter engages with Men Jing's discussions on mismatches in China-EU relations by providing empirical evidence of the mismatches and pins down the areas where mismatches exist. It also interacts with the literature on the conceptual gaps between China and the EU by extending the findings that conceptual gaps not only exist in the concept of sovereignty, human rights and democracy but also areas where China and the EU have shared interests and terms including Economy and Trade, Dialogue and Communications and Politics and Diplomacy. The different emphases of China and the EU in terms of Economy and Trade help to understand why China and the EU have frictions in the area of Economy and Trade, such as in the case of recognising China's Market Economy Status, anti-dumping issues and issues relating to market assess. The different emphases of the two for Politics and Diplomacy contribute to the understanding of the political disputes between the two, such as the arms embargo issue.

Methodology-wise, through a language-oriented constructivist interpretation of the findings on the shared topics' coverage and their longitudinal changes, the connotations of the keywords representing the shared topics, as well as the correlations among some of the

topics' coverage over the years (1994-2019), the chapter engages with corpus-driven constructivist discourse analysis. It confirms the potential of word frequency and connotation analysis as methods linking IR studies and corpus-driven discourse analysis. Word frequency helps to review policy priorities. Connotation analysis allows an investigation of the different emphases of same terms, which is especially useful when analysing misunderstandings in IR. This particularly helps in examining cases where entities have shared interests and discourse but clashes or frictions in terms of actual interactions, nonetheless.

Chapter 5 Identities and Perceptions of the Self and the Other

Another aspect in the perceptions of China and the EU, despite their visions for the structure of the world of the future, is their views on their developmental goals, their expectations of the future of the other as well as China-EU relations. The social constructivist approach stresses the role of identity in shaping relationships. Identity is one aspect linking discourse analysis and the constructivist approach in IR studies. Identity and perceptions analysis through discourse analysis have been flourishing (Benwell & Stokoe, 2006; Dolón & Todolí, 2008; Gregorio-Godeo, 2011; Agius & Keep, 2018), as has the study of identity in international relations from a constructivist perspective (Albert, Jacobson & Lapid, 2001).

Research on the identity of the EU covers several aspects including the different explanations of European integration (Moravcsik, 1993, 2017; Parsons & Moravcsik, 1999; Čeperković, 2014), challenges regarding European Citizenship, immigration and the construction of the collective identity of the EU (Garcia, 1992; Jakobson, 2017; Kostakopoulou, 2001; Pan, 2012), the identity dilemma of the EU in terms of the deficit of democracy and European debt crises (Pan & Yang, 2013) as well as the shifting roles between China and the EU on the international arena (Zhdanova & Istomin, 2017; Zhang, 2016a).

China's identity has also been discussed in an extensive manner especially in Chinese language literature (Li, 2009; Dong, 2013; Pang, 2013; Yang, 2013; Li & McKerrow, 2019). In terms of China-EU studies, there have been constructivist discussions on the role of identity (Wong, 2013; Song & Bian, 2016; Yiwei, 2010) as well.

This chapter studies the EU's identity in the context of China-EU relations and the gap between the EU's self-identity and China's perceptions of the EU. It seeks to explore what official discourse can reveal about the similarities and difference in China and the EU's perceptions of the self and the other.

The chapter generates findings in a few areas:

In terms of common ground, China and the EU have established a consensus on some of the principles essential to both China and the EU, which constitutes a solid base for bilateral relations. China has been consistent in supporting European integration and recognising the impact of the EU as a major power. The EU has been consistent in its official discourse respecting China's One China policy.

In terms of differences, despite the consensus, a few distinct themes have arisen from Corpus EU Domestic regarding the EU's identity. Firstly, the EU's increasing ability to and awareness of improving its hard power; secondly, the EU's perseverance in sticking to and implementing its traditional normative power; and thirdly, the EU's historical view on European Integration despite the challenges it has met.

In terms of China and the EU's perceptions on each other, while the EU attaches overarching emphasis to its normative nature represented by its founding values across time, China's view of the EU is more state-oriented which results in it seeing the EU as representing Europe or a potential "pole" in the world which focuses more on integrity and its economic power. There are few discussions about the differentiated stances and positions of member states in China's official discourse to the EU as these were addressed mostly in China's discourse to individual member states.

The EU's perceptions of China have been changing, from viewing China as an emerging country in Asia in its early policy papers even before the Chinese official discourse showing this aspect, with an understanding of China's emergence containing a high degree of simplicity mainly focusing on integrating China into the international market and with expectations China can be transformed in a way the EU expects which is highly connected to the EU's values. In later years, the EU started to realise that China has its own path and plans, which are highly different from the EU's early understanding of the country's future.

Some specific features or themes have emerged from the corpora (Corpus China PPSP, EUPPSP, China Domestic and EU Internal) applied in this chapter of which the relevant ones were selected, discussed, and expanded with content analysis. Features arising from the discourse on the EU's perception of China are as follow: first, the EU shows an earlier recognition of the rise of China while the Chinese official discourse only addresses the emergence of China or a more proactive China in its discourse in the last five years; second, the EU has been holding reserved attitudes on recognising China's market economy status while China has been striving for MES; third, while China states its national identity as a socialist country with Chinese characteristics for which the economy involves the coexistence of a market economy and state regulations, the EU regards the Chinese economy as state-dominated capitalism (European Commission, 2016b). This mismatch in perceiving China's economic identity constitutes one source of misunderstandings in China-EU relations.

China's self-perception, as evidenced by the discourse, is featured by framing China as a strong nation in the East with increasing confidence, especially in the last five years. China's perceptions of the EU share the view that European integration is a historical trend. However, while the EU has doubts about the existence of "poles" as illustrated in the last chapter, China regards the EU as a "pole" in the multipolar world. The Chinese government

has shown awareness of the EU as a big, impactful power in the world and sometimes regards EU as a special form of “big country” which indicates that China’s perceptions on the EU hold state-oriented understandings.

In this chapter, data are derived from the corpora established (Corpus China PPSP, Corpus EU PPSP, Corpus China Domestic, and Corpus EU Domestics) as well as discourse relevant to the subject for content analysis. For example, in analysing, China’s identity, discourse outside the corpora were applied. The discourse block, or theme, about China and the EU’s self-perception, appeared from this author’s readings of their official discourse about their identities, from the documents inside the corpus but also from outside the corpus. This is because some official documents, for example, the ones on China’s Cultural Soft Power, contains some key descriptions about China’s identity, but the documents are not included in Corpus China Domestic due to the selection criteria for the corpus.

The chapter consists of four sections:

Section 5.1 discusses China’s self-perception in terms of China’s developmental goals to be a strong, confident nation regionally and globally and its outlook on its role in the future world, as shown in China’s domestic discourse. It also discusses the EU’s perceptions of China, especially the EU’s understanding and recognition of China’s rise, its market economy status as well as China’s social-political identity. These themes are selected as they emerged from the corpus-driven discourse analysis and constitute differences, and potential tension between China and the EU.

Section 5.2 explores the EU’s self-perception and China’s perceptions of the EU. Specifically, it highlights the EU’s emphasis on its ambition to increase its hard power, expand its normative power and its vision for keeping European integration as the goal. On China’s perceptions of the EU, the section points out the themes that stand out: first, China sees the EU as a strategic partner and global power; second, China sees the EU as a contributor to the world of multipolarity and globalisation; third, China remains a strong supporter of European Integration regardless of the setbacks of Brexit and other crises of the EU.

Section 5.3 analyses China and the EU’s expectations of China-EU relations. In this section, the differences or mismatches between China and the EU’s expectations in terms of the bilateral relations will be discussed based on the analyses of word clouds. The section also points out a few differences in their expectations, as evidenced by the different discourse styles between the two discourse makers.

Section 5.4 discusses the main findings, their implications and significance, as well as the engagement of these findings with the existing literature on identity and perception issues in China-EU relations.

5.1 Identities and Perceptions of China

This section compares China's self-perception and the EU's perception of China, as reflected in China's domestic discourse relevant to China's self-perception³⁰ and the EU's official discourse on China (Corpus EU PPSP). The purpose is to see whether differences exist between the EU's perceptions and expectations of China and China's self-perception.

5.1.1 China's Identity

China's perceptions of itself boil down to contents at two levels: China's national identity and China's role in the world. In terms of China's national profile, the government has set the tone to build the national image of China as a confident and responsible big power in the world. In terms of China's international position, it aspires to maintain the existing international order but not eliminate the chances to revise the parts it regards unfair or unfavourable to China and other developing countries. There are also signs that China aims to contribute to the current international order but also maintains the right to revise and update it where necessary so that the emerging market's interests are better considered.

5.1.1.1 A Strong Nation in the East

One illustration of China's goal of building its national identity was stated by President Xi in the twelfth group study of the Politburo of the Communist Party of China (CPC) on Cultural Soft Power in 2013. He put forward a clear definition of the goal of China's national identity. He stated that China should construct its image to meet an identity consisting of four nexuses:

We should pay more attention to building the national image of our country by focusing on the following aspects of our nation: China as a big country with a profound history, multi-ethnic groups with integration, harmonious coexistence of diverse cultures; a big country in the East with uncorrupted and transparent politics, developed economy, prosperous culture, stable society, united people and beautiful landscapes; a responsible big country which sticks to peaceful development, facilitates common development, maintains international justice and contributes to the human beings; a big socialist country which is increasingly open and friendly to the world and is full of hope and vibrancy (Xinhuanet, 2013).³¹

This provides a clear definition of China's vision in its ideal national profile as well as its position in the current world system (Xinhuanet, 2013). In Chinese, the phrase "big country" has multiple levels of connotations. It refers to both being big in terms of tangible resources like size, population, and also being big in invisible aspects such as power, impact,

³⁰ The discourse material comes from sources not limited to Corpus China Domestic.

³¹ This piece of text is translated by the author as no official translation is available.

Hereinafter, direct quotes from websites do not have page numbers.

responsibilities, culture, confidence and national dignity. The “big country” discourse has also been illustrated in terms of the aspect of cultural development in China. In 2011, President Xi stated in the “Decision of the Central Committee of the CPC on Some Major Issues Concerning Deepening the Reform of Cultural System” that China should aim to build a “strong nation” with a socialist culture:

(We should) stick to the *socialist cultural developmental path with Chinese characteristics* and make efforts to construct a *strong country with socialist culture* (Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, 2011).

In this piece of text, “developmental path with Chinese characteristics” means that while China follows the reform and opening-up policy and strives for a more open market economy, it has decided to make these happen within the socialist system. “A strong country with socialist culture” stresses two aspects. First, China will develop itself so that the country stands firm and strong on the international arena. Second, a strong China will be accompanied with its social core features and beliefs. Although the discourse does not point them out, in other official discourse on China’s diplomatic approaches, there are Five Principles of Peaceful Development (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2014), the principles of “亲, 诚, 惠, 容 (Amiability, Honesty, Reciprocity and Tolerance)” (Kan, 2014) in dealing with neighbouring countries, among other manifestations of socialist culture.

In the 2013 APEC CEO Summit, President Xi illustrated in more detail what a big country involves. He stated:

China is a big country. We cannot afford any drastic mistake on issues of fundamental importance, as damage from such mistakes will be beyond remedy. Our position is that we must be both bold enough to explore and make adventures and also be prudent and stable and think triple times before actions (Xi, 2013a).

In this piece of discourse, President Xi expanded the illustration of what being a big country means. The core message here is that China needs to be both prudent but confident in dealing with both domestic and international issues. From the constructivist perspective, this could be regarded as talking about the psychology or mentality of an entity which gives a deep understanding of an entity’s values. The Chinese approach of being a big country, according to President Xi, is about balancing the responsibility of setting examples and the trends and avoiding hasty decisions and mistakes. Overall, he stresses more being prudent and avoiding making mistakes as the consequences could be detrimental.

5.1.1.2 A More Confident China

The current Chinese government foresees China as a big country with increasing power. China is no longer shying away from the fact that it is a big country with strong impacts on

the region and in the world. Compared to the longstanding Chinese foreign strategy since 1989 that China should “hide its capacity and bide its time” (韬光养晦 Tao Guang Yang Hui) (Yang, 2014), the current setting for the national identity of China involves more confidence and responsibility. This indicates that China is adopting a more active foreign policy in order to shoulder its due responsibilities and make contributions to the world. As stated by Zhu, China is switching from “hide the shines” to “adjust according to the requirements of the international environment” (大局统筹 Da Ju Tong Chou) (Yang, 2014; Zhu, 2015).

More assertive and commissive discourse, as defined in ROC, has appeared in China’s official discourse. In President Xi’s Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) speech in 2013, for example, he applied the terms “we will” and “China will” instead of the traditional “we should” (Xi, 2013b) which indicates concrete plans with confidence (Guanchazhe, 2014). He also used a set of parallel sentences starting with “I am confident”:

I am confident because first of all, China’s growth rate is within a reasonable and expected range. (...)

I am confident because the quality and efficiency of China’s economic development are improving steadily. (...)

I am confident because China has a strong home-grown driving force for growth. (...)

I am confident because Asia Pacific enjoys sound development prospects (Xi, 2013b).

The term ‘Awoken Lion’ was a term put forward by President Xi Jinping about China’s improving self-esteem. On 28th, March 2014, Xi Jinping delivered a speech on the Fifty Years Anniversary of China-French Ties. He mentioned that:

The Chinese Dream is about peace. A peaceful global environment is a premise of realising the Chinese Dream. For a long time, Chinese people have longed for world peace and taken it as an obligation. We have been in wars and recessions, and we understand how precious peace is. China wishes to work with all countries in the world to bring peace to the globe, as well as protecting and enjoying it.

According to history, realising the Chinese dream would bring opportunities rather than threats, peace rather than turmoil to the world. It will help the world make progress in various aspects.

Napoleon Bonaparte once said that China is a sleeping lion, and when China wakes up, the world will shake. In fact, the lion of China has awoken, but what the world sees now, is a peaceful, amiable, civilised lion (Xi, 2014a).


The 'Awoken Lion' discourse conveys two essential messages: first, China sees itself as a strong country and is determined to be a strong country in the world. Second, China does not want to wage war and hopes to maintain peace.

5.1.1.3 Discourse Blocks on China's Identity and Its Role in the World of the Future

Figure 5-1 shows some of the main Chinese domestic discourse blocks on China's developmental goals.

Figure 5-1 Hierarchy of Discourse Blocks on China's Developmental Goals

(Source: own work)




At the top of this hierarchy is the concept "Community of Common Destiny for All Mankind" which had been mentioned sixty-two times in the two years up until President Xi's speech at Moscow State Institute of International Relations in March 2013, according to Xi Jinping in different speeches (Xinhua, 2012; Chinanews, 2015). This concept depicts the vision of the ideal future world order for the current Chinese government. It pitches the tone for the rest of Chinese domestic political discourse. The rest of the domestic discourse is constructed in such a way as to align with this final goal. The second line of boxes lists the key concepts depicting the Chinese assumption of the key features in the ideal future world: it is a world of multipolarity and multilateralism. The New Type of International Relations, which focus on win-win cooperation instead of zero-sum game, namely the Cold War mentality where entities compete for hegemony, will rule (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2016). Global governance will feature the participation of countries with more equality. At the third level is the Chinese foreign policy under reform. In order to translate China's self-esteem into its position in the future world, China has to carry out a series of reforms in its foreign diplomacy. This refers to the Chinese efforts to take a more proactive,

engaging role in regional and international affairs. The last three lines show how China constructs its national identity through the official discourse of the China Dream and the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.

Figure 5-2 shows China's goals and visions for its national, regional and global development. In other words, China's visions on the ideal future world and China's positions in it.

Figure 5-2 China's Perception of China's Identity and China in the Future World
(Source: own work)



As Figure 5-2 shows, the sphere consists of four circles. In the core of the sphere is China's national identity, which is where all the other identities of China derive from. Official discourse pitching China's current national identity include the discourse of the China Dream and the Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation. Although these two include contents on improving China's international status, they are primarily about China's economic and social development. The circle above that presents the goal for China's regional role, which can be summarised as an aspiration to become "A Big Responsible Country in the East". This extends to China's idea on the ideal world with New Types of International Relations, Multi-polarity and Multilateralism, Global Governance and Democratisation of International Relations as the featuring international orders. The outer circle in the graph, finally, presents China's idea of the ideal human society, which is 'A Community of Common Destiny for All Mankind' in the Chinese political discourse.

Figure 5-2 presents a multi-layered and systematic structure to illustrate China's domestic discourse blocks for its goal in national and international development. This helps to explain where China is now and where China wants to be and where China wants the world to be in


the future. The links between each level of identity goals are not automatic and explicit. In order to translate China's self-esteem into its position in the future world, China has to carry out a series of reforms in its foreign diplomacy. To reach each higher-level goal requires China to take a more engaging, responsible and accountable role in regional and international affairs in the first place.

5.1.2 EU's Perceptions of China

This section reviews the contents on the EU's expectations of China based on text searches in Corpus EU PPSP.

Figure 5-3 shows the query design for the EU's perceptions and expectations of China. This text search is carried out for Corpus EU PPSP with the purpose of understanding the EU's expectations of China's development as well as China's role in the world.

Figure 5-3 Query Design for the EU's Perceptions and Expectations of China



A few themes in the EU's expectations of China and China-EU relations have been found to be frequent and important in the official discourse. These are as follow: first, the EU shows earlier recognition of the rise of China while the Chinese official discourse has only addressed the emergence of China or a more proactive China in its discourse in the last five years; second, the EU has been holding reserved attitudes on recognising China's market economy status while China has been striving for MES; third, while China states its national identity as a socialist country with Chinese characteristics with an economy which involves the coexistence of a market economy and state regulations, the EU regards the Chinese economy as "a state-dominated model of capitalism" (European Commission, 2016b: 17). This mismatch in perceiving China's economic identity constitutes one source of misunderstandings in China-EU relations.

5.1.2.1 Rising China

The first theme of the EU's perceptions of China with high coverage is the rise of China. The EU has recognised the rise of China since the late 1990s. The EU's 1995 policy paper, "A Long-Term Policy for China-Europe Relations"³² stated that:

³² This document is included as it is important in understanding the EU's perceptions of and policies for China although strictly speaking, it is about China-Europe relations instead of China-EU relations.

The rise of China is unmatched amongst national experiences since the Second World War (Commission of the European Communities, 1995: 3).

The EU has also shown its support for integrating China into the global market and its support for China to play a larger role in regional and global issues.

Over recent years China has been forging a more coherent and outward-looking foreign policy to match its growing economic weight. The EU should build on this by encouraging China to play a proactive and responsible role in global issues³³ (Commission of the European Communities 1998: 6).

What is notable is that back in 1998, the EU already had quite a high expectation of China.

The 1998 EU's policy paper on China stated that:

China has become at once more assertive and more responsible in its foreign policy, both regionally and globally. China's role in promoting peace in Korea and Cambodia reflects its renewed commitment to the development of Asia as a whole (Commission of the European Communities, 1998: 4).

These two pieces of discourse from the 1998 policy paper show that the EU has already pitched its policy to engage China more in global issues in the 1990s. Expectations of China have been high since then. However, the EU also showed some changes in its expectations, which focus more on the challenges China was facing. In the 2003 policy paper, the EU stated that:

(...) China's moves towards a more proactive and responsible foreign policy continue to be dominated by its focus on domestic stability and economic development (Commission of the European Communities, 2003: 6).

From this discourse in 2003, the EU has shown reserved opinions about China's rise. The tone has been toned down with reservations as compared to the positive reactions to the emergence of China in 1995 and 1998. Although the Chinese domestic discourse reflects a more proactive China, the more confident Chinese discourse starts after 2013 when the current leadership took over while the EU's discourse on the rise of China started about ten years earlier, and then experienced changes in tone. That is to say that China has been more prudent in its self-evaluation than the EU both in terms of the tones it applies and in terms of the timing of when more confident discourse is made mainstream. Since the EU recognised the rise of China earlier than it was officially recognised by the Chinese government, China has experienced a certain degree of pressure, especially when the EU

³³ Italics in the quoted text of this thesis are applied by the author to highlight the relevant content in the section themes.

emphasises China's responsibilities. However, the discourse on responsibility has been received better in China overall in recent years with China's foreign policies becoming more confident, more active than defensive as discussed in the section on China's self-perception.

5.1.2.2 The Disputed Market Economy Status (MES)

The EU's refusal to grant China MES is one unresolved issue between China and the EU. As a Non-Market Economy (NME) country, a third country's trading figure is used, instead of China's actual figure, to judge anti-dumping cases under the current calculation methods of WTO. China would like to gain MES to reduce the impacts of this unfavourable calculation method to China. For the EU, it faces the dilemma that on the one hand, it has an obligation to abide by the WTO rules that individual members have to ensure their national laws are consistent with WTO rules, and according to Section 15 of the Protocol on the Accession of the People's Republic of China (World Trade Organisation, 2001), the methods to calculate whether a NME country is dumping should expire after fifteen years once China has established the status of a market economy. On the other hand, granting China MES would mean the EU's specific sectors, such as the steel sector, which relies heavily on trade defence instruments (TDI), could face challenges. Granting China MES will recognise China as a free market equal in terms of resolving trade disputes (EurActiv.com AFP, 2016). In fact, only 0.5% of all Chinese exports to the EU are affected by anti-dumping which does not affect the value of trade between China and the EU greatly; however, granting China MES would reflect on more dimensions of certain industries at times. Therefore, there are arguments that granting China MES would involve triangle relations between China, the EU and the US (Rémond, 2007; European Commission, 2016c).

This issue, as reflected in the EU's policy papers on China, is not an independent case but generated from the overall context that the EU has been expecting China to develop a market with a Western style. If we look at the discourse on China's market economy in Corpus EU PPSP, the contents reflect a change of attitudes regarding China's market economy development although the EU has been showing a considerable extend of reserved attitudes on China's MES throughout the years. The longitudinal analysis of the discourse shows that the EU has gone from being supportive of China's market economy although recognising the challenges, to the stage of opening up more channels for Chinese companies in Europe due to the development of the Chinese market economy, to the stage in 2006 when it became very reserved again on China's market economy status. In the EU's 1995 policy paper on China, it was stated that:

The economic reform process launched by Deng Xiaoping sixteen years ago has dramatically changed the economic and social landscape in China. (...) It is in Europe's interests that this trend is accepted as irreversible. (...) However, China still falls well short of having a full market economy, with adequate social protection, including freedom of association for employees. Reform of state-owned industry and the creation of a social security system to cope

with its consequences remain as key challenges for the future. The establishment of an effective legal framework, properly enforced, is an essential element in the process (Commission of the European Communities, 1995: 9).

This text confirms that the EU is supportive of China's market economy development and regards it as an irreversible trend. Overall, the EU was supportive of China's market economy development trend back then. This positivity continued to be reflected in the 2000 report, the "Implementation of the Communication 'Building a comprehensive partnership with China'". In the 2000 document, the EU emphasised that the EC had been granting more Chinese exporters market economy treatment and anti-dumping regulations had been amended with the market-driven changes happening inside China (European Commission, 2000: 9). The documents stress overall progress of trade between China and the EU without mentioning too much about the "challenges" in China's market economy.

This attitude, however, became more critical, with a concerned tone in the EU's 2016 China policy paper:

The EU welcomes productive Chinese investment in Europe provided it is in line with EU law and regulations. In return, the EU expects improved market access for foreign companies in China and a level playing field for business and investment. China should reduce the number of protected sectors and minimise national security reviews (European Commission, 2016b: 8).

Plus, this document addresses a couple of areas which the EU is not satisfied with, including the industrial overcapacity in China:

The EU is seriously concerned about industrial over-capacity in a number of industrial sectors in China, notably steel production. If the problem is not properly remedied, trade defence measures may proliferate, spreading beyond steel to other sectors such as aluminium, ceramics and wood-based products (European Commission, 2016b: 7).

Viewing the discourse in the context of 2016 makes it easier to understand why the EU was applying a more critical perspective to China's market status. The year 2016 was the year China could have been granted MES as based on Section 15. That is to say that the tone and the focus in the discourse connect closely with the context of China-EU relations when the document was issued and reflect the interactions between China and the EU.

5.1.2.3 China's Social-political Identity

Apart from the EU and China's time difference in recognising China's stages of development and China's market economy, another aspect where the EU has shown a different understanding of China is about China's social-political structure. In the EU's 2016 policy paper to China, the EU stated that:

The EU should seek to build trust and co-operation with China based on shared interests. However, EU-China relations must also deal with the reality that China is a one-party system with a state-dominated model of capitalism (European Commission, 2016b: 17).

As compared to the Chinese discourse in describing China's identity as a "socialist cultural developmental path with Chinese characteristics" and a "strong country with socialist culture" (Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, 2011: Section 2), the EU's descriptions of China's social-political system is different from that of Chinese official discourse.

Before ending this section on perceptions of China, it should be mentioned that overall, the similarities between China's self-perception and the EU's perception of China outweigh the differences. A few core similarities are the foundation of China-EU relations including the EU's support for the One China policy, the "One Country, Two Systems" in Hong Kong and Macao, China and the EU's shared interests in the economy, reform and innovation as well as other areas of cooperation (European Commission, 2016b). However, the differences have affected the resolution of disputes including the MES and trade disputes, the EU's arms embargo on China, Europe's perceived ambivalent mindset towards China's rise as well as challenges from a more strategic perspective such as the relatively moderate political and security cooperation, as compared to the strong economic cooperation, between China and the EU.

5.2 Identities and Perceptions of the EU

This section focuses on the EU's perceptions of the developmental goals of the EU and the role of the EU in the future globe in comparison with China's expectations of the EU. The analysis is mainly based on Corpus EU Domestic, but the materials used also extend to relevant sources outside the corpus.

On the EU's developmental goals, a few aspects stand out. These include the EU's will to improve its hard power hand in hand with its soft power and traditional normative power, as well as the EU's vision of European integration despite the setbacks and challenges. The EU's self-perception and its identity are largely bound to the EU's understandings of these aspects. These departure points and developmental goals of the EU play a fundamental role in determining the EU's approaches to China.

5.2.1 EU's Self-perception

A few distinct themes have arisen from Corpus EU Domestic regarding the EU's identity. Firstly, the EU's increasing ability and awareness in improving its hard power; secondly, the EU's perseverance in sticking to and implementing its traditional normative power; and thirdly, the EU's historical view of European Integration despite the challenges it has met.

5.2.1.1 The EU's Increasing Hard Power

The first prominent theme about the EU's development is that the EU is determined to improve its hard power alongside its traditional soft power and normative power. In the Global Strategy of the EU's Foreign and Security Policy titled "Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe" issued in June 2016, the importance for the EU to improve its hard power, including military capabilities, appeared multiple times. The following are two instances:

In this fragile world, soft power is not enough: we must enhance our credibility in security and defence (European Union Global Strategy, 2016: 44).

The European Union has always prided itself on its soft power – and it will keep doing so because we are the best in this field. However, the idea that Europe is an exclusively "civilian power" does not do justice to an evolving reality. (...). For Europe, soft and hard power go hand in hand (European Union Global Strategy, 2016: 4).

The discourse on the EU as owning and needing a combination of soft and hard power shows that the EU regards itself not only as a soft power or civilian power but also one with increasing hard power. The EU has been promoting its hard power in this document by emphasising that it was deploying seventeen military as well as civilian operations at the moment the 2016 European Union Global Strategy was issued (European Union Global Strategy, 2016: 4).

The EU's increasing attention on its hard power also reflects its will to cooperate with China on a broader issue of security and peacekeeping in the world. For example, in the EU's 2016 policy paper, "Elements for a New EU Strategy on China", the EU states that:

The EU should seek a broader shared foreign policy agenda with China based on encouraging China's constructive and active participation in providing security as a global public good. (...) Building on China's constructive engagement during the negotiation of the Iran deal, the EU should seek active *co-operation with China in areas such as Afghanistan, Syria, Libya, the migration challenge, and the overall settlement in the Middle East* (European Commission, 2016b: 11).

This emphasis on hard power is one of the critical elements shown from the EU's discourse on its development. However, it does not mean the EU will reduce its normative power. The EU is still a normative power at its core and, as it states in its official discourse, will continue to embody its normative power.

5.2.1.2 The EU as a Normative Power

Although the EU being a normative power is a tradition, it is still necessary to follow the EU's discourse across the years in terms of its descriptions of the EU's values. The EU, as a

normative power, as shown in the corpus-driven text searches, is still one of the most important themes in the EU's official discourse. The following two examples reconfirm that the EU will not change its core values and will keep promoting them as they are defining within Europe, or as the discourse puts it is "what is peculiarly European"(Garcia, 1992: 8).

The concepts of democracy, civil society, rule-based system and rights-oriented political culture which originated from Europe and spread to other parts of the world are essential for other entities in the world to understand what is peculiarly European (Garcia, 1992: 8).

This confirms the EU's core values which consist of the dimensions of the EU's normative power. The concepts of "democracy, civil society, rule-based system, and right-oriented culture" play a large part in the EU's foreign policies. Apart from the value-based considerations, another aspect of the EU's foreign policy is the EU's interests:

The European Union is entrusted with the task of developing a common foreign and security policy to enable it to protect its interests and values as well as playing a constructive role in world politics (Commission of the European Communities, 1994: 7).

These two pieces of discourse confirm that the EU will protect not only its interests but also its values. These two aspects coexist in the EU's policymaking and are indispensable and intertwined. This is essential for understanding China-EU relations and was especially apparent when we discussed China and the EU's priorities in Chapter 4. The priorities based on the topic frequency search in Chapter 4 and the contents, or collocations on China and the EU's priorities illustrated in expanded detail above are, overall, consistent with each other. It is helpful to understand what the bottom lines for China and the EU are, or in other words, what they will not, or are extremely unlikely to, compromise on. On this basis of mutual understanding and knowledge, improvements in areas where the two have common interests are more likely to be implemented without acute disputes.

5.2.1.3 European Integration as the Goal

European integration is another aspect essential to the understanding of the EU's goals and its identity, which create one of the most important foundations for China-EU relations: the support and belief in European integration. European integration started when Robert Schuman proposed the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (The European Union, 1950). The original and primary drive of European integration was to prevent wars after the catastrophe of World War I. In 1950, the Schuman Declaration was presented, envisioning an integrated Europe based on industrial cooperation and sharing resources. The declaration was presented by French foreign minister Robert Schuman on 9 May 1950. It proposed the creation of a European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), whose members would pool coal and steel production:

By pooling basic production and by instituting a new High Authority, whose decisions will bind France, Germany and other member countries, this proposal will lead to the realisation of the first concrete foundation of a European federation indispensable to the preservation of peace (Foundation Robert Shuman, 1950: para.11).

From the Declaration of the Robert Shuman Foundation, we can see that the EU's identity was initially bound to the coal and steel industry which is on the resource side of intergovernmental cooperation instead of the soft power side. The idea was that this would lead to spill-over effects in other areas so that a more unified European identity and recognition, as well as cooperation in social, political and cultural aspects, would take place over time. Back then, Shuman as well as the main drafter of the Shuman Declaration, another Father of the EU, Jean Monnet, were aware that European Integration was a long-term process rather than a one-off task:

Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a *de facto* solidarity (Foundation Robert Shuman, 1950: para.4)

As Shuman and Monnet predicted, European integrations have never been a single-direction process. EU integration has gone through a long historical process. The core principles of the EU, single market, freedom of capitals and freedom of people has brought the EU member states together. Among these three core principles, the single market is an essential part of European Integration. The move to the single market consists of a series of events and is an on-going process instead of a single event. The European Coal and Steel Community was created in 1951, and the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957 based on the Treaty of Rome. The Treaty of Rome pitched the goal of setting a Common Market. In 1985, the European Council issued the White Paper Completing the Internal Market (European Commission, 1985). In 1986, the Single European Act was signed and pushed the single market forward and set the goal to make a single market in 1992 (Council of the European Union, 1986). The single market aimed to realise the Four Free Movements: the free movement of people, services, money and goods (the Member States, 1986). The single market started in 1993 with twelve countries participating but did not function as well as expected. In 2001, the Single Market Act One (European Commission, 2011) was issued, and in 2012 the Single Market Act Two (European Commission, 2012).

The long-term historical vision of Shuman and Monnet has proved to be appropriate in hindsight considering multiple obstacles and setbacks in European integration, including the EU constitutional crisis in 2005 (Grosskopf, 2007) and the on-going Brexit. However, overall European integration, over the years, has still achieved the highest level of regional integration in the world. Since the European Community was established in 1957, the EU has expanded five times. In 2007, Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU. Six years later


Croatia joined the EU. In 2009, the Lisbon Treaty was signed, which is the most recent ratification of the European Treaty and EN common treaty. This also provided the legal framework and tools for European citizens' identity recognition (Moncada, 2010).

5.2.2 China's Perceptions of the EU

5.2.2.1 The EU as a Strategic Power and Partner

This section analyses China's perceptions of the EU. More specifically, this section highlights the themes that stand out in Corpus China PPSP on China's understandings of the EU and China-EU relations. The text search query designed for searching about relevant contents about China's perceptions of the EU is “欧盟是 (the EU is)” OR “中欧关系是 (China-EU relationship is)” OR “中国和欧盟是 (China and the EU are)” OR “希望欧盟 (hope that the EU)” OR “中国欧盟(China-EU)” OR “中国和欧盟 (China and the EU)”.

Table 5-1 Query Results (Text Tree) on China's View on the EU and China-EU Relations



Based on the search result summary as shown in Table 5-1, this section will highlight some themes which appear frequently and are apparent in the generated results. Due to the

limited scope of the thesis, not all the references, or quotations related to the topic, have been included in the analysis. Only the representative ones are selected to support the themes found and the arguments around it.

The first emergent theme is that China views the EU as a strategic partner and power and would like to establish a comprehensive strategic partnership with the EU around the themes of peace, prosperity, reforms, and civilization (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2014). In China's 2014 policy paper on the EU, there is one dedicated section pitching China's policies to the EU in the new era. The documents state:

欧盟是中国走和平发展道路，推动世界多极化的重要战略伙伴，是中国实现“新四化”和“两个一百年”奋斗目标的重要合作对象。加强与发展中欧关系是中国推动建立长期稳定健康发展的新型大国关系的重要组成部分，是中国外交政策的优先方向之一。中国政府重视欧盟的地位与作用，致力于同欧盟及其成员国一道，在中国全面深化改革和欧洲经济复苏的进程中，全面落实《中欧合作 2020 战略规划》，打造“和平、增长、改革、文明”四大伙伴关系，进一步提升中欧关系的全球影响力 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2014, Section 2)。

The EU is an important strategic partner for China in China's peaceful development and its promotion of multipolarity in the world. It is also an important partner in cooperation for China to realise the “New Four Modernisations” and “Two Centenary Goals”. Enhancing and developing China-EU relations is an important issue for China to establish a new type of big country with long-term, stable, healthy development. China is dedicated to constructing a partnership with the EU in four aspects: “Peace, Growth, Reform and Civilization” and comprehensively implementing the “China-EU 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation” in the process of China's comprehensive, in-depth reform and recovery stage of the European economy. China hopes to further improve the global impact of China-EU relations³⁴ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2014, Section 2).

In this piece of text, China has provided its rationale in cooperating with the EU and has confirmed that China-EU relations are consistent with China's development goals. It also implies that China-EU relations are equal to China's relations with other major countries in the world. This indicates that although the EU is not a nation-state, China positions the EU as equal to a major power in the world. China's 2014 policy paper on the EU is its second and China's most recent policy paper on the EU which was published in 2018 (Xinhua, 2018). Instead of issuing policy papers every year or every other year, China tends to have longer intervals between the issuing of each policy paper. This reflects the different approaches between China and the EU in terms of reporting their policies to each other. The

³⁴ Translated by thesis author.

reasons behind this may be related to the fact that the EU is an intergovernmental organisation. It, therefore, needs to align and update its policies frequently to offer guidance to the member states and EU institutions. China's policy paper aims to state China's perceptions of the EU and China-EU relations. It tends to focus only on the core, relatively stable principles for China-EU relations and is only updated when there are substantial contents added to the topic.

5.2.2.2 The EU as a Contributor to Multipolarity and Globalisation

In Corpus China PPSP, several collocations of the text searches related to China's expectations on the EU and China-EU relations state that both China and the EU support multipolarity and China sees the EU as an important "pole" in the multipolar world.

国务院总理李克强在人民大会堂同欧洲理事会主席范龙佩、欧盟委员会主席巴罗佐共同主持第十六次中国欧盟领导人会晤时指出，欧盟是多极化世界中的重要一极，也是中国实现现代化进程中的重要合作伙伴 (Mission of the People's Republic of China to the European Union, 2013: para.1)。

Premier Li Keqiang, in the 16th China-EU Summit with European Council President Van Rompuy and European Commission President Barroso in the Great Hall of the People, pointed out that the European Union is one important pole in the multipolar world as well as an important partner in cooperation in the process of China's modernisation³⁵ (Mission of the People's Republic of China to the European Union, 2013: para.1).

In this text, China regards the EU as a "pole" in the multipolar world. Relating to the previous discourse that China regards the EU as an important issue for China to establish new type relations with major countries in the world (European Commission, 2013), China's tendency to understand the EU as a whole in terms of its foreign relations with China is evidenced. The following piece of text shows China's perceptions of the EU in terms of the EU's support of multipolarity and multilateralism as well:

中欧都支持多边主义和多极化，中方一直坚定支持欧洲一体化，支持欧洲经济和金融稳定 (Mission of the People's Republic of China to the European Union, 2014b: para.2)。

China always firmly supports European integration as well as the stability of the European economy and financial conditions³⁶ (Mission of the People's Republic of China to the European Union, 2014b: para.2).

³⁵ Translated by the author.

³⁶ Translated by the author.

This text confirms that China and Europe³⁷ both support multilateralism and multipolarity. The support for multipolarity and multilateralism, as argued in the previous chapter, are both focused on maintaining peace and diversity in the world. This, plus China's supports of European integration, or China's vision of European integration as an irreversible trend, stand at the core of China's perceptions of the EU and China-EU relations.

One related argument in Chinese literature is that the Chinese government sees the EU as a special form of big country in China's foreign policies (Xiao, 2014). Since 2014 there have been signs that the Chinese government has been taking the EU increasingly as a unified entity as evidenced by China's increasing dialogues with the EU and its second policy paper on the EU. Since the traditional Chinese diplomatic strategy takes "the big countries ties as the key, the neighbouring countries' ties as the primary consideration, the developing countries as the basis and the multi-lateral relations as the stage",³⁸ if China does take the EU as a special kind of big country, it would mean that China-EU relations are on the first tier in China's foreign diplomacy where China-US relations would be positioned as well.

5.2.2.3 European Integration Remains the Direction for the Future

The support from China on European integration is another foundation of China-EU relations which is connected to China's perceptions of the EU as a major player in the world. The director of the mission of China to the EU, Ambassador Yang Yanyi, commented on China's view of the EU's role in the world in a question and answer session to respond to the media:

问：中国如何看待欧盟在当今世界中的地位和作用？习近平主席是否会继续表达中方对欧盟一体化的支持？

答：欧盟是多极世界的一支重要力量。作为发达国家最为集中的联合体，欧盟处于较高的经济社会发展阶段，拥有庞大市场、充裕资本和先进技术，也富有不同的宗教和文化，在世界事务中扮演着重要角色。欧洲一体化是几个世纪以来欧洲人民追求持久和平繁荣的梦想。欧盟走的是前人没有走过的路。毫无疑问，欧洲一体化取得的成就是巨大的。(Mission of the People's Republic of China to the European Union, 2014a: Section 4).

Question: How does China view the role and functions of the EU in the current world? Will President Xi continue to express China's support for European Integration?

Answer: the EU is one important power in the multipolar world. As the most integrated Union of developed countries, the EU is in a relatively high stage of economic and social development. The EU enjoys a vast market, abundant capital and advanced technology.

³⁷ The text applies the word 中欧关系 (Zhong Ou Guanxi) which indicates China-Europe relations. However, as Herman Van Rompuy was the former president of the European Council, "中欧关系" (Zhong Ou Guanxi) in this context could refer to China-EU relations as well.

³⁸ "大国是关键、周边是首要、发展中国家是基础，多边是舞台" (Xiao, 2014).

It also has its own religions and culture. The EU plays an important role in international affairs. European integration is the manifestation of the dream of European people in their pursuit of peace and prosperity for centuries. The path the EU is following has not been followed by any others before. Unquestionably, the achievement of European integration is huge³⁹ (Mission of the People's Republic of China to the European Union, 2014a: Section 4).

In this text, the EU's economy, the market as well as its history and culture are regarded as both unique and developed. European integration has been understood as a common goal of European citizens to maintain peace. This confirms that China supports European integration, and the EU is regarded as an important pole in the world. One point worth discussing though is whether the co-occurrence of the discourse on European integration and the discourse on the EU as a pole in the world suggests that it is Europe as a whole that China views as an important pole of the world. Reflecting on the vagueness in the Chinese language, China-Europe relations are referred to as 中欧关系 (Zhong Ou Guanxi) while China-EU relations are referred to as 中国——欧盟关系 (China-EU relations) but in some cases, the two terms have been used interchangeably. For example, in the above question and answer session's report, both the term "European Integration" and the term "EU integration" appeared (Mission of the People's Republic of China to the European Union, 2014a).

The ambiguity between the concept of the EU and Europe also exists in the non-Chinese literature in the sense that when the EU is addressed, more attention is given to the traditional, leading EU member states. For example, in Baker's article, when "Europe" is addressed, the EU member states are the objects under discussion (Baker, 2002: 45). The Chinese literature contains more vagueness on this. Both "China-EU relations" and "China-Europe relations" are translated into "中欧关系" (Zhong Ou Guanxi) in some cases for the sake of simplicity while the precise translation of "China-EU relations" should be "中国—欧盟关系" (Zhongguo—Oumeng Guanxi). Therefore, it is sometimes hard to tell from the title of a Chinese article whether the author is talking about China-EU or China-Europe relations.

This is partly because the Chinese language is a high context language which contains more vagueness, and the connotations of the words are highly based on the context. Meanwhile, this also has to do with the government's approach to the EU and the Chinese public's perception of the EU. The emphasis of China's diplomacy includes its relations with peripheral countries, big powers, developing countries and multilateral organisations. On the other hand, there are two levels of the connotation of Europe for Chinese decision-makers and scholars. One is at the member states' level, especially considering the member states'

³⁹ Translated by the author.

important roles in international organisations such as the UN Security Council or G8. Another is the EU intergovernmental, or supranational level (Feng, 2009: 61).

It is subject to discussion, therefore, whether there is a possibility that China is referring to the EU as a pole, or whether it is more referring to an integrated Europe with the EU as its intergovernmental organisation as a major power equal to a pole in a multipolarity instead of the European Union's institutions on their own.

China's perceptions of European integration as an irreversible trend and the EU, or potentially the integrated EU, as a pole in the world, are connected to China's own identity as a unified nation with sovereignty as its core interests. Therefore, China's understanding of the EU and Europe are related to China's state-oriented view of the world. In another example, the then director of the Mission of PRC to the EU, Ambassador Wu Hailong, commented in an article in *People's Daily* that:

欧盟是最大的发达国家集团，中国是最大的发展中国家 (Wu, 2013: para.3)。

The EU is the biggest group of developed countries. China is the biggest developing country (Wu, 2013: para.3).

This reflects that China's view on both itself and the EU are state-oriented. More emphasis is given to the EU as the union of developed countries in the West. This suggests that it could be the intergovernmental features, instead of the "supranational" aspect that China is focusing on in its policy to the EU.

5.3 Expectations for China-EU Relations

This section compares China and the EU's expectations for each other, and China-EU relations as embodied from the corpus-driven searches of Corpus China PPSP and Corpus EU PPSP. Specifically, word clouds are applied to compare the main topics attached to this theme by China and the EU.

5.3.1 Word Clouds

Figure 5-4 shows the word cloud of the file on China's view on the EU and China-EU relations which include all the references generated from the same text search query mentioned in Section 5.2.2.1: “欧盟是 (the EU is)” OR “中欧关系是 (China-EU relationship is)” OR “中国和欧盟是 (China and the EU are)” OR “希望欧盟 (hope that the EU)” OR “中国欧盟(China-EU)” OR “中国和欧盟 (China and the EU)”.

Figure 5-4 Word Cloud for China's Perceptions and Expectations of the EU



As shown, apart from 中国 (China) and 欧盟 (EU), the top frequency words include 发展 (development), 关系 (relationship), 合作 (cooperate), 世界 (the world), 伙伴 (partnership), 和平 (peace), 领导人 (leaders), 政治 (politics), 会晤 (meetings), 加强 (enhance), 积极 (positive), among others. The overall tone is highly positive, and dialogue and politics appear to be quite frequent. This may relate to the fact that most contents about China's exceptions of the EU and China-EU relations are expressed and delivered during speeches, summaries of meetings and summits as well as high-level leaders' meetings.

Figure 5-5 shows the top frequency meaningful words⁴⁰ on the EU's view of China and China-EU relations⁴¹ based on Corpus EU PPSP.

⁴⁰ In this word frequency search, words under 4 letters long are filtered out in order to make sure most of the words produced are meaningful words.

⁴¹ Generated from text search on Corpus EU PPSP.

Figure 5-5 Word Cloud for the EU's Perceptions and Expectations of China



As we can see, the top frequency meaningful words in the data output file based on the text search for the EU's perceptions and expectations of China, include "human policy", "security", "safety", "education" and "environment". The topics indicated by these words are highly consistent with the EU's topic priorities, as found in Chapter 4. Compared with the word cloud figure of China's expectations of the EU and China-EU relations, this word cloud shows more words focused on specific areas of cooperation while the word cloud for China's expectations of the EU shows more words on overall developmental trends. This indicates that in terms of giving details and action plans in each area, the EU's official discourse on China offers more information compared with China's discourse on the EU. Meanwhile, words showing a positive attitude, including "support", "agreement", "partnership" and "development" are also among the top meaningful words in the list. This indicates that the general tone of the EU's perceptions and expectations is positive. The positivity is consistent with China's general tone on the EU and China-EU relations.

5.3.2 Differences in the Level of Detail

Despite the word clouds, the contents and discourse style of Corpus China PPSP and Corpus EU PPSP show differences. Corpus EU PPSP covers a wide range of policies of and conditions in China in detail and with more hierarchies (sections and subtitles) in the documents. For example, product safety, minority policies, China's policies in relation to Africa, China's population issues, migration, human trafficking as well as other economic, social-political situations in China have all been mentioned and discussed in the EU's discourse.

Comparatively speaking, China's official discourse on the EU does not cover as many details about the specific problems the EU is facing within itself although general situations in Europe or the EU, such as integration challenges and debt crisis are addressed. Instead, the focus is on pitching and verbalising China's basic understandings and principles in terms of

China-EU relations. This may be due to a few reasons. First, the belief in non-interference makes China comment less on the specific issues with the EU MS or the challenges of the EU as these would be considered “domestic” issues especially if China views the EU as equal to a big country. Second, EU PPSP has MS and other EU institutions as its audience while Corpus China PPSP has the EU when there are translated versions or the different levels of Chinese government as the audience. The audience of Corpus China PPSP does not have a high requirement as that of Corpus EU PPSP to know about specific action plans to coordinate the policies and actions of MS. This could also be related to the fact that China has a shorter history in issuing official discourse on its foreign policy.

5.4 Discussion: Findings and Significance

This section summarises the key findings of this chapter and discusses how the findings contribute to the existing literature on the role of identities and perceptions of China and the EU. The empirical findings cover three aspects: first, the mismatches in China and the EU's expectations of each other; second, the identity features of China and the EU, respectively, which are not mismatches but not particularly understood or emphasised by the other; and lastly, the longitudinal changes in China and the EU's views of themselves and the other.

The section also reviews the methods applied in this chapter, especially in terms of combining foreign policy discourse (Corpus China PPSP and Corpus EU PPSP) and domestic discourse (Corpus China Domestic and Corpus EU Domestic) for an integrated approach in corpus-driven content analysis.

Methodologically, the chapter discusses both the mismatches between China's self-esteem and the EU's perception of China and vice versa and the mismatch between China's expectations of the EU and vice versa. In other words, it distinguishes the differences between gaps in perception and gaps in expectation. Expectations involve normative power and a future-oriented perspective, which is an area corpus-based discourse analysis can help to inform. Concordance searches on normative words such as “need to”, “should”, among other normative words indicating expectations, along with word clouds which visualise the output of aspects of normative contents, contribute to giving a quick impression of the actor's expectations and aspirations.

Empirically, although the chapter focuses on discovering the differences between China and the EU's perceptions on themselves and the other, the analysis shows that the shared understandings and similarities between the two stands at the core of China-EU relations. China and the EU have established consensus on some of the principles essential to both China and the EU, which constitutes a solid base for bilateral relations. China has been consistent in supporting European integration and recognising the impact of the EU as a major power. The EU has been consistent in its official discourse respecting China's One

China policy, which sets the political foundation for China to retain its diplomatic relations with the EU.

Despite the considerate level of mutual support and understanding, different emphases exist in China and the EU's perceptions and expectations of each other. These mismatches can sometimes be covert instead of overt, namely difference emphases can exist even when the discourse is shared.

The first group of findings is about the EU's perceptions of China and the mismatches between these and China's self-perception. China's self-perception, as evidenced by the discourse, features framing China as a strong nation in the East with increasing confidence, especially in the last five years. While both China and the EU have a vision that China will and should play an important role in the South East Asia region but also across the globe in general, China emphasises national confidence, dignity and being respected while the EU expects China to lead in the resolution of regional issues such as the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula.

The second group of findings is about the mismatches between China's perceptions of the EU and the EU's self-perception.

Although European integration is the direction and future both China and the EU expect, China is more confident about European integration and considers there to be fewer complications in this matter than the EU. China's perceptions of the EU include the view that European integration is an irreversible historical trend. There are fewer discussions about the differentiated stances and positions about member states in China's official discourse on the EU, although these are addressed in China's discourse on individual member states.

Meanwhile, while the EU holds doubts about the existence of "poles" as illustrated in the last chapter. China regards the EU as a "pole" of the multipolar world. The Chinese government has shown awareness of the EU as a big, impactful power in the world and sometimes regards the EU as a special form of "big country" which indicates that China's perceptions on the EU include more state-oriented understandings than the EU's perception of itself.

This chapter also indicates that Chinese official discourse on the EU tends to focus on general policy areas with positive aspirations but less specific, normative requirements on the EU while the EU's discourse on China has expectations and hopes pinned down more specifically.

On top of that, the discourse blocks on China's ideal self and its perception of the ideal future of the world, as presented in Figure 5.1, is a novelty as such hierarchy of discourse blocks which provide a general picture of China's identity in the current literature.

In terms of China and the EU's expectations of the other, Zhang Li's work on the Chinese official media discourse on the EU has pointed out that China's expectations of the EU are

reflexive and impacted by China's identity, interests and perceptions of the EU (Zhang, 2016b). Zhang's work uses the media discourse in China as the data source. This research shares a similarity in terms of its constructive theoretical approach and longitudinal perspective.

Wong argues that it is the changing identities of China and the EU, respectively, which lead to the swing between cooperation and conflict in China-EU relations. He observed the changes in the identities of China and the EU and argued that these changes, as well as the EU's normative nature, set China-EU relations on a collision course. He argues that only if China and the EU's identity achieve more internal consolidation and are communicated to each other more clearly can further progress in China-EU relations be expected (Wong, 2013).

Tsuruoka argues that the 'capability-expectations gap' towards the EU, namely the gap between high expectations of the EU from other entities and the EU's actual ability, hinders the EU's foreign relations. He contends that in the case of EU-Japan relations, there is a reversed 'capability-expectations gap' as Tokyo has a low expectation of the EU as an international actor.

Instead of the 'Capability-Expectations Gap' argued by Hill (Hill, 1993; Tsuruoka, 2008), the argument in this chapter sits in line with Zhang Li's concept of "reflexive expectations", namely China's perceptions of the EU are impacted by China's self-perception, identity, and development, as well as Wong's argument on how the changing identities of China and the EU result in volatility in China-EU relations. This chapter argues that the mismatch of identities and perceptions exists due to China and the EU's self-identities and the projection of these identities on the other. The expectations of the other are rooted in the intrinsic values and developmental stage of the self. In a different way to Japan, China has a high expectation of the EU. However, this expectation from China of the EU is, overall, realistic and based on the EU's actual position and ability in the world. While the EU attaches overarching emphasis to its normative nature, represented by its founding values across time, China's view of the EU is more state-oriented which results in it seeing the EU as representing Europe or being a potential "pole" in the world which focuses more on integrity and its economic power.

The EU's development in terms of striving to increase its hard power makes the EU more conscious about the rise of China. The EU's identity as a normative power makes it hope for changes in China, which creates tensions as China is not ready to have European values imposed, especially when it has suffered from a colonised past.

For China, the EU is a first-tier trading partner, political influencer, and normative power. However, when it comes to geopolitical interactions, the EU is in the second-tier due to its geographical position as well as the fact that it is not a nation-state but an organisation. In

other words, China recognises the EU's strengths as a global impactor; it does not, however, dive into details about the EU's complications and struggles as these aspects do not have direct, detrimental impacts on China. What directly impacts China's perceptions of the EU, however, is China's identity and its interests. China is a sovereign state and emphasises unity and dignity. China respects European integration in the first place, not only because an integrated Europe is beneficial for China, but also because the idea of unity and integration is deeply rooted in the country's culture and conceptual framework.

Longitudinally, the chapter also finds that the EU's perceptions of China have been changing from viewing China as an emerging country in Asia in its early policy papers even before the Chinese official discourse showing this aspect. However, the understanding of China's emergence contains a high degree of simplicity mainly focusing on integrating China into the international market and with expectations that China can be transformed in a way the EU expects, which is highly connected to the EU's values. In later years, the EU started to realise that China has its own path and plans, which are very different from the EU's early understanding of the country's future. Research into China-EU relations has pointed out that the EU has intentions to influence China's social-political choices due to the EU's normative nature and Western democracy being one of the EU's core values (Men, 2012). However, existing research has not pointed out the time difference, or the longitudinal dynamics in China and the EU's recognitions of each other. The chapter finds that the Chinese governmental perception of the rise of China is lower key and lagged in time scope compared with the EU's recognition of "the rise of China". This mismatch in time is not emphasised in existing literature but is evidenced from corpus-based discourse analysis.

5.5 Conclusion

The chapter finds that China, as manifested in its official discourse to the EU, has been coherently supportive and overall optimistic about European integration while the EU is more aware of the complications of the process and the setbacks involved. China and the EU converge in the way that the EU is seen as a power with the potential for global impact with both soft and hard power, which the EU has been increasingly emphasising in its discourse. The EU has also shown consistent support for the One China policy which constitutes a solid base for overall positive interactions between China and the EU.

Some mismatches are shown, nevertheless. China's self-perception, as evidenced by the discourse, is featured by framing China as a strong nation in the East with increasing confidence, especially in the last five years but also with an emphasis on China's history of colonisation and its suffering in the last century. The EU has shown recognition of the emergence of China in its early policy papers back to 1994 and 1995, but its perceptions of China were highly bound by its single-sided expectation that China could be transformed

according to a Western social, political and economic style although this has been adjusted in later stages of the discourse interactions.

The mismatch in time on the perception of China's position and capability leads to some mismatches between the EU and China's expectations of China. When the EU wanted China to shoulder more international, multilateral responsibilities back in the 1990s, China was not yet at the stage of recognising itself as a strong country. When China began showing enhanced confidence and assurance in more recent years, the EU became ambivalent about the rise of China.

The changes in the EU's expectations and perceptions of China are a factor behind setbacks in China-EU relations including the plunge in the relations around 2008 and the EU's ambivalent attitudes regarding recognising China's MES under the WTO system and regarding the lifting of the arms-embargo on China.

China's perceptions of the EU are strongly connected to China's self-perceptions of China as a sovereign state and one with an important role in the world in terms of multipolarity. The EU's self-perception is highly attached to its normative nature and its founding values. Its discourse also contains more awareness of the divergence between member states and the nature of the EU as a supranational and intergovernmental organisation instead of a nation-state. The perceptions of others in China-EU relations, in this sense, are strongly influenced by the perception of self. This enhances Li Zhang's theoretical concept of 'Reflexive Expectations' in China-EU relations which argues that China's expectations of the EU are influenced by China's self-perception, interests and development.

Although the mismatches are undesired, the empirical data show that these twenty-five years have witnessed an evolution in the EU's understanding of China from being incomplete and unrealistic, to a point where it has departed from the EU's single-sided wish based on European values, to a more rounded and comprehensive view which takes into account China's own visions and features.

Chapter 6 Visions for the World Structure of the Future—Shared Terms, Different Connotations?

As this thesis takes a constructivist approach, this chapter takes the stance that visions, perceptions, and aspirations are important elements which influence the interactions between entities in the international arena. The Chinese government and the EU's visions for the world of the future in terms of structure have fundamental impacts on the ways China and the EU interact with each other as well as the ways they generally behave in international affairs.

The existing literature has pointed out that China places more emphasis on multi-polarity while the EU emphasises multilateralism (Naramore, 2008; Geeraerts, 2011; Baeck, 2013; Finamore, 2017). David Scott has also observed that China and the EU have applied both the terms multipolarity and multilateralism.

This chapter, based on corpus-driven discourse analysis, expands the existing discussions on why both terms have existed in China and the EU's official discourse, in what context these two terms have been used, and whether the application and implications of these terms have been changed over the years. Expanding the response to these questions is important in order to understand whether and to what extent the differences between China and EU's visions for the world structure, as stated in the current literature, are reflected or consistent with the discursive evidence from the official discourse of China and the EU, whether these differences have experienced any changes over the last two decades and whether any misunderstandings exist between China and the EU in their knowledge of each other's vision for the world of the future.

This chapter, therefore, aims to offer a more comprehensive understanding of China and the EU's expectations of the world of the future by investigating where and how the differences in China and the EU's visions lie when it comes to their understandings of the world of the future, in terms of structure, through a comparative discourse analysis of their official discourse.

Methodologically, the chapter also aims to achieve this goal by applying corpus-based discourse analysis with the hope that this method can offer details and findings which are otherwise unattainable. The chapter applies a combination of comparative corpus linguistic analysis, content analysis, and critical discourse analysis. For China, two corpora are used: Corpus China Domestic and Corpus China PPSP. Identically, for the EU, Corpus EU PPSP and Corpus EU Internal are used.

Corpus linguistic analysis offers word frequency searches and collocations for “multipolar”, “multipolarity”, “multilateral” and “multilateralism” so that comparisons of the frequency differences and the usage of the terms are possible. Content analysis of selected, relevant pieces of discourse in Corpus China Domestic and Corpus EU Internal on China and the EU’s view on multipolarity and multilateralism will be included. In addition, critical discourse analysis is applied in order to compare whether differences exist between the domestic official discourse and the discourse targeted at an international audience, or each other, on both sides. Techniques of CDA are drawn upon as the importance of target audiences, or to put in another way, the differences between domestic discourse and external discourse are discussed.

Upon comparing the descriptions of China and the EU’s desired future world, a few findings are generated. First, “multipolarity” has a more dominant presence in the Chinese official discourse when it comes to the descriptions of the future world structure, but multilateralism is experiencing an evident rise in its frequencies in recent years in the Chinese official discourse on the EU. Meanwhile, “multipolarity” has appeared in the EU’s official discourse sporadically but “multilateralism” by far outweighs the presence and frequency of “multipolarity”. Second, China regards the structures of multipolarity and multilateralism to be concepts and structures that can coexist in a single world since both terms focus on maintaining peace and preventing hegemony, whereas the EU views a singularly multilateral world as preferable to another configuration including coexistence of multilateralism and multipolarity as multipolarity is a state-oriented concept and the EU, being a post-modern entity with member states pooling part of their sovereignty, sees more value in the functionality of organisations.

Based on the findings, the chapter argues that there are differences and misunderstandings in terms of the Chinese government and the EU’s visions for the future world despite their shared usage of “multilateralism” and “multipolarity”. Although both China and the EU talk about the structures of multilateralism and multipolarity, China emphasises multipolarity more with an increasing emphasis on multilateralism with the understanding that the two structures can coexist. The EU shows a preference for multilateralism and an inclination to discard the concept of multipolarity due to the EU’s nature and its postmodern understanding of sovereignty. The misunderstanding this leads to is that the Chinese government assumes that the EU shares China’s visions of multipolarity while some voices in the EU doubt the future of multipolarity, especially in terms of the connotation of power politics among sovereign states. The Chinese government, as shown in China’s EU official discourse, has been emphasising the concept of multipolarity without showing evident awareness that the concept has various connotations for the EU. On the other hand, the EU takes the connotation of multilateralism in the Chinese official document as identical to the EU’s understanding of multilateralism without a more historical understanding of the Chinese

vision for the world structure which takes a more state-oriented perspective with multipolarity still playing an important role.

The chapter consists of three sections:

Section 6.1 reviews the concepts of multipolarity and multilateralism.

Section 6.2 discusses China's interpretations of multipolarity and multilateralism based on Corpus China Domestic. The content discourse analysis applies the documents on the theme of China's vision for the international order.

Section 6.3 discusses the EU's understandings of multipolarity and multilateralism. It argues that overall, the EU attaches more weight to multilateralism. Content analysis provides insights about the EU's understanding of the two forms of international order. The coverage searches of the terms show the changes in the frequency of use of these two terms over the years as evidence of the EU's stress on multilateralism.

Section 6.4 discusses the findings and their implications.

Section 6.5 concludes the chapter.

6.1 Defining Multipolarity and Multilateralism

Although there are multiple ways to describe the structure of the world, the notions of "multipolarity" and "multilateralism" are at the centre of understanding the basic structures of the world desired by China and the EU. According to Huntington, a unipolar system "would have one superpower, no significant major powers, and many minor powers" (Huntington, 1999: 35). In a unipolar system, the superpower has the capability to resolve key international issues alone, and the coalition of other powers would not be able to overcome the will of the superpower (Huntington, 1999). A multipolar world refers to a world with a number of great powers among which cooperation and competition continue in shifting patterns (Crossick, 2010). These poles should be major powers with comparable strength. Resolving the key international issues in a multipolar world requires the coalition of these major powers (Huntington, 1999: 35; Dee, 2015: 5). This is also the model which European politics approximated to for centuries (Huntington, 1999). Huntington also argued that contemporary international politics does not fit into a unipolar, bipolar or a multipolar world. It is a uni-multipolar system with the US as the superpower coexisting with major powers (Huntington, 1999). Two decades later, the basic structure of the international system has not changed much in this sense.

In a bipolar system, there are two large powers with equal capacities that dominate the focus of international politics (Mearsheimer, 2003: 69–70). In a unipolar system, a single great power with outstanding capabilities stands at the centre of world affairs (Wohlforth, 1999: 9). A multilateral world, instead, is one in which several interdependent countries are working together to seek a win-win relationship from cooperation instead of zero-sum interactions

(Crossick, 2010). Ruggie defined multilateralism as “an institutional form which coordinates relations among three or more states on the basis of ‘generalised’ principles of conduct (...) without regard to the particularistic interests of the parties or the strategic exigencies that may exist in any specific occurrence” (Ruggie, 1992: 571).

Although Huntington and Ruggie have defined multipolarity and multilateralism as structures of the world, it does not mean different countries and entities in the world have attached the same connotations to these terms. China and the EU, although both have applied the terms multipolarity and multilateralism in describing the world and cooperation going on in the world, have different understandings of these world structures as shown from their official discourse.

Multipolarity and multilateralism are both terms describing the types of international system. According to Scott, multipolarity is “a measurement of the distribution of power as concentrated in several poles of power, those poles being Great Powers”. Multilateralism, is “a process; a way of acting that involves several states (big, medium, or small) working together as a matter of practice”(Scott, 2013: 31).

As previously mentioned in the Literature Review of the thesis, existing studies have pointed out that, in general, China emphasises multipolarity while the EU stresses multilateralism (Messner 2007; D. Scott 2007a; Narramore 2008; Clegg 2009; Hooft 2010; Van Langenhove 2010; Geeraerts 2011; Makarychev and Morozov 2011; Wade 2011; D. Scott 2012; Xiaoming Zhang 2012; Baeck 2013; D.A. Scott 2013; Ngeow 2014; D. Scott 2014; Z. Chen 2016) ; Finamore 2017). The reasoning the research offered is that China is a sovereign state so takes a realist-based view and is more state-oriented than the EU which is more bound by multilateralism due to it being a supranational and intergovernmental organisation (Baeck 2013; D.A. Scott 2013; D. Scott 2014; Z. Chen 2016).

Scott notices that “the EU stresses multilateralism, the PRC remains explicit in its welcome of multipolarity”; he also recognises the shifts and mutual influences between the stressed systems of China and the EU and the supplementary usage, on both sides, of the terms referring to the “untidy multilevel international system” such as ‘interpolarity’, ‘asymmetrical multipolarity’, ‘multilateralism multipolarity’ and ‘multi-multilateralism’ (Scott, 2013: 30).

Gustaaf argues that there has been a “shifting constellation of world power” which is “fundamentally altering the distribution of capabilities and identities” (Geeraerts, 2016: 233). He recognises this power shift and is aware of the divergences and convergence between China and the EU as two of the main entities in the world. In his more recent article, Gustaaf has been modestly optimistic about the convergence of China and the EU in terms of building a multilateral international order. In his article published in 2018, he argues that as the US has been playing a less central role in the global governance system, it is likely that

the international order will become more diffused with China, the EU and the US being the strong trading poles (Geeraerts, 2018).

Geeraerts also concludes that the changing constellation of powers in the world will lead to changes in the engagement style between China and the EU. The two will be moving in the direction of reciprocal socialisation (Terhalle, 2011), a process during which they try to reach consensus with pragmatic considerations and reconcile their differences in identities and developmental paths. They will also need to renegotiate about the world order, for which the development is correlated with China and the EU's internal development (Geeraerts, 2016).

In the following sections, both China and the EU's understandings of both terms will be discussed with, firstly, a content analysis and, secondly, a corpus linguistic analysis so that the findings from both methods can be compared to each other, leading to more comprehensive findings and arguments.

6.2 China's Interpretations of Multipolarity and Multilateralism

This section, through content analysis of the documents, specifically discusses China's understanding of the world structure, and features findings on three aspects.

First, it highlights multipolarity as a core concept in the Chinese government's vision of the desired structure of the future world.

Second, it highlights three outstanding themes related to multipolarity as shown in the Chinese official discourse on multipolarity.

Third, it explores the relationship between multipolarity and multilateralism.

6.2.1 Multipolarity is a Core Concept of China's Vision

One of the earliest Chinese official documents on the topic of multipolarity, the "Joint Declaration on a Multipolar World and the Establishment of a New International Order" (China and Russian Federation, 2008; Crossick, 2010), was signed with Russia in 1997. This document was signed in the context of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, when a unipolar structure with the United States as the single "pole" took the place of the bipolar world structure of the post-war (World War Two) world system with the Soviet Union and the United States representing the two world poles respectively. The main purpose of signing this document was to demonstrate the signing countries' determination to counter the hegemonic world system or at least hegemonism (Crossick, 2010). The document states that "the trend towards a multi-polar world is irreversible" (China and Russian Federation, 2008: para.5). It pointed out that although peace and cooperation have been the general direction in which the world is going, "unilateralism and power politics still exist, as well as frequent regional conflicts due to ethnic and religious reasons. (...) the world is faced with more and more new threats and challenges" (China and Russian Federation, 2008: para.5).

The document features China and the Russian Federation's determinations to cooperate in multiple respects including supporting the role of the UN in international relations, condemning terrorism, cooperation in regional organisations, a balanced global economy, North-South dialogue, peace, sustainable development, human rights protection, non-interference in each other's internal affairs as well as regional integration. The support for a world of multipolarity is strong and clear for China, as shown in this document. The fact that China and the Russian Federation are the signing countries also indicates that considerations on the balance of power in the world were one of the motivations behind this view of the world of the future.

The notion of the multipolar world (多极世界 DuoJi ShiJie) was thereafter put forward by the Chinese government as the defining feature of the world's development. As time went by, the unipolar system of the world developed into one with "one superpower and several strong powers" (一超多强 Yi Chao Duo Qiang) from the Chinese perspective. This depiction of the world stage has been commonly received in China for years and has been taught as such in standardised textbooks for public schools (Du, 2009).

Since 2000, the Chinese government published two specially themed documents on multipolarity. The first is "China's View on the Development of Multi-polarity" issued on the official website of the Foreign Ministry of China in English. The second is "中国对多极化发展的看法" ("China's View on the Development of Multipolarity") issued in Chinese in 2003 (Consulate General of the People's Republic of China in Sydney, 2000). The second document has the same title as the first one. However, the second document is not the identical translated version of the first one. It is a different document issued only in Chinese, but the English translations of the title would be the same as the first one. It is possible, based on the languages in which these two documents were issued, that the document in English is aimed at overseas readers while the second document in Chinese is aimed at domestic readers while both share similar themes. The original texts of these two documents are attached in Figure Apx 1 Two Documents on China's View of Multipolarity: the Chinese Version and the English Version. for reference to support the analysis of this section.

Upon confirming that multipolarity is the Chinese government's vision for the trend of the world, the document issued in the Chinese language illustrates further that multipolarity helps to ensure the diversity of cultural, social, and political conditions in the world:

全世界近 200 个国家、60 多亿人口，在民族传统、宗教文化、经济水平、政治制度等方面的情况千差万别，很难想象用一种模式、一种价值观来统一，由一个国家来“领导”。

The nearly 200 countries in the world, with more than 6 billion population, differ greatly in national and ethnic traditions, religious traditions, culture, economic development level, and political

systems among all other aspects. It is unimaginable to require all these countries to apply a single model, ideology or being “led” by one country (Minister of Foreign Relations of the People’s Republic of China: para.1)⁴²

In this domestic version of the document, “China’s View on the Development of Multipolarity” issued in the Chinese language, the emphasis is laid on non-interference in international politics. It focuses primarily on the diversity of countries’ developmental modes and political structures as well as social, religious and cultural traditions, and secondly, on the function of curbing hegemonism of multipolarity as a structure of the world. The Chinese document also states that:

我们推动世界向多极化方向发展，并非针对特定国家，也不是要重演历史上列强争霸的旧剧，而是推动国际关系的民主化。

We promote the world to development towards multipolarity. This is not pointing at a specific country; neither does it lead to repeating the old story in history that powers fight for hegemonism. The aim of this is to promote the democratisation of international relations (Minister of Foreign Relations of the People’s Republic of China, 2000a: para.1).

In the version issued in English, on the other hand, the emphasis is largely on multipolarity as a mechanism to prevent hegemonism in the world with a stronger tone to disagree with “an individual country”:

At present, by virtue of its economic, technological and military advantages, an individual country is pursuing a new “gunboat policy” in contravention of the United Nations Charter and the universally acknowledged principles governing international relations in an attempt to establish a monopolar world under its guidance. This is against the tide of history and is doomed to failure (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2000b: para.3).

This piece of text points out that multipolarity contributes to curbing US hegemonism. Overall, the tone of the document issued in English is stronger with a clear target to disagree with while the first document adopts a milder tone with an emphasis on explaining why multipolarity is beneficial for China.

These differences in emphasis noticed through a comparative reading of these two documents indicate that in terms of the support for multipolarity, the Chinese government’s rationales from both domestic and international perspectives have similar reasons but a different emphasis. The Chinese document emphasises diversity and equality in international

⁴² Translated by the thesis author.

relations more, especially in terms of the autonomy of each country's right to decide its own political and social structures based on its domestic conditions. The document in the English language emphasises the world challenge of hegemonism more.

These differences are related to the fact that although both documents share a similar theme, they are for different audiences. For the domestic audience, the emphasis is to introduce the Chinese government's understanding of multipolarity to the domestic audience and to explain why multipolarity is good for China, stressing that China has to protect its autonomy when it comes to political and social structures. For the overseas audience, the purpose was to clearly state China's stance to support a world with more balanced power distribution. There are more diplomatic considerations and foreign policy involved in the second version.

6.2.2 Three Outstanding Themes Relating to Multipolarity

Although the emphases are differently laid, the two documents issued by the Chinese government on multipolarity share a few common themes: first, multipolarity as an irreversible historical trend; second, multipolarity as a means to guarantee world peace and prevent hegemonism; and third, multipolarity as a means to achieve diversity and non-interference in domestic issues.

6.2.2.1 Irreversible Historical Trend

The first similarity between these two short, keynote documents is that both, in the first sentence, confirm that multipolarity is the general direction where the world structure is heading and, although international situations change, the trend has not changed. The one published in the Chinese language states that:

当前，国际形势正在发生复杂而深刻的变化，但世界走向多极化的趋势并未改变。

Currently, the international situation is undergoing complicated and profound changes. The trend that the world is going towards multipolarity, however, has not changed (Minister of Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China, 2000a: para.1).

多极化的进程可能曲折、漫长并充满斗争，但这是不以人的意志为转移的历史趋势，它符合大多数国家的共同意愿与利益，有利于世界和平与安全。

The development of multipolarity is not without obstacles and struggles and can take a long time. However, multipolarity is a historical trend not subject to an individual's preference (Minister of Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China, 2000a: para.1).

In these two pieces of texts, multipolarity, mentioned in line with economic globalisation, is regarded as a positive trend in the world's development leading to equal relations among developed and developing, big and small countries in the world.

The document issued in English also confirms that:

Since the end of the Cold War, the world has moved towards multipolarity, and the international situation, on the whole, has become more relaxed. This is an objective tendency independent of people's will, reflecting the trend of the development of the present era (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2000b: para.1).

For the Chinese government, the notion is that a world of multipolarity represents an unchangeable direction the world is moving in and the idea that this structure will not change due to any entity's will or different understandings of the world. There is a deep and solid trust in the effectiveness and correctness of this world structure.

6.2.2.2 Peace and Prevention of Hegemonism

Although multipolarity is associated with the realist perspective on the balance of power, if we look at the contexts where multipolarity has been mentioned in Chinese official discourse, we can see that one of the major emphases on multipolarity in the Chinese official discourse has been on hegemony-prevention and reaching an international order which makes wars practically impossible:

The document issued in English states that:

Multi-polarization, on the whole, helps weaken and curb hegemonism and power politics, serves to bring about a just and equitable new international political and economic order and contributes to world peace and development (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2000b: para.1).

The text above confirms the Chinese governmental vision of a multipolar world and the view that a multipolar world prevents hegemony and facilitates world peace. The document in Chinese also emphasises that the purpose of promoting multipolarity is "to promote the democratisation of international relations, promote all powers in the world to enhance coordination and dialogue, avoid confrontation and work together to maintain the peace, stability and development of the world" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2000a: para. 2)

6.2.2.3 Non-Interference and Diversity

The third theme featured in the Chinese official documents on multipolarity is maintaining the diversity of social, cultural, and political features of countries in the world and sticking to the non-interference principle. The Chinese version of the document explains that multipolarity does not focus merely on constructing "poles" in the world. It focuses on promoting equality

among countries and the social, cultural and political diversity in the world by saying that requiring all countries to apply the same model, ideology or being “led” by one country is unimaginable (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2000a: para.1)

These three aspects or themes mentioned above are the major beliefs and connotations behind the Chinese official understanding of a multipolar world based on a comparative content analysis of the two versions of the multipolarity documents.

6.2.3 Coexistence of Multipolarity and Multilateralism

Although the content analysis above argues that multipolarity stands in the core position of China’s understanding of a desired world of the future, multilateralism has received a high degree of recognition and attention in the Chinese official discourse as well, as evidenced by the document issued by China titled “中国有关国际秩序的主张 (China’s Stance on International Order)” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2006).

It is necessary to mention that these keynote documents listed on the page for Materials (Policy Documents, Regulations, Keynote Speeches) of the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in China have a high degree of importance as they are documents setting the keynote or stating China’s basic principles and understanding on certain aspects of international relations. In terms of foreign policies and general development policy in China, only a few concepts, including “peaceful development”, “new security concept”, “multipolarity” and “multilateralism” are showcased as themes of the keynote documents. Among these keynote articles, “中国有关国际秩序的主张 (China’s Stance on International Order)” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2006), issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC, illustrates Chinese understanding of its desired international order:

中国倡导多边主义，主张促进国际关系民主化。

China promotes multilateralism and takes the stance to facilitate the democratisation of international relations (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2006: para. 2).

The complete Chinese original version of this article and its translated English version (translated by the author) document are available in Appendix Figure Apx 1. This document explains some of China’s fundamental stances in terms of its vision of the world order and offers an important context where multilateralism is emphasised. In the document, China emphasises respect for diversity in the world, the new security concept which promotes mutual trust, mutual benefits, equality and coordination among countries, the disagreement around power politics, sustainable development, environmental protection and the role of UN

institutions and UN charter (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2006).

In this text, the Chinese government's support for multilateralism stands at the top of the list of principles China would like to adhere to. The Chinese government has connected multilateralism with equality among countries and justice of the international order. Multilateralism is also considered as a major means to maintain world peace.

The text shows that the Chinese government promotes both multilateralism and multipolarity and regards these two forms as able to coexist in the future. Both terms are applied in contexts relating to preventing hegemony and facilitating international equity.

In 2015, when President Xi Jinping visited London on 19th October, he delivered a speech named "Promote Openness and Tolerance and Facilitate Peaceful Development Together" which stated that:

China has always been a promoter of international cooperation and an active participator of international multilateralism (Xi, 2015).

In this speech, President Xi confirmed that promoting multilateralism is on China's agenda, and China will shoulder increasing responsibilities in international cooperation. This supports the argument that China claims to promote both multipolarity and multilateralism.

There is a clear sign that China believes that multipolarity and multilateralism can co-exist in the desired world of the future; these structures lead to a world of similar features. Plus, there is not much difference in the main themes related to the discourse of multipolarity and multilateralism. Both terms are related to the themes of peace, prevention of power politics, equality and diversity in the world and respect for the role of the UN. The emphasis is on "multi", or respect for diversity in the world, instead of the concepts of "poles" and "lateral" which, in some of the EU's official discourse, relates to the connotations of nation-states and a post-modern understanding of the role of cooperation between international organisations.

6.2.4 Coverage of "Multipolarity" and "Multilateralism" in Corpus China PPSP

In this section, corpus linguistic analysis will be carried out to see whether a different method can lead to new findings, or whether the findings generated by content analysis and corpus linguistic analysis are consistent with each other. Specifically, the section investigates where and how multipolarity and multilateralism related discourse is used in Corpus China PPSP and Corpus EU PPSP.

Before the data search results are shown and analysed, a brief explanation on how Nvivo works in terms of counting coverage in this section is provided. This is because the coverage counting in the data processing done for this section includes the broad context of the terms searched. This is different from the coverage count with no context presented in Chapter 4.

With Nvivo, text searches with no context generate outcomes where a certain term appears without any surrounding words shown with it. Text searches with narrow contexts show the terms one is searching for with the directly adjacent words. Text searches with broad contexts output the term and the whole paragraph where the term appears. The results of each search are coded, and coverage of the term(s) being searching are counted based on the areas coded. The lengths of these coded areas are divided by the length of the document for each year, resulting in the coverage of multipolarity with a broad context. The advantages of a text search with a broad context instead of frequency, which only shows the coverage of the words without counting the surrounding text, is that it takes into consideration a few details: first, one term could appear multiple times in one paragraph which should only count once in terms of its importance; second, if the coverage of a term with a broad context is high, it indicates that contents related to the term cover a big percentage of the document, which is a good indication of the importance of a topic.


In the searches for “multipolarity” and “multilateralism”, their coverage with broad contexts, namely the paragraph they are in, are counted. This is different from the searches in the chapter on the priority differences between China and the EU which adopts coverage of words and their synonyms but with no contexts. This is because the searches are larger in number so simple frequencies would make the search faster and the comparison more straight-forward.

Table 6-1 and Figure 6-1 show the coverage of the term “多极 (multipolar/multipolarity)” in Corpus China PPSP. The coverage of the topic related to “多极” (multipolarity) in Corpus China PPSP is searched with a broad context count, meaning the paragraphs where the term multipolarity appears are coded.

Table 6-1 Summary of References to Multipolarity in Corpus China PPSP

Name	References	Coverage
1994	1	3.93%
1998	1	3.82%
2002	1	6.99%
2003	1	1.07%
2004	1	6.63%
2006	1	0.66%
2009	2	0.52%
2010	1	0.78%
2012	1	7.82%
2013	3	2.26%
2014	12	2.19%
2015	2	1.97%
2016	2	0.19%
2017	1	1.94%
2018	1	0.76%

Figure 6-1 Coverage of 多极 (Multipolarity) with Broad Context (Paragraph Count) in Corpus China PPSP



As Table 6-1 shows, “多极” appeared once, twice, or three times in the documents for each year but appear twelve times in the year 2014. The coverage for “多极”, as Figure 6-1

shows, experiences an overall steady rate but the years 2002, 2004 and 2012 saw more extensive coverage than other years. There is a slight drop in coverage of the term on a fourteen-year scale, but coverage exists for most of the years in the corpus except for 2001 and 2008. These figures indicate that the emphasis on multipolarity in China’s official documents to the EU has been quite steady and consistent between the years from 1994 to


2018 with the years 2002, 2004 and 2012 showing extra emphasis on the topic. However, on the larger timescale, the coverage rate for “多极” is reduced post-2013. This could be related to the increase in new concepts promoted since the Xi-Li administration on international order, such as a new security concept, the democratisation of international relations, and the common destiny of humankind. This could also be related to the fact that the EU has been expressing different opinions on the connotations of “poles” and “multipolarity”.

Meanwhile, Table 6-2 and Figure 6-2 show the searches on “multipolarity” in Corpus China Domestic for comparison.

Table 6-2 Summary of References for Multipolarity in Corpus China Domestic

Name	References	Coverage
1997 江泽民在中国共产党第十五次全国代表大会上的报告	2	2.08%
2003 十六大报告	3	1.64%
2005 中国的和平发展道路	1	3.57%
2007 十七大报告	1	0.50%
2010 中共中央关于制定国民经济和社会发展第十二个五年规划的建议	1	1.39%
2012 十八大报告	1	0.77%
2015 十三五规划建议	1	1.48%
2017 十九大报告	1	0.64%

Figure 6-2 Coverage of 多极 (Multipolarity) with Broad Context (Paragraph Count) in Corpus China Domestic



The collocations of “multipolarity” and “multilateralism” provide more discourse evidence for China’s understanding of these two concepts. In the 2014 EU policy paper issued by China, the term “multipolarity” and “multilateralism” both appear. The term “multipolarity” was mentioned three times with each time referring to general global development:

In the decade since China issued its first China EU Policy Paper, tremendous changes have taken place in China, the EU and the world as a whole. Multi-polarity and economic globalization have deepened; (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2014: pt.1, para. 1).

China and the EU, the world's most representative emerging economy and a group of developed countries respectively, are two major forces for world peace as they share an important strategic consensus on building a multipolar world (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2014: pt.1, para. 4).

China-EU partnership for peace: China stands ready to work with the EU to bring the two major forces closer to pursue peaceful development in a multi-polar world, respect and accommodate each other's core interests and major concerns, make the international order and international system more just and equitable, advocate democracy in international relations and create a peaceful, stable, equitable and orderly development environment for all countries (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2014: pt.2, para. 2).

Meanwhile, "multilateral" was mentioned twice, referring to China's cooperation with the EU:

Commit to jointly upholding the authority of the multilateral disarmament regime and support the adoption of a comprehensive and balanced program of work at the Conference on Disarmament at an early date to carry out substantive work as soon as possible.

Revise and improve the China-EU Customs Agreement and the Strategic Framework for China-EU Customs Cooperation under the guidance of the China-EU Joint Customs Cooperation Committee (JCCC), and intensify bilateral cooperation and multilateral coordination between respective customs authorities on IPR enforcement, supply chain security and facilitation, fighting commercial fraud and promoting trade facilitation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2014: pt.2, para. 2).

In the above texts, multilateralism was mentioned in terms of pushing forward multilateral disarmament regimes and in the context of enhancing the protection of Intellectual Property Rights in Customs cooperation and anti-fraud actions. The application of multilateralism is related to more specific international cooperation projects while multipolarity is mentioned with economic globalisation as a general trend and the form of the future world. The Chinese official discourse suggests that although these two terms emphasise different aspects of the future world, they can coexist and, together, they are the desired world order for China.

While multipolarity has been applied by the Chinese government as a central term depicting the future world, the discourse on multilateralism has also increased in the last two decades. For example, in the 2003 policy paper on the EU, multilateralism appears within the context of enhancing the EU's support to China in terms of personnel training:

China also welcomes a stronger and more active role for the EU in human resource development, in particular, personnel training for China's central and western regions and the build-up of China's capacity for participation in multilateral trading regimes (People.cn, 2003: pt.3, sect. 2, para. 5).

There is a clear message that China would like to engage more with the existing international community and participate in multilateral cooperation. This text also emphasises that China will not seek self-centred approaches but will, instead, seek common interests and development.

Reflecting on the historical background of multilateralism in China, China entered the World Trade Organisation in 2000 and has, since then, become increasingly active in participating in multilateral cooperation and organisation.

In line with its actions, it has also included the discourse of multilateralism as its vision for the future world.

The review of the collocations and the contexts of multipolarity and multilateralism in the Chinese official discourse and the discourse context indicate that both multipolarity and multilateralism in the Chinese context emphasise the implications of “multi-”: both multipolarity and multilateralism are regarded as being opposite to hegemony and unequal relations among countries in international society. The Chinese government takes the view that there is no problem with the structure of multipolarity coexisting with multilateralism. The Chinese discourse seems to take the position that the “multi” part is the real essence of these two terms whereas “polar” and “lateral” are just two levels at which equality among countries should be carried out.

6.3 The EU’s Understandings of Multipolarity and Multilateralism

While the Chinese government believes that multipolarity and multilateralism can coexist in the future world and a world of multipolarity is a shared goal between China and the EU, the EU has differing views when it comes to the question of whether the EU would still use the concept of multipolarity as their favoured version of international order.

6.3.1 Multilateralism over Multipolarity

Early in 2005, Dr Benita Ferrero-Waldner, former European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy, made a similar comment in her speech titled “The EU, China and the Quest for a Multilateral World”, saying that:

China and the EU are obviously interested in the nature of global politics in the 21st century. Some have talked of building a ‘multipolar world’. For the EU, however, it is not the number of poles which counts, but rather the basis on which they operate. Our vision is a world governed by rules created and monitored by multilateral institutions (Ferrero-Waldner, 2005: 3)

Dr Benita Ferrero-Waldner stressed that the focus of the EU is how the world will be operated instead of the number and status of the global powers. This voice in the EU is supported by several EU officials.

When the EU's High Representative Federica Mogherini visited Beijing in 2016, she expressed a similar concern about the vision of the multipolar world:

I know that China regards the European Union as one of the poles of the multipolar system and of the multipolar order. I have the impression sometimes that our time of complexity pushes us even further, and sometimes I doubt that we still have poles in the multipolar system. But we are those who believe in multilateralism and in a system that recognises the different roles for different actors worldwide and the need, as I said, to play by the rules (Mogherini, 2016: 5)

These two statements by EU officials convey a similar message: the EU prefers a multilateral world which operates on the logic of the rule of law instead of a multipolar system which, in the eyes of the EU, is based on the logic of a balance of power.

This is reconfirmed in the European Union Institute of Security Studies (EUISS) document on its global strategies titled "Strategy Matters 2015-2016", one of the key documents issued by the EU on setting the direction of its global strategies for forthcoming years. In this document, the EU, once again, expresses concerns about the validity of the concept of multipolarity. Even the notion of the region, to the EU, should not be as rigid as it was in the traditional sense:

Across regional theatres, there is no single set of powers with roughly equal influence everywhere – nor are regional hegemons determining dynamics on their own. Power configurations change across time and place, making regions themselves dynamic concepts. The world system is no longer bipolar, unipolar or even multipolar: the very notion of 'polarity' is in question (European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2016: 27).

As stated in this piece of text, the EU regards the concept of multipolarity as a more or less outdated way to describe the world order as power configurations can be unstable. In the post-modern world, for the EU, the world no longer operates in the way that "poles" dominate international affairs. Instead, global, or regional institutions based on the rule of law should be the basic units through which international affairs are dealt with.

Among the limited number (nine times) of times "multipolar" or "multipolarity" appear in Corpus EU PPSP, as shown in the concordance search results in Table Apx 15, the first was about the fact that the EU understands that China is supportive of building a world of multipolarity.

Given China's stake in a dynamic and liberal trading system and its political objective of promoting a multipolar world governed by multilateral rules, it has an interest in a successful and timely conclusion of the Doha Round, resulting in the further market opening, accommodation of developing countries interests, and improved WTO rules (Commission of the European Communities, 2003: 595–598).

China's geopolitical vision of a multipolar world, and the Chinese perception of the EU as a partner of growing importance, also provide a favourable context for increased EU visibility. (Commission of the European Communities, 2003: 894–895).

This piece of discourse from Corpus EU PPSP, therefore, is not about the EU's understanding of multipolarity but a confirmation that the EU understands that China supports a multipolar world. In fact, the references in 2003 and 2011 as shown in Table Apx 15 are also about China's positions instead of the EU. This shows that multipolarity is a concept which sits more firmly within the Chinese discourse instead of the EU's.

6.3.2 Coverage of “Multipolarity” and “Multilateralism” in Corpus China PPSP

Table Apx 14 in the Appendix shows the collocations of the term “multilateral” and “multilateralism” in Corpus EU PPSP. As Table Apx 14 and Table Apx 15 show, the word frequency for “multilateral” and “multilateralism” largely outweighs that for “multipolar” or “multipolarity” in Corpus EU PPSP. This indicates that the notion of multilateralism or multilateral cooperation is more popular and well-received in EU policies.

Another theme the EU expresses through the discourse on multilateralism is its respect for the existing international norms. The EU is aware of the fact that traditional multilateralism may need revisions and rising powers want to revise the existing order or even to create new ones, but it points out that revising an established system is not an easy task. In the EUISS document “Strategy Matters”, the EU expresses its preference for keeping the existing international norms by arguing that “opposing existing global governance mechanisms has been easier than creating new ones” especially for the emerging countries, although “Traditional multilateralism is losing steam” (European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2016: 3). The EU favours the existing international order instead of emerging countries trying to create new orders.

Reading relevant texts in China's official discourse to the EU on multipolarity reveals that, when it comes to China-EU relations, the Chinese government holds the belief that the EU agrees on the vision of multipolarity. China's first EU policy paper issued in 2003 begins as follows: “The international situation has been undergoing profound changes (...). The trend towards world multipolarity and economic globalisation is developing amid twists and turns” (People.cn, 2003: para.1). The EU, as indicated from both the officials' speeches, such as the one quoted from Mogherini, or from its related institutes' (e.g. EUISS) analysis, does not strongly attach itself to the idea of multipolarity or the concept of “poles” any more.

In China's EU policy paper in 2014, China also conveyed its belief that multipolarity is a shared vision between China and the EU:

China and the EU, the world's most representative emerging economy and group of developed countries respectively, are two major forces for world peace as they share an important strategic consensus on building a multipolar world (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2014: para.4).

Furthermore, China views the EU as a partner to achieve a multipolar world. In a further illustration in its 2014 policy paper, the government states that:

To grow China-EU relations is an integral part of China's efforts to build long-term, steady and healthy relations with major powers and a priority in its foreign policy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2014: para.5).

This piece of the text shows that China sees the EU as a "major power" around the globe. This perspective on the EU takes the EU as a whole entity and regards its capability as equal to the big countries in the world. China-EU relations support China's goal of enhancing its relations with major powers across the globe.

6.4 Findings and Significance

The findings of this chapter continue with the conclusions of Scott and Gustaaf on the visions of China and the EU in relation to the international order (Scott, 2007a, 2013; Geeraerts, 2011). Scott argues that the EU stresses multilateralism, and China welcomes multipolarity. He also observes that there have been shifts where socialisation plays a role and transfers some of the EU's multilateralism usage and normative underpinnings to China. He continues his observation by pointing out that both terms coexist in both entities with other concepts on the untidy multilevel international order including 'multilateralism multipolarity' and 'multi-multilateralism', among many other orders (Scott, 2013).

Based on concordance analysis and content analysis, the chapter generated some specific findings in terms of China and the EU's visions for the future world.

On China's visions for the world of the future, the chapter finds that:

First, multipolarity has been a core concept in the Chinese post-war vision of the desired future world, as shown in China's official documents on multipolarity. It is a concept which has enjoyed historical consistency in Chinese official discourse.

Second, China's domestic document on multipolarity shows different emphases in the document with the same theme but which has overseas readers as the audience. The domestic document on multipolarity emphasises the diversity of countries' cultures and social-political traditions while the one with overseas readers as an audience emphasises prevention of hegemonism with a strong tone, highlighting its disagreement with US hegemony.

Third, three themes can be drawn from China's theme-specific official documents on multipolarity: multipolarity as the irreversible historical trend in the world's development, multipolarity as a way to promote peace and prevent hegemonism, and multipolarity as helping to boost diversity and the principle of non-interference.

Fourth, China regards that the structure of multipolarity can coexist with multilateralism. Both terms are confirmed in the Chinese documents to be forms of the world supported by the Chinese government while the former emphasises more the structure of power balance and the latter emphasises more the means of cooperation in specific respects.

On the EU's visions for the future world, the chapter has found that:

First, the EU's official discourse (Corpus EU PPSP) in China shows a greater frequency of the term "multilateralism" than "multipolarity". Among the few times "multipolarity" was mentioned, they were referring to China's stance.

Second, the EU officials have expressed doubts about the validity of the existence of "poles" in the world as well as the concept of "multipolarity". The EU takes a view which emphasises organisational cooperation instead of the balance of power between nation-states. This is related to the EU's nature as an intergovernmental organisation with member states pooling part of their sovereignty.

Overall, China and the EU's visions for the future world share a high degree of compatibility in terms of peacekeeping, prevention of hegemony and respect to diversity. However, the above differences are shown in their official discourse on each other.

The findings in the section about China lead to the argument in this section that the concept of multipolarity has been received in China over a long period of time compared with multilateralism and is still crucial to understanding China's view of the structure of the world of the future. Multilateralism has received increasing attention and has been recognised as another core feature in terms of international order in the future world. Both concepts, for China, promote the value of peace, diversity, prevention of hegemonism and non-interference.

Two mismatches between China and the EU's vision for the future world have manifested so far. First, the Chinese government focused on the "multi" part of both multipolarity and multilateralism. It places emphasis on the coercion of hegemony and confrontation of these forms and regards these orders as coexisting in the future world. The EU includes different voices on this. While some still apply the term multipolarity, focusing on a balance of power in work, others draw a more distinct line between multipolarity and multilateralism and regard that multipolarity is not how the EU sees the future world anymore.

Second, China regards multipolarity as a shared vision between China and the EU, whilst the EU has doubts about multipolarity due to the connotation of power politics underlying the concept of multipolarity.

The misunderstanding between China and the EU, therefore, is not merely that China prefers multipolarity and the EU prefers multilateralism. The first misunderstanding is that, in the eyes of the EU, China supports the future world as a world with multipolarity as China follows the realist logic of power balancing. However, the Chinese discourse evidence shows that China states that it promotes and enhances multilateralism as a basic order for the future as well and both multilateralism and multipolarity appear in the context of sustaining peace, equality and common development in the world. The Chinese government does not draw a clear distinction between multipolarity and multilateralism. Both terms promote multiple participators and methods to solve international issues, so both are accepted in the Chinese official vision for the future world.

The second misunderstanding is that the Chinese government assumes that the EU agrees on multipolarity as a form for the future world and has therefore applied this term in China-EU official discourse while the term is associated with power politics from the perspective of the EU. The problem between China and the EU is not that the two have a fundamental clash of world visions and perceptions, but that the EU thinks China has a fundamentally different world vision to that of the EU whereas China assumes the EU has attached the same associations and connotations to multipolarity and multilateralism as China has.

6.5 Conclusion

This chapter responds to the research question of this thesis through a comparison of China's and the EU's visions for the future world and their future selves based on their official discourse between 1994 and 2019 which includes both their discourse on each other (Corpus China PPSP and Corpus EU PPSP) and their domestic discourse (Corpus China Domestic and Corpus EU Domestic).

It has been found that for China, although there is evidence from the corpus that China emphasises multipolarity, the frequency of the terms "multilateralism" and "multilateral" have increased significantly in recent years. Plus, multilateralism and multipolarity co-exist in the Chinese discourse and based on the content analysis, there is a large overlap in their connotations. These indicate that although there are differences in the emphases, there is a trend indicating that China has started a process of adopting the notion of multilateralism, which could be the result of China's enhanced power and position across the globe which lead to the naturalisation of China's acceptance of the multilateral international order.

The chapter expands the understanding of the causes of China-EU political challenges. While previous studies have explained this problem by arguing that China and the EU have diverging world visions, this chapter, based on analysing and comparing China and the EU's

discourse on multipolarity and multilateralism, argues that China and the EU's visions for the future world, although without fundamental clashes, experience mismatches in terms of the historical acceptance and emphases of these world structures. This is because China basically agrees with the EU on moving towards a world where countries are coordinated with mutual respect and multilateral structures. However, as "multipolarity" has a long-standing history of being accepted by the Chinese government and the Chinese public expectation for the future world while multilateralism is a relatively younger concept which is increasing in its frequency in Chinese official discourse, there has been a mismatch in terms of the time, the extent of acceptance as well as emphasis when it comes to multipolarity and multilateralism. China has been emphasising multipolarity for a long time and multipolarity is still a core expectation for the future world whereas multilateralism has been a long-standing notion for the EU and is the core of the EU's understanding for the future world. In recent years, high importance has also been attached to multilateralism in China's vision for the future world. The differences lie in that China believes that multipolarity and multilateralism can coexist since both terms focus on maintaining peace and preventing hegemony. The EU, on the other hand, regards multilateralism as the primary form of the future world order and holds differing viewpoints on the existence of "poles" in the future world. The misunderstandings between China and the EU on their world vision due to the different connotations China and the EU attach to multilateralism and multipolarity provide an explanation for the existing political tension in China-EU relations despite their economic and trade prosperity.

In terms of methodology, this chapter applied the text searches with broad coverage. It also explains why coverage is important, how it is connected to frequency, and why it is helpful for understanding how important a term is, or a topic in a document.

Chapter 7 The Dynamics of Normative Power

This chapter explores the dynamics of the normative power between China and the EU in the studied period by comparing the normative discourse and practices between the two and their impact on China-EU relations. Based on content analysis and language-oriented constructivist analysis, this chapter argues that two drives are connected to the volatility in China-EU relations: the first is the mismatches in the normative goals, priorities and approaches between the Chinese government and the EU's normative efforts; the second is the economic and normative power shifts between China and the EU in the world system.

The chapter consists of four sections. The first section discusses the EU's normative goals, priorities and the controversies and its normative discourse. The texts related to norms are selected and organised based on how norms are generated. Specifically, this part applies the categories of norm-formation in discourse identified in Nicolas Onuf's rule-oriented constructivism, namely assertive discourse, directive discourse and commissive discourse. The data are gathered, organised, and visualised with the assistance of Nvivo in combination with content analysis.

The second section discusses China as a new normative power as well as the goals, priorities, and challenges related to the possible concept of Normative power China. The section also looks at the normative projects in progress between China and the EU and China's recent normative efforts in BRI, AIIB and other cooperation with international organisations. This leads to a comparative view of China and the EU's mismatched goals and priorities and the argument that the two have different aims and emphases in their normative efforts.

The third section explores the differences in the Chinese government's and the EU's normative approaches and how this has impacted EU-China relations. It argues that the changing positions of China and the EU in the world system are one driving force behind the volatility in China-EU relations. China aims at and is in the process of entering into becoming a core state in the world economic system. The EU strives to maintain its position in the world system as a core state but is facing the risk of receding into peripheral status. As a result, there is a normative switch resulting from the repositioning of China and the EU in the world system. The different directions in terms of the movement of China and the EU in the world system create tensions between China and the EU in their trade and political interactions.

The last section then highlights the changes in the EU's approach to interacting with China which is switching from a value-based approach to a pragmatic, interests-based approach. It also discusses the possible misunderstandings related to the translation of the term "pragmatism" in China-EU relations.

7.1 The EU as a Normative Power

The EU's normative power to China is demonstrated in both its discourse and its practice. This section looks at the patterns and changes in the EU's normative discourse on China over the last two decades. Through this, the section also tests and makes critical reflections on the practicalities of applying rule-oriented constructivism (ROC) in analysing the power of language in shaping relations.

ROC argues that language constructs rules and, through repetitive rules, forms certain hierarchies of power relations. Normative discourse is not exactly a type of rule-generating discourse in the original version of ROC as ROC only highlights the rule-shaping force of assertive discourse, directive discourse and commissive discourse which generates the rule of hegemony, hierarchy, and heteronomy. However, the concept of normative power does relate to the types of power relations Onuf categorised. Normative power emphasises the power of normalising values, norms and standards. Normative power distinguishes itself from soft power, therefore, on the basis that soft power lays emphasis on the power of attraction, but normative power could be realised through purposeful actions such as value-promoting and directive discourse.

On the other hand, normative discourse is not simply equal to directive discourse when it comes to the actual discourse material used in this thesis. Unlike the directive discourse patterns Onuf listed in his theory, in the actual official discourse, directive discourse often appears in a form way closer to the form of commissive discourse.

7.1.1 Normative Discourse: Contents and Trends

After reading the selected EU's official discourse on China, it is found that most normative discourse of the EU exists in the form of commissive discourse such as when the EU “encourages China to”, “hopes that China will”, “urges China to” and “supports China to” instead of simply saying “China should” or “China must”.

For example, in the EU's 1998 Fresh Policy on China, it states that:

The focal point of that vision must be to ensure the successful and lasting integration of China as an equal partner in the world economy, coupled with an active commitment to creating a strong and open civil society based on fundamental freedoms and human rights (European Commission, 1998: 1).⁴³

In this case, the EU's discourse is commissive on the surface. However, the rule it hoped to generate was normative. As the parts in italics show, the EU requires itself to push China towards an open market, civil society, fundamental freedoms, and human rights as they are

⁴³ Italics added by thesis author to highlight normative discourse.

in the European value framework. The underlying rule of this sentence in terms of bilateral relations is normative instead of commissive. Another statement in the document states:

The aim of the EU must be to *urge China to move forward in the creation of an open society based on the rule of law while sustaining economic growth and social cohesion* (European Commission, 1998: 3).

In this case, again, the sentence pattern is commissive for the EU itself, but it is directive and normative for China. The EU clarifies its goal in terms of China's development.

The aspects of the EU's expectations of China have been discussed in the last chapter. These expectations are often delivered through normative discourse. For example, the last chapter discussed the EU's increasing attention to hard power and cooperation with China on security issues. The 2016 EU's policy paper to China states that:

China *should be encouraged to* participate consistently in international conflict resolution processes in fulfilment of its responsibilities as a permanent member of the UN Security Council (European Commission, 2016b: 11)

In this quote, "should be" and "encourage" are both normative discourses indicating the EU's expectations of China. These words and phrases showing the EU's normative language as well as normative values are consistent with the finding in Chapter 4 about the EU's top frequency verbs (see Table 4-9).

A Nvivo query has been designed to review the changes in the EU's normative discourse. The query searches for phrases including "China should" OR "China need(s) to" OR "China must" OR "encourage(s) China to" OR "hope(s) that China will" OR "hope(s) China to" OR "urge(s) China to" OR "China ought to" OR "integrate(s) China" OR "support(s) China to" OR "help(s) China to" in the selected EU official document on China were designed.

Figure 7-1 presents the coverage of the normative discourse pattern in the EU's key documents about China from 1994 to 2019. Where there are multiple key documents issued in one year, they are combined into one file so that annual coverage can be the output.

Figure 7-1 Coverage of Normative Discourse Pattern in the EU's Key Official Documents on China




Figure 7-1 shows that from 1994 to 2019 when the key documents on China were issued, the EU showed a consistent level in terms of its normative discourse on China. In 1998, the word coverage for normative discourse reached its peak. There are no apparent increases and falls in the coverage for normative discourse over the last two decades.

A reading of these normative sentences extracted from the EU's discourse on China in the corpus leads to further discoveries on the EU's expectations on China. The themes emerged from the sentences containing these normative words include the EU's expectations in integrating China into the world economy and international community, increasing market access of China, localising international standards on product quality and labour rights as well as supporting the development of civil society and human rights, with the EU's connotations of these terms, in China.

The themes of this normative discourse offer important information on the EU's specific expectations of China which are also connected to the discussions in the last chapter. Examining these expectations reveals further reasons why the EU's normative approach to China has not been well-received in China. While some of the EU's expectations including social and economic growth and cohesion do match with China's preferences, some other expectations, especially the ones which bear different connotations in the Chinese context, do not match. This leads to one important argument of this chapter: the EU's normative efforts are most effective when they match with China's priorities, and least effective when they do not match, or when there are even conflicts with China's priorities and interests.

7.1.2 Commissive Discourse: Self-binding Norms

Another case of the EU's normative discourse is shown through its commissive discourse patterns. Along with the consistent level of normative discourse on China, the EU's documents contain large numbers of commitments and requirements and self-expectations. Below are a few excerpts of commissive discourse shown in the EU's documents:

The EU's fundamental approach to China *must* remain one of engagement and partnership (Commission of the European Communities, 2006a: 2).

In this sample, the phrase “must remain” generates commissive rules. The EU is demanding of itself that it stick to an approach of engagement and partnership with China. A directive-rule towards oneself is different from that towards another. If it is towards others, then the rule of the hierarchy is that there should be a yield between the producer and the audience. However, in this case, the producer and the audience are both the EU itself. This pattern indicates that the EU is under pressure on this occasion so that it is requiring, or even forcing itself to decide on an approach to enable it to get on with China.

On another occasion, the EU states that:

To tackle the key challenges facing Europe today—including climate change, employment migration, security—we *need to* leverage the potential of a dynamic relationship with China based on our values (Commission of the European Communities, 2006a).


This is one of the key statements in the policy paper issued by the Commission of the European Communities in 2006, which sets the tone for the EU's approach to China. The underlined phrase “we need to” is again a commissive discourse. Based on the correlation of discourse, rules and rule, the rules generated by directive discourse are directive rules. This type of rule indicates an underlying chain of command or the rule of hierarchy. What is special about this type of text is that it presents a form of directive discourse of which the target of direction is the discourse producer itself. The real “commander” or “director” in this directive discourse is the EU itself. China becomes the one who takes the upper hand in the hierarchy relations in the context of this sentence.

While the EU is the director in the most directive discourse, the above two cases indicate that the normative discourse makers are not always necessarily in the dominant position in the relationship. When the directive or normative discourse is targeted at itself, it indicates that the normative discourse maker could actually be the one who is being directed when there is pressure or power coming from an external body or the other side. In this piece of text, the external pressure of climate change, migration, security as well as China's huge but not-yet-fully-performed potential to cooperate with the EU have all led to this reflexive directive discourse.

In Corpus EU PPSP, directive discourse patterns, as defined by the criteria above, appeared more than eight hundred times. Among these references, most of the directive discourse indicates the EU's commands to itself instead of commands directly to China. This shows that instead of commanding China, the EU firstly bears a high commissive feature. It holds a high standard for itself and is, primarily being demanding of itself.

A further data analysis of the normative nature of the EU leads to findings supporting this argument. Figure 7-2 shows the data results obtained by extracting, counting and grouping all the sentences containing the word “will” (as will indicates plans and commitments) in the EU's 1998 China policy paper “Building a Comprehensive Partnership with China”:

Figure 7-2 EU's Normative Discourse: Targets of Requirements in Sentence Containing “Will”



As Figure 7-2 indicates, the target of the rules mentioned by the EU in its policy papers is not always China. On the contrary, most of the “will” requirements and rules are raised for the EU. While the EU is conventionally regarded as a normative power and the Chinese side has raised concerns of the EU imposing rules and standards on China, this data suggests that despite its normative values, the EU has been quite normative toward itself, raising self-discipline and expectations.

Based on reading the EU's official discourse on China, it is found that the EU's normative discourse takes the forms of a mixture of commissive discourse and directive discourse. Manners argues that the EU's perceptions, strategies and actions are not separated (Manners, 2009b). In other words, what the EU says and thinks are part of what the EU is and what it does. The EU's commissive discourse supports the fact that the EU's aspiration and claims are translated into its efforts. This seems to fit with an explanation for the normative nature and the high commissive discourse of the EU. The EU's existence is a unique substance in international politics. Making wars materially impossible was the starting point of the EU. The values of promoting peace, human rights and freedom are what the EU established on. In this sense, the EU's normative approach is more based on its values and beliefs. As Manners puts it, “the most important factor shaping the international role of the EU is not what it does or what it says, but what it is” (Manners, 2002: 252). However, one

problem of the idealist feature of the EU is that its values are put down in documents as either commitments or requirements for the other country. The gaps between the EU's words and what the other country can accept, agree to, or implement, are big. In the EU's external relations, or specifically in China-EU relations, this normative discourse of the EU does not eliminate the gaps between what the EU wants for China and what it has achieved in terms of EU-China relations.

Another argument connected to the ineffectiveness of the EU's normative power over China is the close connections between norms and interests. Norms and interests are inseparable (Aggestam, 2009; Youngs, 2004). In fact, norms related to fair trade and the free market, for example, will be better adapted and accepted in China's interactions with each member state through their actual cooperation. It is not surprising to see the EU using its norms as leverage to bargain with China in economic and trade disputes. The problem with this approach, however, is that it is essentially a punitive method. For example, the EU tends to use sanctions, and denunciations to pressure China in the disputes on human rights and MES as observed by Smith (2014) and Waegemans (2014).

The EU faces another major problem in the implementation of normative practice: the different interests of the EU as a whole and those of individual member states (MS). The EU and MS could follow different strategies in their foreign policies (Wissenbach, 2009). The EU's internal segmental nature makes it difficult for the EU to have a consistent approach to China. The EU's political system allows the member states to pursue their own interests. Each of the member states has its own interests which means the mission to spread the norms of the Union is often outweighed by more practical considerations. The EU would have to integrate the interest clashes among the member states as well as between the member states and the Union in order to carry out an integrated approach to China if it does not want to entirely give up its normative discourse on China (Mattlin, 2010; Freeman & Geeraerts, 2011; Holslag, 2010; Waegemans, 2014; Gerrits, 2009).

Contradictions in four aspects, therefore, exist in the EU's normative approach to China, which has led to tension in China-EU relations. The first is the gap between what China wants and what the EU wants for China. The second is the EU's "punitive" way, namely using sanctions and punishments, in conducting its normative mission. The third is the inconsistency of policies between the EU, and the member states. The last is using norms as leverage to bargain for more economic benefits.

7.2 China as a Normative Power

Although normative power could be one defining feature of the EU, it does not mean other countries cannot be normative powers. China is showing features of becoming a normative power in its relations with the EU as well as the world. China may not be normative in the

way the EU is, but it does have normative capabilities manifested from its initiatives and projects.

7.2.1 China's Normative Discourse

If China can be viewed as a new normative power, what are the norms China is trying to promote? As Wang argues, after the Cold War, the US and Europe have been in the centre of the world's power, the values of the West including human rights and democracy have therefore become the mainstream international values whereas the values in favour of developing and emerging countries, including peaceful development and independence, are being pushed to a marginal position (Wang, 2015). Against this background, many hope that a non-Western country may revise the norms unfavourable for developing countries.

Some hold the view that “rising China will, for sure, become a normative power” (Guo Qiong, Wang Cheng & Yang Jinshuo, 2016). They argue that China is becoming both an adopter of the existing rules and a maker of new norms. It is making efforts to shift its identity from a rule-taker to a rule-maker. China should pay more attention to balancing between identity, power and responsibilities (Guo Qiong, Wang Cheng & Yang Jinshuo, 2016).

Norms are articulated and conveyed by discourses. Official discourse is also where an actor shows its first signs of the pursuit of normative power. The early normative discourse initiated by China is the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, namely the principles of “equality, mutual benefit and mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty”, which were promoted by China as the basic principles in international interactions (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 1995). These values, although revised later, have been the backbone of the Chinese guidelines in its foreign diplomacy.

The Chinese government's tone towards contributing to international norms began to be proactive in the last decade. In 2010, in the Communiqué of the Fifth Plenum of the 17th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the Chinese government stated its determination to stick to the “going global” strategy by engaging in and contributing to the international economic system:

It is necessary to actively participate in global economic governance and regional cooperation, to push forward the development, deepen reform and promote innovation by opening up, and to vigorously create new advantages for participating in global economic cooperation and competition (Xinhua, 2010).

Two years later, the report in the Eighteenth Party Congress by Hu Jintao provided a comprehensive description of the values China promotes as the norms of international relations. These include “equality, mutual trust, inclusiveness, mutual learning and mutually beneficial cooperation in international relations” as well as “international fairness and justice”

and these are expressed through commissive discourse phrases such as “we should” (Hu, 2012).

From the first ten years of this century, China's discourse has been increasingly confident both in terms of its domestic discourse and its foreign policy discourse. The current Xi-Li administration is known for walking away from the traditionally modest discourse style and switching to more confident tones in official documents and speeches. In President Xi Jinping's 2014 College of Europe speech, for example, he used several normative discourse patterns such as “we should not”, “we need to”, “China cannot” and “China is committed to” to indicate China's determination to create new norms:

The Chinese people *want* peace. We *do not want* war. This is the reason why China follows an independent foreign policy of peace. China *is committed to* non-interference in other countries' internal affairs. And China will not allow others to interfere in its own affairs. This is the position that we have upheld in the past. It is what we will continue to uphold in the future (Xi, 2014b: para.12, 16–18).

The second sentence of this piece of text, “China is committed to non-interference in other countries internal affairs” bears typical features of the commissive discourse pattern. Here China is making a promise about stepping away from other states' internal affairs. This commissive discourse generates a commissive rule: China has committed itself to following its non-interference foreign policy and is subject to the judgements of the international society if it disobeys its promise. The rule generated by this sentence is one of heteronomy. This means that by making this promise, China positions itself in a net of relations where countries are checked and regulated by each other. This is in line with China's proposal to build a multi-polar world in which big powers are balanced by each other.

Meanwhile, “China will not allow others to interfere in its own affairs” structures a self-directive discourse pattern. A directive rule which demands China to take harsh actions towards others if other states try to interfere in China's internal affairs is generated. This once more illustrates the mobility of ruling patterns between countries: the rule of heteronomy between several countries can contain the rule of hierarchy between two or a few states. Heteronomy can also switch into a hierarchy when a country with power is threatened by external pressure. In this case, the country will take the controlling or dominant position in this relationship.

We *need to* build a bridge of peace and stability, linking the two strong forces of China and the EU (Xi, 2014b: para.20, 21).

We *need to* build a bridge of growth and prosperity, linking the two big markets of China and Europe (Xi, 2014b: para.21, 21).

We *need to* build a bridge of reform and progress, linking the reform processes in China and the EU (Xi, 2014b: para.22, 21).

We *need to* build a bridge of common cultural prosperity linking the two major civilisations of China and Europe. (Xi, 2014b: para.23, 21)

This text demonstrates a parallel directive discourse pattern. This type of discourse often provides systematic information about the strategies, plans, or wishes of the speaker. In this sample, there are four rules generated by the four sentences, respectively, showing China's plan and wishes for relations between China and Europe. The demands for peace, prosperity, reforms, and cultural vitality form a nexus of rules through the parallel discourse structure. There is also a sequence demonstrated in this structure: the priority is to keep the stability and peace of both China and Europe from the Chinese government's perspective. The development of the economy follows stability and peace. Then comes reform and cultural development. President Xi also stated that:

Having said that, we should not forget that there is still great room for the growth of China-EU relations, and the potential is yet to be fully tapped. To move our relationship forward, China needs to know more about Europe, and Europe needs to know more about China (Xi, 2014b: para. 9, 1–3).

This text demonstrates two cases of directive rules from the ROC perspective. The underlined phrase “we should not” forms a self-directive rule. In saying this, President Xi is implying that the current cooperation between China and the EU is still insufficient. Therefore, the underlying rule, at least from the Chinese perspective, is that the interactions between China and the EU need improvement. Self-directives happen when an agent itself is under pressure or is dissatisfied with something. In this case, it would be the latter.

In another underlined phrase, China “needs to” generates another self-directive rule. However, following this self-directive rule, a demand was made to Europe that it should learn more about China. While directive rules normally generate the rule of hierarchy, this sample demonstrates the possibility that when a self-directive is followed by a directive rule towards the other agent, the rule generated between the two agents would be one of heteronomy. China has requirements for not only itself but also for Europe at the same time. This indicates the Chinese government's confidence and its notion of equality between China and Europe.

To observe and understand China properly, one needs to bear in mind both China's past and present and draw reference to both China's accomplishments and the Chinese way of thinking (Xi, 2014b: para.16, 11).

In this sample, the phrase “one needs to” is the immediate marker of a directive discourse pattern. Here the pronoun “one” referring to both China and the rest of the world. On this specific occasion, it refers, particularly to Europe. The rule generated here is that Europe should understand China from a historical perspective and consider China's cultural

traditions while judging China's political system or making decisions about China. China expects Europe to form a more comprehensive understanding of China and discard bias and stereotypes. The deeper implication here is consistent with what was said in the following paragraph: "China cannot copy the political system or development model of other countries" (Xi, 2014b). The rules emerging from this sentence are also directive with the central message that Europe should keep away from any thoughts about changing or reforming China's political system and this is the precondition for further cooperation between China and Europe. This discourse also forms a hierarchical rule between China and Europe. China, as an agent, takes the dominating role on this occasion and demands Europe to behave as China expects. Although the hierarchical relationship is difficult to perceive, an analysis of the discourse pattern and the rules generated can bring hidden links to the surface:

China's reform has entered a deep water zone, where problems crying to be resolved are all difficult ones. What we need is the courage to move the reform forward. To use a Chinese saying, we must "get ready to go into the mountain, being fully aware that there may be tigers to encounter" (Xi, 2014b: para.15).

In the second sentence of this sample, the phrase "what we need is" and "we must" are two markers signifying self-directive discourse patterns. The rules generated by the "we need" indicate that China itself should be courageously facing the difficulties in reform. The rules yielded by "we must" indicate that China will have to push forward the reform regardless of upcoming pressures and problems. Through the self-directive discourse pattern, we realise that China is under great pressures in carrying out the reforms. These pressures come from several aspects: the expectation of international society, the expectation of the Chinese people, as well as the need to maintain the legitimacy of the government. However, China's determination is meanwhile demonstrated by the self-directive rules: it will take on the challenges and go for the reforms. In this way, the government shows its pressures and its resolutions at the same time.

The rule yielded by these two self-directive rules is one of hierarchy. As mentioned previously, when this kind of rule is generated within an agent, the agent is under pressure and is, therefore, placing demands on itself.

From the above samples of self-directive, we can see that self-directives are valuable hints in discourse for critical readers to realise that the agent is under pressure and they can speculate about the possible pressures the agents are facing. This is a way for other countries or agents in other forms to understand the speaker's deep needs and requirements, thus providing hints of what to offer in developing relations with the speaker-agent.

The norms shaped by these commissive discourse statements include the pursuit of peace, the urge to deepen mutual trust and understanding between China and the EU, the

promotion of stable and sustainable development, the pursuit of economic prosperity, reform and improvement, the integration of Asia and European civilisation, and the autonomy of a country to make decisions about its developmental path.

7.2.2 China's Norms: Principles, Diffusion and External Validation

The potential of normative power China (NPC) manifests in at least two aspects. First, NPC is possible as China attaches high importance to its traditional culture, which could be an essential substance for possible norms. Second, the concept of NPE is one which originated in European history, especially relating to the Second World War. Although China was also affected in that period of history, the situation China was in was fundamentally different from that of Europe. In this sense, it would be unrealistic to frame China as a normative power in the exact frame of Manners' NPE is a concept which results from the special recipe of European political history and culture.

However, this does not mean the notion of normative power China does not hold any validity. At least two elements of being a normative power exist in China's case: the first is the culture and values which drive the behaviour of all sectors of Chinese society. The second is the recognition China has received from other states and entities, especially in the central and east Asia region through some international organisations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.

7.3 Economic and Normative Dynamics

This section explores the changing positions of China and the EU in the world economic system as the driving force behind the volatility in China-EU relations. The dynamics of normative power in China-EU relations is closely connected to the changes in economic power in China and the EU. I have taken the position in this thesis that language has a constructive power in shaping realities. As mentioned in the theory chapter, the thesis takes a synthesised approach based on constructivism and realism as well as a liberal perspective. It believes that the relations between language and facts are interactive. Language is both a constructive force of reality and an early sign of what may happen in the future.

7.3.1 Economic Power Changes

The interactions in China-EU relations are connected to multiple factors. So far, the thesis has discussed the differences between China and the EU's perceptions and identities, their priorities, their world visions, their normative goals and discourse and how these factors have affected China-EU relations. This section incorporates the economic and structural factors in explaining the dynamics of China-EU relations.

We are going to look at some figures of investment between China and the EU to demonstrate the dynamics of economic changes between China and the EU. The main indicators of the economy include figures on trade, investment, technology transfer, service transfer, as well as cooperation projects.

After 2004 when the EU expansion brought Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, and the other seven countries into the EU, the EU became the biggest trading partner of China. Up till 2019, the EU was China's biggest trading partner and source of imports for fifteen consecutive years. China has been the EU's second-biggest trading partner and biggest source of imports since 2005 (Economic and Commercial Office of the Mission of the People's Republic of China to the European Union, 2019).


In recent years, the value of the trading goods between China and the MS has gone up to 600 billion US dollars per year. The trading value between China and the EU exceeds 1 million US dollars per minute on average (Economic and Commercial Office of the Mission of the People's Republic of China to the European Union, 2019).

In 2018, the trade between China and the EU reached 682.16 billion US dollars, 10.6% higher than in 2017. China's export figure was 408.63 billion US dollars, 9.8% higher than the previous year; China's import figure was 273.53 billion US dollars, 11.7% higher than that of 2017 (Xinhua International, 2019). The EU is also the largest source of accumulated technology for China (Xinhua International, 2019).

The main exports of China to the EU are industrial goods and consumer products. These include machinery, clothes and footwear, furniture, and toys. The main exports of the EU to China are machinery and equipment, vehicles, aircraft and chemicals (European Commission, 2016a). Traditionally China's industry is more labour-intensive. It exports raw materials and imports high-tech products. Nowadays, China's industry is experiencing profound changes: labour-intensive products have been substituted by high-tech production. China is also exporting high-tech products for the rest of the world.

However, there has been a considerable trade deficit in the EU's trade with China in recent decades due to, on the one hand, the high competitiveness of Chinese products in the European market, and on the other hand, restrictions in accessing the Chinese market for the EU (European Commission, 2016a).

Figure 7-3 Trend in European Union GDP in Comparison with the Trend in China's GDP 2006-2016. (Source: Tradingeconomics.com)



As

Figure 7-3 shows, in the last decade, China's GDP surged in a much sharper manner than that of the EU, although the general trend in the EU's GDP manifests a steady growth.

Nonetheless, the main reason that a power shift is considered here is to emphasize the main change in the comparative economic power of China and the EU: over the last twenty years, there has been a distinct shortened distance between GDP in China and that in the EU; namely, China's economy is catching up with the EU rapidly although its GDP per capita isn't at the same level as that of the EU.

Figure Apx 2 (in Appendix due to size) shows the changes in GDP in nominal numbers for China and the EU from 1990 to 2018. As the figure shows, in 1990, the EU's GDP was already above 7000 billion while China's GDP was just over 360 billion. Before 2005, the EU's GDP growth rate had been generally higher than that of China. However, since 2008, China's GDP growth has been higher than that of the EU.

The drastic improvement in China's economic standing in the world evidences the powerful change between China and the EU. If the current development pattern keeps going, it is possible that China's GDP in nominal numbers will surpass that of the EU in the coming years.

The power dynamics between China and the EU are multi-faceted. First, one cannot simply conclude that China is surpassing the EU in the economy as, until 2018, the EU is still the largest economy in the world based on Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). However, China, up to 2018, had become the third biggest economy in the world in terms of GDP in nominal numbers. Therefore, it is hard to conclude that either of them has more robust economic power than the other.

Second, power should include multiple aspects of an entity's development, such as the economy, social development, the environment, culture, sustainability etc. The economy is just one aspect, although a critical one, for judging power.

Lastly, the power shifts between China and the EU are an on-going dynamic process and indicate by no means movement in a single direction. Both China and the EU have experienced constant developments and changes. Meanwhile, the position of the EU in the world system also bears complications and uncertainties. There is a big gap in economic status among the EU member states. The earlier founding member states of the EU, such as Germany, France, and Italy, have a higher share of GDP in the EU.

7.3.2 Normative Discourse Changes for China and the EU

Overall, the corpus applied in this thesis shows that the EU has been normative across time while Chinese discourse does not include drastic changes in the case of normative discourse. The discourse data indicate that there is an increase in the normative discourse of China on the EU over the period studied by this research. The EU has demonstrated a consistent normative discourse on China.

Why is this so? There could be several reasons. First, the research did not focus on Chinese domestic discourse. If we look at China's domestic discourse, we will find that it is becoming increasingly directive and commissive as well as assertive. However, as this thesis does not focus primarily on the domestic discourse of China, this part of the findings has to be left for further research. Based on comparing China's discourse to the EU and the EU's discourse on China, there is not a distinctive change in the Chinese discourse patterns on the EU. The most obvious changes are that the number of China's high official speeches on the EU and on Europe have significantly increased in the last five years. There is also a more systematic organisation of such official discourse as shown on the website of the Chinese delegation to the EU.

Second, the Chinese language is a high context language and is also vague and implicit.

Third, normative discourse is hard to define in the Chinese language. Also, the amount of Chinese discourse on the EU is still limited in terms of demonstrating a large change in this sense.

7.4 Findings and Implications

The chapter observes two mismatches, or source of clashes, in the normative dynamics between China and the EU. The first is the mismatched normative goals of the Chinese government and the EU's normative discourse and actions towards the other. While the EU aims to engage China in the international market based on the existing rules and promoting the EU's values, China's goal is to develop the country's economy and establish rules favourable for developing countries. The second is the economic power transition between China and the EU, and the normative shifts that go hand in hand with the power shifts.

The more specific findings in this chapter include:

First, the EU's normative discourse stays strong across the years. Apart from the directive discourse, it also has a large amount of commissive discourse, indicating a high level of self-normative, or reflexive normative features. This is related to the organisation, identity as well as the development phase of the EU.

Second, China has an increasing amount of normative discourse, mostly in the form of assertive discourse and commissive discourse but less directive discourse unless in matters relating to high principles in China such as sovereignty issues, or security issues. The combination of assertive discourse and commissive discourse indicates a new form of non-imposing norms which focuses more on respect for diverse political values.

Third, China has values and norms, including non-interference, peaceful development, coexistence, despite the differences in political systems, resilience, and tolerance for risks and uncertainties as indicated in its international projects including the Belt and Road Initiative and Asian Investment Bank.

Finally, there has been a parallel development between the increase in China's normative discourse and China's economic power. In the meantime, the EU's normative discourse stays strong as well as its economic power, although relatively speaking, its economic position in the world system has been diverging from the centre. This dynamic in their economic power shift has formed on the end of a double movement between China and the EU, with the other end being China's increasingly stronger normative discourse. This double movement provides the driving force leading to the enhancement of China's normative power.

The findings in this chapter imply that China has the potential to become a normative power in China-EU relations as China has been developing its own normative principles in the world as well as their diffusion. The economic power shift between China and the EU also contributes to an increase in Chinese normative power through the movement between Chinese economic and norm development. However, this needs to be supplemented by the Chinese norms being accepted by the EU, which will be the last essential criteria for China to be normative in the bilateral relationship. So far, the EU has not taken China as being normative yet, but the trend towards China developing normative power is irreversible.

The argument about the potential of China to become a normative power is in line a group of researchers' opinion on recognising China as a potential normative power (Kavalski, 2013, 2014, 2017; Guo Qiong, Wang Cheng & Yang Jinshuo, 2016; Peng & Tok, 2016; Zhang, 2011; Wang, 2015). More specifically, the normative discourse of China and the increasing economic power shift between China and the EU enhance Clark's arguments that material power and normative power can be mutually constitutive and the economic power of China will facilitate its normative development.

However, a few novelties make this chapter's findings helpful to the existing discussions on China as a normative power:

First, research recognising China's normative power and evidencing it with cases applies to central Asia (Guo Qiong, Wang Cheng & Yang Jinshuo, 2016) or Southeast Asia (Han, 2017) instead of the context of China-EU relations. This chapter situates China's normative power in the context of China-EU relations. This effort breaks with the current view that China's normative power only exist in Central Asia and Southeast Asia. Instead, the chapter departs from the manifestations of normative discourse and argues that China has got the driving force ready to become a normative power so its normative feature is not bound to regional boundaries and will be increasing in China-EU relations as well.

Second, this is the first research focusing on China's normative discourse. Existing literature on Chinese languages has applied the framework of soft power in terms of the discourse studied. This fills the gap identified that normative power China has not been evaluated from the perspective of China's normative discourse development.

Third, the chapter pushed forward theoretical framework development on China as a normative power by discussing the interactions with China and the EU's positions in the international order. So far, research comparing Normative China and Normative Europe has not considered the role of discourse and its interactions with the economic power transitions between the two (Kavalski, 2017).

While Clark does consider the role of economic power, his focus was more on assessing whether and how China could meet the prerequisites of being a normative power and the theoretical elements behind this system of criteria (Clark, 2014). Clark has discussed the conceptual framework taking power, legitimacy and responsibility into consideration when assessing China's normative power potential. He focuses on the missing link in China's normative formation, which is a more defined "responsibility" to be accepted by international society (Clark, 2014).

In other words, while Clark (2014) focuses on the theoretical elements of normative power and China's recognition of it, this thesis has focused on the driving forces of normative China. This chapter points out that, based on the double movement theory, the interactions between China's rising economic power will inevitably bring about social-cultural developments which entail normative power. The normative discourse evidences the movement from the language and culture towards the values, principles, and approach of China.

7.5 Conclusion

This chapter applies a ROC perspective to content analysis to explore what the official discourse between China and the EU offers to review the normative power dynamics in China-EU relations.

It argues that there is a normative power shift between China and the EU, as China expands its normative efforts. This is evidenced by both China's increasing normative efforts and the shifting normative discourse pattern between China and the EU in the past twenty years. The chapter reviewed both China and the EU's normative discourse on the other as evidenced from the corpora. It also reviewed the economic power shifts between China and the EU overall in the last two decades, revealing the hand-in-hand development of normative power shifts and economic power shifts in the bilateral relationship. These discussions are in line with the theoretical framework of this thesis, which regards that normative power and discourse power are mutually constitutive.

Methodologically, in the textual analysis of political discourse, this chapter pointed out the increase in normative discourse in Chinese official discourse over the years. It also finds that among the large amount of normative discourse from the EU, a large quantity is commissive discourse, featuring the self-regulating nature of the EU.

The chapter also finds that normative roles or hierarchy of the relationship should not be decided upon merely by the number of examples of normative discourse pattern, as normative discourse could involve demands and requirements to the self instead of the other, especially in the case of the EU's discourse. It is the amount of directive discourse targeted by each at the other which counts and indicates potential normative power towards the other. This, of course, should ideally be tested in terms of whether the discourse has been accepted by the other, as the core of being normative should be about acceptance. Although the chapter does not have the scope to explore the discourse at this level, further research could be carried out in this direction.

Chapter 8 The Dynamic Multidimensional Mismatches: Conceptualisation, Application and Assessment

Each previous chapter has been focusing on one aspect of the mismatches between China and the EU. This chapter brings these aspects together and presents the framework of the multidimensional dynamic mismatches. However, it is not only the individual mismatches but the interrelations and interactions of these aspects which feed the challenges in China-EU relations. The chapter provides, tests, and assesses the framework for the sake of offering a possible tool to analyse bilateral relations based on corpus analysis.

The chapter aims to consolidate the model of multi-levelled mismatches in China-EU relations derived from the findings and arguments of previous chapters, applying this model to the cases of challenges in China-EU relations and assessing the model. A few case analyses include the recognition of China's MES, as well as Europe's ambivalent attitude to China's projects and initiatives including BRI, 17+1 and AIIB.

The findings and arguments of the previous chapters contribute to the conceptualisation in this chapter. The mismatch between China and the EU exist on multiple levels, including priorities, identity, and perception of the self and the other, the expectations of the other, the future world, and their strategies and approaches. While mismatches at one level can already lead to problems, the coexistence of mismatches at different levels and their variations and evolution over time lead to the volatility of contemporary China-EU relations. The model of multi-levelled mismatches in China-EU relations offers a tool to understand the dynamics of active factors behind the challenges in China-EU relations, helps to categorise the problems in China-EU relations according to their potential cause, and helps to understand the persistent and changing nature of some of the cases.

The chapter contains five sections:

Section 8.1 presents the analytical framework developed through the chapters, which links the elements discussed in the previous chapters together.


Section 8.2 applies the analytical framework to a few cases in China-EU relations to explore the potential of the explanatory power of the framework. The cases are grouped into three categories, namely trade issues, including trade deficit, anti-dumping cases and trade protectionism, persisting issues, including the recognition of China's MES and the EU's arms embargo to China, and cross-continent projects, namely the EU and its member states' misunderstandings and questions about China's projects such as the Belt and Road Initiative and the 17+1 project.

Section 8.3 assesses the applicability of the Dynamic Multidimensional Mismatches framework to different types of cases.

8.1 The Framework of the Dynamic Multidimensional Mismatches in China-EU Relations

The mismatches between China and the EU exist in multiple aspects including priorities and preferences, identities and perceptions, visions of the future world as well as strategies and approaches to each other. These aspects belong to different dimensions in the relationship. Identities and perceptions and the values they represent are the internal drives of China and the EU behind their choices of policies, goals, and approaches. Priorities and preferences are manifestations of the internal drives of the entities. Visions for the future world are the goals of China and the EU in their bilateral relations, but these understandings and views of the future world are also part of their internal drives in their domestic development and external relations. Strategies and approaches are how China and the EU manifest their internal values, reach their goals in the relationship, and fulfil their visions for the world. Figure 8-1 Dynamic Multi-levelled Mismatches in China-EU Relations presents these multidimensional mismatches and the dimensions they sit in:

Figure 8-1 Dynamic Multi-levelled Mismatches in China-EU Relations
(Source: own work)



Under this framework, the assumption is that, ideally, if mismatches do not exist on any level, the relationship between two entities should go smoothly with minimum difficulties in a bilateral context. If mismatches exist in one of the four aspects, the problems will manifest in a relatively contained scope. If mismatches exist in more than one aspect when it comes to some of the challenges, the complexity and fierceness will increase as there will be interactions among the mismatches across the dimensions. Although each case has different

mismatches involved, the consistent, core mismatches across all cases should be related to at least one level presented in this model.

Methodologically, each of these aspects is discussed through analysing features and contents of the selected official discourse between China and the EU. Priorities and preferences are manifested through word frequencies and connotations. Identities and perceptions, as well as visions for the future world order, are emergent themes from the discourse and are analysed upon content analysis.

Apart from its multidimensional and comprehensive scope, and the anchoring points between themes in international relations and discourse features, the dynamics of the framework is another contribution to the current methodologies in explaining the challenges in China-EU studies.

Several dynamics are going on within this framework: first, the proportions of these four aspects will be different in different cases. Second, within each aspect, the mismatches change all the time as the priorities, identities, visions, and strategies change. Lastly, there are interactions among these four aspects, and these interactions are factors behind the challenges as well and manifest their influence in the relationship across time.

8.2 Application of the Framework

This section will apply the framework of multidimensional mismatches developed in this chapter to examine some cases in China-EU relations. As the challenges in China-EU relations exist in multiple aspects and areas and it is not realistic to cover the full range of the issues between China and the EU, a few cases, especially concerning trade and economic cooperation, are selected and grouped to represent challenges of different types.

Overall, the cases used to illustrate challenges are selected and categorised based on rationale so that they echo the challenges defined in the introduction chapter, and they are more relatable to the findings and arguments of the previous chapters. The introduction of this thesis categorises the challenges in China-EU relations into trade disputes, patterns of volatility, and other challenges involving multiple social, political, economic, or cultural aspects. As the challenges in China-EU relations cover a wide range, only a few are selected due to the limited length of this thesis. The cases are selected as they represent three kinds of clashes in China-EU relations: economic disputes, the long-standing issues which contain a high level of stickiness, as well as social-political clashes.

The first group involves the trade issues between China and the EU, including the trade imbalance, the anti-dumping disputes on solar panels and protectionism in the trade environment. The trade issues are essential as this is where China-EU relations started, and trade remains one of central ground of the bilateral relations. China is the number one import source country for the EU and the second-largest export market. The average trade volume

between China and the EU stands at over €1 billion per day (European Commission, 2020). Plus, trade issues showcase that even if priorities match, mismatches in emphases and connotations of trade and other aspects in the four dimensions mentioned in the thesis impact the trade relations.

The second group includes persisting issues, more specifically, the EU's recognition of China's MES and the EU's arms embargo on China. These two issues have both existed for a long time in China-EU relations but are still not resolved, and both cases share similarities in the sense that ups and downs have happened over the years. There is a certain stickiness in both issues. This group is included as the framework suggested in the thesis contains dimensions of longitudinal perspectives to address the volatility and stickiness of the issues across time.

The third group includes challenges regarding the international projects involving China and the EU, including the EU's questions about the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and 17+1 cooperation. These issues are discussed as a group as they involve structural, cross-continent factors. Plus, these challenges share a commonness which is that they have been received with different levels of trust in and outside China. It is, therefore, worthwhile to examine the factors behind the lack of trust with the assistance of the analytical framework.


8.2.1 Trade Issues- Deficit, Anti-dumping Disputes and Protectionism

This section addresses the trade issues in China-EU relations, especially the anti-dumping cases and issues regarding the trading environment between China and the EU such as the trade imbalances, market access as well as protectionism.

8.2.1.1 Trade Deficit

The trade deficit for the EU has been a long-term situation in China-EU relations and has always been one of the EU's primary concerns in trade with China. As Figure 8-2 shows, The EU has had a trade deficit with China for ten years in a row from 2009 to 2019. From 2009 to 2019, the EU's trade deficit was \$178.84 billion (Eurostat, 2019b). For China, although trade surplus is beneficial immediately, in the long-term, it brings risks of inflation and therefore is not healthy for the Chinese domestic economy. Figure 8-2 shows that the deficit decreased between 2011 and 2014 but then increased again after 2015.


Figure 8-2 EU Trade in Goods with China, 2009-2019 (Eurostat, 2019b)



Source: Eurostat (online data code: ext_st_eu27_2019sitc and DS-018995)

eurostat

Figure 8-3 EU-27 Trade with China by Types, 2009-2019 (Eurostat, 2019a)



Source: Eurostat (online data code: ext_st_eu27_2019sitc and DS-018995)

As Figure 8-3 shows, although overall the EU has had a deficit with China from 2009 to 2019, it has a trade surplus in chemicals, food and drink, raw materials, energy and other products. However, the EU's trade deficit in machinery and vehicles and other manufactured goods takes over and leads to an overall trade deficit (Eurostat, 2019a).

The exported machinery and vehicles from the EU take 55% of the EU's core export, and the imported machinery and vehicles take 54% of the core imports. The EU exports more chemicals to China and imports more other manufactured products from China.

Both China and the EU exported and imported high-value products. Although the EU still imports consumer goods, such as footwear and clothing from China which are relatively labour-intensive products, and sells motor vehicles, aircraft and chemicals to China, which are technology-intensive products, the ratio and types of high-value, non-labour-intensive products from China to the EU are increasing (European Commission, 2020). Research has also shown that in recent years, the price gap between made in China textile and clothing and made in Europe equivalents are shrinking since the Chinese industries and enterprises have gone through changes over the years, and the prices of labour have risen (Vandenbussche *et al.*, 2011).

The EU's main imports from China are industrial and consumer goods, machinery and equipment, footwear, and clothing. The EU's main exports to China include machinery and equipment, motor vehicles, aircraft, and chemicals (European Commission, 2020).

According to data of the Economic and Commercial Offices of the Mission of PRC to the EU, in 2017, China became the EU's third-largest source of import and export markets for service trade (Economic and Commercial Office of the Mission of the People's Republic of China to the European Union, 2019). Trade in the service sector makes up more than 10% of the total trade in goods between China and the EU, and the EU's export of services makes up 19% of the EU's total exports of goods (European Commission, 2020)

According to data from Eurostat, in 2017, the EU's export of services to China amounted to 46.7 billion euros, accounting for only 5% of the total, far below the EU's 26% of exports to the United States and the European Free Trade Association (Switzerland, Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein) which accounted for 16% of exports. Similarly, the EU's imports of China's service trade to China totalled 30.6 billion euros, making up only 4% of the total, far below the US's 31% and the European Free Trade Association's 12%. (Economic and Commercial Office of the Mission of the People's Republic of China to the European Union, 2019).]

Economic Power Shifts

The trade deficit can be explained by the economic power shifts, as argued in Chapter 7. China has been moving from being a semi-peripheral state to becoming a core state, in the

context of the world system theory. This can be evidenced by the fact that the EU has been importing a large volume of manufactured and high-tech electronics instead of only raw materials from China.

Figure 8-4 Type of Goods in EU-China Trade (Source: Eurostat, 2019a)




Figure 8-4 shows the top types of goods that the EU imported and exported in trade with China in 2019. It shows that manufactured goods have a higher share than primary goods in terms of both the EU's exports and imports. Machinery and vehicles stand at the centre of the manufactured goods in terms of both exports and imports (Eurostat, 2019a).

Identities and Perceptions

Another perspective form which to understand the trade imbalances is in terms of perceptions and expectations. As the Chinese report states, "China is the biggest developing country and emerging economy while the EU is the biggest developed countries' group. Both China and the EU are poles on the international arena" (Economic and Commercial Office of the Mission of the People's Republic of China to the European Union, 2019: Preface). This description of China and the EU being two of the poles in the world as well as the reference to the EU as the biggest group of countries (Guojia Jituan) echoes the findings in Chapter 5 that the EU is quite often viewed as an equal to a unique type of a country, or significant power, in the Chinese discourse which does not concern the same level of the complexity about the EU's nature and identity as that which the EU recognises in itself. Plus, the Chinese discourse often sees the EU as moving towards being a pole of the future world of multipolarity while the EU has doubts about the popularity of the concept of "poles" in the post-modern world.

This differences in perceptions of each other set a potential clash between China and the EU in their economic interactions as the EU emphasises its identity as a rule-based supranational organisation while China does not dive as deep as the EU into the

complications of the internal discrepancies in the EU. This leads to an awkward situation; since China views the EU as, in a way, equivalent to a “big country”, the underlying expectation is that the EU will act in an integrated manner. This is a double-edged sword for the EU. On the one hand, it demonstrates China's confidence and trust in the integrity of the EU, which simplifies the bilateral relations so that projects and cooperation can be carried out more efficiently. On the other hand, however, this could underestimate the complications within the EU, especially regarding the discrepancies of MS. Since MS may have different positions and opinions when it comes to their relations with China, the actual policies towards China from the EU will take that into full account. This leads to a situation whereby, while China would like to talk directly to the EU for the sake of simplicity and directness, the actual situation is that China has to talk to individual MS for cooperation projects as the integration of the EU's policies takes much longer than China can afford, especially when projects require immediate attention.

8.2.1.2 Anti-dumping Disputes: Mismatched Norms and Identities

Disputes in the photovoltaic (PV) industry are some of the most significant trade disputes in the contemporary trade history of China the EU. The disputes were significantly resolved through negotiations and deal-making in 2013, which provide an example for similar issues to be resolved in the future. In June 2013, the European Commission (EC) imposed anti-dumping duties and anti-subsidies on solar panels imported from China, claiming that Chinese solar panels were exported with a price lower than their production cost. It enforced 11.8% duty on the imports of Chinese PV products and intended to raise it to 47.6% until the solution of a 'floor price' was introduced which refers to a minimum price for Chinese PV products in European markets; this was proposed and passed (Schroeder, 2013; Morris, 2013). On 2nd August 2013, after hard negotiations, the two sides reached an agreement that a 'floor price' should be applied to Chinese solar panel products, which caps module imports to 7 GW per year at a minimum price of €0.56/watt (Voituriez & Wang, 2015). The deal was regarded as officially resolved by negotiations led by officials and commerce leaders on both sides (Steinhauser & Patnaude, 2013).

A few mismatches discussed in the previous chapters are related to this case. Regarding priorities and preferences, China's preference is to guarantee China's economic prosperity and trade success. Although the EU has the same priority, the two sides would, of course, put domestic or internal benefits first. Apart from that, China emphasises fair treatment more. As previously, China's anti-dumping cases had been calculated with a third country being the substitution country, but this is unfavourable to China and unfair from China's perspective. The EU emphasises protecting employment and protecting EU industries.

Regarding the means of resolution, the two focused on the commonness: both sides would like the trade in the PV industry to continue as the EU needs the materials which China can

provide. A floor price is imposed in this case to enhance the fair trade competition. This sets an example for the resolution of disputes in China-EU trade disputes.

However, a further problem one should remember is that China has prioritised restructuring China's economy. Due to the world economic crises, there has been a global over-productivity of steel capacity. In 2016, the Chinese government proposed to proactively reduce this over capacity with the goal of reducing raw steel productivity by 100 million to 150 million tons. Up to 2018, within just three years, China also met this goal. However, to meet this goal, China had to pay a large price: 500 thousand people had to lose their jobs. They had to be re-employed in other industries (Economic and Commercial Office of the Mission of the People's Republic of China to the European Union, 2019).

8.2.1.3 Market Accessibility: Power Shift Dynamics and Mismatched Expectations

The Chinese market holds massive attraction for EU enterprises. China has a population of nearly 1.4 billion and is the second-largest economy, importer and consumer in the world (Economic and Commercial Office of the Mission of the People's Republic of China to the European Union, 2019).

One of the trade challenges is that EU MS have been raising questions about the accessibility of the Chinese market. This, on the one hand, is driven by the fact that Chinese markets have a massive attraction for the EU. In this sense, China is in a favourable position or has the upper hand in the relationship as the EU is more dependent on the Chinese market rather than vice versa. However, that is not to say that China does not need the EU market. As mentioned before, China and the EU are each other's main trading partners. The economic power shifts and the political impact shifts which come with them mean that China is becoming a rising norm-maker and a potential normative power. This is a clash with the EU's expectations as traditionally, the EU had the upper hand in terms of both normative discourse and normative practices in China-EU relations.

On the other hand, this indicates that substantial discrepancies of expectations exist, as found in Chapter 5, between China and the EU. The EU has been expecting political impacts on China beyond China's 'red-lines', namely issues related to China's core interests including its sovereignty and political security, since the start of its interactions with China. Its first earlier policy paper on Asia (Commission of the European Communities, 1994) already pointed out the EU's normative ambitions in interacting with China. This has overall been consistent with the EU's policy against China but has also changed in recent years with the EU gradually realising and accepting that this part of the EU's values will be hard to translate into China. The intention, however, is still there whether it is for political purposes, out of the core EU values and norms, or as a leverage for economic benefits. One thing is clear: the EU has also turned towards a more result-focused approach as an adjustment.

The third argument about the challenges around Chinese market accessibility is about the differences between Chinese social, political, and legal systems and those of the EU. Behind these differences also exist the discrepancies between the EU's interpretation of China in terms of 'state capitalism' and China's interpretation of the Chinese market as being socialist with Chinese characteristics.

China's first FDI (foreign direct investment) regulation was put forward in 1979. Since then, European enterprises have been exploring and testing the waters of the Chinese market. In recent years, foreign enterprises' eagerness to enter and thrive in Chinese markets has rapidly risen. In 2018, the UK's investment in China had risen 150%, achieving a rise in an almost explosive manner. In the meantime, Germany's investment in China has also increased by 79.3%. The total in terms of enterprises of EU MS's foreign investment in China has increased by 22.6% compared to the previous year, which is far higher than the average foreign investment China receives from other countries. This indicates that the EU is confident about the Chinese market and has a strong willingness to expand their Chinese market (Economic and Commercial Office of the Mission of the People's Republic of China to the European Union, 2019).

From the Chinese side, carefully monitoring the EU's access to Chinese market has several reasons. First, China has been a victim of colonisation in the past, especially from major powers including the UK, Germany and France which are still leading powers in the EU despite the fact the UK is leaving the EU now. Second, the Chinese market is applying a dual system where both free market and governmental monitoring are going on. While the free market requires competition, regulations and laws about the markets are made through national administrations which will consider the political, security and economic risk of making China's market more accessible to other countries. The EU may phrase it as protectionism, but it is a precaution all governments must take to protect local interests in the age of globalisation.

8.2.2 Persisting Issues: Recognition of China's Market Economy Status (MES)

MES is important for China mainly because it affects the method of calculation for investigations and judgements on anti-dumping cases. The EU has been applying the method of the alternative country when it comes to calculating dumping. Because China does not have MES, the trading figures of Germany, Brazil, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Mexico had to be used, according to the WTO practices, as references instead of the actual price from China, to judge whether the country had been violating WTO anti-dumping rules. Due to the extent of the randomness of the selection of an alternative country, the calculation has led to a high level of dumping from China (S. Cheng, 2016).

Part of the dispute on granting China MES is about the legal procedures. The law regulating this case is the addendum of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The WTO did not distinguish between a non-market economy and market economies before 1955, when the second paragraph of the addendum to article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), referred to hereafter as the addendum, was put into effect (Puccio, European Parliament & Directorate-General for Parliamentary Research Services, 2015). Section 15 (a) and (d) of the addendum are particularly relevant to the case of China. Section 15 (a) regulates that the importing country can use alternative methods to calculate the value of the goods instead of Chinese domestic prices unless Chinese enterprises prove that they are doing business in the market economy context. Section 15 (d) specifies the conditions under which MES has to be granted to China regardless of Section 15 (a):

15(d) Once China has established, under the national law of the importing WTO Member, that it is a market economy, the provisions of subparagraph (a) shall be terminated provided that the importing Member's national law contains market economy criteria as of the date of accession. In any event, the provisions of subparagraph (a)(ii) **shall expire 15 years after the date of accession**. In addition, should China establish, pursuant to the national law of the importing WTO Member, that market economy conditions prevail in a particular industry or sector, the non-market economy provisions of subparagraph (a) shall no longer apply to that industry or sector (World Trade Organisation, 2001a: 9).

However, in practice, the judgement of whether a country has MES is not the responsibility of the WTO but regulated by the participating countries' internal laws. Under the EU's legal framework, five standards are used to make decisions on whether an entity is a market economy. These include: first, the government cannot intervene in aid allocation or enterprise decisions in the economy; second, the government cannot intervene in corporations in privatisation and cannot use non-marketplace forms in exchange for compensation; third, the country should use modern-day accounting finance standards; fourth, the country should comply with bankruptcy legal guidelines, highbrow belongings legal guidelines and property rights legal guidelines, protect all legal assets rights including intellectual property rights; fifth, the country needs to have a true financial device unbiased of the government (Cheng, 2016).

Since the EU did not think China as met all the conditions, it refused to grant MES to China. These are the basic background details of the case. As Section 5.1.2.2 in Chapter 5 already touched upon the case of MES from the perspective of identity and perceptions, the following sections discuss the case mainly from the perspective of priorities and normative power shifts.

8.2.2.1 Priorities and Preferences

In the case of recognising China's MES, China focuses primarily on China's economic rights but also on its national dignity, especially in terms of being perceived as an impactful power in the world, or an equal to key powers in the West, as argued in Chapter 5. The EU, on the other hand, focuses primarily on the EU's economy, and the adherence to relevant rules and norms. The EU, being a supranational organisation, stands close to existing norms of existing international institutions such as the WTO, in this case.

However, obviously, in this case, both China and the EU attach great importance to WTO rules, but the two have different interpretations of the rules. This, apart from being understood from the EU-US-China triangle relations perspective, can be understood from the perspective of the changing normative dynamics between China and the EU. Before China joined the WTO, the EU had more discourse power over China in the international arena. However, with China's economic power increasing in the 1990s and the early 2000s, the EU started to realise that China might become a more impactful discourse maker in China-EU relations. Therefore, the EU was reluctant to interpret the rules in favour of China; instead, in interpreting the rules, it altered and revised the rules through giving amendments, so that the EU's discourse power, as well as the economic power, could be maintained.

8.2.2.2 Economic and Normative Power Shifts

Another useful part of applying the DMM framework in interpreting the case of MES is that it explains why this case persists over time. While a realist approach would interpret this as a clash in economic interests, the framework in this thesis sees that the changing normative power between China and the EU has complicated the situation. When China was significantly weaker in its discourse power, the EU helped China to enter the WTO, which, in the first place, guaranteed that China could enjoy the benefits promised by WTO rules. However, when China's normative power enhanced, it defended itself due to its increased understanding of the rule-based norms of the WTO, the EU started to avoid giving China MES. Since the EU was granted a role in judging whether China have met the conditions, plus the EU has advantages in interpreting and implementing the rules, it made the choice in favour of its own benefits. However, the case went on to a third stage where it remains to this day, that due to China's continuously increasing normative power in the world, the media pressure fell on the EU, claiming that the EU had avoiding recognising China's MES. Plus, due to China's enhanced economic power overall and its reduced trust for the EU's adherence to its promises, China's interests in getting MES started to decrease. Therefore, the EU has lost its advantage in using this as a leverage in China-EU relations. This case, in such a way, has become a persistent, long-standing case without a clear, definite result so far but it has, in fact, lost most of its political impact in China-EU relations.

8.2.3 Persisting Issues: Arms Embargo

The EU's arms embargo on China started after the 1989 political incident in China when the EU started its ban on selling weapons and relevant technologies to China. This issue shares some similar features with MES in terms of the long time span it covers. Plus, both issues have been persistent: both went through several twists and turns and remain unresolved until today. Moreover, both issues have been pushed to a relatively less core status in the bilateral relationship now as economic corporation and trade, political and cultural communications as well as other mutually beneficial projects are in place. The fact that the cases remains makes it worthwhile to look at it through the analytical framework developed through this thesis to see whether the longitudinal and constructivist perspective can shed light on the stickiness of the case.

For the arms embargo issue, the US is again an important factor as analysed by existing research (Liu, 2005; Zhai, 2020). Others have noticed that there are discrepancies among the member states of the EU (Exartier, 2010). Under the framework of this thesis, a few perspectives can be given. First, as Chapter 4 argues, national safety and sovereignty are in a very high position in terms of China's priorities. This explains why China was trying to argue for lifting the arms embargo in the first place. However, for the EU, it attaches more importance to international norms and its identity and values in promoting Western-style democracy and freedom which emphasise that the individuals' opinions should be respected regardless of whether they are in line with the official or governmental opinions. China attaches more importance to collective security and safety and stresses the benefits of an entity. This is the clash, or mismatch of values behind the issue of the arms embargo, which today perhaps has more of a symbolic meaning instead of any significant impact on China-EU relations as the two have been trading in almost all the main sectors anyways, and China has been able to develop its own national defence without purchasing arms from the EU or the US.

In terms of the dynamics, or changes in this case over the years, they experience several stages, including initial tension, then attempts at resolution and shelving policies nowadays. Looking from the longitudinal perspective especially as argued in Chapter 7, since the beginning, the EU wanted China to convert to Western values as stated in its earlier policy papers and the arms embargo, as a sanction to China, was implemented harshly. However, over time, the EU has realised that China is not interested in changing its values to bring it into line with traditional Western values, and the case reached deadlock with the EU in a dilemma. On the one hand, selling weapons to China is beneficial to the EU's economy and tightens relations between MS and China. On the other hand, it could be viewed as an offence to the US, and the EU would have a hard time arguing for itself in terms of sticking to the traditional core values of the EU. The next stage, which is where China and the EU are today, involved the case cooling off and being marginalised. Resolving it has been pushed to

the side although China still mentions and emphasises in its policy papers that the EU should lift its arms embargo on China.

In recent years, the EU has shifted to a more pragmatic approach to China, focusing more on results and practical cooperation rather than primarily output of Western ideologies. As argued, this is also due to China's approach to being 'Wushi', which focuses on the efficiencies of corporations and results in problem-solving with a down-to-earth working style. This shift in strategies or mindset in the EU is, of course, different from where the EU started in its relations with China in the 1970s, but this shift has shown more effectiveness in China-EU relations regarding the arms embargo issue: at least the case today is not standing in the way of social-economic cooperation between China and the EU despite the unresolved issues. To sum up, the mismatches in priorities as argued in Chapter 4 and the changes in the EU's approaches to China help in understanding the involvement of the arms embargo case with both a comparative view and a time-sensitive perspective.

For both these cases, the limitation of the framework in this thesis, however, is that it does not effectively involve the influence of third parties, which in both cases are primarily the impacts from the US. However, on a bright side, this does offer a chance to focus on the autonomy between China and the EU and its dynamics over the years which are often under-valued, if not neglected, in China-EU studies.

8.2.4 Cross-continent Projects

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) started in 2013 after Chinese President Xi Jinping's visit to Central and Southeast Asia, and aims to improve the connectivity of Asia, Europe and Northeastern Africa through building transportation infrastructure, namely a 'Silk Road Economic Belt' and '21st Century Maritime Silk Road' (Zhao, 2016).

Although OBOR is not primarily a project between China and the EU, it does cover a large area of Europe and Italy and Romania and Bulgaria have also signed the agreement. The 16+1, nowadays 17+1 project is considered to be part of the initiative as well.

In China, the initiative is a very important and grand project which has a lot of positive outlooks. For the world outside China, there have been challenges. Existing controversies about OBOR from Europe can be summarised in two aspects: the first is the overall concern that the project carries China's geopolitical ambition. For the 17+1 cooperation, for example, some EU officials have expressed concerns about whether this will divide Europe (Deutsche Welle, 2019). The second type involves specific concerns about the transfer of technology, market competition as well as the adaptation of local legal frameworks, including standards of production and environmental protection. As reported by Deutsche Welle, for example, Germany has concerns that China will learn the technologies and 'take' the infrastructures and strategic sectors of European countries (Deutsche Welle, 2019).

8.2.4.1 Priorities and Preferences

Europe's areas of concern correspond with the findings in Chapter 4 in the way that Politics and Diplomacy and Laws and Regulations, rank higher in the top hot topics' coverage list of Corpus EU PPSP than in that of Corpus China PPSP. The major concerns and doubts from Europe about OBOR are the areas which matter most for the EU apart from the top two coverage topics, namely Economy and Trade, as well as Communication and Dialogues.

About the first concern on the geopolitical impacts of the projects, there are two groups of arguments. Some argue that OBOR will have impacts extending beyond the economic realm including altering the relations between major powers including China, Europe, Russia and the United States as well as resulting in alternative regional cooperation models in the related areas (Zhao, 2016). Others, however, argue that in the context of OBOR, the impact of the initiative for China and the EU will remain focused on the economy; in particular, international trade in Europe has not "shown any interest to get involved in the global power struggles between Beijing and Washington" (Yu, 2018: 231). Yu Jie, for example, has noticed that there are a few some misunderstandings and mixed opinions outside China about OBOR (Yu, 2017). She mentions that some regard that OBOR is not only a way to expand China's international impact, but also a way to convert China's overcapacity of production as well as support for Chinese enterprises to 'go out'. She mentions that in the implementation of OBOR, it is inevitable and natural that the Chinese government will support Chinese enterprises financially and politically in terms of international competition (Yu, 2017).

The argument in this section goes closer to the second group of opinions. Within the priorities suggested by the findings in Chapter 4, Economy and Trade is China's top concern. The initiative is made in this context as well. OBOR is a comprehensive project, but it is primarily an economic project. It is natural that economic cooperation will spill over to other aspects of social-political parts of the partner countries. However, this does not mean that the social-political impacts will be unhelpful for the participators, nor does it mean China's primary intention is to exert political impacts.

A few arguments can be made to support the claim that BRI is primarily economic. First, it started from the context that countries, including EU MS, as well as other countries in the world, have urgent requirements for infrastructure building.

Second, the economic cooperation of the initiative does not require the participators to change or revise their social-political system. The cooperation is not built on political conditions, and the participation is voluntary. The project does not interfere with the political structure or visions of the participators. Unlike the EU's ambitions in altering China's system at least in the 1990s, China does not require the participators to meet any requirements politically.

Third, the project meets the interests and needs of the participants' needs for infrastructure. The project has been started by China and is moving forward so far due to the support of both China and participating countries. China's priority is the mutual economic development of China and the participating countries. Although it is possible the economic project will have some spill-over effects on the societies of the participating countries, these effects are limited. This is also in line with China's preference for 'de-politicisation' (Xinhua, 2011) when it comes to its relations with Europe as the two have different political ideologies but common interests in the economy. BRI relates to the development strategies of relevant countries and regions, and it has important traction for economic globalisation in the process of promoting policy communication, facility connectivity, trade flow, capital, and financial connectivity.

Lastly, the BRI indeed have met challenges in terms of adapting to local social, political, and economic contexts. These matters have been addressed by China adjusting its policies, incorporating more considerations of the local legal framework.

There have been geopolitical concerns from Europe, especially Germany, about the 17+1 cooperation, which is regarded as part of the BRI. In an interview with Cui Hongjian by Deutsche Welle, Director of the European Institute of the China Institute of International Studies, he commented on Europe's questions and critiques of the 16+1 cooperation, especially regarding some European concerns that this cooperation would divide Europe. He recommended that China's intentions of 16+1 should be understood from its departure point. China's goal of cooperating with Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries is in order for the Chinese enterprises to have better access to the European market and enhance the enterprise's capabilities through international cooperation especially when China had invested in mostly developing countries before 16+1 (Cui, 2019). His main argument is that instead of having geopolitical purposes, 16+1 was primarily an economic project aimed at expanding trade with Europe and enhancing Chinese enterprises' abilities and knowledge about the European market (Cui, 2019).

One way to understand the future of OBOR is to look at whether it matches with China and the EU's priorities. In this case, based on the rankings of priorities in Chapter 4, if OBOR is primarily an economic project, and China manages to communicate effectively and maintain transparency of the project, OBOR should be able to have good results for both sides as it is in line with both sides' interests. However, if it deviates from economic cooperation as its core and does not stick to effective communication, problems could arise due to the mismatched priorities between China and the EU after the top two: Economy and Trade, Communications and Dialogue.

8.2.4.2 Identity, Perceptions, and Expectations

The second aspect of the framework offered by this thesis is identities, perceptions, and expectations. The discussion on this aspect regarding the challenges BRI has met in the context of China-EU relations can continue from the last section based on the primary goal, or the nature of the initiative. It will both discuss China's identity embodied through BRI, and the mismatches between China and the EU on China's identities and their impacts on the implementation of the projects under or related to BRI.

First, the BRI has become a part of contemporary Chinese identity, encompassing China's developmental visions and goals in the international arena under the current administration.

On 24th October 2017, the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China passed the resolution of the “Articles of Association of the Communist Party of China (Amendment)”, which includes the “Belt and Road” in the Party Constitution. So far, BRI is included together with Reform and Opening up, Three Represents, Socialist Core Values (Xinhuanet, 2017) becoming one stage in China's developmental path. It demonstrates that the initiative not only stands for the actual projects going on with the world outside China but has also become a part of Chinese identity, especially in terms of China's relations with the world under globalisation.

Second, the identity aspect of this project is in line with the discourse of the China Dream and the Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation, which focus primarily on making sure China's economy is robust, but equally importantly, that China's national dignity and esteem are revived so that it is respected and welcomed by the international society.

When we compare the discourse blocks of the China Dream, the Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation, as well as BRI, the core identities are similar: they all advocate reviving China's dignity and respect in the international world and boosting China's economy and overall development. In this sense, the core identity embodied by BRI is in line with the previous Chinese official discourse blocks, as demonstrated in Figure 5-1 in Chapter 5.

Furthermore, in explaining China's intentions through the BRI, China did not shy away from responding to the questions of the EU. In response to the questions and challenges raised in Europe on BRI, the Chinese government has put forward an official response through the spokesman of the foreign ministry as well as official documents issued. The issues were addressed in the official discourse instead of being ignored or avoided.

Now that I have discussed the identity of China as manifested through BRI, I would like to point out some mismatches between the EU's understanding of China's intentions as well as the mismatches in China's self-esteem. At least five mismatches exist between China's BRI and the EU:

First, the EU undermines China's confidence and support in European integration. As Section 5.2.1.3 and Section 5.2.2.3 argued, the EU values European integration and the prospects of the EU as a unified power. Although this process has been greatly undermined and challenged by Brexit as well as previous crises, especially France and the Netherlands' disagreements on the EU Constitution (Startin & Krouwel, 2013), the vision of the EU on integration is not going to change as this is where the EU values stand as stated in the Treaty on the European Union (The European Union, 2008). In recent years, the EU has improved in terms of integration (Godement, Vasselier & European Council on Foreign Relations, 2017), especially after the Lisbon Treaty, despite the challenges of Brexit.

China supports European integration and has stated that in its official discourse consistently over the years. This is also in line with the Chinese values, which prefer unity rather than separation due to the Chinese history of being separated by European colonisers during World War Two. However, the EU has doubts and misunderstandings about China's intentions in this respect. For the 17+1 projects, some countries, especially Germany, have expressed concerns about whether 17+1 will divide Europe (Cui, 2019). The Chinese official discourse has responded to this saying that a unified Europe is better for Chinese benefits (Xinhua, 2019). There are also no reasons why China would divide Europe as Europe is China's largest trading partner and a stable and prosperous Europe would be important for China to maintain its economic gains as well as staying strong in the age of the China-US trade war. However, this mismatch in China's intentions does exist and has influenced the initiative.

The reasons behind the EU's doubt is the lack of communication as well as lack of trust on this issue. However, another factor is the developmental imbalance within Europe. The EU tends to blame China for the division while in fact, the initiative is a chance for Eastern Europe to catch up with Western Europe in terms of infrastructure and economy. Blaming China for the internal problems of the EU may be an action of diverting the attention and frustration of European residents to the outside instead of to the core of the problem.

Second, with the EU attaching more importance to hard power in recent years, it is becoming more sensitive about its defence mechanism and hard power as argued in Section 5.2.1.1. It is natural it will have concerns on the safety of the MS, especially when the globe has entered the age where technology and the economy have taken over traditional security matters to become the new competitive areas. Due to the rapid development of Chinese technology, it is natural that some challenges will occur during cooperation. For example, the development of 5G requires base stations to be built in partner countries, and there have been tensions due to different infrastructure standards and materials as well as shapes of different countries. In some cases, some of the stations have had to be demolished and rebuilt to suit the local standards. However, these mismatches have been addressed. In Chinese major tech companies like Huawei, for example, the staff must learn about the EU

laws regarding the field and must pass the tests if they want to continue their professional careers.⁴⁴ This standard and high awareness of the EU legal framework should be enhanced and encouraged as, after all, it is a huge challenge for Chinese staff and enterprises to adapt to these despite language barriers.

Third, the Chinese self-identity has a more historical perspective and involves complications, as argued in Section 5.1.1. On the one hand, China has a history of being humiliated by colonisers in World War One, and a long memory of being invaded by Western capitalised countries which are now the core countries of the MS of the EU. Also, China's GDP per capita is still relatively low compared with other countries in the world due to its large population. China still views itself as a developing country. On the other hand, China has the second-largest GDP in the world and is the initiator of BRI as well as many other international projects in the world. It is becoming more and more confident on the international stage. These two parts of Chinese identity are at the far edges of the pendulum swing of Chinese national identity and the national policies reflect both sides of these identities or are often a mix of the two. This has caused difficulties for the EU to position China's ability and impact correctly and comprehensively. The EU only started an official diplomatic relationship with PRC in 1975, so the EU policies towards China started when China entered the post-Mao era. So, in the EU policy papers, there are hardly any concerns about Chinese history. Instead, since the first EU policy paper on China, the focus has been more about how to start trading with China and, over time, how to impact China politically especially in terms of altering China so that it becomes similar to Western-style countries.

The lack of taking Chinese history and the past into account leads to the EU's incorrect estimation and expectations of China's future, especially politically, in the EU's earlier approaches to China as argued in Chapter 5. It has also led to an overestimation of China's finance ability when it comes to BRI especially considering that the EU's concerns about China mostly still goes under the 'China Threat' thinking mode which started after the 2000s (Fish, 2011; Demirtepe & Ozertem, 2013).

Fourth, the EU also has conflicted identities within itself. These not only exist in the imbalance between Western and Eastern Europe but also in the sense that the EU struggles to decide whether it should rely more on soft power and normative power or on hard power. Plus, the discrepancies among the MS who have more power in policymaking and those who have less is still big. There are also other divisions among well-off economic countries in terms of the development of the EU. The Netherlands, Switzerland, Norway and Denmark, for example, have different stances to that of Germany, as shown in the EU constitution crises (Startin & Krouwel, 2013).

⁴⁴ As introduced by Huawei company promotion presentations in the University of Edinburgh, winter 2019.

Finally, China's vision is about being an impactful, strong but not hegemonic big power in the world, as argued in Chapter 5. However, the EU's vision of the world is more based on a rule-based, international system with several international organisations becoming the organiser of the world system. China was not a part of the EU's rule but had its own set of rules and values. This is challenging for the EU as the EU regards that some of the rules and values should be universal. In the history of Western major powers, countries arise through conquering others in wars. This logic is applied by the EU to China, leading to the assertion that China will be hegemonic as well. This is also the logic behind the so-called China Threat Theory which arose in the beginning of 2000s and lasts until now (Grainger, 2010).

Although the Chinese government and most Chinese people believe that China will not tolerate hegemony due to China's traditional values, it is understandable that the rest of the world, including the EU, wonder whether China can successfully balance being a big power and being non-dominating.

One way forward is that both China and the EU improve awareness and clear communications of their self-identities and adjust expectations of the other. For China, there is a need to understand the complexity of the EU and have a more realistic expectation of how integrated EU policies are and keep track of the development of this integration, especially after Brexit.

8.2.4.3 Economic and Normative Power Shifts

Chapter 7 has argued that the Chinese discourse is becoming increasingly directive and confident. The projects China is promoting also facilitate new norms which are not included in the EU's existing norms. Meanwhile, the economic power shift between China and the EU is enhancing the normative power shift between the two as well.

Regarding the challenges, China and the EU met in the context of international projects and initiatives, and economic and normative power shifts also exist. The economic-normative dynamics which are going on in the relations are one driving force behind the EU's doubts and questions on China's initiative. China is rising while the EU is, comparatively speaking, struggling to retain its position in the world. This power transition creates a lot of tension as rising power will meet resistance from traditional powers. This tension has translated into the EU's discourse on Chinese proposals and projects in the world.

Economic-wise, BRI covers a wide range of industries. Normative-wise, the establishment of AIIB promotes new norms outside the current norms led by the EU. Although there has been no consensus on what exactly China's new norms in the context of BRI are, the existing literature has mentioned that one of the potential norms promoted through BRI could include prioritising economic development and focusing on the basic needs of people as well as poverty alleviation (Belt & Road News, 2019). Apart from that, potential norms as manifested through BRI include localised norms instead of universal norms, mutual benefits instead of

zero-sum style in cooperation, increased flexibility in the face of uncertain situations, and improved tolerance for delayed debt payback or debt reduction in special cases.

In Ian Manners' framework, the norms are the ones accepted in international society as 'normal'. As argued by Kavalski, recognition and acceptance by others are the keys to judging whether a power is normative (Kavalski, 2014). I have discussed whether this is a special phenomenon in the EU. If this concept can only be applied to the European Union, then a new concept is needed to summarise China's power and ability to make rules, as a norm-expander or a new type of norm-maker. Of course, we may as well call China a new normative power.

Returning to the example of the Belt and Road Initiative, China has shown its determination to maintain international order. But OBOR also shows China's determination to improve the international order. Such contradictions also bring difficulties to the EU's evaluation of China. On the one hand, the EU is worried that China will not abide by the existing norms in the international system. On the other hand, China's norms are more adaptive for developing countries. If the EU's normative power cannot be revised so that it considers the rights and historical background of developing countries, it could be an indicator of the limited applicability of this specific concept instead of a negative judgement on the potential of China being a normative power.

8.2.4.4 Visions for the Future World

Two main arguments of Chapter 6 help to analyse the mismatches behind the challenges regarding BRI in the China-EU context.

First, China adopts and supports both multipolarity and multilateralism. Multipolarity is a traditional concept adopted in the modern Chinese view of the future of the world. This concept is well-tuned with the Chinese understanding of power politics in the early stage of PRC. In recent years, as Chapter 6 observes, Chinese has increasingly emphasised multilateralism. The coexistence of multipolarity and multilateralism stands at the core of the Chinese view of the future world order.

The effect this leads to is that China attaches importance to both bilateral relations as well as multilateral relations. Chapter 5 has mentioned that China views the EU as a 'pole' in the world. In this sense, trade between China and Europe, as part of the BRI and 17+1, is helpful for the world to achieve a state of power balance and coerce the unilateralism of the US.

However, from the EU's perspective, as it has a close alliance with the US with whom it has a lot of history and culture, as well as shared values, it is in a difficult position, especially considering that the US is not supportive of BRI. The EU would prefer to tackle the project within the EU's multilateral framework although bilateral projects between China and the MS

are the core activities of the initiatives in the first place since it is primarily economic, as I argued in the previous section.

Second, BRI, as well as 17+1, can enhance and facilitate the internationalisation of multilateralism. The EU has impacted 17+1 projects, have been y EU rules by establishing a global partner centre to help 17+1 countries better understand EU rules and start cooperation under EU rules. This centre requires the participation of EU (Cui, 2019).

The EU's multilateralism is only based on mutual political consultation between European countries, and a considerable number of European countries are developed countries. This does not fully apply to the actual situation, including China and Southeast Asia and Central Asia. In addition, there are serious development imbalances within the EU. Many of the problems revealed by the Belt and Road Initiative stem from development issues within Europe and within partner countries. In fact, EU countries have an advantage in terms of cooperation, because EU laws and regulations are complete and mature, and they have detailed regulations for many economic activities, which can help the sustainable development of cooperation itself. Therefore, China's Belt and Road Initiative is a chance to enhance both the current application of the EU's multilateral system and a chance to revise the weakness of the system.

8.3 Assessing the Framework of Multidimensional Mismatches

This section assesses the effectiveness and applicability of the framework of Multi-levelled Mismatches. It firstly addresses its contributions as well as the gap it fills regarding the existing analytical framework of China-EU relations. Then it goes on to point out how this framework applies best to what kind of cases in bilateral relations. Finally, it goes on to address some limitations of the framework.

Many have argued that the reason for the challenges between China and the EU is mistrust and miscommunication. The existing literature has argued that mistrust and miscommunication exist behind the challenges between China and the EU (Scott, 2014b). The framework of this thesis helps to push this further and ask the question: in what areas do mistrust and miscommunications exist? What are the relations among these aspects? How does this mistrust affect China-EU relations?

It categorises the challenges in China-EU relations according to their scopes and the possible causes so that analyses of the challenges can take these aspects into account.

Plus, it does not only include aspects which are internal factors, such as identities, but also external factors such as the economic power shift as well as the world structure. The multidimensional mismatches are developed as a tool to examine and understand the comprehensive challenges in China-EU relations which cover more than one area such as

the unresolved issue on China's MES, the challenges raised by OBOR, the doubts in Europe about China's 17+1 project, which are not only focused on specific cooperation areas between China and the EU but encompass wide economic, social-political as well as cultural scopes.

In addition, it takes a longitudinal view and discusses the changes in strategic approaches as well as the normative power changes between China and the EU. This longitudinal aspect, along with the aspects on the interrelations among the different areas of mismatches, helps to explain the structural challenges, manifesting in the volatility of the relationship as well as some persisting, or sticky problems such as the recognition of MES.

It takes full account of the autonomy of China-EU relations regardless of the influence of the third party. This is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, the mismatches between China and the EU as well as the challenges which are closely connected to these mismatches are addressed with focus and without the distractions or external factors such as the influence of a third country. On the other hand, the factor of third parties, for example, the impact of US and China-US relations, is not considered. This is a limitation of the current framework although further development of the framework, which focuses on the context of a triangle relationship, may be developed so that the limitation is worked on.

From applying this framework in the three selected categories of cases, some conclusions can be drawn about the applicability of the framework:

First, for trade issues, mostly one or two aspects of the four themes are sufficient in examining the main mismatches behind the cases. Analysing trade issues within the multi-faceted and multi-level framework developed throughout this thesis is an interesting approach. Both have the economy as their primary interests. Then if only these factors are concerned, the two should not have major conflicts in the economy. However, if we are taking other aspects discussed in other chapters into consideration, the causes of the trade conflicts are more comprehensive. A lot of challenges in China-EU relations can be understood from the point of view of mismatches in priorities, as argued in Chapter 4. Although in a lot of areas, China and the EU have shared interests, this does not mean their preferences and priorities are the same.

Second, a comprehensive project needs comprehensive analytical tools and frameworks which consider both political, economic as well as structural dynamics. For more comprehensive cases which involve economic, social-political, cultural, and structural factors, the framework helps to keep a balance of taking account of comprehensive factors and addressing the structural factors as well.

Third, for cases which are persisting or sticky and which have existed cross a long time span in the relationship, the framework has the advantage of helping with examining the factors

behind the stickiness as it includes a longitudinal view and address the changes of policies and approaches over the years as well as the interrelations among the aspects.

8.4 Conclusion

This chapter has presented the framework of Dynamic Multidimensional Mismatches (DMM) and explained the interrelations among the four aspects of the framework. This framework brings the findings of the previous chapter together and discusses the relationship among different aspects of these mismatches and how their interactions influence China-EU relations.

The chapter has also applied the framework to three different categories of cases, namely the trade issues, persisting issues including the issues of the arms embargo and MES, and the EU's questions on China's international projects. Based on the application, the chapter has assessed the applicability of this framework by highlighting its contributions, pointing out its limitations and discussing the types of cases for which it has the best explanatory power.

Chapter 9 Conclusion

This thesis adds to the existing debates and discussions on the challenges in contemporary China-EU studies by developing and applying the corpora of official discourse between China and the EU for twenty-five years (1994-2019). This conclusive chapter will, most importantly, review the main findings and arguments of this research and spell out their significance and implications for the existing literature on China-EU studies, thus responding to the research questions of this thesis. It will also reflect on the advantages and limitations of the research and its methodology and set the agenda for future research for the author and other researchers in the field.

The chapter consists of six sections:

Section 9.1 reviews the contents, key findings and arguments of the previous chapters.

Section 9.1.1 responds to the research question of the thesis.

Section 9.2 summarises the contributions of this thesis in terms of both methodology and China-EU scholarship. It also discusses the originality of the research and provides the implications of the findings for Chinese and English language literature.

Section 9.3 reviews the advantages and limitations of the methodological approach of this thesis.

Section 9.4 lists the limitations of this research.

Section 9.6 lays out the possible research agenda for the future.

9.1 Reviewing Chapter Contents, Main Findings and Arguments

The thesis begins by introducing the official discourse interactions and their development between China and the EU alongside the general development of China-EU relations since the establishment of their diplomatic relations but especially after 1994, when the EU issued its first policy paper on Asia with a large emphasis on China, up to 2019 when the thesis was completed.

Each chapter covers an aspect of the background and development of the official discourse interactions in China-EU relations and the ups and downs of the general China-EU relations as well as the linkage between the two.

The theme of each chapter constitutes one level or aspect where the divergence of China and the EU exist. The themes of the core chapters of this thesis were decided by joint consideration of the themes emerging in the discourse data and the on-going debates in China-EU studies in order to engage closely with the current discussions in the field.

Chapter 1 provided an overview of China-EU relations since their establishment. The core task done in the introductory chapter it was to narrow down, or categorise the challenges in contemporary China-EU relations into three aspects: first, the imbalanced development between economic cooperation and political cooperation between China and the EU; second, the volatility of the relationship, or the reoccurring cycles of ups and downs; and third, the specific disputes between China and the EU on trade, the arms embargo, China's Market Economy Status, along with other specific disputes. This set the basis for the discussion of this thesis as the analysis of each chapter tackles one element behind the challenges in China-EU relations.

Apart from this, Chapter 1 also aimed to highlight one assumption of this thesis: official discourse matters in international relations and in studying international relations. It presents an overview of the official discourse in China-EU relations, how it developed alongside the interactions in China-EU relations, and the fact that it is undervalued due to the fact that it is not designed to attract readers so is hard to read and under-researched in the current literature.

Chapter 2 presented the theoretical framework. It introduced the application of two main branches of theoretical approaches in this thesis: first, the language-oriented constructivist approach; second, the mutual interactions between discourse, society and the economy. The first theoretical school includes theories on the relativity of languages, the associations between language, thoughts and realities. The second group is informed by the constructivist theory, especially language-oriented, or rule-oriented constructivism and norm-oriented constructivism in IR. The third is Karl Polanyi's theory on Double Movements between economy and society, which informs the dialectic relationship between economic power and normative power as argued in the synthesised theoretical framework put forward through this thesis.

Chapter 3 introduced the methodology adopted in this thesis. The thesis adopted an innovative methodological approach which takes the official discourse as the resource and platform from which to research China-EU relations over a long period. It contributes, methodologically, to applying corpus-driven discourse analysis and content analysis in combination with theoretical frameworks in IR. The thesis pushes the interdisciplinary methodology to the newest frontier, paving the way for future research adopting or improving the synthesised methodological model shown in Section 3.3.3, Figure 3-1 Correlations between Chapter Aspects and Discourse Levels, in this thesis.

Chapter 4 conducted a comparative corpus-driven content analysis on Corpus China PPSP and Corpus EU PPSP, which contains China and the EU's policy papers, reviews, and leaders' speeches from 1994 to 2019. Through searching the top frequency meaningful words and comparing the results between China and the EU's statements on their priorities

and the hot topics in the literature, the chapter finds that mismatches of topic priorities exist between Corpus China PPSP and Corpus EU PPSP which suggests that China and the EU, although sharing topics, have different preferences and priorities.

Chapter 4 finds that China and the EU share solid common ground and interest in several core policy areas but especially the economy and trade, communication, and dialogue as well as politics and diplomacy. There are, however, differences in the topic preferences between China and the EU. The topic Security and National Defence has a higher position in the coverage ranking of Corpus China PPSP than that of Corpus EU PPSP, indicating the importance of this area to China. Law and Regulation ranks higher in Corpus EU PPSP, indicating the importance of the rule of law and normative power for the EU.

Chapter 4 also points out that even in traditional sectors such as the economy, politics and communication, laws, and security, the two have different emphases. This fills the gap and explains why China-EU problems do not only happen when it comes to human rights or sovereignty issues but also in the economy to which both attach utmost priority.

In addition, Chapter 4 also finds that the most frequently used verbs and nouns in the official discourse of China and the EU on each other show differences. China applies words related to mutual respect, learning from each other and prudently handling disputes more, such as “相互了解”, “相互尊重”, “妥善处理” while the EU uses more normative words and words related to plans such as “will”, “should”, “help” and “encourage”.

Chapter 5 discusses the differences between China and the EU’s developmental goals and their expectations of the other as well as China-EU relations. It shows that China and the EU’s self-perceptions are each different. China sees itself as a big country in the East with a critical role in the world with a socialist system. The EU recognises China’s strong international status but expected China, especially in the early years of its interactions with China, to adopt some of the Western social-political features. China sees the EU as the institution of an integrated Europe and expects Europe to keep being integrated.

Chapter 5 finds that in terms of perceptions on the self and the other, China and the EU share several agreements including their support for diversity and peace, their visions for European integration as the historical trend and their shared support for “One China” and the “One Country, Two Systems” policies. However, differences and mismatches in their self-perceptions and expectations of the other do exist. First, the EU started to emphasise the rise of China and the responsibilities of China as a major power earlier than the Chinese official discourse and with more expectations attached, which is one source of tension between China and the EU. Second, the EU expected China’s economy to change into a Western-style one while the Chinese economy developed into one combining state regulation and a market economy. Over the years, the EU has shown overall support for

China's market economy development, but when it came to the time when China's Market Economy Status could be officially recognised according to the WTO rules, the EU voiced more critiques of the economy of China so as to protect European industry. On the EU's identity, the content analysis based on Corpus EU reveals that a few themes stand out in terms of the EU's self-perception: the EU's will to improve its hard power; the EU will stick to its normative values; and the EU's historical view on European integration. China views the EU as an important power in the world and sees the EU as a "pole" in the multipolar world, or in a sense, a special form of "big country". China's view on the EU is state-oriented, whereas the EU's self-perception is more rooted in a multilateral perspective. Apart from that, however, there is a high degree of shared vision on European integration and the support for a world of diversity and peace. The chapter also finds that Corpus EU PPSP shows more focus on specific policy areas; Corpus China PPSP tends to focus on key policies and strategic visions.

Chapter 6 studied China and the EU's vision for the ideal future world. Based on comparing their official discourse on the future world and their positions in the future world, it argues that China's world vision is more state-oriented. The current framework of Chinese foreign policy envisions a world of humankind sharing a common destiny with countries more interdependent on each other. The EU's world vision is institutional-oriented. It emphasises keeping the established norms and rules in the current world system, whereas China emphasises adjusting the rules so that it meets developing countries' needs better. China's world vision focuses on promoting a world of multipolarity and multilateralism while the EU stresses multilateralism and holding diverse opinions on the existence of "poles" and the structure of "multipolarity".

Chapter 6 concluded that China and the EU's visions for the future world share a high degree of compatibility, as shown in their shared theme on peacekeeping, prevention of hegemony and respect for diversity. Difference emphases, however, do exist. China takes multipolarity as the core of the future world structure and believes that multipolarity and multilateralism can coexist as both stress "multi" which indicate the balance of power and diversity. The EU, on the other hand, holds doubts about the existence of "poles" and emphasises "multilateralism" much more than "multipolarity".

Chapter 7 investigates the differences between China and the EU's normative discourse and their normative approaches along with the normative power shift between the two and argues that this normative power shift, together with the economic power shift in the world system, form the structural reasons behind the tension in China-EU relations. The chapter also discusses the current trend in China-EU relations, where both claim to take a pragmatic approach to the other. It discusses the possible misunderstandings caused by the translations of the term "pragmatism". It suggests that further understanding and examination on what a pragmatic approach really means for each other would be helpful for the two to

achieve more balanced interests with brotherhood and benevolence in daily practices in China-EU relations.

Chapter 7 finds that first, the EU's official discourse to China contains a significant number of normative discourses. Second, the EU's normative discourse not only implies the EU's expectations of China but also the EU's self-expectations, as demonstrated by the proportion of commissive discourse in the EU's official policy papers on China. Third, China has shown tendencies to become a new normative power. The Chinese normative power starts with economic cooperation while the norms, namely equality among countries and more flexibility and resilient considerations for developing countries manifest through economic projects. Last, there is a normative power shift alongside the economic power shift between China and the EU in the world system. While economically, China is going from the semi-peripheral zone, which features labour-intensive industries and exporting raw materials, to the core area, which features knowledge-intensive industries and the exporting of high-tech products, normative power also improves. This change in normative power challenges the part in the existing norms which does not fit developing and emerging countries needs whereas the EU tends to protect the existing norms and regards that revisions of the norms are easier said than done. The tension between China and the EU is that between a traditional normative power and a new normative power as well.

Chapter 8 combines the aspects of mismatches discussed in the previous chapter together and presents the analytical framework of Dynamic Multidimensional Mismatches in China-EU relations. This provides a possible analytical tool for not only bilateral relations but also potentially multilateral relations, with further extensions in the future, in IR studies. This framework combines the aspects of priorities, identities and perception, visions for the world order, and normative power dynamics through the developmental path of China and the EU as two entities with self-esteem, visions for their destinations and their proposed means to reach their destinations. In this way, the interrelations among the elements are demonstrated through the roles they play in the developmental paths of both entities. The dynamic nature of this model also correlates with the longitudinal perspectives offered by the corpus-driven discourse analysis.

Chapter 8 also applies the framework to analyse a few cases in China-EU relations, including the trade issues, the recognition of China's MES, the arms embargo issue as well as the misunderstanding and challenges regarding China's Belt and Road Initiative and other global projects such as the 17+1 summit.

9.1.1 Responding to the Research Questions

This research has three aims: first and foremost, it seeks to contribute to understanding the challenges between China and the EU including disputes in specific areas, the volatility, or the re-occurrence of ups and downs, as well as the imbalanced cooperation in different

“pillars” which is under debate, or aspects of the comprehensive partnership between China and the EU; second, it strives to achieve the first aim via a synthesis of the constructivist approach and Corpus-Driven discourse analysis of the official discourse between China and the EU from 1994 to 2019; third, it aims to propose the analytical framework of ‘Dynamic Multidimensional Mismatch’ to analyse and understand the challenges in China-EU relations and potentially other bilateral relationships.

The research question raised in the Introduction is:

- **How does a corpus-driven discourse analysis, underpinned by constructivist assumptions and based on the corpora of the official discourse between China and the EU (1994 to 2019) help to examine and explain the challenges in contemporary China-EU relations?**

Several sub-questions have been designed to guide the analyses throughout the thesis, responding to the main research question step by step. In this section, I will also respond to the sub-questions first, leading to an integrated response to the main question.

Questions in terms of understanding and categorising the challenges in China-EU relations include:

- What characterises the challenges in contemporary China-EU relations?
- What role does official discourse play in contemporary China-EU relations?

These have been addressed in Chapter 1, Section 1.1 and Section 1.2, respectively. The thesis has observed three categories of challenges in China-EU relations. These include, first, the volatility of the relationship, or the reoccurring cycles of ups and downs despite the general positive developmental trend of the relationship; second, there are specific disputes in China-EU relations in different policy areas, including trade issues, political issues such as the arms embargo, economic-political issues such as recognition of China’s MES, human rights disputes, and frictions in other areas; third, there are structural challenges in the bilateral relations, including the imbalances between economic and political interactions, though whether this is problematic is debatable, and the power shifts between China and the EU economically, politically and normatively in the international arena. These feature the contemporary challenges in China-EU relations.

The thesis discusses the role of official discourse at both an ontological level and practical level. At the ontological level, the thesis has taken the stance of that of ROC and LR that language has a shaping power for constructing social realities and is also, in turn, constituted by social realities. At the practical level and in the context of China-EU relations, official discourse frames and envisions the direction of the relationship, sets the agenda and regulates the communication between the two entities through establishing the mechanism of dialogue. In turn, the events and interactions in China-EU relations manifest in their official

discourse, which then contributes to the next round of mutual constitution between discourse and social realities. Official discourse also provides a systematic, continuous and longitudinal resource which, with the assistance of corpus-driven discourse analysis, offers the opportunity to generate both quantitative and qualitative information, comparing the thoughts of China and the EU on an equal basis with the external bias and variants under control.

The sub-questions responded to through the empirical chapters include:

- In what aspects do misunderstandings and mismatches exist in China-EU relations? How do these mismatches and misunderstandings relate to each other?
- How and to what extent do these mismatches explain the challenges in China-EU relations?

Through the corpus-driven content analysis with a comparative and longitudinal perspective, the thesis finds that although China and the EU share a large volume of topics, visions and goals, mismatches do exist in their priorities, visions for the future world structure, perceptions of the self and the other and their normative goals and approaches. These mismatches, together with the context that China is emerging into the core area in the world economy and has been proactive on the international stage with the potential of becoming a new normative power, lead to tension and the challenges in contemporary China-EU relations.

Regarding the second sub-question above, the thesis address this by discussing the similarities and differences between China and the EU in each of the aspects mentioned in the paragraph above, with evidence emerging from the corpora. Specifically, the thesis finds that while China and the EU have overall matching priorities, they do have different preferences in some of the shared policy areas and topics. While both focus on Economy and Trade, Politics and Diplomacy and Culture, China stresses Security and Defence, and the EU emphasises Laws and Regulations. These differences play a role in actual cases, including the case of Market Economy Status, market accessibility and the EU's questions on China's cross-continent initiatives.

Differences also exists between China and the EU in terms of their identities and perceptions of the self and the other, their visions for the future international order, and their normative approaches. In other words, apart from the differences of their priorities as manifested in their discourse, their goals, and the means, values, and manners to achieve their goals and destinations also contain differences.

In particular, China's perceptions of the EU are strongly connected to China's self-perceptions of China as a sovereign state. Its priorities in foreign relations are to protect the safety of the nation and ensure economic prosperity. The EU's self-perception is highly attached to its normative nature and its founding values, which led to its early expectations that it would impact China's social-political environment. This approach of the EU led to

tension in the bilateral relations, especially in the form of political disputes, as manifested in the case of MES. Although the EU has shifted its approach to a more pragmatic one, the normative nature of it remains, forming one source of tension.

The thesis also argues that there is a normative power shift between China and the EU, as China expands its normative efforts evidenced by both China's increasing normative efforts and the shifting normative discourse pattern between China and the EU in the past twenty years. This normative clash forms another source of tension, as demonstrated in the case of the trade deficit and the EU's reserved attitudes on China's global economic projects.

The uniqueness of the explanatory power of this thesis also sits in the analytical framework it offers. The Dynamic Multidimensional Mismatch (DMM) framework combines the aspects of mismatches in one system. Each case of tension may apply one or multiple aspects of the system. This provides guidance for future analysis of the challenges in China-EU relations. The analytical framework is also supported by the theoretical framework, namely the mutual construction between discourse power, normative power and economic power developed in the thesis, making the analytical tool both well-founded theoretically and applicable methodologically.

In terms of its methodology, the thesis aims to respond to the questions including:

- What does the corpora established in this thesis (Corpus China PPSP, Corpus EU PPSP, Corpus EU Internal, Corpus China Domestic) offer to understand the levels and aspects where challenges exist in China-EU relations?

The thesis explores this resource through establishing a specialised corpus of the official discourse between China and the EU from 1994 to 2019 which consists of seven sub-corpora: Corpus China PP (policy papers), Corpus EU PP, Corpus China PPSP (policy papers and speeches), Corpus EU PPSP, Corpus China Domestic, and Corpus EU Internal. Among them, Corpus China PPSP and Corpus EU PPSP contain the official policy papers and keynote speeches of China and the EU on each other. Corpus China Domestic contains China's domestic official discourse relevant to China's developmental goals. Corpus EU contains the EU's global strategies and their external action policies. These corpora provide the materials for carrying out corpus-driven discourse analysis throughout the thesis. This also makes it possible to compare the contents between different corpora to see whether China and the EU have different understandings of the same word, concept, theme, or topic.

- What aspects of corpus-linguistic techniques contribute to analysing China-EU relations, and potentially other bilateral relations in IR studies?
- How could the constructivist approach in IR be combined with the ontological and epistemological approaches behind corpus-driven discourse analysis? What are the strengths and limitations of this synthesised, multidisciplinary approach?

For the question on methodology, the thesis argues that a synthesis of a constructivist perspective and corpus-driven discourse analysis, as well as considerations of the international political economy, help to expand the existing understanding of the challenges in China-EU relations especially in explaining the re-occurrence of down periods following successful economic interactions between China and the EU. What's more, corpus-driven discourse analysis offers a top-down approach to discourse information complemented by bottom-up approaches which involve more human reading and organising of key thematic discourse blocks arising from the existing literature, and preliminary findings of corpus linguistic analysis have been effective in offering more comprehensive explanations for the ups and downs in China-EU relations. Further practitioners of discourse analysis in IR studies can apply and develop the methods of specific bilateral relations.

Regarding the second question, the ontological stance of both constructivism and linguistic relativity support mutual construction between discourse and thoughts as well as ideas. This common ground makes it possible to combine these two approaches. The advantages of combining a constructivist approach with corpus-linguistics is that it offers IR studies a vast source of corpora-driven analytical techniques, material and tools, plus the chance to look at the changes in discourse over a long time span in a relatively quick way. The disadvantages are that, in practice, the considerations regarding technical problems in dealing with corpora sometimes consume the strategic understanding of the factors beyond language. This is why the analytical framework put forward in this thesis contains actual aspects of whether the mismatches exist instead of only the methodological framework.

Theoretically, the sub-question is:

- What elements of constructivist theories contribute to a corpus-driven discourse analysis approach to China-EU relations?

As presented in Chapter 2, the thesis combines the elements of mutual construction between language and thoughts as promoted in linguistic relativity, especially Sapir-Whorf Theory, mutual construction between material power and thoughts/ideas in CIPE, especially Coxian Critical Theory and the relationship between normative power and discourse power in rule and norm-oriented constructivism. This is the first effort to combine these elements from multiple disciplines and put forward a synthesised theoretical framework. This framework offers a strong, simplified tool for future research involving discourse in China-EU studies.

Finally, the integrated response to the main research question:

- **How does a corpus-driven discourse analysis, underpinned by constructivist assumptions and based on the corpora of the official discourse between China and the EU (1994 to 2019) help to examine and explain the challenges in contemporary China-EU relations?**

In terms of understanding the challenges in contemporary China-EU relations, this thesis reveals the mismatches and misunderstandings in five aspects: their priorities, world visions, perceptions of self and the other, strategies as well as the normative approaches between China and the EU between 1994 and 2019. This thesis points out that while there is solid common ground and there are shared interest areas between China and the EU, among these shared interests, the two have differences in priorities. Their view of self and their expectations of the other, as well as China-EU relations, do not always match, both in terms of content and in terms of time. Their visions for the order of the future world, despite the similarities, hold divergences as well. Their strategies and engagement style have discrepancies in terms of content and time. Their normative approaches, intertwined with the power transitions in the world, hold differences. The interrelations of these mismatches and misunderstandings explain the dynamics behind the challenges in China-EU relations.

The findings on the mismatches of each aspect are interconnected to the rest of the aspects. For example, the findings on the differences in topic priorities, especially the EU's emphasis on Laws and Regulations, suggest that, compared with China, the EU focuses more on policy areas which embody its normative nature. This is in line with the analysis in Chapter 7 on the EU as a normative power. Chapter 4 finds that China emphasises Security and Defence. Most of the content related to this topic concentrates on keeping the peaceful environment international and domestically with recent years' references increasingly about dealing with peacekeeping and new forms of security issues in the international arena. The driving force of China's focus on security is further explored in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, especially in terms of China's self-esteem and its visions for the future world. The findings assist the understanding of the volatility in China-EU relations despite the generally positive trend and vast common ground between the two.

Through the corpus-driven content analysis with a comparative and longitudinal perspective, the thesis finds that although China and the EU share a large volume of topics, visions and goals, mismatches do exist in their priorities, vision for the future world structure, perceptions of the self and the other and their normative goals and approaches. These mismatches, together with the context that China is emerging into the core area in the world economy and has been proactive on the international stage with the potential to become a new normative power, lead to tension and the challenges in contemporary China-EU relations.

Although the word mismatch has been used in the title of the thesis, I would like to stress that mismatch does not equal or suggest incompatibility. Nor does it imply that in the aspects discussed in the thesis, China and the EU differ in every way. Mismatches suggest the coexistence of similarities and differences. Mismatches in these aspects discussed in the themes mean that in terms of the shared topics and common ground, China and the EU have different emphases or different priorities. These differences, depending on the specific issues China and the EU are dealing with, can turn into forces which lead to the

policymaking of China and the EU. Therefore China-EU relations enjoy a highly positive developmental trend overall but they are not free of problems and challenges. Overlooking the challenges reduces the opportunities for China and the EU to expand the current scope and depth of their interactions, which is against the aims and purpose of both sides. It is the challenges and problems this thesis focuses on in the first place with the aim to increase the understanding of these problems and provide a basis for understanding for both sides to understand each other and think of ways to address each other's interests while protecting their own priorities.

The point of stressing this is that the mismatches in topic priorities are based on the common topic interests between China and the EU. The mismatches exist in the context of China and the EU sharing a long list of common topics which indicate the large amount of common ground between China and the EU. The differences in the topic rankings should not be understood in a dogmatic way as the data generated by Nvivo based on the corpus, and the search queries will inevitably bear inaccuracies in itself although efforts have been made as far as possible to make sure the data are generated from clear, consistent and sensible designs of text searches. Rather, the difference between China and the EU's priorities should be viewed as helping to understand each other's priorities when it comes to their disputes. For example, in the case of the arms embargo, for China, this case is most relevant to security and economy, which are among China's top priorities. For the EU, this issue is relevant mostly to the topics of politics, society and human rights with the EU's definitions, and regulations which are also high on the EU's list. However, it is interesting to frame it in such a way as to see that the EU and China still have a shared interest in lifting the arms embargo. From the perspective of the autonomy between China and the EU, therefore, it is entirely possible to resolve this issue. This indicates that a third party, possibly the US, could have played an important role in this issue, influencing the dynamics between China and the EU. Another possibility is that, at different times, in a different international environment, China and the EU's priorities could change.

9.1.2 Value and Features of the Analytical Framework

The Dynamic Multidimensional Mismatches (DMM) framework has been developed throughout the thesis to understand the challenges in these bilateral relations in a comprehensive way. What this analytical framework offers is not a mere combination of the aspects but one which stresses the interrelations among these aspects with a historical, longitudinal and structural perspective.

Growth/Developmental Path

In terms of the interrelations among the aspects, a developmental or growth path will help to explain it. If China and the EU are seen as two developing entities working towards their goals, their visions for their future position in the future world will be their developmental

goal. Their identities and perceptions are where they are now internally and conceptually from the rule and norm-oriented constructivist perspective; their identities and perceptions of the self and the other set the rules and norms as well as patterns or hierarchies between China and the EU. These patterns and norms manifest in their strategic approaches to each other.

The Autonomy between China and the EU

While different approaches exist, including the China-EU-US approach, the arguments on the conceptual gaps and strategic mismatches have been effective in explaining the challenges in China-EU relations, the autonomy between China and the EU, especially the economic power shifts between them and how this shift interacts with the normative power changes, is not given due attention in the existing literature. The reason why this is important is that a large number of the problems and issues are economic, although social-political disputes also exist at all levels.

9.2 Research Contribution

This research is original, especially in terms of the materials and methodology it applies, the theoretical and analytical frameworks it has developed, and the new findings it has generated, although the contributions add to and expanded upon the existing literature and work on China-EU relations.

9.2.1 Corpora Development

Official discourse has been under-studied in existing China-EU studies as argued in Section 1.3.6. Despite the volume and complexities of the China-EU official discourse, this research takes the challenging task of developing specialised corpora on contemporary China-EU relations for analytical purposes and is the first research of its kind systematically based on corpora. This extends Synder's efforts in compiling and commenting on the official discourse between China and the EU in his book *The European Union and China, 1949-2008, Basic Documents and Commentary*, a pioneering effort in collecting the official discourse on the bilateral relationship. The machine-readable corpora established in this thesis covers the length of twenty-five years between 1994 and 2019, including the comprehensive policy papers, key strategy documents and official speeches between China and the EU over these years. The significance of this is that it offers a first attempt at developing corpora of the period for the purpose of corpus-driven discourse analysis. This offers an example for future research taking a similar approach. The corpora between China and the EU can be extended as the discourse and documents cover wide areas. The research pushes the frontier of this aspect by keeping in mind the analytical value, the machine readability, the scope and comparability of the documents so that future corpora-establishment can follow these experiences.

9.2.2 Empirical Contributions

Empirically, the thesis fills gaps in existing analyses on the understanding of the challenges in China-EU relations. The thesis engages with a few key discussions on the challenges in China-EU relations including the mismatched priorities between China and the EU as discussed by Men Jing (Men, 2012, 2014), the differences in China and the EU's visions of the international order as discussed by Scott (Scott, 2012), the debatable imbalances between economic and political cooperation (Hammond & Jing, 2016; Jan van der Harst & Tjalling Halbertsma, 2017), and especially all levels of conceptual gaps between China and the EU (Zhu & Zhang, 2002; Pan, 2010; Men, 2011; Zhou, 2011a; Zhang, 2012a; Weil & Jing, 2012; Chen & Song, 2012).

The thesis argues that the current explanations, including triangle analysis of China-EU-US relations, the conceptual gaps between China and the EU, the mismatched visions and perceptions and the mismatched approaches could offer more comprehensive, systematic insights about the challenges in China-EU relations if the aspects are put together with a supporting theoretical framework. To achieve this purpose, this thesis takes the combined approach of corpus-driven discourse analysis of China-EU relations, and develops the synthesised theoretical framework, namely the mutual construction between normative, discourse and economic power. With these supporting methodological and theoretical approaches, the thesis extends the current scholarship on contemporary China-EU studies by offering a rounded and comprehensive perspective to examine and explain the challenges in contemporary China-EU studies. The thesis, apart from its original methodological and theoretical frameworks, puts forwards an original analytical framework, which is the Dynamic Multidimensional Mismatches (DMM) between China the EU as demonstrated in Section 8.1. Through developing this analytical framework, the thesis offers a tool and perspective, which includes systematic and longitudinal perspectives for understanding the challenges and mismatches between China and the EU.

The thesis also applies the framework of DMM in explaining a few cases in China-EU relations, including the trade issues in China-EU relations, especially relating to trade protectionism and market accessibility, the persisting issues such as MES, the arms embargo, and the EU and the MS' ambivalence and reserved perceptions about China's initiatives such as the 17+1 cooperation and Belt and Road Initiative. The thesis argues that the framework of DMM offers a unique chance to look at the challenges with a comprehensive framework which considers the commonness behind these challenges and discusses the relationship among the different aspects of the mismatches. Stickiness of some of the issues is apparent as the framework considers the longitudinal factors and changes of priorities and strategies in the relationship. Although the framework does cover the whole scope of China-EU challenges, it shows strong potential in explaining cases which cover multiple aspects of China-EU relations such as the EU's misunderstandings about

China's international cooperation initiatives and projects and cases which covers a long time span thanks to the involvement of longitudinal corpora.

9.2.3 Theoretical Contributions

Theoretically, it expands the constructivist theoretical framework, especially ROC, in the way that it incorporates corpus-linguistic techniques and considerations of IPE. It combines Rule and norm-oriented constructivism, a constructivist approach which was considered distinct from realism, with realist frameworks on the power transitions as well as traditional constructivist focuses such as identities and perceptions.

This is the first effort in the field to develop an original theoretical framework for mutual construction between normative, discourse and economic power. The theoretical framework was developed through theories in Language Philosophy, IR, and IPE. The relationship between discourse and ideas was developed through the discussion of linguistic relativity on language and thoughts. The relationship between economic power and ideas is based on the Coxian theory of IPE on the relationship between material power, ideas, and institutions. It also discusses the relations between normative power and discourse based on rule and norm-oriented constructivism. The thesis synthesises these relationships and puts forward a mutual construction between normative power, discourse, and economic power. This is the first effort to combine these approaches and apply this theoretical framework to understand China-EU relations. This framework combines the nexuses of realist, constructivist factors and a longitudinal, systematic perspective.

This paves the way for future research in IR studies which combines a discussion of the constructivist factors such as the linguistic, and conceptual differences, differences in visions and understandings about the future world and future identity of China and the EU, with consideration of the realist structural causes, structures, and more specifically, China and the EU's changing positions in the world economic system through the official discourse.

In terms of the analytical scope, the thesis brings a more macro-perspective which considers the influence of the normative power shift between China and the EU in the world system. This thesis has developed a framework of Dynamic Multidimensional Mismatches (DMM) to explain the challenges in China-EU relations. Instead of focusing on a specific issue in China-EU relations, it takes a macro-perspective. It looks at the commonalities, including the ideological, structural, systematic factors behind the problems in China-EU relations rather than factors for specific, individual cases. It argues that the interrelated and multilevel mismatches and misunderstandings of priorities, perceptions, strategies, and approaches are the common factors behind the challenges in China-EU relations. The DMM framework provides a way to show where the discrepancies in China-EU relations exist, what are they and how are they mismatched with each other in a comprehensive way.

9.2.4 Methodological Contributions

Methodologically, this thesis develops the machine-readable corpora on the official discourse on China-EU relations between 1994 and 2019 and, more importantly, carries out a corpus-driven discourse analysis to examine the challenges between China and the EU.

This thesis contributes to the existing methodology in China-EU studies in that it designs, applies, tests and reviews an alternative approach to interpreting the problems in understanding the issues in China-EU relations; it combines a constructivist perspective with corpus-based, comparative discourse analysis. At the time of writing, no interpretations of China-EU challenges based on a systematic examination of the development of China and the EU's official discourse exists. The thesis establishes a specialised corpus of the key official discourse between China and the EU from 1994 to 2019. The corpus consists of China's EU policy papers and the Chinese presidential and prime ministerial, foreign ministers', and ambassadors keynote speeches to the EU, the EU's China policy papers, mid-term review and national strategies to China, the EU officials' keynotes speeches to China, the joint statements and press releases between China and the EU. For the sake of comparing domestic priorities and foreign policy priorities, China's Five-Year Plans and the EU's Global Strategies are included as a sub-corpus. In addition, the official documents on some specialised topics such as human rights, intellectual property rights, agriculture, education and communication are included as a sub-corpus.

It demonstrates the value of corpus-based discourse analysis in analysing China-EU relations and international relations in general with the application of both Chinese and English language materials on an equal basis. This helps bridge the gap between corpus linguistics and IR studies by applying the established specialised corpora, analysing the corpora features and contents, categorising empirical findings and discovering the relationship between the categories, thus creating the framework for examining and explaining the challenges in China-EU relations. The framework has the potential to be applied to other bilateral, or even multilateral cases in IR studies.

The discourse analysis of this thesis combines two perspectives of the official discourse between China and the EU. The first is a longitudinal view of the development of their discourse, on, for example, the changes in top topics, key terms and normative discourse patterns in order to study the dynamics in China-EU relations during the last twenty-two years. The second is snapshots of the discourse of China and the EU at various points arranged into several topic discourse blocks to reveal the central themes of China and the EU over the years. In this way, the thesis hopes to give a more comprehensive insight into the development of China-EU discourse along with the ups and downs of the bilateral relationship, whether they be the result of conscious policy decisions or a reflection of changing perceptions of the self and the other. Through this, the thesis strives to push

forward the existing understanding of the importance of official documents in terms of the amount and range of information and implications they contain despite the common view that official discourse can be dry and void.

9.2.5 Implications for Chinese and English language Literature

For literature in the Chinese language, the thesis provides work applying rule and Norm-oriented constructivist theories. This is so far the first work which applies these branches of constructivist approach in China-EU relations, and the application with a corpus makes the approach even more unique. As mentioned in Section 1.3.6, a large part of Chinese literature on China-EU relations does not explicitly mention the theoretical framework being applied. This research pushes forward the development of the theoretical and methodological development in Chinese language literature by offering a comprehensive theoretical, methodological and analytical framework for China-EU relations and potentially other bilateral relations to fill a missing link in the Chinese literature that represents a systematic approach combining economic, structural and longitudinal perspective. This also responds to the proposal promoted by Professor Zhu Liqun (Zhu, 2007) on the methodology of China-EU studies mentioned in the literature review of this thesis.

For literature in the English language, the thesis offers more knowledge about official discourse in the Chinese language, especially when a lot of the Chinese official discourse has not been translated into English and is only assessable on websites in the Chinese language.

9.3 Reflections on the Methodology

The findings of the thesis are generated by analysing the official discourse between China and the EU from 1994 to 2019. More specifically, the discourse materials are selected and organised into the format for a specialised corpora of policy papers, official keynote speeches, discourse on China's domestic development, the EU's discourse on its global strategies and external action policies. Relevant special-themed documents have also been applied for content analysis to supplement the analysis.

corpus-driven comparative discourse analysis, in combination with content analysis, forms the main research method of this thesis. The content analysis has a weakness in that the researcher can "cherry-pick" (Ryan & Wray, 1997) in terms of the approach in discourse analysis, namely only choosing the discourse that supports the argument they want and ignoring or disregarding any material which has a different meaning. Therefore, this thesis breaks new ground by introducing a corpus-based analysis in China-EU relations. Corpus-based linguistic analysis is a subject which has met with rapid growth in recent decades. With the development of machine learning and big data in computer science, the application of corpus-based analysis has been driven into new areas. A computer can output keywords

from a large volume of documents in a few seconds while traditionally this would take an expert a considerable amount of time. This trend in the development of computer science set the basis for the interdisciplinary approach of this thesis, with the hope that governments of different entities could process and understand each other's policies in a more efficient way but with fewer misunderstandings. The thesis seeks to establish a methodological framework which combines human reading and machine reading when it comes to official policy analysis of official documents.

A few reasons lie behind the usage of word frequency in analysing the official discourse on China-EU relations. First, for most linguistic analysis, lexical features are usually the first step. It expands from lexical analysis to the analysis of semantic features, sentence patterns, coherence, rhetoric and figures of speeches. Second, top frequency word searches offer quick information about the topics in a large text database. Word frequency offers a way to look at the hot topics in the discourse on China and the EU on each other. This is particularly useful when the discourse is larger than the capability of an individual's reading capacity. The larger the corpus is, the more meaningful word frequency is as the likelihood of a connection between preferred topics and word frequency will increase with the amount of data. Second, word frequency offers not only the preferred words and topics but also offers how these preferred topics are ordered. In this way, it is possible to compare China and the EU's preferred topics not only in the sense of what topics are preferred by each other but also how their preferences differ. It is important to remember preferences can differ in two ways: first, one topic which appears in the top 10 topic list for China, for example, may not appear in the top 10 for the EU. Second, one topic appearing in the top ten for both China and the EU, may have different positions in the two lists, indicating that although this topic is a shared hot topic, it has relatively different degrees of importance for China and the EU respectively.

9.3.1 Advantages of Corpus-driven Discourse Analysis

The advantages of corpus-driven content analysis manifest in the volume and quality of the findings in the thesis. A few aspects of the advantages of this method stand out during the research:

First, it offers a database where the use of words, sentence patterns, figures of speech, coherent devices as well as general tones can be searched for in minutes. Once the corpora are established, textual analysis has a good basis and vast possibilities; this makes top-down discourse analysis possible (by top-down I refer to the quantitative aspects of the discourse), for example the frequency of a word in discourse and the possible positivity and negativity in the discourse. This reduces the weakness of cherry picking by supplementing it with a more objective source on a large scale. Findings are more reliable and valid if shown to occur across a large discursive dataset. A corpus approach to discourse analysis guards

against the possibility that discourse analysis in general, could “cherry-pick”, either intentionally or unconsciously (Ryan & Wray, 1997), data or linguistic features which are helpful to prove a preconceived argument.

Second, corpus analysis is data-driven without hypotheses or expectations of what will be found; the patterns emerge through coding of the texts and are accounted for in the analysis. It might lead to hugely different findings compared to the “bottom-up” approach of discourse analysis, which starts with hypotheses. This is also why Chapter 3 has a greater emphasis on corpus analysis while the other chapters have a greater emphasis on comparative discourse analysis.

9.3.2 Limitations of Corpus-Driven Discourse Analysis

The disadvantages of this approach, however, are that data outputs can never be “precise”; this is caused by searching criteria never being perfect as they are designed by humans. If one is searching for synonyms for the economy, each person may generate a different list. In addition, although a text search with customised contexts exist in software such as Nvivo, a machine can never tell the real proportion or coverage of a topic in a certain document as this is largely dependent on the calculation method of coverage. Therefore, there is a risk of a researcher taking a dogmatic approach to the results of the data in analysing the discourse.

For example, queries cannot be designed to count the exact proportion of a theme or topic as in the actual text, the sentences and phrases related to the topic are highly diverse. A long paragraph could be talking about one single but important topic while in the synonym query searching system, this is counted as the topic appearing only once. Similarly, there are cases where a short paragraph, or even sentence, contains topic words multiples times and these are therefore counted as multiple frequencies for a certain topic.

The data collection and analyses, as mostly showcased in Chapter 4, involve a process to adjust the original plan, validate part of the feasibility of the interdisciplinary methodology but also to eliminate gradually the parts which are infeasible at this stage due to the author’s limitations in knowledge regarding computer science and especially, natural language processing.

While it’s still not definitive whether a text-based data analysis of official documents can bring substantial benefits to understanding international actors, it is this author’s opinion that by utilising the data analysis, research can be greatly aided, whether traditional or not, in gaining a large amount of material to aid future research endeavours or justify claims made.

There are a couple of methods for gathering documents to create a corpus, none more legitimate than the others, but they have different emphases. One way is the naive gather everything approach. This approach is easy to start off with once you have a data-gathering

method and eases the researchers' burden of frustration and the selection process. The downside to this approach is that it leaves the collective corpora subject to imbalances in the data.

Other methods take a more curated approach to document collection; such approaches require a more finely tuned and more defined selection process, naturally resulting in a much higher burden on the researcher to maintain corpus integrity along the required lines as well as well-founded domain knowledge for the targeted research area which is more in line with this thesis.

9.4 Limitations of the Research

There were several limitations, including the restricted focus on autonomic interactions between China and the EU without consideration of the factors of the third actors such as US influence, the decision-making in merging multidisciplinary research methods, defining and narrowing down the scope of analysis, the limited efforts in longitudinal data derivation and analyses, as well as the implementation of GT, and these will be discussed for the aim of improved future research and as a reference for other researchers.

One weakness of this research is that the role of third parties is not considered due to the limited range and scope. In this case, for example, the US plays an important role and should ideally be discussed in the analysis. One possible way to do this is to conduct discourse analysis for three discourse-makers: China, the EU and the US. This could be realised by establishing corpora on the US's official discourse to China (Corpus US-China), the US's official discourse to the EU (corpus US-EU), and a comparison between Corpus US-China and Corpus EU PPSP, for example. This would involve effort beyond the scope of this research and should be explored in future research.

Decision-making regarding the nature of this research, especially because it is multidisciplinary, has been another challenging aspect. The research has three aims: to understand the challenges in China-EU relations and ultimately contribute to the sustainable development of the bilateral relationship; to explore the potential of applying corpus-driven discourse analysis in IR studies, and to propose an analytical framework for analysing the mismatches in China-EU relations and potentially other bilateral relationships. It has been challenging for this author to decide which focus should be primary as the merge of methodological approaches crosses disciplines and requires a large focus and effort on discussing the compatibility of the ontological, epistemological, theoretical stance and the specific links between IR approaches and corpus-driven linguistics. Within the scope of one thesis, it has been hard to address multiple aims. This leads to limitations in that efforts on the case-based analysis of the specific challenges in China-EU relations have been limited and conceptualisation or theorisation based on the themes emerging from the data could also have been developed further. In other words, the completeness and depth of both the

scope of the application of corpus-driven analysis and China-EU studies in this research had to be compromised due to shared attention for both research questions and aims. However, this author has realised that this is, in a way, unavoidable in multidisciplinary research if corpus-driven discourse analysis is not a conventional approach in China-EU scholarship and issues are addressed in an exploratory manner, paving the way for future research endeavours.

One issue related to this cross-disciplinary endeavour is that during the open coding of discourse data and the emergence of themes, the scopes of analysis expanded in all ways and became hard to control and narrow down. This is helpful for realising the complexity of the study but was extremely challenging for individual research within a limited scope. Further studies applying this approach could be carried out in a more controlled manner with a focus limited to one specific case in bilateral relations.

A relative limitation is that corpora consisting of comprehensive, general guiding documents can assist in the comparison of topics' coverage across corpora. This is beneficial for giving a quick, rough impression of the speaker's discourse emphases and priorities. However, as these comparisons are based on word frequency searches, the design of queries and the quantity of the corpora,⁴⁵ the disregard of theme-specific discourse could lead to inaccuracies in data output. This kind of corpora of general policy papers seems to contribute to giving a fuller range of potential factors besides the challenges as well as opportunities in a bilateral relationship but this is not the best type of corpora to contribute to understanding specific cases in a bilateral relationship. For case-specific analysis, for example, the trade disputes between China and the EU, discourses which are focused on the theme, including trade documents and dialogue on the economic forum between China and the EU should be applied instead. Further research, if aiming at specific cases in China-EU relations, should consider establishing specialised corpora on specific themes and be concentrated on a limited number of cases.

Regarding the longitudinal perspective of the analysis, which is supported by corpus-driven discourse analysis, the thesis applies data across the twenty-five years and discusses the changes in the discourse over the period. The longitudinal perspective of this thesis manifests in two ways. The first is corpus-based searches, which lead to trend lines of word coverage across the years. The other is the content analysis which contains both earlier discourse and more recent discourse based on the corpus. However, the chronicle analysis in some of the chapters may seem to be focusing more on recent years. This is potentially due to a few factors including the larger amount discourse in more recent years due to the

⁴⁵ Although the size of corpora does not theoretically affect the word coverage, the bigger the corpora, the more it contributes to impartial data but, as in specialised corpora, the size of corpora might be too small or incomplete for outputting a full range of data.

availability of more organised official discourse from China on the EU in recent years and on China's delegation to the EU, and the author's subconscious focus on more recent trends in the discourse. Future research incorporating corpus-driven analysis, especially for corpora holding a large amount of data, should be in a better position to carry out longitudinal analysis with equal attention paid to each episode of the researched period.

The coding of the discourse data in this thesis is not only derived from constant comparison of the corpus and searching for items such as word frequency and collocations among other language features but also influenced by the topics and themes of China-EU scholarship. This is good in the sense that topics and themes were chosen in the thesis which are more engaged with the existing literature, but could lead to the problem that the selection, organisation of data and the themes derived from them are not entirely intact from the author's existing understanding and knowledge of the field. If the grounded theory approach is carried out in a stricter manner, the open coding could have been done in a more unrestricted way so that the theme arising from the corpora was less bound to the existing debated topics regarding China-EU relations.

Lastly, the thesis focuses on the European Union as a whole entity instead of focusing on the individual member states. This is not to say that member states are not relevant to China-EU relations, but the research was more interested in the produced policies of the EU instead of the process of policymaking. Further research could consider the divergence among member states and different institutions in the EU more.

9.5 Policy Implications

Before 2006, the EU did not realise that its objectives in engaging with China were bound to fail as China holds a firm stance about protecting its political style and values and this is China's bottom line. Any cooperation is considered with the condition that this bottom line is respected. One China is respected. When the EU, or MS, cross over the line, the economy and trade will be severely affected. In recent years, the EU has shifted gradually to a more realist approach with China, claiming that it will be more pragmatic with China. Compared to the past, this is a big improvement as it indicates that the EU is prepared to compromise its original goals of promoting its political values in China and has started to accept the fact that China will not, and has never intended to be impacted by the EU in that sense. Focusing on economic cooperation is welcomed by China.

However, this does not mean the EU's approach has matured to the stage where opinions are integrated within the EU. Critiques about the EU being "pragmatic" have also arisen. The doubts from the European side indicate that understanding of what is a functional, or pragmatic approach are not clearly defined, and there is not necessarily consensus between China and the EU. While both hope to expand common economic interests, the EU should avoid understanding China's engagement style with the EU as an "economy only" style as

China's Wu Shi style has richer and multi-faceted connotations which go beyond a mere calculated approach. Perhaps the best official translation of China's Wu Shi approach is not Pragmatic, but down-to-earth, or mutual trust and win-win, focusing on implementation. Although there is not a perfect word to encompass the full range of connotations of Wu Shi as well as China's general diplomatic approach, efforts should be made to explain China's approach to the EU better and take account of China's understanding of international orders and China's top design of its foreign policy. The EU should avoid swinging from one extreme of attempting to change China as the EU wanted to another extreme which is to engage with China merely on a benefits-oriented style without mutual trust. The EU should be more open to engaging China comprehensively and mutually contributing to each other in terms of social development with respect for each other's bottom lines.

Both sides should avoid having double standards. The EU, while promoting some of its values to the world, should be prepared to reform its own values according to the changes and needs of the society. China, while protecting itself from the EU's influence in unwanted areas, should also understand the history and nature of the EU as an organisation established on a certain set of rules and the fact that the EU's actions will be bounded by these values for rather a long time and it is unrealistic to expect the EU to transform its ideas.

In the past, the EU's efforts in promoting its values in China did not work very well. The next step after a "pragmatic" engagement style is for both sides to be more open and trustful with each other and establish a rule-based, multilateral mechanism to protect the priorities and bottom lines of both sides.

While the official Chinese discourse never attempts to promote Chinese values to the world, it is suggested that in some cases, stating China's values clearly and firmly does help clarify the misunderstandings. The less China explains itself, the harder it is for the EU to understand. Chinese values and understanding of the world could also complement the EU's values and norms and facilitate the EU's development in the next stage.

China and the EU should also bear in mind their differences as one is a state, and the other is not. The cooperation between the two should be distinguished from that between countries and countries, and focus on areas where the two both desires to develop within the scope of the EU to avoid treating the EU as a country which is beyond the EU's scope of administration and affairs.

China also needs to understand the demarcation between the EU and member states. On the one hand, issues directly related to MS should be negotiated with MS with reference to the EU regarding procedure and respect to the multilateral system. Issues regarding multilateral cooperation and the amelioration of multilateralism should be discussed with the

EU with due respect as the existence of the EU in Europe is one of the main features of China-Europe diplomacy that no one can avoid and deny.

Looking to the future, the development of the engagement styles between China and the EU requires enhanced communication from both sides. While enormous efforts and progress have already been made in human rights, sustainable development, anti-corruption, anti-poverty, and protection of disadvantaged groups such as women and children, both sides should work on expanding common interests and focusing on the shared values and norms with a more targeted, clear communication based on the attitudes of mutual respect and acceptance of differences.

Finally, the uncertainties and the changes in international relations have created vast opportunities but also challenges during the research. In the last few years, the EU has experienced Brexit, which created changes in the EU's identities and its policies. Potentially it also influences the EU's general external action policies as well as its relations with China due to its internal change. Overall, as China supports European integration and China is experienced in terms of unifying the country, there is a good base for the two to explore a constructive structure for the future of the EU. China has also experienced more uncertainties in the international environment alone with China becoming increasingly impactful in the world. The research covers the years from 1994 to 2019. During the years 2017 and 2018, new official discourse between China and the EU has been issued, including the joint statement of the eighth High-Level Dialogue between China and the EU. China has also issued one document titled "Sticking to Multilateralism in the New Era" (Wang, 2018), which relates a lot to the discussion in Chapter 5 of this thesis. The research is based on official discourse and offers a chance to follow the changes in China-EU relations through the attitudes and statements of the official institutions; it paves the way, both content-wise and methodology wise, for future research applying this approach.

9.6 Possible Agenda for Future Research

Several endeavours during this research can be further explored and expanded. For example, I have established the Corpus Joint, which includes the joint press release, joint statement as well as other high-level strategic dialogues between China and the EU. However, since this thesis mainly focuses on comparing China's official discourse to the EU and vice versa, Corpus Joint isn't involved in the analysis. Further research and analysis could be done with this corpus.

In terms of discourse data collection, several archives and discourse resources could be applied in the future for research with similar methods. For example, the European Parliament offers the European Parliament proceedings parallel corpus 1996-2011.⁴⁶ This

⁴⁶ More information available at <https://www.statmt.org/europarl/>. Last accessed on 11/12/2020.

offers several corpora of the European Parliaments' discourse in the official languages of the EU. Unfortunately, the Chinese language corpora on the European parliament proceedings are not available at present. However, in the near future, there is hope that more and more EU discourse could be available in non-EU languages such as Chinese due to the improvement in functions of the locally-based delegation of the EU, such as the EU's delegation to China in Beijing which is starting to offer information about the EU's China policies and activities in the Chinese language in recent years.

Scholars who are better equipped with computer techniques, especially in database and machine learning could try using a web-crawler and web scraper to gather discourse materials on a certain theme. This method can be more effective if one does not have a high requirement for accuracy but instead focuses on the abundant amount of discourse.

As mentioned previously, corpora consisting of comprehensive policy papers and overarching, guiding discourse with multiple aspects of bilateral relations talked about is helpful for generating quick impressions of policy emphases which do not require too much accuracy. However, future research, especially that aiming to explain specific challenges in bilateral relationships, should consider establishing and applying corpora concentrating on the specific topic.

Table Apx 2 The Framework of China-EU Political Dialogues

Meeting & Regularity	Level/People	Place
Annual Summits	the Heads of State or Government President of the European Council and the President of the European Commission, assisted by the European High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy/Vice President of the Commission	alternate in China and Brussels
Annual meetings "executive-to-executive" meetings	President Barroso, accompanied by members of the European Commission and Premier Wen, accompanied by members of the State Council	
Regular political dialogue on strategic and foreign policy issues	the EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy/Vice President of the Commission and the Chinese State Councillor responsible for foreign affairs.	
Meetings when needed in addition to annual meetings in the margins of the United Nations General Assembly.	between the EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy/Vice President of the Commission and the Foreign Minister of China	
Annual meetings	EU and Chinese Political Directors.	alternate between Beijing and Brussels
Annual meetings	EU Director for Asia Pacific affairs and his or her Chinese counterpart on Asian and Pacific issues.	alternate between Beijing and Brussels
Meetings at least once a year on international security, arms control, non-proliferation and export control issues	EU and Chinese experts	
Meetings at least once a year on the control of Small Arms and Light Weapons	EU and Chinese experts	
A meeting every six months	the Minister of Foreign Affairs of China and the Ambassadors from the European Union posted in Beijing.	
A meeting every six months	the EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy Vice President of the Commission and the Ambassador of China to the European Union	

A.2. Corpora and Document Lists

Table Apx 3 is a list of the key policy papers of China and the EU on each other. Apart from this, this section includes the documents lists of the corpora developed for this thesis. Five corpora have been developed for this thesis: Corpus China PPSP, Corpus EU PPSP, Corpus Joint, Corpus China Domestic and Corpus EU Domestic. This section lists the documents included in each of the corpora⁴⁷.

Table Apx 4 shows the documents in Corpus China PPSP. Table Apx 5 shows the documents in Corpus China Domestic. Table Apx 6 shows the document list of Corpus EU PPSP, while Table Apx 7 is the document list of Corpus EU Internal. Plus, a corpus containing the key joint press release and statements is included, as shown in Table Apx 8. Although there was not enough scope to include Corpus Joint into the analysis, the establishment of the corpus contributes to further research.

Table Apx 3 A List of the Key Policy Papers between China and the EU (1994-2019)

Year	The EU's Policy Paper to China	China's Policy Paper to the EU
1994	Towards A New Asia Strategy (Commission of the European Communities, 1994)	
1995	A Long Term Policy for China-Europe Relations (Commission of the European Communities, 1995)	
1998	Building a Comprehensive Partnership with China (Commission of the European Communities, 1998)	
2000	Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the Implementation of the Communication ``Building a Comprehensive Partnership with China" (European Commission, 2000)	
2001	Commission Working Document Country Strategy Paper China (European Commission, 2001)	
2001	EU Strategy towards China Implementation of the 1998 Communication and Future Steps for a More Effective EU Policy (Common Security and Defence Policy Committee on Foreign Affairs, 2001)	

47 Please contact the thesis author if you would like to apply the corpora for research or other purposes

2001	Communication from the Commission— Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships (Commission of the European Communities, 2001)	
2002	Commission Working Document— Country Strategy Paper China (European Commission, 2001)	
2003	Commission Policy Paper for Transmission to the Council and the European Parliament— A Maturing Partnership-Shared Interests and Challenges in EU-China Relations (Commission of the European Communities, 2003)	China's EU Policy Paper 2003 (People.cn, 2003)
2003	National Indicative Programme 2005-2006 China (European Commission, 2003)	
2006	Communication From the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament —EU– China: Closer partners, growing responsibilities (Commission of the European Communities, 2006b)	
2006	& Commission Working Document: Closer Partners, Growing Responsibilities—A policy paper on EU-China trade and investment: Competition and Partnership (European Commission, 2006b)	
	China Strategy Paper 2007-2013 (European Commission, 2006a)	
2010	Mid-term Review National Indicative Programme 2011-2013 (European Commission, 2010)	
2013	EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation (European Commission, 2013)	
2014		China's EU Policy Paper 2014 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2014)
2016	Elements for a new EU strategy on China (European Commission, 2016b)	
2018		China's EU Policy Paper 2018 (Xinhua, 2018)
2019	EU-China -A Strategic Outlook (European Commission, 2019)	

Table Apx 4 Document List of Corpus China PPSP (1994-2019)

Year	Title
1994	李鹏总理在首届亚欧会议上的讲话
1998	朱镕基总理在第二届亚欧会议上的讲话
2001	国务院总理朱镕基在第三届亚欧外长会议闭幕式上的讲话
2002	朱镕基总理在第四届亚欧首脑会议上的讲话-携手共创亚欧合作新局面
2003	中国对欧盟政策文件
2004	温家宝在第五届亚欧首脑会议讲话-加强对话合作深化伙伴关系
	温家宝在第六届亚欧首脑会议上发表讲话-
2006	加深亚欧合作, 共同应对挑战
2008	国家主席胡锦涛在第七届亚欧首脑会议上的讲话(全文)
	中国驻欧盟使团团长宋哲大使在欧洲议会对华关系代表团会议上发表讲话
	中国驻欧盟使团团长说中国发展同欧盟关系的决心和信心不变
	中国驻欧盟使团团长宋哲在欧中学术网络年度晚宴上的讲话
	驻欧盟使团团长宋哲会见欧盟理事会秘书长索拉纳
2009	中国驻欧盟使团团长宋哲大使在中欧社会论坛中欧媒体研讨会上的讲话
	欧盟委员会主席巴罗佐会见我驻欧盟使团团长宋哲
	中国驻欧盟使团团长宋哲大使在欧中关系专家协会会议上的讲话
	中国驻欧盟大使说中欧关系定位应避免盲人摸象
	宋哲中欧关系已形成全方位和多领域的合作格局
	驻欧盟使团团长三个超越助中欧关系健康发展
	驻欧盟使团团长宋哲大使在第十一次中欧领导人会晤成果研讨会上发表主旨讲话
2010	2010 戴秉国与阿什顿 1 日在贵阳举行首次中欧战略对话
	以青春的视角观察青春的中国
	——中国驻欧盟使团团长宋哲大使在与欧洲高校研究生交流时的讲话
	中国驻欧盟使团团长宋哲大使在中欧关系研讨会上的讲话
	张立荣公使出席“中国改革及其对欧盟和世界的影响”研讨会
	温家宝在第八届亚欧首脑会议开幕式上的致辞-推动亚欧合作进程深入向前发展
	中国驻欧盟使团团长宋哲大使在第五次欧洲议会对华关系非正式对话会上发表的主旨讲话
2011	中欧举行第二轮高级别战略对话
	中国驻欧盟使团团长宋哲大使会见欧洲理事会主席范龙佩
	中国驻欧盟使团团长: 对欧投资始终坚持互利共赢
	中国驻欧盟使团团长: 中欧伙伴关系独树一帜
	中国驻欧盟使团团长宋哲: 对中美合作充满信心
	中国驻欧盟使团团长宋哲大使在欧洲议会“中国故事”图片展开幕式上的讲话
	驻欧盟使团团长宋哲大使在文化中国·锦绣四川欧洲行高层会议上的讲话
2012	温家宝在第九届亚欧首脑会议上的主旨发言 共同担负起促进世界经济稳定增长的重任
	——在亚欧首脑会议上的主旨发言
	王家瑞会见欧盟外交与安全政策高级代表阿什顿
	第三轮中欧高级别战略对话在京举行
2013	习近平会见欧洲理事会主席范龙佩和欧盟委员会主席巴罗佐
	商务部部长高虎城在《议会》杂志中国专刊发表署名文章
	李克强 推动中欧全面战略伙伴关系不断取得新发展
	中国驻欧盟使团团长吴海龙大使会见欧洲议会左翼联盟党团主席齐默尔
	中国驻欧盟使团团长吴海龙大使在《人民日报》发表文章
	中国驻欧盟使团团长吴海龙大使在《议会》杂志中国专刊发表署名文章
	中国驻欧盟使团团长吴海龙大使接受《外交世界》杂志专访
	第三届“中欧论坛”成功举行

2014	2014 中国驻欧盟使团团长杨燕怡大使会见欧洲议会左翼联盟党团主席齐默尔
	中国驻欧盟使团团长杨燕怡大使会见欧盟对外行动署首席运营官奥沙利文
	2014 中国驻欧盟使团团长杨燕怡大使拜会欧盟外交与安全政策高级代表阿什顿办公室主任莫里森
	2014 中国驻欧盟使团团长杨燕怡大使拜会欧盟委员会主席巴罗佐办公室副主任兼外事顾问索布拉尔
	2014 中欧举行第四轮高级别战略对话
	2014 国务院副总理马凯会见欧盟委员会副主席兼经济与货币事务委员雷恩
	2014 杨燕怡大使出席欧盟智库研讨会就习近平主席访欧及中欧关系发表演讲
	2014 杨燕怡大使向欧洲理事会主席范龙佩递交国书
	2014 中国外长王毅在《新欧洲》发表署名文章《中国的发展让世界更精彩》
	2014 中国驻欧盟使团团长杨燕怡大使会见欧委会教育、文化、语言多样性和青年事务委员瓦西利乌
	2014 中国驻欧盟使团团长杨燕怡大使向欧盟委员会主席巴罗佐递交国书
	2014 中国驻欧盟使团团长杨燕怡大使就习近平主席访问欧盟总部接受中外媒体采访
	2014 习近平会见欧洲议会议长舒尔茨
	2014 习近平会见欧盟委员会主席巴罗佐
	2014 习近平同欧洲理事会主席范龙佩举行会谈
	2014 习近平致电祝贺图斯克当选欧洲理事会主席
	深化互利共赢的中欧全面战略伙伴关系 ——中国对欧盟政策文件
	习近平在欧洲学院的演讲(全文)
	习近平在比利时《晚报》发表署名文章--中欧友谊和合作：让生活越来越好
	中华人民共和国国务院总理李克强在第十届亚欧首脑会议第一次全会上的发言
	张高丽会见欧盟委员会主席巴罗佐
	李克强致电祝贺图斯克当选欧洲理事会主席
	欧洲理事会主席范龙佩会见杨洁篪
2015	中共友好代表团访问欧盟宣介十八届四中全会精神
	中国国务院总理李克强同欧盟领导人互致贺电庆祝中欧建交40周年
	加强互联互通合作 打造亚欧大陆的光明未来 ——外交部副部长王超在第十二届亚欧外长会上的发言
	外交部副部长王超会见欧洲议会欧中友好小组主席德瓦
	外交部长王毅和欧盟外交和安全政策高级代表费代丽卡·莫盖里尼发表署名文章庆祝中欧建交40周年
	张德江同欧洲议会议长互致贺电庆祝中欧建交40周年
	王毅：中国 - 中东欧国家合作 遵循平等相待、互利共赢、包容开放原则
	王毅谈当前中国外交几个问题
	第十二届亚欧外长会主席声明--共同打造可持续和安全的未来
	中欧举行第五轮高级别战略对话
2016	李克强出席第十一届亚欧首脑会议并发言（媒体总结）
	李克强在第十一届亚欧首脑会议上 的发言（全文）
	王毅会见欧盟外交与安全政策高级代表莫盖里尼
	王毅盘点 2015 年中国外交和中欧关系
	中国驻欧盟使团团长杨燕怡大使在《人民日报》发表文章
	习近平会见欧洲理事会主席图斯克和欧盟委员会主席容克
	李克强与欧洲理事会主席图斯克、欧盟委员会主席容克共同主持第十八次中国欧盟领导人会晤
	李克强出席第十一届亚欧首脑会议并发言
	杨洁篪会见欧盟委员会主席容克
	王毅会见欧盟轮值主席国斯洛伐克外长来恰克
	第六轮中欧高级别战略对话在布鲁塞尔举行
	驻欧盟使团团长杨燕怡大使向第六届中欧论坛致贺信

2017	李克强在第12届中欧工商峰会上的演讲--共同奏响高水平互利合作新乐章（全文）
	第七轮中欧高级别战略对话在京举行
	专访中国驻欧盟使团团长杨燕怡：中欧合作做大共同利益的蛋糕
	李克强会见欧盟委员会副主席、外交与安全政策高级代表莫盖里尼
	驻欧盟使团团长张明大使会见欧盟对外行动署副秘书长贝利亚
	驻欧盟使团团长张明大使在欧盟媒体撰文 解读十九大与中欧关系--新时代 新机遇
2018	中欧举行第八轮高级别战略对话
	刘鹤副总理在第七次中欧经贸高层对话后与欧委会卡泰宁副主席共见记者时的讲话
	王毅：新时代应坚持多边主义
	王毅：希望我们的合作伙伴言而有信
	欧盟委员会主席容克会见王毅
	王毅：中欧应具备和提高历史自觉和时代担当
	王毅回应欧洲对“16+1 合作”的担忧
	王毅：希望我们的合作伙伴言而有信
	王毅：遵守国际协议是国际法基本常识
	2018 中国对欧盟政策文件
2019	王毅会见欧盟外交与安全政策高级代表莫盖里尼
	求同存异、凝聚共识——第九届中欧论坛将在布鲁塞尔举办
	携手推动中欧关系在新时期迈上新台阶
	求同存异、凝聚共识——第九届中欧论坛在布鲁塞尔成功举办
	王毅：中欧之间合作仍是主流，共赢才是目标

Table Apx 5 Document List of Corpus China Domestic

Name
1997 十五大报告
2003 十六大报告
2004 中国对多极化发展的看法
2004 中国对当前国际形势的看法
2005 中国的和平发展道路
2005 中共中央关于制定国民经济和社会发展第十一个五年规划的建议
2006 中国外交政策
2006 当前国际形势
2006 中国有关国际秩序的主张
2007 关于社会主义初级阶段的历史任务和我国对外政策的几个问题（中英文）
2007 十七大报告
2009 互利共赢的开放战略
2009 和谐世界
2010 中共中央关于制定国民经济和社会发展第十二个五年规划的建议
2012 十八大报告
2015 中共中央关于制定国民经济和社会发展第十三个五年规划的建议
2016 发展权：中国的理念、实践与贡献
2017 十九大报告
2019 新时代的中国与世界

Table Apx 6 A list of the Documents in Corpus EU PPSP (1994-2019)

Year	Document Title
1994	A New Asia Strategy
1995	A Long Term Policy for China-Europe Relations
1998	Building a Comprehensive Partnership with China
2000	REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT on the Implementation of the Communication "Building a Comprehensive Partnership with China"
2001	Commission Working Document Country Strategy Paper China National Indicative Programme 2002-2004 China
	COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT EU Strategy towards China: Implementation of the 1998 Communication and Future Steps for a more Effective EU Policy
	COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships
2003	COMMISSION POLICY PAPER FOR TRANSMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT A maturing partnership - shared interests and challenges in EU-China relations (Updating the European Commission's Communications on EU-China relations of 1998 and 2001)
2004	NATIONAL INDICATIVE PROGRAMME 2005-2006 CHINA
2006	COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT EU – China: Closer partners, growing responsibilities
	COMMISSION WORKING DOCUMENT Accompanying COM(2006) 631 final: Closer Partners, Growing Responsibilities A policy paper on EU-China trade and investment: Competition and Partnership CHINA Strategy Paper 2007-2013
2010	Introductory remarks by Herman VAN ROMPUY President of the European Council at the EU-China Summit Opening remarks by President Barroso at the opening ceremony of the first EU-China High Level Cultural Forum
	DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION INSTRUMENT PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA MID-TERM REVIEW NATIONAL INDICATIVE PROGRAMME 2011-2013
	Remarks by Herman Van Rompuy, President of the European Council, and José Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission, following the EU-China summit Speech by President Barroso at the EU China Business Summit Peoples of yesterday, peoples of tomorrow: 35 years of EU/China relations
2012	Herman Van Rompuy, President of the European Council Speech to the EU-CHINA Business Summit 2012 High Representative Catherine Ashton meets the Defence Minister of China Opening remarks by President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy at the 15th EU-China Summit NDRIS PIEBALGS European Commissioner for Development Opening remarks at the 1st EU-China Mayors' Forum / Brussels Catherine Ashton meets the Defence Minister of China Speech by President Barroso: "A story of European endurance and perseverance"
	Statement by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton following the third High Level Strategic Dialogue with China Statement by President Barroso following the 14th EU-China Summit
2015	REPORT on EU-China relations (2015/2003(INI)) Committee on Foreign Affairs
2016	JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Elements for a new EU strategy on China
2017	Remarks by the High Representative Mogherini following the 7th EU-China Strategic Dialogue "Europe and Asia - building a Cooperative Global Order". Speech by the HR/VP Federica Mogherini at Tsinghua University Belt and Road Forum – EU common messages EU-China Summit: moving forward with our global partnership

2018	Speech by EU Ambassador to China at Global Times Diplomats Forum on 40th Anniversary of Reform and Opening-Up
	Remarks by High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini at the joint press point with Wang Yi, State Councillor and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China following the EU-China Strategic Dialogue
	EU-China Summit: deepening the strategic global partnership
	Press Statement by European Council President Donald Tusk following the 20th EU-China Summit
	Joint statement of the 20th EU-China Summit
	EU-CHINA LEADERS' STATEMENT ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND CLEAN ENERGY
	EU steps up its strategy for connecting Europe and Asia
	Explaining the European Union's approach to connecting Europe and Asia
	JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE, THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS AND THE EUROPEAN INVESTMENT BANK
	Connecting Europe and Asia - Building blocks for an EU Strategy
	Connecting Europe and Asia – Building blocks for an EU strategy - Council conclusions (15 October 2018)
	Remarks by President Donald Tusk at the opening ceremony of the 12th ASEM summit
	Speech by President Donald Tusk at the gala dinner of the ASEM summit
	Closing remarks by President Donald Tusk at the 12th ASEM summit
	Official Journal of the European Union Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on 'Joint Communication to the European
	Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the European Investment Bank — Connecting Europe and Asia — Building blocks for an EU Strategy'
	Report on the state of EU-China relations (2017/2274(INI)) Committee on Foreign Affairs
	OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE
	OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE ENVIRONMENT, PUBLIC HEALTH AND FOOD SAFETY
2019	EU-China Summit: Rebalancing the Strategic Partnership
	EU-China Strategic Outlook: Commission Contribution to the European Council (21-22 March 2019)
	European Commission and HR/VP Contribution to the European Council
	Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council
	EU-China- A Strategic Outlook
	Remarks of President Juncker at the joint press conference with Mr Li Keqiang, Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, and Mr Donald Tusk, President of the European Council, following the EU-China Summit
	HR/VP Federica Mogherini visits Beijing to discuss bilateral relations and foreign policy cooperation
	Commission reviews relations with China, proposes 10 actions

Table Apx 7 A Document List of Corpus EU Internal

Year
1997 Treaty of Amsterdam
2001 Treaty of Nice
2003 The European Union and the United Nations The choice of multilateralism
2007 Treaty of Lisbon
2010 2009 Annual Report from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the European Parliament
2010 A Twelve-point EU Action Plan in Support of the Millennium Development Goals
2010 Europe 2020 A European Strategy for smart sustainable and inclusive growth
2011 EU Cohesion Policy 2014- 2020 Investing in Growth and Jobs
2011 Main Aspects and Basic Choices of the CFSP 2010
2012 Main Aspects and Basic Choices of the CFSP 2011
2013 Council Decision on 2013755 EU of 25 November 2013 on the association of the overseas countries and territories with the EU
2013 Main Aspects and Basic Choices of the CFSP 2012
2014 EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on the European Year for Development
2014 Main Aspects and Basic Choices of the CFSP 2013
2015 Main Aspects and Basic Choices of the CFSP 2014
2015 Sustainable Development Goals and the Agenda2030
2015 The EU's Contribution to the Millennium Development Goals
2016 0709 Speech of the HR and VP Mogherini at the Warsaw Summit Experts' Forum
2016 1010 Speech by Federica Mogherini at the Public Seminar EU as A Global Actor
2016 1017 Council Conclusions on the Global Strategy on the EU's Foreign and Security Policy
2016 1021 European Council meeting 20 and 21 October 2016 Conclusions
2016 Shared Vision Common Action A Stronger Europe A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign And Security Policy
2016 Speech by HR and VP Mogherini at the EUISS Annual Conference Towards an EU Global Strategy Final Stage
2016 Speech by HRVP Mogherini at the EUISS Annual EU Global Strategy Towards the Final Stage
2016 Speech by the HR and VP Federica Mogherini at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
2017 0913 The State of the Union 2017 Catching the Wind in our Sails
2017 60 Years of EU in the World
2017 A Global Strategy for the European Union
2017 European Consensus on Development One World Our Dignity Our Future
2017 Future of Europe European Parliament sets out its vision
2017 Implementing the EU Global Strategy Year 1
2018 Implementing the EU Global Strategy Year Two
2019 EU Action to Strengthen Rules-based Multilateralism Council Conclusions
2019 Speech by High Representative VicePresident Federica Mogherini at the Conference Walking the Strategic Talk A Progress Report
2019 Speech by High Representative VicePresident Federica Mogherini on Implementing the EU Global Strategy Challenges and Opportunities
2019 Statement on the International Day of Multilateralism and Diplomacy for Peace
2019 The EU's Global Strategy Three Years On Looking Forward
20190620 A New Strategic Agenda 2019-2024
20190715 EU priorities at the United Nations and the 74th United Nations General Assembly Adopted

Corpus Joint includes the inexhaustive joint press release and statements made by both China and the EU on different occasions but mostly from EU-China summits.

Table Apx 8 List of Documents in Corpus Joint (Joint Statement, Press Release and Other Joint Documents Between China and the EU from 1994-2019)

2001	Joint Press Statement of the Fourth EU-China Summit
2002	Joint Statement of the Fifth EU-China Summit
2003	Joint Statement of the Sixth EU-China Summit
2004	Joint Statement of the Seventh EU-China Summit
2005	Joint Statement of the Eighth EU-China Summit
2006	Joint statement of the Nineth EU-China summit
2007	Joint Statement of the Tenth China-EU Summit Beijing
2009	Eleventh EU-China Summit Prague Joint Press Communique
2009	Joint Statement of the Twelveth EU-China Summit Nanjing
2010	Thirteenth EU-China Summit Joint Press Communiqué
2012	Joint Declaration on the First Round of the EU-China High Level People to People Dialogue
2012	Joint Press Communiqué 15th EU-China Summit Towards a Stronger EU-China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership
2012	Joint Press Communiqué of the 14th EU-China Summit
2012	Joint Press Release after the 3rd EU-China High-level Strategic Dialogue
2012	Press Statement by President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy and President of the European Commission Jose Manuel Barroso Following the 15th EU-China Summit
2013	Joint Declaration on EU-China Cultural Cooperation
2014	Joint Communiqué of the Second Meeting for the EU-China High-Level People-to-People Dialogue
2014	Joint Statement Deepening the EU-China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership for mutual benefit
2015	China-EU Summit Joint Statement The Way Forward After Forty Years of China-EU Cooperation
2015	Joint Statement on The Third Round of The EU-China High Level People-to-People Dialogue
2017	List of Outcomes of the 19th China
2018	Joint Statement of the 20th EU-China Summit

Table Apx 9 Top 50 Verbs of Corpus LOB

Corpus: LOB_lemma.csv 47890 units 1007677 tokens		
Type	Frequency: 01 - Freq	Dispersion: 01_CV
be_verb	40986	0.124279
have_verb	13165	0.193323
not_adverb	5458	0.177387
do_verb	3437	0.31636
say_verb	3032	0.650974
would_verb	2650	0.32862
when_adverb	2544	0.205856
make_verb	2469	0.111093
will_verb	2169	0.464664
go_verb	2090	0.60957
can_verb	1960	0.383335
so_adverb	1945	0.231846
take_verb	1827	0.22928
out_adverb	1731	0.372992
up_adverb	1728	0.416314
know_verb	1656	0.593208
as_adverb	1634	0.180945
come_verb	1621	0.508312
see_verb	1599	0.501983
could_verb	1598	0.485809
then_adverb	1527	0.55608
give_verb	1521	0.225629
only_adverb	1486	0.20804
now_adverb	1484	0.311655
get_verb	1394	0.581688
may_verb	1316	0.632792
should_verb	1263	0.490017
well_adverb	1216	0.268597
think_verb	1181	0.685461
find_verb	1181	0.252918
must_verb	1114	0.239029
more_adverb	1100	0.215419
very_adverb	1071	0.270167
where_adverb	1031	0.27128
use_verb	1004	0.626113
also_adverb	994	0.539326
look_verb	978	0.825401
even_adverb	971	0.255542
seem_verb	929	0.366546
too_adverb	920	0.34248
do n't_verb adverb	868	1.014114
tell_verb	865	0.672059
just_adverb	822	0.579654
still_adverb	811	0.195017
there_adverb	804	0.416863
down_adverb	801	0.66409
leave_verb	766	0.465477
show_verb	764	0.45973

Figure Apx 1 Two Documents on China's View of Multipolarity: the Chinese Version and the English Version.

Two Original Documents on China's View of Multipolarity: the Chinese version and the English version. The English version is not a direct translation of the Chinese document.

中国对多极化发展的看法

当前,国际形势正在发生复杂而深刻的变化,但世界走向多极化的趋势并未改变。全世界近 200 个国家、60 多亿人口,在民族传统、宗教文化、经济水平、政治制度等方面的情况千差万别,很难想象用一种模式、一种价值观来统一,由一个国家来“领导”。《联合国宪章》所确定的关于主权平等、互不干涉内政等国际关系基本准则绝没有过时。各国的历史文化、社会制度和发展模式应该得到尊重。多极化的进程可能曲折、漫长并充满斗争,但这是不以人的意志为转移的历史趋势,它符合大多数国家的共同意愿与利益,有利于世界和平与安全。我们推动世界向多极化方向发展,并非针对特定国家,也不是要重演历史上列强争霸的旧剧,而是推动国际关系的民主化,促进世界各种力量在平等互利的基础上,加强协调对话,不搞对抗,共同维护世界的和平、稳定与发展 (Consulate General of the People's Republic of China in Sydney, 2003)。

China's View on the Development of Multi-polarity

2000/11/15

Since the end of the Cold War, the world has moved towards multi-polarity, and the international situation on the whole has become more relaxed. This is an objective tendency independent of people's will, reflecting the trend of the development of the present era. Multi-polarization on the whole helps weaken and curb hegemonism and power politics, serves to bring about a just and equitable new international political and economic order and contributes to world peace and development.

However, we have also noticed that over a period of time, world forces have become increasingly out of balance, hegemonism and power politics have further developed and regional crises have occurred frequently. This shows that the move towards multi-polarization of the world is a tortuous and long process.

At present, by virtue of its economic, technological and military advantages, an individual country is pursuing a new "gunboat policy" in contravention of the United Nations Charter and the universally acknowledged principles governing international relations in an attempt to establish a monopolar world under its guidance. This is against the tide of history and is doomed to failure. Innumerable historical facts demonstrate that hegemonism may hold away for a time, but it cannot wreak havoc for a long time. China is firmly opposed any form of hegemonism and power politics. China is ready, together with the international community, to safeguard world peace and stability and make joint efforts to bring about a just and equitable new international political and economic order (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2000).

A.3. Query Designs for the Topic Coverage Searches

The text search for topic coverages in Chapter four could contain terms which are partially overlapping. For example, one could argue that energy in the topic of Environment and Energy could contain some overlapping contents with the topic Security. However, the searches are designed so that they reflect the hot topics in literature and the official statements of China and the EU on their priorities, or aspects of interests on the introductory pages of their official website. It is not possible for topics not to overlap each other. Therefore, the coverage counted by text searching should be viewed as references for the importance of the topic instead of absolute figures measuring the importance of the topics. However, the changes of the coverage of one topic of the years, as well as the overall ranking of one topic among the top topic list are valid because searching criteria stay the same for each year and are identically written for Corpus China PPSP and Corpus EU PPSP.

Once the topics are set, the next question this chapter will look at is that among these common interests represented by the sixteen most frequency topics, which ones are the more important ones for each side? What are China and the EU's preference among their favourite topics? In order to get data for this, the first step is to define the searching criteria for the topic coverages. Each attempt of keywords searches based on designed selection criteria through Nvivo is called a query. The design of queries is crucial for reliable and meaningful data output. The goal is to extract the texts related to these sixteen topics, avoiding double counts or miss counts as much as possible.

The following two tables show the queries designed and applied for searching topic coverages in Corpus EU PPSP and Corpus China PPSP. Taking the query for Economy and Trade in EU PPSP for example, in order to retrieve all the related texts to this topic, the keywords set "econom* OR trad* OR business OR commerce* OR finance* OR tax OR tariff OR invest* OR deficit OR budget OR savings" were searched for in Corpus EU PPSP through Nvivo. Wildcards are applied to search for words with the same stems and in different tenses and forms. Running this query leads to the output of a frequency of economy and trade-related topics in the applied document. Queries are designed in similar ways for the rest fourteen most discussed topics in EU-China relations.

A few details were considered in designing the queries:

The first is the choice of the synonyms: the synonyms are selected based on Oxford Thesaurus Online. Although words other than synonyms are included in the queries, synonyms are the first groups of words to go for when designing the queries.

The second is the usage of wildcards. Nvivo (updated to version 12) does not allow searches for stemmed words while wild cards are used. When wildcards are involved, only searches for "exact matches" are allowed. Plus, wildcards are not permitted when phrases are

involved in the queries (“Sciences and Technology”, for example, includes the phrases “artificial intelligence”). In these cases, words with the same stemmed were searched for to compensate for the potential loss of relevant words.

Third, Wildcards does not work for Chinese corpus in Nvivo. Therefore, queries for China PPSP do not involve wildcards. Compensations for potential loss of words were done through manually putting in as many synonyms as possible.

Last, Nvivo has to be re-set to different language mode in “project language” as the parsing for Chinese and English requires different modes.

Other than these difference in details for the designing of the queries, the queries for China PPSP are basically translations of the queries designed for EU PPSP in order to make the searches as identical as possible for both corpora so that the output of data can be comparable.

Table Apx 10 Query Design for the Coverage of Selected Eleven Hot Topics in Corpus EU PPSP

Topics	EU PPSP	Searching Criteria
1Economy and Trade	econom* OR trad* OR business OR commerc* OR financ* OR tax OR tariff OR invest* OR deficit OR budget OR savings	wild card; exact matches
2Communication	communicat* OR exchang* OR dialogue* OR talk* OR negotiat* OR debat* OR discuss* OR agree* OR disagree* OR consensus OR speak OR spoke OR spoken OR contact* OR convers* OR correspond* OR connect* OR intercommunicate OR convey* OR transmi* OR mediat*	wild card; exact matches
3Politics	politics OR political OR diplomatic OR diplomacy OR policy OR international OR affairs OR relations OR relationship OR "foreign affairs" OR "international affairs" OR "foreign relations" OR "international relations" OR "domestic affairs" OR "foreign policy"	no wild card; with stemmed words
4Laws and Regulations	law* OR rule* OR regulat* OR judic* OR standard* OR order* OR principl* OR legal* OR qualif* OR legitima* OR norm* OR quality OR certif* OR constitut* OR legislat* OR juris* OR charter OR edict* OR command* or code	wild card; exact matches
5Environment and Energy	environment* OR energy OR climate OR warming OR green* OR wind OR water OR electric* OR pollut* OR natur* OR gas OR CO2 OR emission* OR air OR recycl* OR clean*	wild card; exact matches
6Society and Social Issues	soci* OR insurance OR organisation OR labo* OR employ* OR Health* OR immigrat* OR crim* OR pension* OR hous* OR public	wild card; exact matches
7Security and Defence	securit* OR defen* OR militar* OR arm* OR safety OR peace* OR territor* OR protect* OR guard* OR safeguard* OR weapon* OR force OR navy	wild card; exact matches
8Education and Research	educat* OR tutor* OR school* OR coach* OR training* OR learn* OR research* OR stud* OR university OR exam OR academi* OR journal OR publication OR scholar* OR graduate* OR teach*	wild card; exact matches
9Reform	reform OR revolution* OR improve* OR amend* OR correct* OR renovat* OR rectif* OR amelior* OR reconstruct* OR remodel* OR reconstitut* OR emend*	wild card; exact matches
10Science and Technology	technology OR technological OR tech OR science OR scientific OR cloud OR data OR digit OR digital OR virtual OR computer OR cyber OR internet OR AI OR "artificial intelligence" OR "big data" OR "data mining" OR robot OR robotic OR "mobile phone" OR "2g" OR "3g" OR "4g" OR "5g" OR "6g" OR "deep learning" OR "maching learning" OR "data science"	no wild card; with stemmed words
11Culture	cultur* OR civiliz* OR art* OR heritage OR music* OR architectur* OR museum OR exhibition	wild card; exact matches

Table Apx 11 Query Design for the Coverage of Selected Eleven Hot Topics in Corpus China PPSP

Topics	China PPSP	Searching Criteria
1) 经济与贸易 (Economy and Trade)	经济 OR 经贸 OR 贸易 OR 交易 OR 商业 OR 经商 OR 商务 OR 商人 OR 商贸 OR 财经 OR 财政 OR 金融 OR 税收 OR 税务 OR 投资 OR 赤字 OR 预算 OR 储蓄 OR 关税	no wild card; exact matches
2) 交流与对话 (Communication and Dialogue)	辩论 OR 讨论 OR 同意 OR 不同意 OR 达成一致 OR 讲话 OR 交谈 OR 接触 OR 联系 OR 谈话 OR 交流 OR 交换 OR 表达 OR 回应 OR 传达 OR 转达 OR 斡旋 OR 协调 OR 调解	no wild card; exact matches
3) 政治和外交 (Politics and Diplomacy)	政治 OR 外交 OR 政策 OR 国际事务 OR 内政 OR 国际关系 OR 对外政策	no wild card; exact matches
4) 法律和规范 (Laws and Regulations)	法律 OR 规则 OR 规定 OR 司法 OR 审判 OR 标准 OR 秩序 OR 原则 OR 法规 OR 法制 OR 依法治国 OR 法治 OR 质检 OR 规范 OR 合法性 OR 食品安全 OR 质量 OR 资格证	no wild card; exact matches
5) 环境与能源 (Environment and Energy)	环境 OR 能源 OR 环保 OR 气候 OR 全球变暖 OR 绿色 OR 风能 OR 水能 OR 电能 OR 核能 OR 污染 OR 自然 OR 温室气体 OR 二氧化碳 OR 碳排放 OR 空气 OR 气体 OR 节能 OR 减排 OR 回收 OR 清洁	no wild card; exact matches
6) 社会 (Society and Social issues)	社会 OR 社保 OR 社会保险 OR 社会保障 OR 低保 OR 非政府组织 OR 劳动力 OR 雇佣 OR 就业 OR 健康 OR 移民 OR 犯罪 OR 罪犯 OR 退休金 OR 保险金 OR 保险 OR 房屋 OR 房价 OR 房地产 OR 公共安全	no wild card; exact matches
7) 安全与国防 (Security and Defence)	安全 OR 防御 OR 国防 OR 军事 OR 部队 OR 武装 OR 武器 OR 武力 OR 和平 OR 保卫 OR 国土 OR 领土 OR 陆军 OR 海军 OR 空军	no wild card; exact matches
8) 教育与科研 (Education and Research)	教育 OR 教研 OR 教学 OR 留学 OR 教师 OR 导师 OR 学校 OR 教练 OR 学生 OR 交换生 OR 训练 OR 学历 OR 探索 OR 学习 OR 大学 OR 考试 OR 考核 OR 专家 OR 科研 OR 创新 OR 研究 OR 研发	no wild card; exact matches
9) 改革 (Reform)	改革 OR 变革 OR 转型 OR 提高 OR 改善 OR 改正 OR 更新 OR 修正 OR 完善 OR 重组 OR 调整 OR 重建	no wild card; exact matches
10) 科技 (Techonology)	科技 OR 数字 OR 数码 OR 虚拟 OR 电脑 OR 计算机 OR 网络 OR 互联网 OR 云端 OR 人工智能 OR 大数据 OR 数据挖掘 OR 机器人 OR 手机 OR "2g" OR "3g" OR "4g" OR "5g" OR "6g" OR 深度学习 OR 机器学习 OR 数字科学	no wild card; exact matches
11) 文化与艺术 (Culture)	文化 OR 文明 OR 艺术 OR 遗产 OR 音乐 OR 建筑 OR 博物馆 OR 展览	no wild card; exact matches

A.4. Wordlists, Words in Context and Collocations

Table Apx 12 Top fifty Frequency Words in Corpus China PPSP and Corpus EU PPSP

China PPSP				EU PPSP		
	Word	Count	Weighted Percentage (%)	Word	Count	Weighted Percentage (%)
1	中国	1466	1.91	china	4710	2.56
2	合作	1323	1.72	european	1162	0.63
3	发展	1245	1.62	economic	1092	0.59
4	关系	934	1.22	development	1064	0.58
5	欧盟	811	1.06	chinese	1044	0.57
6	世界	554	0.72	cooperation	894	0.49
7	中欧	552	0.72	trade	861	0.47
8	国际	526	0.69	also	827	0.45
9	双方	520	0.68	asia	809	0.44
10	经济	516	0.67	policy	802	0.44
11	共同	502	0.65	programme	760	0.41
12	欧洲	480	0.63	operation	734	0.40
13	加强	426	0.55	dialogue	707	0.38
14	战略	346	0.45	rights	684	0.37
15	领域	345	0.45	human	639	0.35
16	推动	342	0.45	global	638	0.35
17	交流	338	0.44	international	627	0.34
18	和平	324	0.42	support	613	0.33
19	对话	323	0.42	world	593	0.32
20	问题	312	0.41	social	585	0.32
21	重要	294	0.38	commission	563	0.31
22	促进	292	0.38	investment	547	0.30
23	会议	274	0.36	new	539	0.29
24	贸易	274	0.36	europe	537	0.29
25	伙伴	272	0.35	issues	533	0.29
26	全面	262	0.34	countries	523	0.28
27	国家	253	0.33	reform	507	0.28
28	积极	240	0.31	areas	503	0.27
29	相互	232	0.30	environmental	475	0.26
30	投资	231	0.30	energy	469	0.26
31	政策	217	0.28	political	456	0.25
32	社会	215	0.28	union	450	0.24
33	改革	214	0.28	security	445	0.24
34	稳定	211	0.27	sustainable	426	0.23
35	主席	208	0.27	market	417	0.23
36	维护	208	0.27	level	416	0.23
37	支持	204	0.27	implementation	412	0.22
38	中方	193	0.25	including	409	0.22
39	地区	181	0.24	relations	399	0.22
40	使团	177	0.23	growth	396	0.22
41	全球	175	0.23	law	392	0.21
42	政治	175	0.23	agreement	381	0.21
43	安全	169	0.22	projects	380	0.21
44	文化	167	0.22	action	377	0.21
45	深化	165	0.21	key	360	0.20
46	不断	164	0.21	people	352	0.19
47	开放	163	0.21	economy	351	0.19
48	人民	161	0.21	well	351	0.19
49	表示	160	0.21	regional	349	0.19
50	领导人	158	0.21	wto	347	0.19

Searching Criteria:

Minimum length: words with 3 letters and above for Corpus EU PPSP; words with 2 Chinese characters for Corpus China PPSP so that words are meaningful

Table Apx 13 Concordance of Security and Defence in Corpus China PPSP (Partial 2014)

Search 安全防制国防军事部队武...			Occurrences 312 (36.74)	Texts 18	
Index	File	Left	Node		
121	2014.pdf	报告指出中国将继续高举和平发展合作共赢的旗帜将始终不渝走	和平	发展道路将以更加积极的姿态参与国际事务发挥负责任大国作用将	
122	2014.pdf	当代中国最鲜明的特色是改革开放中国要实现现代化目标需要通过争	和平	国际环境发展自己又以自身发展维护和促进世界和平需要不断扩大同	
123	2014.pdf	方应尊重彼此根据自身情况选择的发展道路共同致力于维护世界的	和平	与稳定坚持合作共赢理念的中国为世界繁荣与发展注入强劲	
124	2014.pdf	核问题第一阶段措施达成协议中方积极支持叙利亚化学武器销毁工作决定派	海军	军舰参与叙利亚化学武器海运护航中国和欧盟都主张通过外交手段	
125	2014.pdf	为世界和平与发展作出更大贡献坚持与邻邦为善的中国为亚太地区	和平	与发展贡献更多正能量中国是世界上邻国最多的国家陆海邻国	
126	2014.pdf	疏离官的理念中俄在长达4300多公里边境线上实现了世代友好	和平	从丹东中朝边境到满洲里中俄边境从霍尔果斯中哈边境到东兴口岸	
127	2014.pdf	方建设21世纪海上丝绸之路的倡议受到广泛欢迎这些足以证明	和平	发展与合作是中国周边形势的主流毋庸讳言中国与个别国家存在	
128	2014.pdf	与合作是中国周边形势的主流毋庸讳言中国与个别国家存在一些	领土	和海洋争端我们始终通过谈判以和平方式解决希望有关	
129	2014.pdf	与个别国家存在一些领土和海洋争端我们始终通过谈判以	和平	方式解决希望有关国家能够与我们相向而行http://www.chinamission.be/	
130	2014.pdf	雪中送炭我们坚定支持欧洲一体化也期待欧方更加理解和支持中国的	和平	发展信任中国的战略走向我们希望和欧盟做更多世界中相互信任共同发展	
131	2014.pdf	/03/31就中欧全面战略伙伴关系新的战略内涵共同打画中欧	和平	增长改革文明四大伙伴关系当地时间3月31日国家主席习近平在布鲁塞尔同	
132	2014.pdf	中欧关系将中欧两大力量两大市场两大文明结合起来共同打画中欧	和平	增长改革文明四大伙伴关系为中欧合作注入新动力为世界发展繁荣	
133	2014.pdf	开展3个在中欧亚欧全球层面的合作第一中国和欧盟要	和平	伙伴关系主和平安发展道路中欧对构建多极世界格局具有重要战略共识	
134	2014.pdf	中欧亚欧全球层面的合作第一中国和欧盟要做和平伙伴带头走	和平	发展道路中欧对构建多极世界格局具有重要战略共识双方要尊重彼此	
135	2014.pdf	要尊重彼此自主选择的社会制度照顾彼此核心利益支持彼此走	和平	发展道路双方更加强在国际和地区事务中的沟通与协调共同推动	
136	2014.pdf	高度重视中欧关系支持欧洲一体化进程愿同欧方一道努力打画中欧	和平	增长改革文明四大伙伴关系推动中欧全面战略伙伴关系不断迈上新台阶深化互利	
137	2014.pdf	新兴市场国家和发展中国家整体实力增强各国相互依存和利益交融不断加深	和平	发展合作共赢成为时代潮流但世界仍然很不安宁影响世界和平与发展	
138	2014.pdf	对内全面深化改革努力实现全面建成小康社会的目标对外坚持扩大开放坚持走	和平	发展道路推动建设开放型世界经济建立以和平互信包容互鉴合作共赢	
139	2014.pdf	全面战略伙伴关系将双方各自发展提供助力并为世界的	和平	与繁荣作出重要贡献第二新时期部分中国对欧盟政策欧盟是中国走	
140	2014.pdf	与繁荣作出重要贡献第二新时期部分中国对欧盟政策欧盟是中国走	和平	发展道路推动世界多极化的重要战略伙伴是中国实现新四化和两个一	
141	2014.pdf	全面深化改革和欧洲经济复苏的进程中全面落实中欧合作2020战略规划打画	和平	增长改革文明四大伙伴关系进一步提升中欧关系的全球影响力中欧和平伙伴关系	
142	2014.pdf	打画和平增长改革文明四大伙伴关系进一步提升中欧关系的全球影响力中欧	和平	伙伴关系中国愿与欧盟一道致力于将多极世界的两大力量更紧密结合起来	
143	2014.pdf	愿与欧盟一道致力于将多极世界的两大力量更紧密结合起来带头走	和平	发展道路尊重和照顾彼此核心利益和重大关切推动国际秩序和	
144	2014.pdf	和国际体系朝着公正合理的方向发展弘扬国际关系民主化为世界各国创造	和平	稳定平等有序的发展环境中欧增长伙伴关系中国愿与欧盟一道将全球	
145	2014.pdf	交流反海盗联合演练等方面合作共同维护亚丁湾索马里海域	和平	致力于共同维护多边裁军机制的权威支持日内瓦裁谈会早日达成全面	
146	2014.pdf	谈会早日达成全面平衡的工作计划尽早开展实质性工作加强国际核	安全	努力防止外空武器化及及外太空军备竞赛维护外空和平与安全在防扩散	
147	2014.pdf	平衡的工作计划尽早开展实质性工作加强国际核安全努力防止外空	武器	化及及外太空军备竞赛维护外空和平与安全在防扩散出口管制领域加强	
148	2014.pdf	工作加强国际核安全努力防止外空武器化及及外太空军备竞赛维护外空	和平	与安全在防扩散出口管制领域加强交流与合作加强网络安全对话与	
149	2014.pdf	国际核安全努力防止外空武器化及及外太空军备竞赛维护外空和平与	安全	在防扩散出口管制领域加强交流与合作加强网络安全对话与合作推动	
150	2014.pdf	防扩散出口管制领域加强交流与合作加强网络安全对话与合作推动构建	和平	安全开放合作的网络空间通过中欧网络工作小组等平台促进中欧在打	
151	2014.pdf	出口管制领域加强交流与合作加强网络安全对话与合作推动构建和平	安全	开放合作的网络空间通过中欧网络工作小组等平台促进中欧在打击	
152	2014.pdf	次多领域合作机制夯实中欧关系发展的政治基础四扩大防务	安全	领域合作加强中欧防务安全领域各层级人员交往打画双方务实合作	
153	2014.pdf	关系发展的政治基础四扩大防务安全领域合作加强中欧防务	安全	领域各层级人员交往打画双方务实合作领域和范围完善安全政策	
154	2014.pdf	防务安全领域各层级人员交往打画双方务实合作领域和范围完善	安全	政策对话机制为逐步提升对话层级创造条件欧盟应早日解除对华军	
155	2014.pdf	欧方尊重中方在台湾问题上的重大关切反对任何形式的台湾独立支持两岸关系	和平	发展和中国和平统一大业慎重处理涉台问题欧盟及其成员国与台交往应严格	
156	2014.pdf	成员国不支持台加入仅限主权国家参加的国际组织要求欧盟及其成员国不借台武器和可	武器	和可用于军事目的的设备物资及技术不与台进行任何形式的	
157	2014.pdf	加入仅限主权国家参加的国际组织要求欧盟及其成员国不借台武器和可	军事	目的的设备物资及技术不与台进行任何形式的军事交流与	
158	2014.pdf	和可用于军事目的的设备物资及技术不与台进行任何形式的	军事	交流与合作六鼓励港澳与欧盟合作中国中央政府支持和鼓励香港	
159	2014.pdf	互助协定和中欧海关合作战略框架加强中欧海关在知识产权执法供应链	安全	与便利打击商业间谍和贸易便利化等领域的双边合作以及在多边	
160	2014.pdf	的交流不断中提高欧盟知识产权合作层次和水平加强中欧在信息	安全	尤其是网络安全方面的合作与交流第八气候变化部分能源环保水利海洋	
161	2014.pdf	扩大中欧领事合作便利双边人员往来新欧双方切实保护在欧中国公民的	安全	与合法权益为中方人员赴欧提供包括签证入境和居留在内的	
162	2014.pdf	桥梁欧洲学院诞生于第二次世界大战结束之后是人们反思战争渴望	和平	的产物人类历史总是伴随着战争魔咒第二次世界大战的惨烈促使欧洲	
163	2014.pdf	中国人民对被侵略被奴役的历史记忆犹新尤其珍惜今天的生活中国人民希望	和平	反对战争所以始终奉行独立自主的和平外交政策坚持不干涉别国内政	
164	2014.pdf	珍惜今天的生活中国人民希望和反对战争所以始终奉行独立自主的	和平	外交政策坚持不干涉别国内政也不允许别人干涉中国内政我们过去一直是	
165	2014.pdf	义市场经济民主政治先进文化和和谐社会生态文明维护社会公平正义促进人的全面发展坚持	和平	发展全面建成小康社会进而实现现代化逐步实现全体人民共同富裕独特的文化传统	
166	2014.pdf	一道在亚欧大陆架起一座友谊和合作之桥我们要共同努力建造	和平	增长改革文明四座桥梁建设更具全球影响力的中欧全面战略伙伴关系--	

Table Apx 14 Multilateral/Multilaterally/Multilateralism in Corpus EU PPSP

1	1994	to play a more active role in	multilateral	actions with a view to maintaining international
2	1994	To strengthen links with Asian countries in	multilateral	fora, and further encourage Asian participation in
3	1994	fora, and further encourage Asian participation in	multilateral	organisations. • To pursue all actions necessary
4	1994	(see Annex III, Table 1 for list).	Multilateral	Co-operation The Union is engaged in a
5	1994	active commitment to trade liberalisation within the	multilateral	system with respect for all of the
6	1994	Uruguay Round and other actions at the	multilateral	level. The Union has also sought to
7	1994	These are in conformity with the Union's	multilateral	obligations and commitments which limit their use
8	1994	large region and the weakness of the	multilateral	organisations for political consultation are all factors
9	1994	and in appropriate fora both bilateral and	multilateral,	such as the UN Commission on Human
10	1994	the path for work undertaken at the	multilateral	level, for example concerning the post Uruguay
11	1994	the post Uruguay Round agenda. Regionalism and	multilateralism.	The EU has a long-standing relation with
12	1994	they are consistent with the GATT- based	multilateral	trade system. 2. 1 • 1 Raising
13	1994	including in the field; and co-ordination in	multilateral	fora. With regard to economic co-operation, the
14	1994	both bilaterally and in the framework of	multilateral	organisations. • The Union should, in particular,
15	1995	the international community in the dialogue through	multilateral	fora such as the United Nations. The
16	1995	environment in China, have focused on the	multilateral	negotiations for China's WTO membership and on
17	1995	membership, but some could be implemented under	multilateral	surveillance over a specified period of time
18	1995	and trade reforms, helping China into the	multilateral	trade system, and achieving better market access
19	1995	• bilateral ties, and international dialogue in	multilateral	fora using cooperation to pursue the goals
20	1995	by China's trading partners, both bilaterally, and	multilaterally	in the GATT accession discussions, some improvements
21	1998	involvement of China in both regional and	multilateral	initiatives of global interest. A. 1 Upgrading
22	1998	be given to Beijing's greater involvement in	multilateral	negotiations on such issues. Europe should also
23	1998	of them. The growing demand for a	multilateral	security dialogue in East Asia provides opportunities
24	1998	in the pace and scope of further	multilateral	trade Rounds. Financial turbulence in Asia has
25	1998	EU should back up its bilateral and	multilateral	trade negotiations with concrete assistance to China
26	2000	involvement of China in both regional and	multilateral	initiatives of global interest." COM (1998) 181,
27	2000	has been reluctant to advance the ARF	multilateral	process any further, putting its traditional emphasis
28	2000	the EU has been eager to use	multilateral	fora to advance the cause of human
29	2000	to the WTO, both dialogues, bilateral and	multilateral	will be used to resolve trade issues
30	2001	1999 and the EU in May 2000,	multilateral	negotiations were concluded in September 2001. WTO
31	2001	recipient from 1992 to 1997. Other important	multilateral	donors are the Asian Development Bank and
32	2001	with the new approaches developed by most	multilateral	agencies. The analyses of the challenges and
33	2001	and the EU are signatories to several	multilateral	environmental agreements and have a mutual interest
34	2001	account. China, as a party to several	multilateral	environmental agreements (e.g. Climate Change, Biodiversity, Desertification)
35	2001	all issues of concern, in support of	multilateral	problem-solving wherever this applies on international and
36	2001	degradation. Co-operation with China, bilaterally and within	multilateral	structures such as the UN, is crucial
37	2001	Taiwan issue resolved peacefully through dialogue, – suppo	multilateral	efforts to limit arms proliferation, exports and
38	2001	landmines), – identifying ways of promoting engagement in	multilateral	security dialogues for conflict prevention on regional
39	2001	fundamental shared interest in strengthening the rules-based	multilateral	trading system. In this regard, the importance
40	2001	fruitful partnerships to promote common interests within	multilateral	environmental agreements, where feasible. • Assist China
41	2001	Asia to play a greater role in	multilateral	fora, ensuring open markets and a non-discriminatory
42	2001	the success of the open and rules-based	multilateral	trading system established under the GATT and
43	2001	early launch of a new Round of	multilateral	trade negotiations. These negotiations, on the basis
44	2001	the region. The further strengthening of the	multilateral	trading system is even more important for
45	2001	from any possible shift of emphasis from	multilateralism	towards plurilateral or bilateral trading arrangements– particularly
46	2001	political, economic or social field, both in	multilateral	institutions and in our bilateral relations. We
47	2001	redouble our efforts to enhance the open	multilateral	framework for trade and investment, to remove
48	2001	dialogue with China), and in regional and	multilateral	fora, notably in the UN and its
49	2001	rights we should strengthen our bilateral and	multilateral	dialogue with our Asian partners, encourage civil
50	2001	completion of a comprehensive new Round of	multilateral	trade negotiations, and through working for the
51	2001	who have yet to become members. A	multilateral	approach is the only realistic way forward
52	2001	instance in the continued health of the	multilateral	system, common challenges such as environmental degradation
53	2001	12.11.1999). 24 – deepening EU/Japan cooperation at the	multilateral	level, both in the WTO with the
54	2001	in the broader Asia-Pacific region. At the	multilateral	level too, there is scope for the
55	2001	relationship further. – building stronger alliances at the	multilateral	level, most particularly in the WTO, with
56	2001	its ability to promote regional stability, support	multilateralism,	raise mutual awareness, and strengthen the position
57	2001	with respect to our bilateral, regional and	multilateral	relations with Asia. More specific priorities have
58	2003	increasingly involved in world affairs, especially in	multilateral	fora, and is rapidly emerging as a
59	2003	engaged in both the new round of	multilateral	negotiations under the WTO Doha Development Agenda
60	2003	which are proliferating, can be complementary to	multilateral	liberalisation and rule-making, but only if they
61	2003	particular as regards the key role of	multilateral	organisations and systems. Through a further reinforcement
62	2003	weight, both in the bilateral and the	multilateral	context. Given its particular position as a
63	2003	China share views on the importance of	multilateral	systems and rules for global governance, which
64	2003	political dialogue has also followed up on	multilateral	efforts to limit arms proliferation, arms exports,
65	2003	with Taiwan in non-political fields, including in	multilateral	contexts, in line with the EU's 'One-China'
66	2003	common interest both in the bilateral and	multilateral	context. ! Enhance co-operation to promote multilateral systems
67	2003	and multilateral context. ! Enhance co-operation to promo	multilateral	systems and rules for global governance, particularly
68	2003	on Disarmament, and to sign and ratify	multilateral	treaties and conventions such as the Comprehensive
69	2003	of promoting a multipolar world governed by	multilateral	rules, it has an interest in a
70	2003	co-ordination related to the new round of	multilateral	negotiations under the WTO Doha Development Agenda,

71	2003	more balanced international order based on effective	multilateralism,	and wants to engage China as a
72	2003	rights and peaceful resolution of conflicts through	multilateral	mechanisms at the core of it. Its
73	2003	considered more appropriate for coverage in the	multilateral	framework. The CSP and NIP are thus
74	2003	X Norway X X X X X	Multilateral	Donors ADB X X X X X
75	2004	considered more appropriate for coverage in the	multilateral	framework. The CSP and NIP are thus
76	2004	X Norway X X X X X	Multilateral	Donors ADB X X X X X
77	2006	and contributing to a strong and effective	multilateral	system. The goal should be a situation
78	2006	to see an EN 4 EN effective	multilateral	system. But there remain divergences in values,
79	2006	China's integration into world energy markets and	multilateral	governance mechanisms and institutions, and to encourage
80	2006	dispute settlement system to ensure compliance with	multilaterally	agreed rules and obligations. Trade defence measures
81	2006	and security through a reformed and effective	multilateral	system. They should co-operate closely in the
82	2006	framework of the UN, working to find	multilateral	solutions to emerging crises, and to combat
83	2006	EN structures. This common interest, in strong	multilateralism,	peace and security should also be reflected
84	2006	its procurement market and acceding to the	multilateral	Government Procurement Agreement as soon as possible
85	2006	with China and to ensure compliance with	multilaterally	agreed rules and obligations. This is not
86	2006	relationship based on objective application of agreed	multilateral	rules. Using anti- dumping and anti-subsidy instruments
87	2006	health standards. Increasing China's engagement with the	multilateral	system China is already a major beneficiary
88	2006	with the benefits it derives from the	multilateral	trading system and to make a substantial
89	2006	cooperation in the WTO and in other	multilateral	rule- making organisations. Addressing macro- economic challenges
90	2006	Delegation also has regular contacts with important	multilateral	donor organisations such as the World Bank,
91	2006	justice and the EU's commitment to effective	multilateralism.	19 3.5 REVIEW OF PREVIOUS CO-OPERATION In
92	2006	Member States, and between the EC and	multilateral	aid organisations, is strong in form but
93	2006	the political arena, in areas such as	multilateralism	and global sustainable development, further evidence is
94	2006	(GMES). Trade policy dialogue This dialogue covers	multilateral	issues of strategic interest such as the
95	2006	China has subscribed to all the major	Multilateral	Environmental Agreements (MEAs) which, with international encouragement
96	2006	that signed international treaties on labour and	Multilateral	Environmental Agreements (ME As) be respected. Future
97	2010	the leitmotiv of China's priorities for receiving	multilateral	assistance, which over the past 30 years
98	2015	China should play a stronger role in	multilateral	financial institutions that better reflects the size
99	2015	engage as a responsible actor in the	multilateral	order; encourages the new institution to depart
100	2015	the Chinese Government to build up new	multilateral	institutions; urges the EU institutions and Member
101	2015	to ILO core labour standards and key	Multilateral	Environmental Agreements; underlines the increasing tendency of
102	2015	initiative it should be pursued in a	multilateral	way; believes that it is of the
103	2015	and regional conflicts and to attaining a	multilateral	world order that respects international law, universal
104	2015	the EU should rely on bilateral and	multilateral	cooperation in order to effectively contribute to
105	2016	for a better global governance based on	multilateralism	and on international law. Beijing is a
106	2016	is a crucial interlocutor towards a more	multilateral	and cooperative world order. We see it
107	2016	cooperate towards the same goal, within a	multilateral	framework, within the international norms and rules,
108	2016	deepen such cooperation at international level and	multilateralism.	To do so, it is crucial that
109	2016	interest in being partners for a strengthened	multilateral	system. And we cannot be conservative in
110	2016	that rather than unilateral approaches it is	multilateral	frameworks we need to strengthen. In a
111	2016	its engagement with China towards a more	multilateral	and cooperative global order. And I know
112	2016	But we are those who believe in	multilateralism	and in a system that recognises the
113	2016	and other tools at both bilateral and	multilateral	level. The EU should also continue to
114	2016	crisis settlement (be it locally or in	multilateral	fora such as the UNSC), building African
115	2016	GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND WORKING TOGETHER IN THE	MULTILATERAL	CONTEXT China wants a say in global
116	2016	EU should build on this, while promoting	multilateralism	and encouraging China to support global standards
117	2016	experience with China's resources. V.I Promoting effective	multilateralism	The EU is committed to supporting effective
118	2016	The EU is committed to supporting effective	multilateralism,	with the United Nations at its core.
119	2016	are complementary to the existing international institutions	Multilateral	decision-making should be inclusive and involve all
120	2016	the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and in	multilateral	and plurilateral trade and investment initiatives, assuming
121	2016	in particular the work towards creating a	multilateral	investment court. Additional areas where the EU
122	2016	China share a common interest in supporting	multilateralism.	The EU should work with China towards
123	2016	engaged role in the WTO and in	multilateral	and plurilateral trade and investment initiatives, assuming
124	2016	countries. The EU should advance bilateral and	multilateral	cooperation on development to support the implementation
125	2016	co-ordination, and promote practical engagement both in	multilateral	fora and on the ground, for example
126	2016	as to strengthen good governance and the	multilateral	system. In addition, the EU should seek
127	2016	in this field at both bilateral and	multilateral	level. The environment is now a top
128	2016	address global and regional challenges within the	multilateral	system. 3. The EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda
129	2016	at the World Trade Organisation and in	multilateral	and plurilateral trade and investment initiatives, assuming
130	2017	on behalf of China to free trade,	multilateralism	and sustainable development. More than ever, we
131	2017	the world managed to achieve, meaning the	multilateral	agreements in Paris on climate change and
132	2017	most powerful forces to push towards a	multilateral	system, a rules-based global governance, where we
133	2017	climate and environment-friendly and social sustainability.	Multilateral	banks, like the European Investment Bank, the
134	2017	change, common security threats, the promotion of	multilateralism,	peacekeeping and peace-building. Comprehensive discussions took place
135	2017	change, common security threats, the promotion of	multilateralism,	peacekeeping and peace-building. Comprehensive discussions took place
136	2018	aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, both	multilaterally,	e.g. in the framework of the G20,
137	2018	Organisation] as the centre of the rules-based	multilateral	trading system, and commitment to co-operate on
138	2018	remains at the centre of the rules-based	multilateral	trading system which we want to preserve
139	2018	change, common security threats, the promotion of	multilateralism,	and the promotion of open and fair
140	2018	global leadership. It shows our commitment to	multilateralism	and recognises that climate change is a

141	2018	the era of globalisation and of interdependence,	multilateralism	must be at the heart of what
142	2018	the bathwater, we must all preserve the	multilateral	system and improve it from within." President
143	2018	rules-based, transparent, non- discriminatory, open and incl	multilateral	trading system with the WTO as its
144	2018	as well as their joint commitment to	multilateralism	and the rules-based international order with the
145	2018	development. Both sides reaffirmed their commitment to	multilateralism	and the rules-based international order with the
146	2018	the rules-based, transparent, non-discriminatory, open and	multilateral	trading system with the WTO as its
147	2018	on regulatory matters and through coordination in	multilateral	fora. Similarly, the EU and China will
148	2018	Macroeconomic Dialogue as a basis for broader	multilateral	cooperation and for cooperation on issues related
149	2018	and to work together to reinforce the	multilateral	humanitarian system and its coordination mechanisms. 35.
150	2018	pillars (political, economic and social/cultural), support rule	multilateralism,	and develop connectivity cooperation based on the
151	2018	free trade and investment,1. and promoting the	multilateral	rule-based system to allow the full development
152	2018	with shared political will and mutual trust,	multilateralism	can succeed in building fair and effective
153	2018	in the Paris Agreement. Collaborating in Other	Multilateral	Fora The EU and China emphasize the
154	2018	of upfront collaboration and continued cooperation in	multilateral	energy fora, notably the G20 and the
155	2018	and scientific collaboration, underlining the benefit of	multilateral	cooperation. They reaffirm their commitment to Mission
156	2018	combine financial sources from international financial insti	multilateral	development banks and the private sector to
157	2018	in the wider bilateral relationship, and in	multilateral	fora– to create synergies and to find
158	2018	in finance International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and	Multilateral	Development Banks (MDBs) are a central component
159	2018	women and men, and defending international law,	multilateralism,	transparency and accountability. 13097/18 FCA/ik 3 ANNEX
160	2018	people-to-people connections. It should reinforce a rules-b	multilateral	international order, delivering quality infrastructure, a level
161	2018	their public and private financial institutions and	Multilateral	Development Banks. The Council also underscores the
162	2018	strengthening the EU's cooperation and coordination with	Multilateral	Development Banks, in close collaboration with the
163	2018	jobs at risk, the growing distrust in	multilateral	institutions, undermining the stability of our societies,
164	2018	universal, rules- based, open, non-discriminatory and equita	multilateral	trading system under the WTO'. As its
165	2018	would be far harder without an effective	multilateral	trade mechanism. 6. Empowerment of civil society
166	2018	common security threats and the promotion of	multilateralism;	whereas there are many areas where constructive
167	2018	EU's ETS; whereas the EU's vision for	multilateral	governance is one of a rules- based
168	2018	is more important than ever to promote	multilateralism	and a rules-based system; whereas the EU
169	2018	2015; whereas the EU insists on a	multilateral	governance structure and on non-discriminatory implementation of
170	2018	other areas of joint interest while promoting	multilateralism	and a global governance based on respect
171	2018	defend EU values and principles; stresses that	multilateralism	is one of the core EU values
172	2018	six overarching challenges of the BRI: a	multilateral	approach to BRI governance; very little local
173	2018	mitigation of climate change, in line with	multilateral	governance and international standards; 28. Supports the
174	2018	by lending its active support to the	multilateral	rules-based trading system and the WTO; believes,
175	2018	negotiations, while reiterating the need to pursue	multilateral	solutions; calls, in RR\1158776EN.docx 17/45 PE619.387v02-00 EN
176	2018	and definition of respective industrial standards in	multilateral	fora; recalls the importance of reducing government
177	2018	protectionist trade measures, and continues to urge	multilateral	cooperation in order to address the structural
178	2018	mitigation of climate change, in line with	multilateral	governance and international standards; 11. Supports the
179	2018	by lending its active support to the	multilateral	rules-based trading system and the WTO; believes,
180	2018	negotiations, while reiterating the need to pursue	multilateral	solutions; calls, in this respect, for the
181	2018	and definition of respective industrial standards in	multilateral	fora; recalls the importance of reducing government
182	2018	protectionist trade measures and continues to urge	multilateral	cooperation in order to address the structural
183	2019	time pursue deeper engagement on global and	multilateral	issues, including reform of the World Trade
184	2019	rules-based, transparent, non- discriminatory, open and incl	multilateral	trading system with the World Trade Organisation
185	2019	which can be decisive for ensuring effective	multilateral	responses to global challenges. EU-China cooperation has
186	2019	II. Cooperating with China to support effective	multilateralism	and fight climate change The EU is
187	2019	same time, China's engagement in favour of	multilateralism	is sometimes selective and based on a
188	2019	The EU is committed to supporting effective	multilateralism	with the United Nations at its core.
189	2019	Security Council and a beneficiary of the	multilateral	system, China has the responsibility to support
190	2019	Development Assistance donor and a partner in	multilateral	fora. In this respect, we should establish
191	2019	Trade Organisation is the cornerstone of the	multilateral	trading system but its rules need to
192	2019	and their citizens. The EU will support	multilateral	efforts, notably in the G20 context, to
193	2019	European Union. We pursue strong bilateral and	multilateral	cooperation on files where we share interests,

Table Apx 15 Concordance of "Multipolar" and "Multipolarity" in Corpus EU PPSP

Corpus: Corpus EU PPSP Search Term: multipolar Occurrences: 8 (0.28) Texts: 4/15							
Index	File	Left	Node	Right			
1	2003	and its political objective of promoting a	multipolar	world governed by multilateral rules, it has			
2	2003	EU visibility. China's geopolitical vision of a	multipolar	world, and the Chinese perception of the			
3	2011	This reflects China's interests in supporting global	multipolarity	and resisting perceived US hegemony			
4	2015	Partnership, which is so necessary in a	multipolar	and globalised world, and to speed up			
5	2016	as one of the poles of the	multipolar	system and of the multipolar order. I			
6	2016	of the multipolar system and of the	multipolar	order. I have the impression sometimes that			
7	2016	that we still have poles in the	multipolar	system. But we are those who believe			
8	2016	as a more balanced partner in a	multipolar	world, although regional security in the Asia-Pacific			
9	2018	the context of a complex, globalised and	multipolar	world where China has become a significant			

Table Apx 16 Collocations of “China Should” in the Reference of “China Should” in Corpus EU PPSP (Full List)

Index	Stat (01 - Freq)	Collocate	Stat	Freq (coll.)	Freq (corpus)
1	L	the	144	144	557
2	L	and	122	122	408
3	R	to	68	68	268
4	R	of	64	64	249
5	R	in	62	62	244
6	L	a	37	37	155
7	L	eu	37	37	130
8	R	reference	29	29	68
9	R	be	27	27	75
10	L	coverage	27	27	78
11	R	on	24	24	92
12	L	with	24	24	98
13	L	for	21	21	71
14	R	its	21	21	66
15	L	as	20	20	61
16	L	that	20	20	54
17	L	china	19	19	205
18	L	should	17	17	113
19	L	global	13	13	45
20	L	developme	12	12	39
21	R	issues	12	12	21
22	L	policy	11	11	26
23	L	internation	10	10	39
24	M	•	10	10	17
25	R	at	9	9	22
26	R	by	9	9	45
27	L	economic	9	9	39
28	R	economy	9	9	19
29	L	from	9	9	34
30	L	more	9	9	33
31	L	world	9	9	22
32	R	co-operati	8	8	26
33	R	key	8	8	15
34	R	work	8	8	19
35	L	all	7	7	21
36	L	an	7	7	26
37	L	chinese	7	7	27
38	R	cooperatio	7	7	31
39	L	dialogue	7	7	12
40	L	eu's	7	7	14
41	L	investmen	7	7	26
42	L	is	7	7	69
43	R	open	7	7	17
44	R	sustainable	7	7	22
45	L	trade	7	7	28
46	L	4	6	6	13
47	L	approach	6	6	11
48	L	engageme	6	6	14

49	L	europe	6	6	24
50	L	human	6	6	24
51	R	including	6	6	12
52	L	interests	6	6	13
53	R	new	6	6	14
54	L	other	6	6	25
55	M	reform	6	6	15
56	R	take	6	6	6
57	R	together	6	6	11
58	R	wto	6	6	21
59	L	2	6	6	13
60	L	2	5	5	20
61	R	5	5	5	8
62	R	also	5	5	26
63	L	climate	5	5	12
64	R	ensure	5	5	12
65	R	fair	5	5	7
66	L	it	5	5	32
67	R	markets	5	5	11
68	R	migration	5	5	8
69	L	order	5	5	15
70	R	own	5	5	6
71	R	security	5	5	19
72	R	strengthen	5	5	7
73	R	support	5	5	21
74	R	these	5	5	10
75	R	towards	5	5	15
76	R	values	5	5	7

Corpus: Corpus 2| Search Term: China should| Statistic: 01 - Freq| Span: 20-20|

Collocation freq. threshold: 5.0| Statistic value threshold: 5.0|

CPN: 01 - Freq (5.0)/ L20-R20/ C: 5.0-NC: 5.0|

Table Apx 17 Collocations of "China Should" in the Reference of
"China Should" in Corpus EU PPSP (Revised List)

Index	Stat (01 - Freq)	Collocate	Stat	Freq (coll.)	Freq (corpus)
1	L	eu	37	37	130
2	R	reference	29	29	68
3	L	coverage	27	27	78
4	L	china	19	19	205
5	L	should	17	17	113
6	L	global	13	13	45
7	L	development	12	12	39
8	R	issues	12	12	21
9	L	policy	11	11	26
10	L	international	10	10	39
11	L	economic	9	9	39
12	R	economy	9	9	19
13	L	world	9	9	22
14	R	co-operation	8	8	26
15	R	key	8	8	15
16	R	work	8	8	19
17	L	chinese	7	7	27
18	R	cooperation	7	7	31
19	L	dialogue	7	7	12
20	L	eu's	7	7	14
21	L	investment	7	7	26
22	R	open	7	7	17
23	R	sustainable	7	7	22
24	L	trade	7	7	28
25	L	approach	6	6	11
26	L	engagement	6	6	14
27	L	europe	6	6	24
28	L	human	6	6	24
29	R	including	6	6	12
30	L	interests	6	6	13
31	R	new	6	6	14
32	M	reform	6	6	15
33	R	take	6	6	6
34	R	together	6	6	11
35	R	wto	6	6	21
36	L	climate	5	5	12
37	R	ensure	5	5	12
38	R	fair	5	5	7
39	R	markets	5	5	11
40	R	migration	5	5	8
41	L	order	5	5	15
42	R	security	5	5	19
43	R	strengthen	5	5	7
44	R	support	5	5	21
45	R	values	5	5	7

Table Apx 18 Concordance of “need to” (要) in Corpus China PPSP

Corpus: Corpus China PPSP Search Term: 要 Occurrences: 108 (12.72) Texts: 16/18				
Index	File	Left	Node	Right
1	1994.pdf	和技术转让的重点可持续发展不仅	要	考虑当前发展的需要也应为
2	1994.pdf	之三十六下降到百分之二十三最终	要	降到发展中国家的一般水平
3	1998.pdf	新月异经济全球化趋势不断发展各国人民	要	和平谋稳定促合作求发展的呼
4	1998.pdf	扩大共同利益的汇合点总之我们	要	面向未来建立和发展跨世纪的
5	1998.pdf	物价稳定和人民币汇率稳定我们	要	适当扩大国内需求充分发挥国内市场潜力
6	1998.pdf	贸易提高利用外资的水平我们	要	加大改革力度加快建立社会主义市场
7	2001.pdf	贫富差距和数字鸿沟拉大亚欧国家	要	顺应世界发展的潮流积极应对
8	2001.pdf	存在巨大潜力和广阔前景我们	要	加强对国际和地区问题以及联合国
9	2002.pdf	也有利于维护世界和平促进共同发展我们	要	采取更实质性的步骤携手共创
10	2004.pdf	突出面对新的机遇和挑战我们	要	坚持相互尊重平等互利互不干涉内政的原则
11	2004.pdf	会议更紧密经济伙伴关系宣言我们	要	充分利用亚欧会议现有对话
12	2004.pdf	继续致力于消除贸易壁垒改善投资环境	要	充分发挥亚欧工商论坛作用加强政府
13	2008.pdf	促进世界经济增长的重要力量我们	要	齐心协力向世界展示信心团结与
14	2008.pdf	公正有效的国际金融体系我认为一	要	增加发展中国家在国际金融组织中的
15	2008.pdf	合理的全球金融救助机制我们	要	认真吸取金融危机的教训处理好三个
16	2008.pdf	是金融创新与金融监管的关系	要	根据需求和可能稳步推进金融创新
17	2008.pdf	虚拟经济与实体经济的关系	要	始终重视实体经济的发展使
18	2008.pdf	一个大陆的亚欧国家更是如此我们	要	坚持对话合作互利共赢赢的正确方向
19	2008.pdf	在当前金融危机的形势下	要	特别防止贸易和投资保护主义亚欧
20	2008.pdf	创造良好条件坚持以人为本推动可持续发展	要	积极推进国际发展合作加大减贫
21	2008.pdf	的理念维护粮食安全促进救灾合作	要	高度重视农业发展将粮食安全放在发展
22	2008.pdf	才能富强亚欧大陆才能兴旺我们	要	继承和发扬亚欧文化交流的传统
23	2008.pdf	就是政治互信和互利合作	要	相互促进战略性就是双方要从全局
24	2009.pdf	提高业务水平但更重要的是媒体记者	要	走入对方社会同各界人士进行
25	2009.pdf	单方面强调自己的感受想法也	要	更多地了解对方的情况聆听
26	2009.pdf	应成为全球新秩序的支柱之一	要	着眼有益于欧系欧中关系发展
27	2009.pdf	其美美人之美意思是说人们不仅	要	懂得欣赏自己创造的美还要会
28	2009.pdf	中国驻欧盟使团团长宋哲日前表示	要	实现中欧关系长期健康稳定发展须
29	2009.pdf	加强合作伙伴关系指中欧	要	相互尊重平等互利照顾彼此重大关切
30	2009.pdf	仍然大成就是一个发展中国家	要	解决好中国国内的问题实现
31	2010.pdf	欧洲一体化进程高度重视对欧关系中欧	要	相向而行加强政治对话增进战略
32	2010.pdf	新的内涵和体现一方面我们强调	要	实现人与自然的和谐相处减少
33	2010.pdf	监督权还有一方面我们在国际上	要	推动建设和谐世界中国是24
34	2010.pdf	摩擦双方应保持理智的心态	要	着眼于立足于整体追求系统整体的
35	2010.pdf	中欧关系的发展发挥独特的重	要	作用张立荣表示欧洲学院选择
36	2010.pdf	习近平当日在欧洲学院发表了重	要	演讲并成功结束访欧之行习近平
37	2010.pdf	将为世界带来新的发展机遇中欧	要	建设改革进步之桥把中欧两大
38	2010.pdf	的空间和前景更加广阔我们	要	把握机遇顺应形势从战略
39	2010.pdf	的成果促进世界经济稳定复苏同时	要	着眼长远推动经济结构性改革逐步
40	2010.pdf	的结果共同应对重大全球性挑战	要	坚持共同但有区别的责任
41	2010.pdf	环保领域合作推动发展绿色经济	要	树立和落实互利合作多元发展
42	2010.pdf	各国特别是发展中国家的能源需求	要	携手打击恐怖主义和海盗袭击
43	2010.pdf	促进了欧亚文明的共同繁荣进步	要	充分尊重文明和宗教信仰的多样性
44	2010.pdf	在世界经济复苏的道路上我们	要	和衷共济携手并进让我们共同努力开创
45	2010.pdf	其最初的目的之一也正是	要	有效防范一国家的崛起打破均势
46	2010.pdf	还有1亿.5贫困人口中国	要	达到欧洲的水平发展道路还很
47	2011.pdf	存在一些疑虑和担忧宋哲认为	要	推动中欧关系稳步健康发展要使
48	2011.pdf	努力把握好以下六点一登高望远	要	始终着眼长远和全局从战略
49	2012.pdf	问题的努力欧洲有关国家	要	正确处理财政整顿金融稳定
50	2012.pdf	握住世界科技和产业革命的脉动	要	重点推动清洁能源生态保护空间
51	2012.pdf	起来实现共赢科技创新没有国界	要	消除技术贸易壁垒健全知识产权保护
52	2012.pdf	包容有序的国际经济秩序依然任重道远	要	深入推进国际金融体系改革当务之急是
53	2013.pdf	做出更大贡献习近平强调中欧双方	要	充分发挥领导人会晤以及多个对话机
54	2013.pdf	世界和地区安全与稳定双方	要	扩大贸易和投资合作推进

54	2013.pdf	世界和地区安全与稳定 双方	要	扩大贸易和投资合作 推进
55	2013.pdf	宏伟蓝图 下一个十年在政治领域 双方	要	加大交流 不断增进战略互信与
56	2013.pdf	下一个十年的合作 绘制宏伟蓝图 双方	要	不断增进战略互信与合作 务实
57	2013.pdf	三个目标 努力一是做到相互支持 中欧	要	理解和支持各自选择的发展
58	2013.pdf	欧中关系发展带来新的机遇 双方	要	增强互信 扩大合作 推动欧中关系
59	2014.pdf	当前中欧关系和今年双边重	要	交往 交换看法 杨大使表示中
60	2014.pdf	最鲜明的特色是改革开放中国	要	实现现代化目标 需要通过争和平
61	2014.pdf	和世界各国一道证明国强并不必然	要	称霸 中国和欧盟作为最大的
62	2014.pdf	出席还将在欧洲学院发表重	要	演讲 中方期待同欧方领导人
63	2014.pdf	中欧关系合作 共赢 赢是关键 双方	要	牢牢把握中国发展和欧洲经济复苏
64	2014.pdf	高端的多引擎合作 中欧 双方	要	尊重彼此选择的发展道路和
65	2014.pdf	共赢理念贯穿中欧合作始终 双方	要	坚持通过平等对话和友好
66	2014.pdf	中欧战略合作 前景广阔 新形势下我们	要	全面落实中欧合作 开展3个在
67	2014.pdf	多极世界 格局具有重要战略共识 双方	要	尊重彼此自主选择的社会制度 照
68	2014.pdf	要做增长 伙伴相互提供发展机遇	要	尽快谈成 谈好投资协定 启动自由
69	2014.pdf	大市场为目标 加强基础设施来 互联互通	要	坚持市场开放 携手维护多边贸易
70	2014.pdf	具有文明 属性和历史纵深 双方	要	通过平等对话交流 增进相互了解 加强
71	2014.pdf	全面战略伙伴关系实现 首个十年的重	要	发展中国与欧盟以年度领导人
72	2014.pdf	推动二十国集团作为国际经济合作主	要	论坛 在国际经济金融事务中发挥
73	2014.pdf	国家发展道路形成了中国特色社会主义 提出	要	建设社会主义市场经济 民主政治 先进文化 和谐社会
74	2014.pdf	行健君子以自强不息的思想 强调	要	苟日新 日日新 又日新在
75	2014.pdf	架起一座友谊和合作之桥 我们	要	共同努力 建造和平 增长 改革 文明
76	2014.pdf	的中欧全面战略伙伴关系- 我们	要	建设和平 增长 改革 文明 四大伙伴关系
77	2014.pdf	安理会拥有3个常任理事国 席位	要	和平 不要战争 要多边 不要单边
78	2014.pdf	常任理事国 席位要和平 不要战争	要	多边 不要单边 要对话 不要对抗
79	2014.pdf	和平 不要战争 要多边 不要单边	要	对话 不要对抗 是双方的共识
80	2014.pdf	和平发展合作 共赢 赢的道路- 我们	要	建设增长 繁荣之桥 把中欧两
81	2014.pdf	世界最重要的两大经济体 我们	要	共同坚持市场开放 加快投资 协定
82	2014.pdf	来为世界经济 增长的双引擎- 我们	要	建设 改革 进步之桥 把中欧两大
83	2014.pdf	自身改革 带动世界发展 进步- 我们	要	建设文明 共荣 荣之之桥 把中欧
84	2014.pdf	同而欧盟 强调多元一体 中欧	要	共同努力 促进人类各种文明之花 竞相
85	2014.pdf	盗等等问题上进行了有效合作 我们	要	携起手来 同全世界所有爱好和平的人们
86	2014.pdf	国内生产总值达到16.7万亿美元 中欧	要	共同坚持互利 共赢 坚持市场开放
87	2014.pdf	代表几千年来相互促进 相映生辉 我们	要	共同坚持文明 多样性 引领文明 互容
88	2014.pdf	未有未有 智者求同 愚者求异 中欧	要	本着相互尊重 平等相待 求同存异 合作 共赢
89	2014.pdf	有制度安排 这个软件支撑 我们	要	高举贸易 投资 自由化 便利化的
90	2014.pdf	动2020战略规划 中欧合作 迈上新台阶	要	全面落实好中欧合作 加紧推动投资
91	2015.pdf	必须加以珍惜 维护另一方面 我们	要	平衡推进 亚欧三大支柱 领域合作
92	2015.pdf	方达成重要共识 中欧两大力量	要	共建和平 增长 改革 文明 四大伙伴关系
93	2015.pdf	协定所有要素内容的重要性 包括	要	确保世界贸易组织第十次部长级会议
94	2015.pdf	缅怀先烈 珍视和平 开创未来 中欧	要	共同推动国社会 捍卫二战胜利
95	2017.pdf	也会带来这样那样的问题 我们	要	正视这些问题 采取措施 加以解决 减少负面影响
96	2017.pdf	正确看待相互竞争 有市场就会有竞争	要	抛弃所谓一国成功必然意味着
97	2017.pdf	符合事实 只会误导认知 贻误合作 机遇	要	鼓励良性竞争 而非恶性竞争 良性竞争
98	2017.pdf	欧盟作为世界上的两支重要力量	要	肩负维护世界和平 促进共同发展
99	2017.pdf	世界贸易组织的重要成员 中欧 双方	要	高举维护贸易 自由化和投资 便利
100	2018 comb	倡对外转嫁矛盾 更不得人心	要	实现世界的持续和平与共同发展
101	2018 comb	共享应坚持以秩序规则为基础	要	捍卫联合国宪章的宗旨和原则
102	2018 comb	开放透明 包容 共建一带一路 当然	要	遵循国际规则 和市场规律也追求
103	2018 comb	成果文件也也都明确提出开展合作	要	遵守欧盟法规 欧盟代表也多次
104	2018 comb	需求相结合 共同开展具体项目合作	要	合作形成 争取早落地 早实施
105	2019 comb	发展机遇 共同利益 远远大于分歧 双方	要	不断拓展 深化战略合作 并本着
106	2019 comb	势头推动它不断迈上新台阶 我们	要	努力增进中欧之间的政治互信
107	2019 comb	习近平主席访问欧洲期间 中欧双方同意	要	全面落实中欧合作 战略规划 打造和平 增长
108	2019 comb	外长会议上 指出 践行 多边主义	要	坚持以维护和平 促进发展为目标 多边主义

Table Apx 19 Concordance of “need to” in Corpus EU PPSP

Corpus: Corpus EU PPSP Search Term: need to Occurrences: 161 (5.54) Texts: 15									
Index	File	Left	Node	Right					
1	1994	the Union and its Member States will	need to	continue to contribute to poverty alleviation and					
2	1994	many of the region's countries on the	need to	improve the register's coverage and efficiency. At					
3	1994	Korea's attitude on nuclear inspections underlines the	need to	reinforce the efficiency and maintain the credibility					
4	1994	a bottleneck to future growth. Some countries	need to	invest heavily in mass education and the					
5	1994	steps in the right direction, but more	need to	be opened (there are none as yet					
6	1994	European Business Community in Tokyo and Seoul	need to	be supported. The role of the EBICs					
7	1994	• Supporting trade promotion. There is no	need to	duplicate Member State export efforts, but better					
8	1994	impact, the Commission and the Member States	need to	enhance their coordination. In addition, in evaluating					
9	1994	on the environment with countries in Asia	need to	be reinforced. Strong relations already exist with					
10	1995	and Macau each have distinctive characteristics which	need to	be respected. Both territories already run their					
11	1995	scourge for millions of Chinese and the	need to	feed such a huge population is at					
12	1995	lack of appropriate skills in China. We	need to	identify a coherent European contribution in education					
13	1995	policy-making and programme development, to China. We	need to	identify partners in other provinces for initiatives					
14	1995	environmental standards. Of critical importance is the	need to	integrate environmental considerations into other areas of					
15	1995	EU can best help Chinese efforts. We	need to	identify a coherent European contribution in a					
16	1995	to the development of local economies. Initiatives	need to	be in tune with the needs					
17	1995	on Chinese studies in Europe. We also	need to	review the usefulness of European Documentation Centres					
18	1998	rapid economic growth, far-reaching reforms and the	need to	preserve social cohesion. This process has potential					
19	1998	goal to be achieved, sustained efforts still	need to	be made by China to respect the					
20	1998	accession negotiations. The Commission and Member States	need to	be fully updated at all stages on					
21	1998	this Communication is that EU-funded cooperation programmes	need to	be even more closely linked with the					
22	2000	to the “one China” principle, underlining the	need to	resolve the question of Taiwan peacefully through					
23	2000	ground. The EU has repeatedly emphasised the	need to	make the dialogue more results-oriented and better					
24	2000	this Communication is that EU-funded co-operation programmes	need to	be even more closely linked with the					
25	2000	not a source of confrontation, and will	need to	involve members of the European business community					
26	2000	challenges China faces, the Commission will also	need to	define further those areas that can benefit					
27	2001	government reform should continue. The government will	need to	change to meet the demands of the					
28	2001	economy and the rule of law will	need to	be strengthened. The government sees strengthening disciplin					
29	2001	criminal law where reforms are pending. The	need to	establish a comprehensive legal framework is now					
30	2001	China provide the best evidence of the	need to	reconcile economic growth with overall sustainable development					
31	2001	Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the	need to	ensure compliance of the Chinese legislation with					
32	2001	China provide the best evidence of the	need to	reconcile economic growth with overall sustainable development					
33	2001	around large-scale national initiatives. These programmes will	need to	fit into a clear national strategy, and					
34	2001	have been significant developments in China which	need to	be taken account of in re-focusing EU					
35	2001	stronger, reflecting a mutual recognition of the	need to	clarify differences and identify ways of moving					
36	2001	Prodi and Prime Minister Zhu on the	need to	strengthen co-operation in this area, not least					
37	2001	pollution and climate change. Having detected the	need to	care for the natural environment in order					
38	2001	the size of the country and the	need to	reach people at the regional, municipal and					
39	2001	region over the previous decades, and the	need to	ensure an effective and proactive EU presence					
40	2001	between India and Pakistan (and the imperative	need to	encourage progress towards nuclear disarmament, and the					
41	2001	global partnerships, as well as to the	need to	further strengthen our relations with key ASEAN					
42	2003	China, and in global affairs– create the	need to	take the partnership forward. In the EU,					
43	2003	development, and severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS),	need to	be addressed. Moreover, the sluggish state of					
44	2003	China policy. China, on its side, will	need to	ensure that all branches and levels of					
45	2003	at the United Nations, while stressing the	need to	safeguard the human rights of ethnic minorities					
46	2003	weighed down in the short-term by the	need to	maintain economic stimulus and in the long					
47	2003	and in the long term by the	need to	improve social welfare. Economic and trade relations					
48	2003	dialogue across the board has shown the	need to	streamline and further develop the current institutional					
49	2003	to be addressed, and there is a	need to	work towards balanced regional economic growth. An					
50	2003	the medium to long-term perspective. • The	need to	develop a clearly targeted action. To this					
51	2003	to maximise project impact, and • The	need to	assist China to develop a regional Asian					
52	2003	The Government is increasingly conscious of the	need to	involve civil society in the process of					
53	2003	had the same effect. New development concepts	need to	be developed which take account of externalities,					
54	2003	improved significantly and efforts in this regard	need to	be continued. However, there is also a					
55	2003	be continued. However, there is also a	need to	develop new policies and instruments to deal					
56	2003	invested in environmental improvement but the resources	need to	be used more efficiently and effectively. Government					
57	2003	We should also take account of the	need to	focus on a very limited number of					
58	2003	need for a focused approach, and the	need to	maximise programme impact. In response, I and					
59	2004	to be addressed, and there is a	need to	work towards balanced regional economic growth. An					
60	2004	the medium to long-term perspective. • The	need to	develop a clearly targeted action. To this					
61	2004	to maximise project impact, and • The	need to	assist China to develop a regional Asian					
62	2004	The Government is increasingly conscious of the	need to	involve civil society in the process of					
63	2004	had the same effect. New development concepts	need to	be developed which take account of externalities,					
64	2004	improved significantly and efforts in this regard	need to	be continued. However, there is also a					
65	2004	be continued. However, there is also a	need to	develop new policies and instruments to deal					
66	2004	invested in environmental improvement but the resources	need to	be used more efficiently and effectively. Government					
67	2004	We should also take account of the	need to	focus on a very limited number of					
68	2004	need for a focused approach, and the	need to	maximise programme impact. In response, I and					
69	2006	including climate change, employment, migration, security– we	need to	leverage the potential of a dynamic relationship					
70	2006	sides' interests and the EU and China	need to	work together as they assume more active					
71	2006	challenges. For growth to continue, China will	need to	maintain the momentum of domestic reform and					
72	2006	In order to succeed, EU operators will	need to	develop a more thorough knowledge of the					
73	2006	raw materials and energy, illegal logging, China's	need to	improve environmental protection and statistics. When it					
74	2006	best be achieved through capacity-building, where China's	need to	innovate in order to attain sustainable development					
75	2006	social safety nets, and there is a	need to	provide improved social protection in the form					
76	2006	11th Five Year Plan, which acknowledges the	need to	address these issues, but at the same					
77	2006	solidly on mutual gains, there is a	need to	look beyond the time when development co-operation					
78	2006	November 2006 in Brussels. Civil aviation The	need to	develop a new framework for China-EU civil					
79	2006	as key global economic players and the	need to	further enhance bilateral economic relations, the European					
80	2006	a level playing field in business taxation	need to	be ensured in both the Chinese and					
81	2006	certain operational deficiencies requiring rectification: a) judges	need to	be better trained, b) costly evidence to					
82	2010	areas of the CSP and affirmed the	need to	fine-tune the MIP in line with China's					
83	2010	of DCI and ALA projects include the	need to	(a) align interventions closely with China's own					
84	2010	wages. Debates have been aired on the	need to	increase domestic consumption, with the expectation that					
85	2010	issues, including environmental issues and gender equality,	need to	be mainstreamed in the implementation of the					
86	2010	Concentration– Projects under the current CSP projects	need to	be streamlined, moving away from covering different					
87	2010	of decisions. iii) Expected results Recalling the	need to	keep the design simple and focused, a					
88	2012	internal macroeconomic imbalances within the euro zone	need to	be addressed in order to guarantee financial					
89	2012	us. We have also learned that we	need to	address together global challenges, if we want					
90	2012	With Premier Wen we agreed on the	need to	promote more investment in both directions. But					

91	2012	In this context I will stress the	need to	implement the decisions taken last year in
92	2012	area into the world economy, and the	need to	make progress in the Middle East Peace
93	2012	we must not lose from sight the	need to	secure growth and job creation. Indeed, fiscal
94	2012	the global economy, and all leading economies	need to	contribute to redressing these. As the Confucian
95	2012	both face in the medium term. We	need to	work ever more closely together on a
96	2015	infrastructure investments in Europe, and underlines the	need to	cooperate with China and other countries in
97	2015	and US-China climate change statements; stresses the	need to	cooperate in the field of energy in
98	2016	and opportunities, it is clear that we	need to	engage with the world. But this does
99	2016	engine of development and resilience. But we	need to	keep in mind that resilience is not
100	2016	it was also implemented. So we only	need to	strengthen and deepen such cooperation at international
101	2016	why our European Union insists on the	need to	address all maritime disputes in a peaceful
102	2016	unilateral approaches it is multilateral frameworks we	need to	strengthen. In a more global and contested
103	2016	and other kinds of infrastructure. China will	need to	fulfil its declared aim of making its
104	2016	of the global economic crisis demonstrates the	need to	work effectively with emerging market economies to
105	2016	States are made aware when EU interests	need to	be safeguarded. The Commission and the EEAS
106	2016	States are made aware when EU interests	need to	be safeguarded. Annual EU-China summits and high-level
107	2017	of global issues where we see the	need to	work closely together to guarantee the world
108	2017	guarantee the world order is sustained: the	need to	implement the Paris climate change agreement; and
109	2017	the Paris climate change agreement; and the	need to	work on the UN Sustainable Development Goals.
110	2017	a third element: we both recognise the	need to	support the WTO [World Trade Organisation] and
111	2017	in world affairs. The second, is the	need to	look for win-win solutions. And the third,
112	2017	where conflicts arise. In other cases, we	need to	expand and enlarge the current system of
113	2017	other partners in the world. And we	need to	work on de-radicalisation of young people especially,
114	2017	parts of the world. And we also	need to	work seriously on cutting the financing of
115	2017	or within Asia than towards Europe. We	need to	realise that this is a global phenomenon.
116	2017	move in the world as today. We	need to	understand the scale, the magnitude of the
117	2017	In order to promote productive investment we	need to	think holistically and take into account inter-continental
118	2017	the risk of misappropriation of funds. We	need to	apply global standard lending disciplines. At the
119	2017	lending disciplines. At the same time, we	need to	bring in other financial institutions and a
120	2017	business— and for their daily lives— people	need to	be able to access free and independent
121	2017	business— and for their daily lives— people	need to	be able to access free and independent
122	2018	facts are well known and do not	need to	be repeated here. As was to be
123	2018	joint projects in this field. We will	need to	create synergies between the China's Belt and
124	2018	comprehensive responses to displacement and recognise the	need to	develop tools and institutional structures accordingly. The
125	2018	The impact of climate change and the	need to	speed up a global transition to low-carbon
126	2018	Fiscal and financial sustainability of infrastructure projects	need to	be ensured to avoid the risk of
127	2018	and create growth and jobs, connectivity investments	need to	ensure market efficiency and be fiscally viable.
128	2018	competitive neutrality of this rail connection would	need to	be addressed. The EU is supporting the
129	2018	crowding in more private investment, stressing the	need to	make the most of existing instruments, starting
130	2018	to their swift implementation. It underscores the	need to	increase transport security and customs cooperation. Transport
131	2018	in this regard. It also underscores the	need to	move towards the long-term decarbonisation in air
132	2018	of energy connectivity, the Council highlights the	need to	address climate change, in line with the
133	2018	trade and investment agreements. It underlines the	need to	pursue better possibilities to allow business to
134	2018	Plan of Action on Iran. We also	need to	be determined in promoting and protecting key
135	2018	and opportunities posed by migration, and the	need to	work together in forging an effective global
136	2018	the security environment in our regions, the	need to	uphold international law, the global non-proliferation regime
137	2018	there are issues of corruption here, these	need to	be tackled directly. 4.4.4. The EECS is
138	2018	and the EU's proposed trans- port corridors	need to	become fully aligned, not least where possible
139	2018	global infrastructure, and finds that all SDGs	need to	be taken into consideration in the context
140	2018	to be beneficial to both sides, they	need to	deliver mutual benefit and to be transparent,
141	2018	marine resources). 5.4.1. Many other SDGs also	need to	be taken into account, notably Goal 5
142	2018	policy and that EU public diplomacy efforts	need to	be strengthened in the light of this
143	2018	be resolved through negotiations, while reiterating the	need to	pursue multilateral solutions; calls, in RR\1158776EN.docx 17/4
144	2018	China 2025' strategy, in view of the	need to	restructure our production sectors towards intelligent manufactu
145	2018	PRC as the chief concern; reiterates the	need to	ensure protection for the European knowledge-based economy;
146	2018	effective progress to this end; reiterates the	need to	cooperate further in the field of sanitary
147	2018	does not finance armed conflict; emphasises the	need to	prevent conflict minerals from being processed in
148	2018	be resolved through negotiations, while reiterating the	need to	pursue multilateral solutions; calls, in this respect,
149	2018	China 2025' strategy, in view of the	need to	restructure our production sectors towards intelligent manufactu
150	2018	PRC as the chief concern; reiterates the	need to	ensure protection for the European knowledge-based economy;
151	2018	effective progress to this end; reiterates the	need to	cooperate further in the field of SPS
152	2018	does not finance armed conflict; emphasises the	need to	prevent conflict minerals from being processed in
153	2019	be honest with each other when we	need to	be or when progress is slower than
154	2019	we can do a lot better. We	need to	find a better balance and level of
155	2019	in third countries. There is a real	need to	partner up and deliver the significant resources
156	2019	the clean energy transition, with whom we	need to	continue developing a strong relationship, given the
157	2019	the multilateral trading system but its rules	need to	be modernised and some gaps must be
158	2019	will be essential for our future and	need to	be fully secure. 5G networks will provide
159	2019	be honest with each other when we	need to	be or when progress is slower than
160	2019	we can do a lot better. We	need to	find a better balance and level of
161	2019	implementation of decisions taken and stressed the	need to	step up common work on the joint


Table Apx 20 Collocation of Human Rights in Corpus EU PPSP

Corpus: Corpus EU PPSP			
Index Stat (01-Freq)	Collocate	Freq (coll.)	Freq (corpus)
7 R	china	79	3094
8 R	dialogue	72	706
10 L	law	70	394
11 L	respect	46	173
12 M	with	42	2602
14 L	eu-china	34	714
16 R	rule	31	217
17 R	eu	30	2304
19 R	situation	29	122
20 L	democracy	28	67
21 L	international	27	625
23 L	rights	25	664
26 R	issues	23	532
29 R	economic	22	1062
31 L	european	20	1124
32 R	including	20	408
34 R	development	18	1047
36 L	protection	18	250
37 L	governance	16	262
38 R	freedoms	15	33
39 R	human	15	625
40 R	through	15	451
41 R	defenders	14	18
42 L	good	14	180
43 L	promotion	14	83
45 R	facility	13	46
46 R	fundamental	13	47
47 L	political	13	449
50 M	standards	12	241
51 L	support	12	602
52 L	co-operation	11	718
54 R	security	11	435
56 R	dialogues	10	167
57 L	initiative	10	91
58 R	key	10	360
59 R	mechanisms	10	60

Table Apx 21 Collocation of Human Rights in Corpus China PPSP

Corpus: Corpus China PPSP				
Index	Stat (01 - Freq)	Collocate	Freq (coll.)	Freq (corpus)
1	L	对话	7	283
2	R	发展	6	729
4	L	问题	6	150
5	L	促进	5	254
6	R	开展	5	102
7	R	中国	4	1017
8	L	中欧	4	1486
9	L	亚欧	4	473
10	L	人权	4	25
11	M	安全	4	122
12		作用	3	128
13	L	公正	3	31
14	R	合作	3	990
15	L	基础上	3	59
16	R	客观	3	26
17	L	状况	3	4
18	L	看待	3	41
19	R	等	3	246
20	L	继续	3	107
21	R	不应	2	9
22	M	之名	2	1
23	M	交流	2	258
24	R	借	2	1
25	R	内政	2	7
26	M	和平	2	164
28	L	国际关系	2	23
29	M	地区	2	125
30	R	存在	2	45
32	M	干涉	2	4
33	M	欧洲	2	434
34	R	欧盟	2	792
35	M	相互尊重	2	56
36	L	相关	2	50
37	M	积极	2	153
38	M	稳定	2	120
39	M	繁荣	2	81
40	L	网络	2	33
41	L	重要	2	215
42	M	领域	2	290

Figure Apx 2 GDP in Nominal Numbers of China and the EU 1990-2018
Source: (The World Bank, 2020)



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